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The Bureau Exclusive: The US Government Fentanyl Case Against China, Canada, Mexico

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Canadian federal police recently busted a massive fentanyl lab with evident links to Mexico and Chinese crime networks in British Columbia.

Canada increasingly exploited by China for fentanyl production and export, with over 350 gang networks operating, Canadian Security Intelligence Service reports

As the Trump Administration gears up to launch a comprehensive war on fentanyl trafficking, production, and money laundering, the United States is setting its sights on three nations it holds accountable: China, Mexico, and Canada. In an exclusive investigation, The Bureau delves into the U.S. government’s case, tracking the history of fentanyl networks infiltrating North America since the early 1990s, with over 350 organized crime groups now using Canada as a fentanyl production, transshipment, and export powerhouse linked to China, according to Canadian intelligence.

Drawing on documents and senior Drug Enforcement Administration sources—including a confidential brief from an enforcement and intelligence expert who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter—we unravel the evolution of this clandestine trade and its far-reaching implications, leading to the standoff that will ultimately pit President Donald Trump against China’s Xi Jinping.

In a post Tuesday morning that followed his stunning threat of 25 percent tariffs against Mexico and Canada, President Trump wrote:

“I have had many talks with China about the massive amounts of drugs, in particular fentanyl, being sent into the United States—but to no avail. Representatives of China told me that they would institute their maximum penalty, that of death, for any drug dealers caught doing this but, unfortunately, they never followed through, and drugs are pouring into our country, mostly through Mexico, at levels never seen before.”

While Trump’s announcements are harsh and jarring, the sentiment that China is either lacking motivation to crack down on profitable chemical precursor sales—or even intentionally leveraging fentanyl against North America—extends throughout Washington today.

And there is no debate on where the opioid overdose crisis originates.

At a November 8 symposium hosted by Georgetown University’s Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues, David Luckey, a defense researcher at RAND Corporation, said: “The production, distribution, and use of illegally manufactured fentanyl should be thought of as an ecosystem, and the People’s Republic of China is at the beginning of the global fentanyl supply chain.”

The Bureau’s sources come from the hardline geopolitical camp on this matter. They believe Beijing is attempting to destabilize the U.S. with fentanyl, in what is technically called hybrid warfare. They explained how Canada and Mexico support the networks emanating from China’s economy and political leadership. In Canada, the story is about financial and port infiltration and control of the money laundering networks Mexican cartels use to repatriate cash from fentanyl sales on American streets.

And this didn’t start with deadly synthetic opioids, either.

“Where the drugs come from dictates control. If marijuana is coming from Canada, then control lies there,” the source explained. “Some of the biggest black market marijuana organizations were Chinese organized crime groups based in Brooklyn and Flushing, Queens, supplied from Canada.

“You had organizations getting seven or eight tons of marijuana a week from Canada, all controlled by Chinese groups,” the source said. “And we have seen black market marijuana money flowing back into Canadian banks alongside fentanyl money.”

Canada’s legal framework currently contributes to its appeal for China-based criminal organizations. “Canada’s lenient laws make it an attractive market,” the expert explained. “If someone gets caught with a couple of kilos of fentanyl in Canada, the likelihood of facing a 25-year sentence is very low.”

The presence in Toronto and Vancouver of figures like Tse Chi Lop—a globally significant triad leader operating in Markham, Ontario, and with suspected links to Chinese Communist Party security networks—underscores the systemic gaps.

“Tse is a major player exploiting systemic gaps in Canadian intelligence and law enforcement collaboration,” the source asserted.

Tse Chi Lop was operating from Markham and locations across Asia prior to his arrest in the Netherlands and subsequent extradition to Australia. He is accused of being at the helm of a vast drug syndicate known as “The Company” or “Sam Gor,” which is alleged to have laundered billions of dollars through casinos, property investments, and front companies across the globe.

Reporting by The Bureau has found that British Columbia, and specifically Vancouver’s port, are critical transshipment and production hubs for Triad fentanyl producers and money launderers working in alignment with Mexican cartels and Iranian-state-linked criminals. Documents that surfaced in Ottawa’s Hogue Commission—mandated to investigate China’s interference in Canada’s recent federal elections—demonstrate that BC Premier David Eby flagged his government’s growing awareness of the national security threats related to fentanyl with Justin Trudeau’s former national security advisor.

A confidential federal document, released through access to information, states, according to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS): “Synthetic drugs are increasingly being produced in Canada using precursor chemicals largely sourced from China.”

“Preliminary reporting by the BC Coroner’s Service confirms that toxic, unregulated drugs claimed the lives of at least 2,511 people in British Columbia in 2023, the largest number of drug-related deaths ever reported to the agency,” the record says. “CSIS identifies more than 350 organized crime groups actively involved in the domestic illegal fentanyl market … which Premier Eby is particularly concerned about.”

A sanitized summary on Eby’s concerns from the Hogue Commission adds: “On fentanyl specifically, Canada, the United States, and Mexico are working on supply reduction, including as it relates to precursor chemicals and the prevention of commercial shipping exploitation. BC would be a critical partner in any supply reduction measures given that the Port of Vancouver is Canada’s largest port.”

But before Beijing’s chemical narcotics kingpins took over fentanyl money laundering networks from Canada, the story begins in the early 1990s when fentanyl first appeared on American streets, according to a source with full access to DEA investigative files.

The initial appearance of fentanyl in the United States was linked to a chemist in Ohio during 1992 or 1993, they said. This illicit operation led to hundreds of overdose deaths in cities like Chicago and New York, as heroin laced with fentanyl—known as “Tango & Cash”—flooded the streets. The DEA identified and dismantled the source, temporarily removing fentanyl from the illicit market.

Fentanyl seemed to vanish from the illicit market, lying dormant.

The mid-2000s saw a resurgence, this time with Mexican cartels entering the methamphetamine and fentanyl distribution game, and individuals of Chinese origin taking up roles in Mexico City. “One major case was Zhenli Ye Gon in 2007, where Mexican authorities seized $207 million from his home in Mexico City,” The Bureau’s source said. “He was a businessman accused of being involved in the trafficking of precursor chemicals for methamphetamine production.”

Ye Gon, born in Shanghai and running a pharma-company in Mexico, was believed to be perhaps the largest methamphetamine trafficker in the Western Hemisphere. Educated at an elite university in China, he made headlines not only for his alleged narcotics activities but also for his lavish lifestyle. While denying drug charges in the U.S., he claimed he had received duffel bags filled with cash from members of President Felipe Calderón’s party—a claim that was denied by officials. His arrest also caused a stir in Las Vegas, where Ye Gon was a “VIP” high roller who reportedly gambled more than $125 million, with the Venetian casino gifting him a Rolls-Royce.

Despite high-profile crackdowns, the threat of fentanyl ebbed and flowed, never truly disappearing.

Meanwhile, in 2005 and 2006, over a thousand deaths on Chicago’s South Side were traced to a fentanyl lab in Toluca, Mexico, operated by the Sinaloa Cartel. After the DEA shut it down, fentanyl essentially went dormant again.

A new chapter unfolded in 2013 as precursor chemicals—mainly N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP) and 4-anilinopiperidine (4-ANPP)—began arriving from China. This is when fentanyl overdoses started to rise exponentially in Vancouver, where triads linked to Beijing command money laundering in North America.

“These chemicals were entering Southern California, Texas, and Arizona, smuggled south into Mexico, processed into fentanyl, and then brought back into the U.S., often mixed with Mexican heroin,” the U.S. government source explained.

At the time, a kilo of pure fentanyl cost about $3,000. By 2014, it was called “China White” because heroin was being laced with fentanyl, making it far more potent. In February 2015, the DEA issued its first national alert on fentanyl and began analyzing the role of Chinese organized crime in the fentanyl trade and related money laundering.

The profitability and efficiency of fentanyl compared to traditional narcotics like heroin made it an attractive commodity for drug cartels.

By 2016, fentanyl was being pressed into counterfeit pills, disguised as OxyContin, Percocet, or other legitimate pharmaceuticals. Dark web marketplaces and social media platforms became conduits for its distribution.

The merging of hardcore heroin users and “pill shoppers”—individuals seeking diverted pharmaceuticals—into a single user population occurred due to the prevalence of fentanyl-laced pills. This convergence signified a dangerous shift in the opioid crisis, broadening the scope of those at risk of overdose.

The profitability for traffickers was staggering. One pill could sell for $30 in New England, and Mexican cartels could make 250,000 pills from one kilo of fentanyl, which cost around $3,000 to $5,000. This was far more lucrative and efficient than heroin, which takes months to cultivate and process.

This shift marked a significant turning point in the global drug trade, with synthetic opioids overtaking traditional narcotics.

By 2016, entities linked to the Chinese state were entrenched in Mexico’s drug trade. Chinese companies were setting up operations in cartel-heavy cities, including mining companies, import-export businesses, and restaurants.

“The growth of Chinese influence in Mexico’s drug trade was undeniable,” the source asserted.

Recognizing the escalating crisis, the DEA launched Project Sleeping Giant in 2018. The initiative highlighted the role of Chinese organized crime, particularly the triads, in supplying precursor chemicals, laundering money for cartels, and trafficking black market marijuana.

“Most people don’t realize that Chinese organized crime has been upstream in the drug trade for decades,” the U.S. expert noted.

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit in 2020, drug trafficking organizations adapted swiftly. With borders closed and travel restricted, cartels started using express mail services like FedEx to ship fentanyl and methamphetamine.

This shift highlighted the cartels’ agility in exploiting vulnerabilities and adapting to global disruptions.

By 2022, the DEA intensified efforts to combat the fentanyl epidemic, initiating Operation Chem Kong to target Chinese chemical suppliers.

An often-overlooked aspect of the drug trade is the sophisticated money laundering operations that sustain it, fully integrated into China’s economy through triad money brokers. Chinese groups are now the largest money launderers in the U.S., outpacing even Colombian groups.

“We found Chinese networks picking up drug money in over 22 states,” the source explained. “They’d fly one-way to places like Georgia or Illinois, pick up cash, and drive it back to New York or the West Coast.”

Remarkably, these groups charged significantly lower fees than their Colombian counterparts, sometimes laundering money for free in exchange for access to U.S. dollars.

This strategy not only facilitated money laundering but also circumvented China’s strict currency controls, providing a dual benefit to the criminal organizations.

They used these drug-cash dollars to buy American goods, ship them to China, and resell them at massive markups. Chinese brokers weren’t just laundering fentanyl or meth money; they also laundered marijuana money and worked directly with triads. Operations like “Flush with Cash” in New York identified service providers moving over $1 billion annually to China.

But navigating the labyrinth of Chinese criminal organizations—and their connectivity with China’s economy and state actors—poses significant challenges for law enforcement.

“The challenge is the extreme compartmentalization in Chinese criminal groups,” the U.S. expert emphasized. “You might gain access to one part of the organization, but two levels up, everything is sealed off.”

High-level brokers operate multiple illicit enterprises simultaneously, making infiltration and dismantling exceedingly difficult.

The intricate tapestry of Chinese fentanyl trafficking highlights a convergence of international criminal enterprises exploiting systemic vulnerabilities across borders. The adaptability of these networks—in shifting trafficking methods, leveraging legal disparities, and innovating money laundering techniques—poses a formidable challenge to Western governments.

The leniency in certain jurisdictions including Canada not only hinders enforcement efforts but also incentivizes criminal activities by reducing risks and operational costs.

As the United States prepares to intensify its crackdown on fentanyl networks, having not only politicians and bureaucrats—but also the citizens they are serving—understand the importance of a multifaceted and multinational counter strategy is critical, because voters will drive the political will needed.

And this report, sourced from U.S. experts, provides a blueprint for other public interest journalists to follow.

“This briefing will help you paint the picture regarding Chinese organized crime, the triads, CCP, or PRC involvement with the drug trade and money laundering—particularly with precursor chemicals and black market marijuana,” the primary source explained.

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Alberta

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Harshanedeep Singh from rozanaspokesman.com

News release from the Conservative Party of Canada

After nine years, the NDP-Liberal government has lost control of crime. Violent crime has skyrocketed by 50 percent since Trudeau became Prime Minister and 256 people were killed by a criminal who was out on bail or another form of release in 2022, the latest year available with full data.

On Saturday, Canadians witnessed the shocking, heinous murder of Harshandeep Singh, a 20-year-old security guard in Edmonton, Alberta. Singh was shot in the back while thanklessly doing his job as a nighttime security guard at a central Edmonton apartment building. A promising young life was snuffed out by a cold-blooded monster.

“One cannot imagine how Harshandeep’s family and friends feel,” said Tim Uppal, Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. “Our thoughts and prayers go out to his family at this incredibly difficult time.”

Edmonton Police have since arrested two individuals and charged them with first degree murder: “Evan Rain, 30, and Judith Saulteaux, 30, were arrested and charged with 1st degree murder in relation to Singh’s death.”

Early indications suggest that Rain has a known prior violent history, with media reports aligning with Rain’s current age. In 2018, an “Evan Chase Francis Rain”, then age 24, was charged for a violent kidnapping in Wetaskiwin, one hour south of Edmonton. A woman was forced into the trunk of a car at gunpoint. It is not clear from media reports how this case was concluded.

In 2022, “Evan Rain, 28, of Paul First Nation” (45 minutes west of Edmonton) faced twenty-nine charges for a violent robbery in northern Saskatchewan involving firearms.

This is from the 2022 RCMP news release at the time:

Evan Rain, 28, of Paul First Nation, is charged with:

-one count, robbery, Section 344, Criminal Code;
-one count, have face masked with intent to commit an indictable offence, Section 351(2), Criminal Code;
-eight counts, possess a firearm knowing it was obtained by the commission of an offence, Section 96(2), Criminal Code;
-one count, possession of property obtained by the commission of an offence, Section 354(1)(a), Criminal Code;
-one count, mischief under $5,000, Section 430(4), Criminal Code;
-sixteen counts, possess a firearm while prohibited, Section 117-01(3), Criminal Code; and
-one count, point a firearm, Section 87(2), Criminal Code.

The status of these charges is not readily apparent. The RCMP’s 2022 news release does make clear that Rain was already prohibited from possessing firearms: “sixteen counts, possess a firearm while prohibited, Section 117-01(3).”

“It appears that our so-called ‘justice’ system terribly failed Harshandeep Singh – just as it has outrageously failed so many others,” said Uppal. “Harshandeep Singh’s murder cannot be accepted as just an unfortunate, unavoidable reality in our society. Authorities should answer to Rain’s prior police interactions and potential criminal history, including whether he was out on bail or some other form of release order.”

Life wasn’t like this before Justin Trudeau. Since the NDP-Liberal government passed Bill C-75 and Bill C-5, which gave high priority to releasing repeat violent offenders and took away mandatory jail time for certain violent crimes, a crime wave has been unleashed across the country. This was evident in a report from the Fraser Institute which showed that Canada’s violent crime rate is 14 percent higher than that of the United States’.

Trudeau’s only response to this has been to crack down on law-abiding firearms owners and Indigenous hunters which has done nothing to improve Canada’s public safety. Instead, violent gun crime is up by a staggering 116 percent since the Liberals formed government.

Enough is Enough. Canadians deserve to feel safe in their communities. Only Common Sense Conservatives will bring home safe streets by ending Justin Trudeau’s catch-and-release justice system and bringing jail, not bail, for repeat violent offenders.

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Canada can – and should – crack down on trade-based money laundering

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Jamie Ferrill for Inside Policy

Neglecting to take decisive action enables organized criminal networks whose activities cause significant harm on our streets and those of our international partners.

Financial crime bears considerable political and economic risk. For the incoming Trump administration, the threat that transnational organized crime and the illicit financial flows pose to global financial stability is a top priority. The threat of tariffs by the Trump administration makes the costs to Canada in enabling global financial crime all too apparent. In addition to the cost of tariffs themselves, the associated reputational risk and loss of confidence in Canada’s financial system has implications for investments, credit, supply chains, and bilateral co-operation and agreements.

Canada’s proximity to major international markets, stable economy, high standard of living, and strong institutions and frameworks make it an attractive place to do business: for both legitimate and criminal enterprises.

Trade is a key contributing sector for Canada’s economic security. It represents two-thirds of Canada’s GDP, and exports alone support nearly 3.3 million Canadian jobs. Trade is also highly vulnerable to criminal exploitation. Ineffective oversight, regulatory complexity, and lagging technology adoption, coupled with a lack of export controls, make it possible to move vast proceeds of crimes, such as those from drug trafficking, human trafficking, corruption, and tax evasion through the global trade system.

These vulnerabilities are well-known by transnational organized crime groups. They are able to effectively move billions of dollars of dirty money through the global trade system every year, a method commonly referred to as Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML).

While any statistics must be interpreted with caution, evidence shows that TBML is a prevalent method of money laundering.

What is it?

There are several types of Trade-Based Financial Crimes such as terrorism financing through trade, sanctions evasion, and simply trade fraud. However, the TBML definition is necessarily specific. Essentially here, TBML is a money laundering method: the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. TBML involves the movement of value through the global trade system to obfuscate the illicit origin. This is usually done through document fraud: undervaluing, overvaluing, phantom shipping, or multiple invoicing. Different techniques employ different aspects of the supply chain. And TBML may be just one method used within larger money laundering operations.

By way of example, US authorities allege that two Chinese nationals living in Chicago laundered tens of millions of dollars for the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels. Drugs were smuggled into the United States and sold throughout the country. The proceeds from these sales were collected by the Chinese nationals. Those proceeds were used to purchase bulk electronics in the United States, which were then shipped – with a falsified value – to co-conspirators in China, who sold them locally. The legitimacy provided by the electronics sales and the trade transaction provide cover to “clean” proceeds from precursor crime.

Either the importer and/or the exporter of the goods can shift value. Chances here are the electronics shipped were undervalued: on leaving the country, they are declared at a (much) lower value than they are actually worth. The importer in China pays the undervalued invoice, then sells the goods for what they are worth. The profit from those electronics now appears clean, since it was used for a “legitimate” sale. The ensuing value gap can be transferred informally or stored as illicit wealth. The value has now shifted, without fiat currency leaving the country of origin.

But the cycle does not stop there. The value and money itself continue to traverse around the world, through various intermediaries such as financial institutions or cryptocurrency exchanges. It then goes right back into the system and enables the very crimes and organized crime groups that generated it in the first place. It is, in short, the business model of organized crime.

The Canadian problem

Ultimately, the proceeds of crime that have been legitimised through TBML (and other money laundering methods) supports the criminal enterprises that generated the value in the first place. In the example, these are prolific cartels who have been behind the fentanyl crisis, migrant trafficking and abuse, corruption, and widespread violence that destabilizes communities and undermines governments across North America and beyond.

With new actors, drug routes, and ways of doing business, the cartels are very much active in Canada. The Sinaloa cartel in particular has established a significant presence in Canada where it controls the cocaine market, manufactures and distributes fentanyl, and is embedded in local criminal networks. This increases Canada’s role as a strategic location for drug trafficking and a base to export abroad, notably to Europe, the US, and Australia.

Hells Angels, Red Scorpions, ’Ndrangheta, and other organized crime groups are also exploiting Canada’s strategic location using their transnational links. These groups are active in criminal activities that generate proceeds of crime, which they launder through Canadian institutions. From drug trafficking to extortion to human and sex trafficking, the foundation of organized crime relies on generating and maximizing profits. The proceeds generally need to be laundered; otherwise, there are direct lines back to the criminal organizations. They are, without a doubt, exploiting the trade sector; the very sector that provides so much economic security for Canada.

Canada’s regulation, reporting, and prosecution record for money laundering is notoriously weak. Its record for regulation, reporting, and prosecution for trade-based financial crimes, namely here TBML, is even weaker.

As financial institutions and other regulated entities face increased scrutiny following the TD Bank scandal and the Cullen Commission’s inquiry into money laundering in BC, more criminal activity is likely to be displaced into the trade sector and the institutions it comprises.

TBML is difficult for financial institutions to detect, especially given that 80 per cent of trade is done through open accounts. It exploits established trade structures that are meant to protect the system –like documentation and invoicing processes – by manipulating transactions outside traditional payment systems, which requires more sophisticated anti-money laundering strategies to address these hidden vulnerabilities.

Addressing the problem

Trade is a gaping vulnerability. Yet, it attracts minimal attention in countering transnational financial crime. Containing the fentanyl crisis for one requires a collaborative effort to bolster supply chains and the trade sector against financial crime. This means global cooperation, technological advances (such as blockchain technology), appropriate resourcing, more scrutiny on high-risk countries and shippers, and regulatory innovation.

But political will is in short supply. The federal government’s Budget 2024 and the resulting proposed Regulations Amending Certain Regulations Made Under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorism Financing Act will grant CBSA new authorities to counter TBML, but limited resources to make good on them. And CBSA cannot do it alone.

Transnational organized crime and the illicit financial flows that support it poses a threat to global financial stability. The enabling of financial crime hurts Canada’s reputation abroad. With a new political regime emerging in the US, Canada cannot afford to be seen as a weak link. Loss of confidence in a country and its financial system has implications for investments, credit, supply chains, and bilateral cooperation and agreements.

By neglecting to take decisive action, we inadvertently enable organized criminal networks whose activities cause significant harm on our streets and those of our international partners. With profits as their primary driver, it is imperative that we scrutinize financial pathways to disrupt these illicit operations effectively.

Organized crime groups are not bound by privacy laws, bureaucracy, political agendas, and government budgets. They are continually evolving and staying many steps ahead of what Canada is equipped to control: technologically, geographically, strategically, logistically, and tactically. Without appropriate regulations, technological advances, and resources in place, we will continue to be a laggard in countering financial crime.

More systematic change is needed across regulatory frameworks, law enforcement coordination and resourcing, and international partnerships to strengthen oversight, close loopholes, and enhance detection and disruption.  It would be a low-cost signal to the Trump administration that Canada is committed to upping its game.


Jamie Ferrill is senior lecturer in Financial Crime at Charles Sturt University and co-editor of Dirty Money: Financial Crime in Canada.

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