Business
How big things could get done—even in Canada
From the Fraser Institute
By Philip Cross
From Newfoundland’s Muskrat Falls hydro project, to Ottawa’s Firearms Registry and the Phoenix pay system, to Montreal’s 1976 Olympics, Canada is a gold medal winner when it comes to wasting tax payer dollars. It doesn’t have to be this way.
Last year, Bent Flyvbjerg, a Danish professor of economic geography specializing in megaprojects, and Canadian journalist Dan Gardner co-authored a book How Big Things Get Done. They investigate what they coin the “Iron Law of Megaprojects,” which holds they routinely come in well over budget, far past projected deadlines, and without the projected benefits.
Unfortunately for taxpayers, the book contains numerous examples of Canadian megaprojects that follow this Law of Megaprojects. The federal government’s infamous firearms registry is a textbook template for how IT projects can go terribly wrong, ending up 590 per cent over budget. The Muskrat Falls hydro project in Newfoundland is cited as a classic demonstration of what happens when hiring a firm with little direct experience managing such a large complex project. Most famously, the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games wins the title for the largest cost overrun in Olympic history, finishing 720 per cent over budget. The authors suggest Montreal’s “Big Owe” stadium “should be considered the unofficial mascot of the modern Olympic Games.”
One thing all these Canadian examples have in common is extensive government involvement. Not that governments learned from their past mistakes. The federal government’s Phoenix pay system fiasco demonstrates that IT remains a black hole, with the government recently announcing it would abandon Phoenix after spending $3.5 billion trying to implement it. Several light train projects across the country have gone off the rails, the poster boy being the system in Ottawa, which is years behind schedule and already $2.5 billion over budget.
There are several reasons why government projects are chronically prone to failure. One is that politicians, especially late in their careers, want legacies in the form of monumental tangible projects irrespective of whether they effectively meet a public need. You can see this dynamic clearly at work today in Canada, as the Trudeau government pushes for a prohibitively expensive (probably more than $100 billion) high-speed rail connection between Windsor and Quebec City. Meanwhile, Ontario Premier Doug Ford promotes a traffic tunnel underneath Highway 401 between Brampton and Scarborough, and Quebec Premier Francois Legault revives plans for a third link connecting Quebec City to the south shore of the St. Lawrence River. While Canada clearly needs more transportation infrastructure, these projects are not the most cost-effective way of meeting the needs of commuters.
Governments deceptively deploy several tricks to help get uneconomic projects built. They routinely produce unrealistically low-cost estimates to make wasteful ego-driven projects appear affordable. Another tried and true tactic is to just “start digging a hole and make it so big, there’s no alternative to coming up with the money to fill it in,” as former San Francisco mayor Willie Brown admitted. This approach preys on the mistaken belief that large sunk costs mean scrapping a project “would be interpreted by the public as ‘throwing away’ the billions of dollars already spent” when it is actually a textbook example of throwing good money after bad.
Unlike other studies of how major infrastructure projects typically are over budget, Flyvbjerg and Gardner have some concrete recommendations on how to manage large projects that respect deadlines and budgets.
These steps include careful consideration of the actual goals of the project (airlines can meet the need for fast transport in the Windsor-Quebec corridor without the expense of high-speed rail), detailed planning and preparation followed by swift execution to minimize costly surprises (summarized by their advice to “think slow, act fast”), accounting for the cost of similar projects in the past, and breaking large projects into smaller modules to allow projects to scale back when they run into trouble. A good example of these principles at work in Canada were several oilsands projects built before 2015, when severe shortages were addressed by firms using modularity and synchronizing their work schedules to free up scarce labour and materials.
However, one major flaw in Flyvbjerg and Gardner’s analysis is their failure to understand the economics of renewable energy. They cite solar and wind projects as examples of projects that routinely finish under budget, a major factor in their declining cost. But building renewable energy is not their only cost to the energy grid, as back-up plants must be maintained for those periods when the sun is not shining or the wind is not blowing, as noted in a recent article by Bjorn Lomborg. The expense of maintaining plants that often are idle raises overall costs. This is why jurisdictions that rely extensively on renewable energy, such as Germany and California, have high energy costs that must be paid either by customers or taxpayers.
However, apart from this mistake, there is much governments and taxpayers can learn from How Big Things Get Done.
Author:
Business
Canada’s future prosperity runs through the northwest coast
Prince Rupert Port Authority CEO Shaun Stevenson. Photo courtesy Prince Rupert Port Authority
From the Canadian Energy Centre
A strategic gateway to the world
Tucked into the north coast of B.C. is the deepest natural harbour in North America and the port with the shortest travel times to Asia.
With growing capacity for exports including agricultural products, lumber, plastic pellets, propane and butane, it’s no wonder the Port of Prince Rupert often comes up as a potential new global gateway for oil from Alberta, said CEO Shaun Stevenson.
Thanks to its location and natural advantages, the port can efficiently move a wide range of commodities, he said.
That could include oil, if not for the federal tanker ban in northern B.C.’s coastal waters.
The Port of Prince Rupert on the north coast of British Columbia. Photo courtesy Prince Rupert Port Authority
“Notwithstanding the moratorium that was put in place, when you look at the attributes of the Port of Prince Rupert, there’s arguably no safer place in Canada to do it,” Stevenson said.
“I think that speaks to the need to build trust and confidence that it can be done safely, with protection of environmental risks. You can’t talk about the economic opportunity before you address safety and environmental protection.”
Safe Transit at Prince Rupert
About a 16-hour drive from Vancouver, the Port of Prince Rupert’s terminals are one to two sailing days closer to Asia than other West Coast ports.
The entrance to the inner harbour is wider than the length of three Canadian football fields.
The water is 35 metres deep — about the height of a 10-storey building — compared to 22 metres at Los Angeles and 16 metres at Seattle.
Shipmasters spend two hours navigating into the port with local pilot guides, compared to four hours at Vancouver and eight at Seattle.
“We’ve got wide open, very simple shipping lanes. It’s not moving through complex navigational channels into the site,” Stevenson said.
A Port on the Rise
The Prince Rupert Port Authority says it has entered a new era of expansion, strengthening Canada’s economic security.
The port estimates it anchors about $60 billion of Canada’s annual global trade today. Even without adding oil exports, Stevenson said that figure could grow to $100 billion.
“We need better access to the huge and growing Asian market,” said Heather Exner-Pirot, director of energy, natural resources and environment at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
“Prince Rupert seems purpose-built for that.”
Roughly $3 billion in new infrastructure is already taking shape, including the $750 million rail-to-container CANXPORT transloading complex for bulk commodities like specialty agricultural products, lumber and plastic pellets.
The Ridley Island Propane Export Terminal, Canada’s first marine propane export terminal, started shipping in May 2019. Photo courtesy AltaGas Ltd.
Canadian Propane Goes Global
A centrepiece of new development is the $1.35-billion Ridley Energy Export Facility — the port’s third propane terminal since 2019.
“Prince Rupert is already emerging as a globally significant gateway for propane exports to Asia,” Exner-Pirot said.
Thanks to shipments from Prince Rupert, Canadian propane – primarily from Alberta – has gone global, no longer confined to U.S. markets.
More than 45 per cent of Canada’s propane exports now reach destinations outside the United States, according to the Canada Energy Regulator.
“Twenty-five per cent of Japan’s propane imports come through Prince Rupert, and just shy of 15 per cent of Korea’s imports. It’s created a lift on every barrel produced in Western Canada,” Stevenson said.
“When we look at natural gas liquids, propane and butane, we think there’s an opportunity for Canada via Prince Rupert becoming the trading benchmark for the Asia-Pacific region.”
That would give Canadian production an enduring competitive advantage when serving key markets in Asia, he said.
Deep Connection to Alberta
The Port of Prince Rupert has been a key export hub for Alberta commodities for more than four decades.
Through the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, the province invested $134 million — roughly half the total cost — to build the Prince Rupert Grain Terminal, which opened in 1985.
The largest grain terminal on the West Coast, it primarily handles wheat, barley, and canola from the prairies.
Today, the connection to Alberta remains strong.
In 2022, $3.8 billion worth of Alberta exports — mainly propane, agricultural products and wood pulp — were shipped through the Port of Prince Rupert, according to the province’s Ministry of Transportation and Economic Corridors.
In 2024, Alberta awarded a $250,000 grant to the Prince Rupert Port Authority to lead discussions on expanding transportation links with the province’s Industrial Heartland region near Edmonton.
Handling Some of the World’s Biggest Vessels
The Port of Prince Rupert could safely handle oil tankers, including Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), Stevenson said.
“We would have the capacity both in water depth and access and egress to the port that could handle Aframax, Suezmax and even VLCCs,” he said.
“We don’t have terminal capacity to handle oil at this point, but there’s certainly terminal capacities within the port complex that could be either expanded or diversified in their capability.”
Market Access Lessons From TMX
Like propane, Canada’s oil exports have gained traction in Asia, thanks to the expanded Trans Mountain pipeline and the Westridge Marine Terminal near Vancouver — about 1,600 kilometres south of Prince Rupert, where there is no oil tanker ban.
The Trans Mountain expansion project included the largest expansion of ocean oil spill response in Canadian history, doubling capacity of the West Coast Marine Response Corporation.
The K.J. Gardner is the largest-ever spill response vessel in Canada. Photo courtesy Western Canada Marine Response Corporation
The Canada Energy Regulator (CER) reports that Canadian oil exports to Asia more than tripled after the expanded pipeline and terminal went into service in May 2024.
As a result, the price for Canadian oil has gone up.
The gap between Western Canadian Select (WCS) and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has narrowed to about $12 per barrel this year, compared to $19 per barrel in 2023, according to GLJ Petroleum Consultants.
Each additional dollar earned per barrel adds about $280 million in annual government royalties and tax revenues, according to economist Peter Tertzakian.
The Road Ahead
There are likely several potential sites for a new West Coast oil terminal, Stevenson said.
“A pipeline is going to find its way to tidewater based upon the safest and most efficient route,” he said.
“The terminal part is relatively straightforward, whether it’s in Prince Rupert or somewhere else.”
Under Canada’s Marine Act, the Port of Prince Rupert’s mandate is to enable trade, Stevenson said.
“If Canada’s trade objectives include moving oil off the West Coast, we’re here to enable it, presuming that the project has a mandate,” he said.
“If we see the basis of a project like this, we would ensure that it’s done to the best possible standard.”
Business
Ottawa’s gun ‘buyback’ program will cost billions—and for no good reason
From the Fraser Institute
By Gary Mauser
The government told Cape Bretoners they had two weeks to surrender their firearms to qualify for reimbursement or “buyback.” The pilot project netted a grand total of 22 firearms.
Five years after then-prime minister Justin Trudeau banned more than 100,000 types of so-called “assault-style firearms,” the federal government recently made the first attempt to force Canadians to surrender these firearms.
It didn’t go well.
The police chief in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, volunteered to run a pilot “buyback” project, which began last month. The government told Cape Bretoners they had two weeks to surrender their firearms to qualify for reimbursement or “buyback.” The pilot project netted a grand total of 22 firearms.
This failure should surprise no one. Back in 2018, a survey of “stakeholders” warned the government that firearms owners wouldn’t support such a gun ban. According to Prime Minister Carney’s own Privy Council Office the “program faces a risk of non-compliance.” And federal Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree was recently recorded admitting that the “buyback” is a partisan maneuver, and if it were up to him, he’d scrap it. What’s surprising is Ottawa’s persistence, particularly given the change in the government and the opportunity to discard ineffective policies.
So what’s really going on here?
One thing is for certain—this program is not, and never has been, about public safety. According to a report from the federal Department of Justice, almost all guns used in crimes in Canada, including in big cities such as Toronto, are possessed illegally by criminals, with many smuggled in from the United States. And according to Ontario’s solicitor general, more than 90 per cent of guns used in crimes in the province are illegally imported from the U.S. Obviously, the “buyback” program will have no effect on these guns possessed illegally by criminals.
Moreover, Canadian firearms owners are exceptionally law-abiding and less likely to commit murder than other Canadians. That also should not be surprising. To own a firearm in Canada, you must obtain a Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL) from the RCMP after initial vetting and daily monitoring for possible criminal activity. Between 2000 and 2020, an average of 12 PAL-holders per year were accused of homicide, out of approximately two million PAL-holders. During that same 10-year period, the PAL-holder firearms homicide rate was 0.63 (per 100,000 PAL-holders) compared to 0.72 (per 100,000 adult Canadians)—that’s 14 per cent higher than the rate for PAL-holders.
In other words, neither the so-called “assault-style firearms” nor their owners pose a threat to the public.
And the government’s own actions belie its claims. If these firearms are such a threat to Canadians, why slow-roll the “buyback” program? If inaction increased the likelihood of criminality by law-abiding firearms owners, why wait five years before launching a pilot program in a small community such as Cape Breton? And why continue to extend the amnesty period for another year, which the government did last month at the same time its pilot project netted a mere 22 firearms?
To ask those questions is to answer them.
Another question—how much will the “buyback” program cost taxpayers?
The government continues to block any attempt to disclose the full financial costs (although the Canadian Taxpayers Federation has launched a lawsuit to try to force the government to honour its Access to Information Act request). But back in 2020 the Trudeau government said it would cost $200 million to compensate firearms owners (although the Parliamentary Budget Officer said compensation costs could reach $756 million). By 2024, the program had spent $67.2 million—remember, that’s before it collected a single gun. The government recently said the program’s administrative costs (safe storage, destruction of hundreds of thousands of firearms, etc.) would reach an estimated $1.8 billion. And according to Carney’s first budget released in November, his government will spend $364 million on the program this fiscal year—at a time of massive federal deficits and debt.
This is reminiscent of the Chretien government’s gun registry fiasco, which wound up costing more than $2 billion even after then-justice minister Allan Rock promised the registry program would “almost break even” after an $85 million initial cost. The Harper government finally scrapped the registry in 2012.
As the Carney government clings to the policies of its predecessor, Canadians should understand the true nature of Ottawa’s gun “buyback” program and its costs.
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