Alberta
Open letter to Canada’s Premiers calling for pivot in response, end to lockdowns
Premiers,
It has been over one full year since the declaration of the Pandemic. SARS CoV-2 has been in Canada much longer than that, as you well know.
You are responsible for the response in each of your jurisdictions. While the Medical Officers of Health (MOH) are equally responsible for the advice they have given, you personally were elected to lead. They were not.
Your own statistics prove that for people under the age of 60, SARS CoV-2 is not something to be feared. In one full year, people under the age of 60 are twice as likely to die from a heart disease. For people 20 – 40 years old, they are five times more likely to die in a car accident. Worldwide 2.54 million people die from Pneumonic annually. SARS CoV-2 has killed under 2 Million in a year. The risk from SARS CoV-2 has been widely exaggerated, by you, your MOH and the media.
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2021.625778/full
For people over 60, your approach has failed our seniors.
Canada has ranked last in the Organization of Economically Developed Countries (OECD) in care of those most at risk to SARS CoV-2. Over 96% of all reported SARS CoV-2 deaths were in our seniors. Even Canada’s Chief Medical Officer of Health admitted this is Canada’s shame.
Your use of “lockdowns” did not save over 21,000 of our seniors. It failed them.
The use of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) which we now call “lockdowns” was known to have little effect on the spread of infectious diseases long before SARS CoV-2 arrived. In fact, the World Health Organization (WHO) assembled the best infectious disease doctors in the world to write the 2019 version of “Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Measures”. If you read the document, for a Pandemic of the severity of SARS CoV-2, most of these measures were not recommended for use. Yet we used almost all of them.
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/329438/9789241516839-eng.pdf
Top infectious disease doctors in the world have proven in repeated detail peer reviewed research papers all over again that “lockdowns” do not have significant impacts on either the spread or deaths for SARS CoV-2. Yet you and the media constantly tell us they do. But one of the many in depth studies found: “While small benefits cannot be excluded, we do not find significant benefits on case growth of more restrictive NPIs. Similar reductions in case growth may be achievable with less‐restrictive interventions”.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eci.13484
What is also know is that “lockdowns” cause terrible collateral damage. The damage to Canadians Mental Health, Societal Health, Children’s Education and Social Development, Patients with other Severe Illnesses and to our National Economy (Federal and Provincial/Territorial) will continue, until you remove and promise never to inflict “lockdowns again. These impacts and deaths seem not to be considered in any cost benefit analysis by you or your MOH.
Many of the world’s experts have tried to help target the response to SARS CoV-2 to save the most vulnerable, while minimizing the effects on the rest of our population. You have ignored these experts. In fact, most of these experts have been completely censored by you, your MOH and the media.
Please read the attached Paper, “One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada”. The Paper states what we had collectively planned to do in a Pandemic, what we have done, and how to pivot out of our failed response.
It is time to stop.
Listen to all expert voices.
Pivot.
Thank you for your time.
David Redman
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired)
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada March 31, 2021
David Redman
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
Emergency Management
Pandemics happen continuously. Since 1955, this is the world’s fifth pandemic. In the next fifty-five years there is going to be five more. We have never responded to a pandemic like we responded to COVID-19.
It must be clear that a pandemic is not a Public Health Emergency, it is a Public Emergency because all areas of society are affected: public sector, private sector, not- for-profit sector, and all citizens.
In Canada, we have an Emergency Management Process that we normally use in a pandemic. We have pre-written Pandemic Response plans. These plans were written incorporating the hard lessons learned from previous pandemics.
Part of the lessons learned from previous pandemics is contained in the World Health Organization (WHO) “Non-pharmaceutical public health measures for mitigating the risk and impact of epidemic and pandemic influenza” dated 2019.
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/329438/9789241516839-eng.pdf
This document included the world’s best studies and information on the use of 15 separate non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). The use of these NPIs was discussed in the development of the existing Provincial Plans.
The 2019 WHO document was known, or should have been known, by all Medical Officers of Health in Canada. The use of each of the NPIs was dependant on the severity of the pandemic. Even in a High or Extraordinary Pandemic the use of all or most of these NPIs at the same time was not envisioned.
Prior to the use of each NPI, the Federal and Provincial/Territorial governments needed to demonstrably justify how each NPI would protect the life of Canadians. Some of the NPIs were not recommended for use in any pandemic, including:
- Contact Tracing (not recommended after first two weeks)
- Quarantine of Exposed Individuals
- Entry and Exit Screening
- Border Closures
One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada March 31, 2021
David Redman
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
Some of the NPIs were recommended for use only as a last resort, including: • Workplace Measures and Closures
Despite this, they were used as a first resort.
Some NPIs were not recommended for a pandemic with the severity of COVID-19, including:
- School Measures and Closures
- Face Masks for Public These recommendations were ignored.The lack of any attempt to publicly demonstrate a cost benefit analysis based on life and impact on lives shows a complete disregard for “Due Diligence” by both our Medical Officers of Health (MOH) and our Premiers.
In summary on NPIs, the collateral damage from the use of each NPI needed to be justified in a cost benefit analysis, showing not only what life saving could be expected, but what the short-term and long-term impact on lives would be. Further, it needed to be demonstrably shown why the WHO recommendations were ignored. This was never done for any of the NPIs invoked.
The aim of the pre-written pandemic plans is to allow our leaders to rapidly minimize the impact of a new pandemic on our society. The four goals of the pandemic plans are clearly defined:
• Controlling the spread of influenza disease and reducing illness (morbidity) and death (mortality) by providing access to appropriate prevention measures, care, and treatment.
• Mitigating societal disruption in Alberta through ensuring the continuity and recovery of critical services.
• Minimizing adverse economic impact.
• Supporting an efficient and effective use of resources during response and recovery
https://www.alberta.ca/pandemic-influenza.aspx#toc-1
The purpose in writing these plans in advance is to ensure the government could rapidly advise the public of the scope of the new hazard and publicly issue a complete written plan to address it. That way the public can see the entire plan, see the phases of the plan, and all steps that will be taken. The public understands their role in the plan. The response to the pandemic would then be coherent.
This has not happened.
One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada March 31, 2021
David Redman
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
The Canadian Response – Not Based on Emergency Management
The Canadian response to COVID-19 has been incoherent, constantly changing, and with no plan. The sole focus on COVID-19 case counts led to a completely flawed response trying to deal only with the first pandemic goal, and failing.
In February and March 2020 we knew that over 95% of the deaths in China and Europe were in seniors, over the age of 60, with multiple co-morbidities.
One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada March 31, 2021
David Redman
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
We should have immediately developed options for the protection of concentrations of our seniors over 60 with co-morbidities. Our Long Term Care (LTC) homes should have developed and offered quarantine options, for both the residents and the staff.
In our first full year of COVID-19 in Canada, 96% of our over 22,800 deaths have been in seniors, over the age of 60, with multiple co-morbidities. See Figure 5 in link below, updated weekly by Health Canada.
https://health-infobase.canada.ca/covid-19/epidemiological-summary-covid-19- cases.html
That is over 21,890 deaths. It is likely that thousands of these deaths could have been avoided, as over 80% of the deaths in the first wave occurred in LTC homes.
After one full year, we stand at 73% of the 22,880 deaths in LTC homes, 16,700 of our seniors. Our country ranked last in the OECD for protecting our seniors.
https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/canadas-nursing-homes-have-worst-record- for-covid-deaths-among-wealthy-nations-report/ar-BB1f76sw
This may have cost $2 billion, but could have saved over 16,700 lives as 73% of Canadian deaths have been in LTC homes in the first year of COVID-19. Instead we locked down healthy Canadians and our businesses and spent well over $240 billion to force over 8 million healthy Canadians to stay at home. The cost mounts daily.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/tracking-unprecedented-federal-coronavirus-spending- 1.5827045
We did not need to follow the failed lock down practice of China or Europe. Lockdowns have not saved 21,890 of our Canadian seniors. We knew who was most at risk and had time to provide the option of quarantine for our seniors, both in LTC homes and in society. Instead, we sacrificed our seniors.
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/26/world/elderly-care-homes-coronavirus-intl/index.html
In June 2020, the Canadian Institute for Health Information reported that Canada had a higher
proportion of COVID-19 deaths within LTC settings than other OECD countries included in its
comparison. At that time, deaths in Canadian LTCs from COVID-19 were at 81% of the total, while
OECD countries reported LTC COVID-19 deaths of 10-66% (average of 38%) of their totals.
The CBC News analysis has tracked $105.66 billion in federal payments to individuals; $118.37
billion that has gone to businesses, non-profits and charitable organizations; and a further
$16.18 billion in transfers to provinces, territories, municipalities and government agencies.
One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada March 31, 2021
David Redman
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
Our leaders and doctors constantly tell us we are in danger of overwhelming our medical system. If we had acted to quarantine our seniors’ long term care facilities, our hospital capacity would not have been challenged, as 71% of our hospital beds and 64% of our ICU capacity continue to this day to be filled with seniors. See Figure 5 in link below, updated daily by Health Canada.
https://health-infobase.canada.ca/covid-19/epidemiological-summary-covid-19- cases.html
We would not have needed to stop other medical procedures.
https://lfpress.com/opinion/columnists/goldstein-canadas-medical-wait-times-longest- ever-because-of-covid-19
We should never have forced healthy medical staff to self-isolate. We should have made rapid testing a priority for all orders of government.
We ignored the other three goals of our pre-existing pandemic plans:
• Mitigating societal disruption in Alberta through ensuring the continuity and recovery of critical services.
• Minimizing adverse economic impact.
• Supporting an efficient and effective use of resources during response and recovery
Ignoring these three goals and following a failed lockdown response has caused massive collateral damage in terms of deaths and long-term effects on our population. Collateral damage, largely ignored by mainstream media, includes but is not limited to:
- Societal health,
- Mental health,
- Other health conditions,
- Children’s education and social development,
- Economic healthhttps://pandemicalternative.org/ https://collateralglobal.org/
We are told that lockdowns (i.e. the persistent use of NPIs) has decreased the spread and deaths from COVID-19. Therefore, it is assumed that the collateral deaths are somehow justified. Nothing could be further from the truth.
One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada March 31, 2021
David Redman
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
We knew from the WHO 2019 NPI document cited earlier that the use of most NPIs have little effect on the spread of a virus. It was a lesson learned. Unfortunately, it had to be proved again through studies by some of the best infectious disease doctors in the world. One such study on the spread of COVID-19 is quoted:
“European Journal of Clinical Investigation
Assessing mandatory stay‐at‐home and business closure effects on the spread of
COVID‐19
Methods
We first estimate COVID‐19 case growth in relation to any NPI implementation in subnational regions of 10 countries: England, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, South Korea, Sweden and the United States. Using first‐difference models with fixed effects, we isolate the effects of mrNPIs by subtracting the combined effects of lrNPIs and epidemic dynamics from all NPIs. We use case growth in Sweden and South Korea, 2 countries that did not implement mandatory stay‐at‐home and business closures, as comparison countries for the other 8 countries (16 total comparisons).
Conclusions
While small benefits cannot be excluded, we do not find significant benefits on case growth of more restrictive NPIs. Similar reductions in case growth may be achievable with less‐restrictive interventions.”
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eci.13484
Further comment on deaths from COVID-19 and non-lockdown countries compared to lockdown countries:
https://off-guardian.org/2021/03/23/lockdown-one-year-on-it-doesnt-work-it-never- worked-it-wasnt-supposed-to-work/
COVID-19 has followed the annual seasonal infection curve almost exactly, in spite of lockdowns in our country. Our MOH and Premiers take credit for the seasons when it is in their favour and blame their citizens when seasons dictate “exponential increases”. Our Premiers and MOHs continue to abandon our Emergency Management Process and give in to fear.
One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada March 31, 2021
David Redman
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
Conclusions – An Emergency Management and Science Based Way Ahead
Canadians deserve a confidence-based response to the COVID-19 pandemic and all future pandemics. An eight-point process is proposed for the immediate future:
|
1. Releaseacomprehensive,FourGoal-basedPandemicPlan,showingwhatis to be done phase by phase, and what the public’s role is in each phase. |
|
One Year of COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Canada March 31, 2021
David Redman
Former Head of Emergency Management Alberta
7. Geteveryoneunder65withoutpre-existingcompromisedimmune systems, who can and want to work, fully back to work.
8. Continuetovaccinateassafeandeffectivevaccinesbecomeavailable,for the current strain of COVID-19.
Canada’s Response to COVID-19 After One Year
Alberta
The Recall Trap: 21 Alberta MLA’s face recall petitions
When Democratic Tools Become Weapons
A Canadian politician once kept his legislative seat while serving time in prison.
Gilles Grégoire, a founding figure in Quebec’s nationalist movement, was convicted in 1983 of multiple counts of sexual assault against minors, mostly girls between the ages of 10 and 14. He inhabited a cell yet remained a member of the National Assembly. A representative of free citizens could no longer walk among them.
Grégoire became the kind of figure who seems made for a recall law. His presence in office after conviction insulted the very notion of a democratic mandate. Yet Quebec lacked recall legislation, and the Assembly chose not to intervene. The episode lingers as a reminder that even robust democracies sometimes fail to protect themselves from rare, glaring contradictions.
Such cases hold powerful sway over the political imagination. They tempt reformers to believe that recall is the cure for democratic injustice, giving it exceptional weight it does not deserve. A constitution shaped by anomalies becomes a constitution shaped by distortion.
We are grateful that you’re enjoying Haultain Research.
For the full experience, and to help us bring you more quality research and commentary, please upgrade your subscription.
Alberta’s own history proves the point, though the lesson has been forgotten. William Aberhart’s rise in 1935 owed more to spiritual magnetism and Depression-era desperation than to prudent reform. He promised Social Credit prosperity through monthly dividends to all citizens. The electorate believed that a new economic order would arrive at a cheerful pace. It did not. Within eighteen months of taking office, Aberhart found himself the target of what he himself had created. His government had passed recall legislation in its first session, fulfilling a campaign promise to democratize Alberta’s government. When the promised dividends failed to materialize, his own constituents in Okotoks-High River began gathering signatures for his removal. The charge was not misconduct but failure to deliver miracles.
Faced with this threat, Aberhart’s government retroactively repealed the recall legislation rather than allow him to be forced from his seat. He thus became the first Canadian politician to institute recall and to be threatened with it. History recorded the episode as a cautionary tale rather than a triumph of democratic vigilance. It showed how easily recall could slip from a tool for integrity to a weapon for frustration, revealing a truth that democratic societies often forget: mechanisms designed for exceptional cases seldom remain limited to them.
Those two stories frame Alberta’s problem today. The province revived recall legislation under Premier Jason Kenney in 2021, with the law taking effect later that year. The measure returned with assurances that high thresholds would prevent misuse. Its defenders claimed recall would restrain arrogance and encourage accountability, offering ordinary Albertans a way to hold politicians accountable between elections. Then, facing discontent within his own party over COVID mandates, Kenney himself became the subject of a different form of recall, a leadership review that undermined his power. Premier Danielle Smith, who succeeded him, amended the recall legislation in July 2025 to make it easier to use. She lowered the signature threshold and extended the collection period, changes that would soon work against her own government.
The result has been quite different from what either leader intended. On October 23, 2025, Alberta approved its first recall petition of the modern era, targeting Education Minister Demetrios Nicolaides in Calgary-Bow. The applicant, Jennifer Yeremiy of a group called AB Resistance, told reporters that their goal was “to put forward enough recalls to trigger an early election.” This was not a response to corruption or criminality. It was an explicit strategy to overturn the results of the 2023 provincial election.
The floodgates opened from there. As of December 10, 2025, twenty-one MLAs face active recall petitions. The list now includes Premier Smith herself, as well as multiple cabinet ministers, backbenchers, and even one NDP opposition member. None confronts allegations of criminality. None confronts evidence of corruption. None resembles Gilles Grégoire. Their adversaries object to education funding decisions, the government’s use of the notwithstanding clause during a teachers’ strike, and various claims of insufficient constituent engagement. These are matters of policy disagreement, not grounds for judicial removal from office.
The principled case for recall legislation deserves some consideration. A democratic society must guard against officeholders whose conduct becomes so egregious that the public cannot wait for the next scheduled election. A mechanism for such removal, carefully designed and narrowly applied, reflects respect for citizenship and the dignity of democratic representation. The theory imagines a vigilant electorate using a sharp tool with care, meeting the rare case with a rare response.
Reality seldom matches this ideal. British Columbia has maintained recall legislation since 1995—thirty years during which not a single MLA has been successfully recalled, despite no shortage of controversial politicians and unpopular decisions. When recall petitions have been attempted there, they have almost exclusively targeted MLAs from close ridings over policy disputes rather than serious misconduct. The pattern is remarkably consistent. Recall becomes a tool for the sore losers of close elections, not a mechanism for removing the genuinely unfit.
This should not surprise us. Most political conflicts involve competing policy visions rather than breaches of trust. Legislators are elected precisely to judge the merits of those visions over a defined term. Elections confer authority because they settle disputes for a time, allowing governments to govern and oppositions to organize for the next contest. A recall mechanism that permits policy quarrels to trigger removal undermines the very purpose of elections. It invites factions to overturn results they dislike through extraordinary means, weakening the equilibrium that representative government tries to protect.
The Aberhart episode illustrates this tendency with clarity. His opponents did not claim he had abused office or engaged in corruption. They claimed he had failed to conjure prosperity, which was entirely true; his promise of monthly dividends proved impossible to deliver. Their frustration stemmed from disappointment rather than betrayal, from unmet expectations rather than broken trust. Yet they seized on the recall mechanism to express that disappointment, nearly removing him on that basis alone. The effort had nothing to do with the integrity of public office and everything to do with the volatility of public expectation during desperate times.
The contemporary Alberta law requires signatures from sixty percent of voters who participated in the last election, collected within 90 days. This appears to be a significant threshold designed to prevent frivolous attempts. The appearance misleads in several ways. First, the threshold is lower than it sounds because it requires sixty percent of actual voters rather than eligible voters—a crucial distinction that substantially reduces the number needed. Second, even petitions that fall short of this threshold can inflict severe political damage. The mere existence of an active recall petition marks an MLA with the taint of public disapproval, regardless of whether the petition succeeds.
The scale and coordination of current efforts reveal something more troubling than isolated expressions of constituent dissatisfaction. A website called Operation Total Recall provides organizational infrastructure for a systematic campaign targeting all 44 MLAs who voted to use the notwithstanding clause during the teachers’ strike. This is not spontaneous grassroots democracy. It is coordinated political warfare using recall as a weapon to overturn electoral outcomes. The effort aims not at removing individual members for cause, but at destabilizing an elected government through mass petitions. Analysis of the 2023 election results shows that five UCP MLAs won by fewer than 1,000 votes, with roughly a dozen more winning by fewer than 2,000. Multiple successful recalls could topple a government with only an 11-seat majority, precisely the outcome the organizers openly seek.
Each successful petition would trigger not just a referendum but also, if that referendum passes, a by-election costing taxpayers between $500,000 and $1 million. This is public money spent not to address disqualifying conduct but to re-litigate policy disagreements that voters already decided in 2023. The financial cost alone should give pause. But the deeper costs run to the foundations of representative government itself.
Prudence counsels caution here. Stable institutions exist precisely to restrain public passions rather than reflect them in every heated moment. Legislators must make decisions that sometimes contradict immediate popular sentiment, particularly when facing complex policy files or managing competing interests across diverse constituencies. A system that keeps them in constant survival mode, forever fighting off recall petitions over unpopular but necessary decisions, cannot foster the kind of judgment that good governance requires. Hayek warned that societies often overestimate their ability to redesign the political order according to the impulses of the moment, mistaking the intensity of feeling for the wisdom of action. Recall legislation embodies exactly this temptation, pretending to offer precise accountability while producing disorder and instability.
The concerns of those organizing these recall campaigns may well be sincere. Many genuinely believe that government policies on education funding or the use of constitutional override powers represent serious failures deserving extraordinary remedy. But sincerity of belief does not make the remedy appropriate. These matters played out during the 2023 election campaign. Voters heard the arguments on both sides. They weighed the competing visions. They made their choices. Those choices produced a government with a mandate to govern according to its platform, which included the education policies and approach to constitutional questions now under attack through recall petitions.
A representative who steals public funds or breaks criminal law betrays the trust voters placed in him. Recall aimed at such behaviour may have genuine merit, providing a necessary safeguard against serious malfeasance. But a representative who supports an unpopular policy does not betray his office—he exercises the judgment he was elected to exercise. That is the political job. Voters who disagree may vote him out at the end of his term. They ought not demand his eviction for legislative disagreement over education funding levels or the appropriate use of constitutional tools in labour disputes.
The shift that recall produces goes beyond individual cases. It fundamentally alters the character of political engagement, moving energy away from long-term relationship building and toward short-term confrontation. Petition campaigns demand signatures rather than solutions. They mobilize resentment rather than reflection. They organize anger rather than deliberation. The timing of the first modern recall petition makes this dynamic clear—it launched during a province-wide teachers’ strike, piggybacking on existing mobilization and emotion. But teachers’ strikes happen. Contract negotiations sometimes get contentious. Should every education minister facing difficult bargaining face recall? Should every healthcare minister dealing with doctors’ disputes become a petition target? This path leads to governance by perpetual crisis, where every unpopular but necessary decision triggers a removal campaign.
The effect on the dignity and effectiveness of public work deserves particular attention. Legislators must confront complex files that rarely offer clearly correct answers. They must choose among imperfect options while balancing competing demands from local constituents and provincial interests. Recall turns these unavoidable difficulties into personal liabilities. Taking a principled but unpopular stand risks triggering a petition. The pressure to remain popular at all times can overwhelm the responsibility to remain principled, inverting the proper relationship between representative and constituency.
If Albertans are genuinely dissatisfied with their government’s direction, a perfectly functional mechanism exists to express that dissatisfaction: the next general election, scheduled for October 2027. That is less than two years away—hardly an eternity in democratic terms. In the meantime, voters retain numerous other tools for making their voices heard. They may contact their MLAs directly, organize politically through parties and interest groups, attend town halls and constituency meetings, and build support for the opposition. These traditional channels require patience and persuasion. They require building actual majority support rather than mobilizing intense minorities. Recall petitions short-circuit this democratic process, allowing well-organized groups to force expensive special votes over disputes that were already litigated during the last election. The NDP opposition, which came close but ultimately fell short in 2023, appears in a hurry to open a back door to reverse its electoral fortune through extraordinary means.
The case of Gilles Grégoire illuminates a genuine weakness in democratic systems—the inability to remove someone whose continued presence in office becomes morally intolerable. This reveals a fundamental flaw. But the solution lies in targeted remedies: clear rules for automatic expulsion upon conviction for serious offences, for instance, rather than a broad recall system that allows every policy grievance to become a removal campaign. Such targeted measures would correct specific defects without inviting the broader turmoil that comprehensive recall legislation produces.
Alberta’s present situation echoes the Aberhart lesson with remarkable fidelity. Recall laws seldom remain tied to their original purpose. They drift toward unintended uses, shifting from instruments of moral accountability to weapons of political agitation. They reward passion rather than judgment at precisely the time when there is already far too much passion and not nearly enough good political judgment. They trade stability for drama and substitute the illusion of democratic empowerment for the reality of weakened institutions that guard freedom.
When Jason Kenney introduced recall legislation in 2021, Alberta had twenty-six years of British Columbia evidence showing how these laws function in practice. That evidence pointed clearly in one direction. Yet the UCP proceeded anyway, and in July 2025, the Smith government made recalls even easier, lowering thresholds and extending signature periods precisely when the government enjoyed a comfortable majority. Now, multiple petitions target UCP cabinet ministers and backbenchers while organizers openly seek to force an early election. The NDP leader’s response captured the irony perfectly: “Hoisted on your own petard.”
A healthy political community requires transparent elections that produce precise results, firm mandates that allow governments to govern, and representatives who can exercise judgment with appropriate stability between electoral contests. It requires citizens who understand that disagreement over policy, much less tit for tat, does not warrant removal. It requires carefully designed safeguards against genuine abuse of office rather than mechanisms that allow temporary frustration to masquerade as a permanent principle. Recall legislation promises a swift cure for democratic ailments while delivering turbulence and rewarding radical impatience.
Democracy depends on accepting election results even when we disagree with them. It depends on waiting for our turn to make our case to voters at the next scheduled opportunity. The recall weapon undermines these basic norms in the service of immediate partisan advantage, encouraging precisely the kind of political mischief that corrodes public trust. This is not democratic vitality expressing itself through new channels. It is democratic exhaustion, the permanent campaign that prevents anyone from governing.
Alberta stands at a point where history speaks with unusual clarity. The Grégoire case shows us the moral outlier who truly deserved immediate removal from office. The Aberhart episode shows us the grave danger of using recall for anything less serious. The voters of this province should draw the correct lesson from both stories. They should protect democracy by resisting the recall illusion—not by eliminating all accountability mechanisms, but by insisting that extraordinary remedies be reserved for truly remarkable circumstances rather than routine policy disputes. That distinction makes all the difference between a legitimate tool and a partisan weapon.
We are grateful that you’re enjoying Haultain Research.
For the full experience, and to help us bring you more quality research and commentary, please upgrade your subscription.
Alberta
Here’s why city hall should save ‘blanket rezoning’ in Calgary
From the Fraser Institute
By Tegan Hill and Austin Thompson
According to Calgarians for Thoughtful Growth (CFTG)—an organization advocating against “blanket rezoning”— housing would be more affordable if the mayor and council restricted what homes can be built in Calgary and where. But that gets the economics backwards.
Blanket rezoning—a 2024 policy that allowed homebuilders to construct duplexes, townhomes and fourplexes in most neighbourhoods—allowed more homebuilding, giving Calgarians more choice, and put downward pressure on prices. Mayor Farkas and several councillors campaigned on repealing blanket rezoning and on December 15 council will debate a motion that could start that process. As Calgarians debate the city’s housing rules, residents should understand the trade-offs involved.
When CFTG claims that blanket rezoning does “nothing” for affordability, it ignores a large body of economic research showing the opposite.
New homes are only built when they can be sold to willing homebuyers for a profit. Restrictions that limit the range of styles and locations for new homes, or that lock denser housing behind a long, costly and uncertain municipal approval process, inevitably eliminate many of these opportunities. That means fewer new homes are built, which worsens housing scarcity and pushes up prices. This intuitive story is backed up by study after study. An analysis by Canada’s federal housing agency put it simply: “higher residential land use regulation seems to be associated with lower housing affordability.”
CFTG also claims that blanket rezoning merely encourages “speculation” (i.e. buying to sell in the short-term for profit) by investors. Any profitable housing market may invite some speculative activity. But homebuilders and investors can only survive financially if they make homes that families are willing to buy or rent. The many Calgary families who bought or rented a new home enabled by blanket rezoning did so because they felt it was their best available option given its price, amenities and location—not because they were pawns in some speculative game. Calgarians benefit when they are free to choose the type of home and neighbourhood that best suits their family, rather than being constrained by the political whims of city hall.
And CFTG’s claim that blanket rezoning harms municipal finances also warrants scrutiny. More specifically, CFTG suggests that developers do not pay for infrastructure upgrades in established neighbourhoods, but this is simply incorrect. The City of Calgary charges an “Established Area Levy” to cover the cost of water and wastewater upgrades spurred by redevelopment projects—raising $16.5 million in 2024 alone. Builders in the downtown area must pay the “Centre City Levy,” which funds several local services (and generated $2.5 million in 2024).
It’s true that municipal fees on homes in new communities are generally higher, but that reflects the reality that new communities require far more new pipes, roads and facilities than established neighbourhoods.
Redeveloping established areas of the city means more residents can make use of streets, transit and other city services already in place, which is often the most cost-effective way for a city to grow. The City of Calgary’s own analysis finds that redevelopment in established neighbourhoods saves billions of taxpayer dollars on capital and operating costs for city services compared to an alternative scenario where homebuilding is concentrated in new suburban communities.
An honest debate about blanket rezoning ought to acknowledge the advantages this system has in promoting housing choice, housing affordability and the sustainability of municipal finances.
Clearly, many Calgarians felt blanket rezoning was undesirable when they voted for mayoral and council candidates who promised to change Calgary’s zoning rules. However, Calgarians also voted for a mayor who promised that more homes would be built faster, and at affordable prices—something that will be harder to achieve if city hall imposes tighter restrictions on where and what types of homes can be built. This unavoidable tension should be at the heart of the debate.
CFTG is promoting a comforting fairy tale where Calgary can tighten restrictions on homebuilding without limiting supply or driving up prices. In reality, no zoning regime delivers everything at once—greater neighbourhood control inevitably comes at the expense of housing choice and affordability. Calgarians—including the mayor and council—need a clear understanding of the trade-offs.
-
Bruce Dowbiggin1 day agoWayne Gretzky’s Terrible, Awful Week.. And Soccer/ Football.
-
espionage23 hours agoWestern Campuses Help Build China’s Digital Dragnet With U.S. Tax Funds, Study Warns
-
Focal Points14 hours agoCommon Vaccines Linked to 38-50% Increased Risk of Dementia and Alzheimer’s
-
Opinion1 day agoThe day the ‘King of rock ‘n’ roll saved the Arizona memorial
-
Automotive4 hours agoThe $50 Billion Question: EVs Never Delivered What Ottawa Promised
-
Agriculture1 day agoCanada’s air quality among the best in the world
-
Business21 hours agoCanada invests $34 million in Chinese drones now considered to be ‘high security risks’
-
Health12 hours agoThe Data That Doesn’t Exist




