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New report highlights housing affordability challenges across Canada

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From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Wendell Cox

The year 2022 marked a concerning increase in “severely unaffordable” housing markets, extending beyond the scope of the six major markets.

The Frontier Centre for Public Policy’s Demographia Housing Affordability in Canada report, released today, cast a spotlight on the pressing issue of housing affordability in Canada. This comprehensive report offers a detailed analysis of middle-income housing affordability during the third quarter of 2022, focusing on 46 housing markets referred to as census metropolitan areas.

The report goes beyond the conventional analysis of property prices, delving into the intricate interplay between house prices and income. Price-to-income ratios, a crucial metric for assessing housing affordability, have gained global recognition. Esteemed institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations, OECD, and IMF, have endorsed this measurement. The Frontier Centre for Public Policy’s housing affordability index adopts a similar approach, utilizing the “median multiple” calculation. This calculation involves dividing the median house price by pre-tax median household income.

The report sheds light on the historical context of housing affordability within Canada’s six major markets – Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa – each with populations surpassing one million. The period from 1970 to the mid-2000s witnessed relative stability in the housing affordability landscape. However, by 2005, Vancouver’s market initiated a significant shift towards unaffordability, a trend that has only intensified since the mid-2000s.

The year 2022 marked a concerning increase in “severely unaffordable” housing markets, extending beyond the scope of the six major markets. The number of severely unaffordable markets surged from 18 in 2019 to 24 among the surveyed 46 markets. In contrast, the count of “affordable” markets dwindled from eight in 2019 to a mere three.

The advent of remote work, or “telecommuting” during the pandemic led to a surge in households seeking more spacious living spaces. This surge in demand outpaced supply, resulting in a “demand shock” that further exacerbated the challenges of housing affordability.

The epicentre of unaffordable housing primarily lies in British Columbia and Ontario. Notably, Vancouver and Toronto emerged as the most severely unaffordable major markets, ranking third and 10th least affordable among 94 markets in Demographia’s International Housing Affordability Report 2022. This phenomenon extended beyond Vancouver, impacting other markets in British Columbia. Similarly, the trend reached markets beyond Toronto, prompting a net interprovincial migration as households pursued more affordable housing options.

Amidst these challenges, four markets – Moose Jaw (SK), Fort McMurray (AB), Saguenay (QC), and Fredericton (NB) – have managed to uphold their affordability. The Canadian housing market faces intensified scrutiny, with analyses highlighting the formidable task of addressing the nation’s housing crisis. This includes restoring affordability and enabling home ownership amidst obstacles such as the scale of the issue and the capacity of the home-building sector.

At the heart of the crisis lies urban containment regulation, which has driven land prices to unsustainable levels, constraining housing supply for middle income households. This scenario arises from the deliberate intent of urban containment policies to inflate land prices. Disparities in land costs across markets play a pivotal role in housing affordability disparities. Government policies, like urban containment, unintentionally contribute to government-induced inequality by inflating land prices. Practical alternatives exist to revitalize housing affordability.

Migration to more affordable housing markets has become a priority for many, as evidenced by an unprecedented population shift away from major metropolitan areas towards regions with more affordable housing options. Ensuring affordability remains in these markets is pivotal. Neglecting this could lead to replicating the ongoing affordability crisis in regions that are currently more affordable, which could limit opportunities for future generations and impact Canada’s attractiveness as an international migration destination.

About the Frontier Centre for Public Policy The Frontier Centre for Public Policy is an independent, non-partisan think tank that conducts research and analysis on a wide range of public policy issues. Committed to promoting economic freedom, individual liberty, and responsible governance, the Centre aims to contribute to informed public debates and shape effective policies that benefit Canadians.

Wendell Cox is a Senior Fellow at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. He is principal of Demographia.com, author of Demographia World Urban Areas and an author of Demographia International Housing Affordability (19 annual editions) and Demographia World Urban Areas. He earned a BA in Government from California State University, Los Angeles and an MBA from Pepperdine University. He served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers in Paris, a national university.

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As Ottawa meddles with pension funds, Albertans should consider provincial pension plan

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From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Marco Navarro-Genie 

Who Should Control Canada’s Pension Wealth?

Ottawa wants to compel large pools of Canadian money to be invested in Canada, instead of allowing investment funds to find the best return for Canadian investors.

Last week, another scandalous and potentially corrupt string of federal activities popped up.

This one has deep implications for pension plans in Canada, including the debate about an Alberta Pension Plan. Mark Carney’s double game of politics and profit enhances the drive to patriate Alberta’s pension wealth.

At issue is a report in the media saying that Brookfield may be looking to raise a $50 billion fund with contributions from Canada’s pension funds and an additional $10 billion from the federal government.

This report has drawn significant attention for several reasons. Toronto-based Brookfield is one of the world’s largest alternative investment management companies, claiming about one trillion in assets under management. Their portfolio spans real estate, renewable energy, infrastructure, and private equity, making them a significant player in domestic and international markets. The magnitude of Brookfield’s investments places them at the forefront of global financial movements, giving considerable weight to any fund they propose to establish.

The second reason is that Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau have voiced their ambitions to boost home-grown investments. One of the government’s strategies includes tapping into Stephen Poloz, the former Governor of the Bank of Canada. Poloz succeeded Mark Carney as the head of the bank. The Liberal government has tasked Poloz with leading a working group to identify “incentives” that would “encourage” institutional investors to keep their capital in Canada.

Moreover, Finance Minister Freeland has suggested implementing new regulations to ensure that more of Canada’s substantial pension fund reserves, which amount to an impressive $1.8 trillion, are allocated toward Canadian ventures. This comes when a staggering 73% of Canadian pension funds are invested abroad.

On its face, a plan to invest more Canadian wealth in Canada might sound reasonable. However, the plan avoids the crucial question of why money experts prefer investing outside Canada. Considering that question, one must consider the Trudeau government’s economic record.

Put differently, Ottawa is looking for ways to compel large pools of Canadian money to be invested in Canada instead of allowing investment funds to find the best return for Canadian investors. Those large cash pools typically belong to hard-working Canadians, such as teachers’ pensions. They would be forced to earn less for their pension money.

Forcing such large sums to remain in Canada would mask the continuous slump in productivity in the Canadian economy.

Given current economic policies and layers of taxation that do not exist elsewhere (such as the unpopular carbon taxes), Canadian companies are less competitive. Forcing pools of money to stay in Canada rather than seeking the best return for their clients offers an artificial boost that makes Ottawa policies seem less harmful.

It is, therefore, a politically motivated move. That level of government intervention historically always results in disastrous consequences. Politics directing traffic for the movement of capital rarely achieves good outcomes. The real issue is sagging productivity.

But that is only half the problem. The other significant issue is ethics.

Prime Minister Trudeau has recently named Mark Carney as his special economic advisor. Carney is the Chair of Asset Management and Head of Transition Investing at Brookfield.  The Brookfield website shows Carney is responsible for “developing products for investors.”  Carney is also the most mentioned name among people likely to succeed Justin Trudeau as leader of the Liberal Party of Canada.

In short, the man who closely advises the government of Canada on how to compel gargantuan pools of money to be invested in Canada conveniently oversees the development of the “product” for the private Toronto firm, through which that money would be forced to be invested in Canada. Furthermore, the same firm reportedly seeks (read lobbying) from the federal government an infusion of $10 billion for the new fund.

As a Liberal and a potential party leader, given Justin Trudeau’s fortunes, Mark Carney could become prime minister in the immediate future. This means that Carney would benefit from creating new rules forcing investment money to stay in the country in two ways: As a leading man at Brookfield, Carney and the firm stand to make tens of millions from the policy. Second, as a carbon tax enthusiast, once squarely in political office, Carney would benefit from masking the ill, underproductive effects of the radical green agenda and carbon taxes he supports.

When Alberta progressives oppose the desire of many Albertans to patriate Alberta pension funds to the province, they cite concerns that the province might use the funds for political purposes, undermining the maximum return. This is not an outlandish concern, in some respects, given the history of the Alberta Heritage Fund.

However, it is not an exclusive danger inherent to the Alberta government. It does not warrant the presupposition that the federal government is a better steward of Alberta’s pension wealth, as demonstrated by the developments above. All things being equal, and unless human nature is outlawed by federal statute, the risks are the same.

But if something goes wrong with Albertans’ pension wealth, would they rather deal with people in Alberta than people in Ottawa, half a continent away Raising Alberta voices in Ottawa when Ottawa has been bent on doing the opposite of what is good for Albertans has never produced good results or reversed the nefarious effects on Albertans.

Ottawa politicians will do what is best for Laurentians every single time. The history of the Dominion, from the national policy to Crow rates and the National Energy Policy to Carbon Taxes, shows Ottawa policies always favour vote-rich Laurentia first and foremost.

Mark Carney’s product development for Brookfield shows, at worst, that Alberta’s pension wealth is just as much as risk with federal policies driven by political motivations. This one would be doubly bad because it is meant to serve and benefit Carney and his Bay Street friends as much as it is designed to help his future colleagues in Ottawa. And on both counts, Carney would benefit as a financier and politician.

Albertans should take their money and run.

Marco Navarro-Genie is Vice President Research with the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. He is co-author, with Barry Cooper, of COVID-19: The Politics of a Pandemic Moral Panic (2020).

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Canadians largely ignore them and their funding bleeds their competition dry: How the CBC Spends its Public Funding

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If we want to intelligently assess the value CBC delivers to Canadians in exchange for their tax-funded investment, we’ll need to understand two things:

  1. How CBC spends the money we give them
  2. What impact their product has on Canadians

The answer to question #2 depends on which Canadians we’re discussing. Your average young family from suburban Toronto is probably only vaguely aware there is a CBC. But Canadian broadcasters? They know all about the corporation, but just wish it would lift its crushing hobnailed boots from their faces.

Stick around and I’ll explain.

For the purposes of this discussion I’m not interested in the possibility that there’s been reckless or negligent corruption or waste, so I won’t address the recent controversy over paying out millions of dollars in executive benefits. Instead, I want to know how the CBC is designed to operate. This will allow us to judge the corporation on its own terms.

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CBC’s Financial Structure

We’ll begin with the basics. According to the CBC’s 2023-24 projections in their most recent corporate plan strategy, the company will receive $1.17 billion from Parliament; $292 million from advertising; and $209 million from subscriber fees, financing, and other income. Company filings note that revenue from both advertising and legacy subscription pools are dropping. Advertising is trending downwards because of ongoing changes in industry ad models, and the decline in subscriptions can be blamed on competition from “cord-cutting” internet services. The Financing and other income category includes revenue from rent and lease-generating use of CBC’s many real estate assets.

The projected combined television, radio, and digital services spending is $1.68 billion. For important context, 2022-23 data from the 2022-2023 annual report break that down to $996 million for English services, and $816 million for French services. 2022-23 also saw $60 million in costs for transmission, distribution, and collection. Corporate management and finance costs came to around $33 million. Overall, the company reported a net loss of $125 million in 2022-23.

The corporation estimates that their English-language digital platforms attract 17.4 million unique visitors each month and that the average visitor engages with content for 28 minutes a month. In terms of market relevance, those are pretty good numbers. But, among Canadian internet users, cbc.ca still ranked only 43rd for total web destinations (which include sites like google.com and amazon.ca). French-language Radio-Canada’s numbers were 5.2 million unique visitors who each hung around for 50 minutes a month.

Monthly engagement with digital English-language news and regional services was 20 minutes. Although we’re given no visitor numbers, the report does admit that “interest in news was lower than expected.”

CBC content production

All that’s not very helpful for understanding what’s actually going on inside CBC. We need to get a feel for how the corporation divides its spending between programming categories and what’s driving the revenue.

The CRTC provides annual financial filings for all Canadian broadcasters, including the CBC. I could describe what’s happening by throwing columns and rows of dollar figures at you. In fact, should you be so disposed, you can view the spreadsheet here. But it turns out that my colorful graph will do a much better job:

As you can see for yourself, CBC spends a large chunk of its money producing news for all three video platforms (CBC and Radio-Canada conventional TV and the cable/VOD platforms they refer to as “discretionary TV”). The two conventional networks also invest significant funds in drama and comedy production.

The chart doesn’t cover CBC radio, so I’ll fill you in. English-language production costs $143 million (roughly the equivalent of the costs of English TV drama/comedy) while the bill for French-language radio production came in at $94 million (more or less equal to discretionary TV news production).

CBC Content Consumption

Who’s watching? The CBC itself reported that viewers of CBC English television represented only 5.1 percent of the total Canadian audience, and only 2.0 percent tuned in to CBC news. By “total Canadian audience”, I mean all Canadians viewing all available TV programming at a given time. So when the CBC tells us that their News Network got a 2.0 percent “share”, they don’t mean that they attracted 2.0 percent of all Canadians. Rather, they got 2.0 percent of whoever happened to be watching any TV network – which could easily come to just a half of one percent of all Canadians. After all, how many people still watch TV?

According to CRTC data, between the 2014–15 and 2022–23 seasons, English language CBC TV weekly viewing hours dropped from 35 million to 16 million. That total would amount to less than six minutes a day per anglophone Canadian. Specifically, news viewing fell by 52 percent, sports by 66 percent, and drama and comedy by 51 percent.

CBC Radio One and CBC Music only managed to attract 14.3 percent of the Canadian market. What does that actually mean? I’ve seen estimates suggesting that between 15 and 25 percent of all Canadians listen to radio during the popular daily commute slots. So at its peak, CBC radio’s share of that audience is possibly no higher than 3.5 percent of all Canadians.

recent survey found that only 41 percent of Canadians agreed the CBC “is important and should continue doing what it’s doing.” The remaining 59 percent were split between thinking the CBC requires “a lot of changes” and was “no longer useful.” Those numbers remained largely consistent across all age groups.

It seems that while some Canadian’s might support the CBC in principle, for the most part, they’re not actually consuming a lot of content.

CBC Revenue sources

CBC’s primary income is from government funding through parliamentary allocations. Here’s what those look like:

Advertising (or, “time sales” as they refer to it) is another major revenue source. That channel brought in more than $200 million in 2023:

But here’s the thing: the broadcast industry in Canada is currently engaged in a bitter struggle for existence. Every single dollar from that shrinking pool of advertising revenue is desperately needed. And most broadcasters are – perhaps misguidedly – fighting for more government funding. So why should the CBC, with its billion dollar subsidies, be allowed to also compete for limited ad revenue?

Or, to put it differently, what vital and unique services does the CBC provide that might justify their special treatment?

It’s possible that CBC does target rural and underserved audiences missed by the commercial networks. But those are clearly not what’s consuming the vast majority of the corporation’s budget. Perhaps people are watching CBC’s “big tent” drama and comedy productions, but are those measurably better or more important than what’s coming from the private sector? And we’ve already seen how, for all intents and purposes, no one’s watching their TV news or listening to their radio broadcasts.

Perhaps there’s an argument to be made for maintaining or even increasing funding for CBC. But I haven’t yet seen anyone convincingly articulate it.

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