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Government-shackled interference inquiry unlikely to get answers

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From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Ryan Alford

” the commission will receive a large portion of its testimony in secret with no cross-examination by the parties. Additionally, the government will have the last word not merely on what information is provided to the inquiry, but on what the commission can publish — even in its final report “

The foreign interference inquiry into the 2019 and 2021 elections (also known as the “Hogue commission,” named for Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue) is holding preliminary hearings this week. Those with experience with public inquiries in general, and with the Rouleau commission into the emergency powers declaration of 2022 in particular, can see it will be a failure.

When it comes to public inquiries, the government makes the rules, and when it says, “Heads I win, tails you lose,” the only winning move is not to play. Those rules, written by the cabinet in the form of a public inquiry commission’s mandate and terms of reference, allow the government to reveal and restrict information about its own failures as it sees fit.

The most important feature of the Hogue commission’s mandate is the restriction on the information provided to the inquiry: the terms of reference state plainly that if the government didn’t provide a confidential cabinet document to Special Rapporteur David Johnston back in 2023 when he was tasked with looking into election interference without the authority of a public inquiry, the commissioner won’t see it, either.

The details that made it into Johnston’s final report were far more tame than what the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) allegedly told former Conservative leader Erin O’Toole when he led the party. O’Toole told Parliament that CSIS informed him that he had been targeted in an ongoing campaign of misinformation coordinated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). When asked, Johnston said that was news to him. (Subsequently, NDP MP Jenny Kwan added that CSIS had told her she was an “evergreen” target of Beijing.)

When Johnston was confronted about the discrepancies, he merely noted that the information CSIS revealed had not been made available to him at the time, and he had “reported on what was made available to us … the amount of information available was an ocean and we saw a very large lake.” (Unfortunately, Johnston could not see any issue with the political equivalent of investigating the causes of the sinking of the Titanic when directed to do so at Lac Tremblant).

Johnston concluded, based on the information provided to him by the government, that he could not attribute the misinformation spread during the 2021 election to state actors. Information coming from many unofficial sources — and via leaks — makes this untenable. Evidence also shows that Chinese Canadians in Richmond, B.C. were bombarded with slander targeting local Conservative MP Kenny Chiu on the WeChat social media platform.

The Hogue commission should add to its focus the activities of Senator Yuen Pau Woo — and the government’s knowledge of these activities. However, once again, the commission’s ability to investigate hinges entirely on the government’s willingness to hand over sensitive and potentially incriminating documents, and for those targeted by misinformation to speak freely knowing that information will be available immediately to those they named as their persecutors.

Until 2022, Woo served as the facilitator (i.e., caucus leader) of the Liberal-aligned Independent Senators Group. In a decision made on Dec. 4, Commissioner Hogue granted Woo the right to participate in the foreign interference inquiry as an intervenor, as “he will contribute the perspective of a political figure working to address issues of foreign interference while advocating for a community that risks being stigmatized or negatively impacted by counter-interference measures, whether proposed or put in place.”

Woo has been accused of adopting the CCP’s rhetoric but has denied working for China. Groups targeted by CCP intelligence operations in Canada (including Uyghurs and Hong Kongers) opposed Woo’s participation in the interference inquiry (along with that of politicians Han Dong and Michael Chan) on the ground that he would be allowed “access to sensitive information shared by witnesses or victims (and) will deter witnesses from speaking freely.”

Their concerns were aired around the same time as a report emerged alleging Woo had pledged to support the United Front, which is an arm of the CCP.  In December, investigative journalist Sam Cooper reported that a recording existed of Woo briefing the Canada Committee 100 Society — a Chinese cultural organization with ties to the United Front according to declassified American intelligence — in May of 2020. In that recording, Woo advised members that groups officially listed by the CCP as United Front Work Department (UFWD) organizations cannot (and presumably, will not) be considered agents of the Chinese state.

However, a Privy Council Office report from 2020 shows that the government knew the CCP’s UFWD had allegedly coordinated electoral interference through community groups. The report specified that the UFWD had facilitated electoral interference in 2019, noting that “the UFWD’s extensive network of quasi-official and local community and interest groups allow it to obfuscate communication and the flow of funds between Canadian targets and Chinese officials.” Despite all this, Woo had reassured the Canada Committee 100 Society that they could continue their activities.

It is already a given that the commission will receive a large portion of its testimony in secret with no cross-examination by the parties. Additionally, the government will have the last word not merely on what information is provided to the inquiry, but on what the commission can publish — even in its final report, as the commission’s terms of reference refer to disclosure procedures that clearly implicate the attorney general’s power to withhold information for the purpose of national security.

This is why the first two days of the inquiry were devoted to managing expectations about how the public’s right to know would need to be “balanced” against national security confidentiality and all the other reasons the government will invoke to justify withholding and censoring information.

It is ironic that at an inquiry made possible by whistleblowers within CSIS, those at the commission will be classed “persons personally bound to secrecy” by an order-in-council issued in tandem with the mandate of the Hogue commission. Most won’t mind; the Hogue commission hired a number of personnel who did yeoman service at the Rouleau commission, including its lead counsel and research council chair.

This time around, there have been no grand public assurances that the government is committed to providing unprecedented access to information. Rather, we’ve been put on notice that obfuscation and dithering over confidentiality will be used to beat us down.

Some parties, like the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, have already indicated they have had enough of the charade. Others, including those like members of Parliament Michael Chong and Jenny Kwan, who were the victims of shocking hostility and ineptitude from the CCP and the government, will likely persist, although it is already clear that they deserve much more information, and much better treatment from the Hogue commission.

As for myself, I can only say, “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.”

Ryan Alford is a professor in the Bora Laskin Faculty of Law at Lakehead University and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

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Banks

TD Bank Account Closures Expose Chinese Hybrid Warfare Threat

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From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Scott McGregor

Scott McGregor warns that Chinese hybrid warfare is no longer hypothetical—it’s unfolding in Canada now. TD Bank’s closure of CCP-linked accounts highlights the rising infiltration of financial interests. From cyberattacks to guanxi-driven influence, Canada’s institutions face a systemic threat. As banks sound the alarm, Ottawa dithers. McGregor calls for urgent, whole-of-society action before foreign interference further erodes our sovereignty.

Chinese hybrid warfare isn’t coming. It’s here. And Canada’s response has been dangerously complacent

The recent revelation by The Globe and Mail that TD Bank has closed accounts linked to pro-China groups—including those associated with former Liberal MP Han Dong—should not be dismissed as routine risk management. Rather, it is a visible sign of a much deeper and more insidious campaign: a hybrid war being waged by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) across Canada’s political, economic and digital spheres.

TD Bank’s move—reportedly driven by “reputational risk” and concerns over foreign interference—marks a rare, public signal from the private sector. Politically exposed persons (PEPs), a term used in banking and intelligence circles to denote individuals vulnerable to corruption or manipulation, were reportedly among those flagged. When a leading Canadian bank takes action while the government remains hesitant, it suggests the threat is no longer theoretical. It is here.

Hybrid warfare refers to the use of non-military tools—such as cyberattacks, financial manipulation, political influence and disinformation—to erode a nation’s sovereignty and resilience from within. In The Mosaic Effect: How the Chinese Communist Party Started a Hybrid War in America’s Backyard, co-authored with Ina Mitchell, we detailed how the CCP has developed a complex and opaque architecture of influence within Canadian institutions. What we’re seeing now is the slow unravelling of that system, one bank record at a time.

Financial manipulation is a key component of this strategy. CCP-linked actors often use opaque payment systems—such as WeChat Pay, UnionPay or cryptocurrency—to move money outside traditional compliance structures. These platforms facilitate the unchecked flow of funds into Canadian sectors like real estate, academia and infrastructure, many of which are tied to national security and economic competitiveness.

Layered into this is China’s corporate-social credit system. While framed as a financial scoring tool, it also functions as a mechanism of political control, compelling Chinese firms and individuals—even abroad—to align with party objectives. In this context, there is no such thing as a genuinely independent Chinese company.

Complementing these structural tools is guanxi—a Chinese system of interpersonal networks and mutual obligations. Though rooted in trust, guanxi can be repurposed to quietly influence decision-makers, bypass oversight and secure insider deals. In the wrong hands, it becomes an informal channel of foreign control.

Meanwhile, Canada continues to face escalating cyberattacks linked to the Chinese state. These operations have targeted government agencies and private firms, stealing sensitive data, compromising infrastructure and undermining public confidence. These are not isolated intrusions—they are part of a broader effort to weaken Canada’s digital, economic and democratic institutions.

The TD Bank decision should be seen as a bellwether. Financial institutions are increasingly on the front lines of this undeclared conflict. Their actions raise an urgent question: if private-sector actors recognize the risk, why hasn’t the federal government acted more decisively?

The issue of Chinese interference has made headlines in recent years, from allegations of election meddling to intimidation of diaspora communities. TD’s decision adds a new financial layer to this growing concern.

Canada cannot afford to respond with fragmented, reactive policies. What’s needed is a whole-of-society response: new legislation to address foreign interference, strengthened compliance frameworks in finance and technology, and a clear-eyed recognition that hybrid warfare is already being waged on Canadian soil.

The CCP’s strategy is long-term, multidimensional and calculated. It blends political leverage, economic subversion, transnational organized crime and cyber operations. Canada must respond with equal sophistication, coordination and resolve.

The mosaic of influence isn’t forming. It’s already here. Recognizing the full picture is no longer optional. Canadians must demand transparency, accountability and action before more of our institutions fall under foreign control.

Scott McGregor is a defence and intelligence veteran, co-author of The Mosaic Effect: How the Chinese Communist Party Started a Hybrid War in America’s Backyard, and the managing partner of Close Hold Intelligence Consulting Ltd. He is a senior security adviser to the Council on Countering Hybrid Warfare and a former intelligence adviser to the RCMP and the B.C. Attorney General. He writes for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.

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2025 Federal Election

In Defeat, Joe Tay’s Campaign Becomes a Flashpoint for Suspected Voter Intimidation in Canada

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Sam Cooper's avatar Sam Cooper

Canadian police initiated review of campaign complaint.

In one of the most closely scrutinized races of Canada’s 2025 federal election, Joseph Tay—the Conservative candidate identified by federal authorities as the target of aggressive Chinese election interference operations—was defeated Monday night in Don Valley North by Liberal Maggie Chi, following a campaign marred by threats, suspected intimidation, and digital suppression efforts.

The Bureau has learned that Canadian police last week reviewed complaints alleging that members of Tay’s campaign team were shadowed in an intimidating manner while canvassing in the final days of the race. The status of the incident review remains unclear.

With over 20,000 votes—a 43 percent share compared to 53 percent for Liberal Maggie Chi—Tay nearly doubled the Conservative Party’s 2021 vote total of 12,098 in this riding.

Last Monday, federal intelligence officials disclosed that Tay was the subject of a highly coordinated transnational repression operation tied to the People’s Republic of China. The campaign aimed to discredit his candidacy and suppress Chinese Canadian voters’ access to his messaging through cyber and information operations.

That same day, federal police advised Tay to suspend door-to-door canvassing, according to two sources with direct knowledge, citing safety concerns. Several days later, Tay’s campaign reported to police that a man had been trailing a door-knocking team in a threatening manner in a Don Valley North neighbourhood.

Following The Bureau’s reporting, the New York Times wrote on Sunday: “Fearing for his safety, Mr. Tay… has waged perhaps the quietest campaign of any candidate competing in the election. The attacks on Mr. Tay have sought to influence the outcome of the race in Don Valley North, a district with a large Chinese diaspora in Toronto, in what is the most vote-rich region in Canada.”

In a twist, in neighbouring Markham–Unionville, Peter Yuen—the Liberal candidate who replaced former MP Paul Chiang, who had made controversial remarks about Tay being turned over to Chinese officials—was defeated by Conservative candidate Michael Ma. According to Elections Canada’s results, Ma secured the riding by about 2,000 votes.

Tay and his campaign team had conducted extensive groundwork in Markham–Unionville earlier this year, where he publicly announced his intention to seek the Conservative nomination in January. However, the party ultimately assigned him on March 24 to Don Valley North—a riding that, according to the 2024 report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), was the site of serious foreign interference by the People’s Republic of China during the 2019 election.

At 2 a.m., Tay posted a message to X thanking supporters: “By God’s grace, though we did not win tonight, we have already won something far greater—the courage to stand, to speak, and to dream together.”

Signaling he may run again, Tay added: “Our journey does not end here. I remain committed to upholding Canadian values—freedom, respect, and community—and will continue to serve and help build a wholesome, principled community in every way I can.”

Last Monday, SITE—Canada’s election-threat monitoring task force—confirmed that Tay was the target of a coordinated online disinformation campaign, warning in briefing materials that “this was not about a single post” but a “deliberate, persistent campaign” designed to distort visibility and suppress legitimate discourse among Chinese-speaking voters.

The tactics bore striking resemblance to interference allegations uncovered by The Bureau during the 2021 federal election, when Conservative MP Bob Saroya was unseated in Markham–Unionville amid allegations that operatives linked to the Chinese government had shadowed Saroya, surveilled his campaign, and sought to intimidate voters. Senior Conservative officials said CSIS provided briefings at the time warning of what they described as “coordinated and alarming” surveillance efforts.

In Tay’s case, official sources confirmed that Chinese-language platforms circulated disinformation framing him as a fugitive, invoking his Hong Kong National Security Law bounty—set at $180,000 CAD—to portray his candidacy as a threat to Canada.

Earlier this month, The Bureau reported that former Liberal MP Paul Chiang—who defeated Conservative incumbent Bob Saroya in 2021—withdrew as a candidate after the RCMP opened a review into remarks he made suggesting that Joe Tay’s election could spark “great controversy” for Canada because of Hong Kong’s national security charges, and that Tay could be handed over to the Chinese consulate to collect a bounty. Chiang later apologized, describing the comments as a poorly judged joke. However, prominent diaspora organizations and human rights groups condemned the remarks as a disturbing example of rhetoric echoing transnational repression.

According to SITE assessments reviewed by The Bureau, coordinated suppression efforts were particularly acute in Don Valley North, where Tay’s online visibility was sharply curtailed across Chinese-language social media ecosystems.

The status of the RCMP’s review into Chiang’s remarks—and a separate complaint to Toronto police alleging that Tay’s campaign staff may have been intimidated while canvassing—remains unclear.

With Mark Carney’s Liberals securing a narrow minority and Canada’s political landscape growing increasingly polarized—against the backdrop of an intensifying cold war between Washington and Beijing—some pundits predict voters could be heading back to the polls sooner than expected. Whether election threat reviewers will now dig deeper into China’s suspected interference in this and other ridings remains an open question.

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