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The Latest Biden/Harris ‘Lawful Pathways’ Scheme: Declare Latin American Migrants to Be ‘Refugees’

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From the Center For Immigration Studies

By Todd Bensman

Thousands flying in who would not have qualified as refugees in the past

Almost sight unseen and scarcely noticed by the American public, the Biden/Harris administration’s Department of Homeland Security has super-charged yet another “Lawful Pathways” program to admit tens of thousands of people from Latin America who they claim would otherwise have crossed the border illegally.

It’s called the Safe Mobility Office Initiative (SMO), Movilidad Segura in Spanish, jump-started in May 2023 and its capacity expanded this spring. The SMO initiative uses the U.S. refugee resettlement system in a historically atypical way that some critics see as abusive to fly in tens of thousands of people from nationalities the United States has very rarely regarded as warranting refugee resettlement in recent decades — in record numbers and in record-fast time, a CIS examination and analysis of the new program shows.

(See my colleague Nayla Rush’s discussion of the SMO initiative in the context the Biden/Harris administration’s broader remaking of the refugee resettlement program.)

From storefront “offices” set up in Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) personnel and United Nations proxies have granted refugee status to at least 21,000 people from seven Latin America countries in the first year of the program, as of May 2024, some half of them having already arrived, a White House fact sheet reports. (Canada and Spain also take part in the SMO initiative, and several thousand additional people were approved for resettlement in those countries.) The newly minted refugees were Haitians, Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, Cubans, Guatemalans, Ecuadorians, and Colombians. Data not yet in will likely show greater numbers through June and July because, in May, the Biden administration expanded the SMO program to add Hondurans and Salvadorans for a total of nine nations whose citizens can now be considered for U.S. refugee status.

Historically, the U.S. bestows the highly desired refugee status on grounds that recipients credibly claim they cannot return home due to a “well-founded fear” of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group, according to USCIS, whose personnel are staffing the SMO foreign offices in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other UN agencies.

The offer of refugee resettlement brings with it an interest- and penalty-free flight loan backed by U.S. taxpayers, followed by a broad assortment of U.S. resettlement aid and welfare benefits, and a quick path to permanent residence and U.S. citizenship, all very difficult to legally reverse.

March 2024 Mixed Migration Centre survey of SMO users shows the vast majority, 90 percent, want to travel to the United States for economic opportunities and better living standards rather than to flee war or persecution.

The 21,000 approved for resettlement as of May are a harbinger of even greater number of “refugee” classifications of essentially economic immigrants in Latin America. Tens of thousands more were in the pipeline to fill the administration’s historically high refugee allocation for the Latin America region, from less than 5,000 to an unprecedented 50,000 in 2024. More than 190,000 had registered for those 50,000 slots by the end of May, although many may be declined and referred by the SMO offices to other “lawful pathways”, such as family reunification visas, labor programs, or the legally dubious parole programs.

“Working closely with international organization partners, we are building capacity, running extensive messaging campaigns, and exponentially increasing the number of people who receive information or services via the SMOs,” Marta Youth, the principal deputy assistant secretary for the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration testified before a congressional committee in March: “In the refugee pathway, we aim to resettle between 35,000 and 50,000 individuals in Fiscal Year 2024, an historic and ambitious goal that would amount to an increase in refugee resettlement from the Western Hemisphere of over 450 percent from last year.”

This sharp departure from traditional operation of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) — essentially handing out of refugee approvals to those usually regarded as economic migrants looking to work in the U.S. — is explained by the administration’s public justification: to divert the recipients from planned travel on dangerous migrant trails en route to illegal U.S. Southwest border crossings from Mexico.

That rationale for the expansion of “refugee” resettlement from Latin America comes in an election year in which a mass illegal immigration border crisis figures as a top problem among voters.

“The Safe Mobility initiative is one of the many ways the United States is facilitating access to safe and lawful pathways from partner countries in the region at no cost, so refugees and vulnerable migrants don’t have to undertake dangerous journeys in search of safety and better opportunities,” one State Department release explained last year.

The administration’s justifications for its newfound generosity of refugee status handouts strikes some familiar with USRAP as one of several deviations from operational norms, for short-term political purposes, indicating misuse or even abuse.

Elizabeth Jacobs, a former USCIS attorney and now the Center for Immigration Studies’ director of regulatory affairs and policy, told me the Biden administration’s goal is to serve the short-term political purpose of reducing the appearance of border congestion in an election year. That comes at a steep price, she said.

“This new program is consistent with the Biden administration’s overall strategy to obscure the border crisis from the American public, but not actually reduce the entries of inadmissible aliens to the United States,” Jacobs said. “There are winners and losers to nearly all immigration policies. The losers, here, are the aliens abroad who meet the statutory criteria for refugee status and are in actual need of resettlement.”

One of a Trio of Programs Enabling Invisible Immigration

The Safe Mobility Offices program is actually the third initiative in a broader Biden administration policy strategy of addressing the bad publicity caused by mass illegal border crossings that surpassed nine million in just the first three years of the Biden administration.

The SMO works in concert with two other major “lawful pathways” programs that, between the pair, have paroled into the country on “humanitarian” protection grounds more than one million inadmissible economic immigrants since 2022 who otherwise would supposedly have staged the politically problematic illegal border crossings the administration now wants to reduce.

One of those programs has admitted more than 500,000 inadmissible aliens from 100 countries on two-year renewable but legally challenged “humanitarian parole” permits granted through the “CBP One” mobile phone app. These hundreds of thousands were admitted into the United States at eight U.S.-Mexico land border ports of entry. (See: “New Records Unveil Surprising Scope of Secretive ‘CBP One’ Entry Scheme”.)

The other humanitarian parole program has rechanneled from presumed border crossings another half-million inadmissible aliens by pre-authorizing mostly Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans to fly commercial from 77 countries into 45 international U.S. airports, ostensibly as humanitarian rescues. (See “New Data: Many Migrants in Biden’s ‘Humanitarian’ Flights Scheme Coming in from Safe Countries and Vacation Wonderlands”.)

At least 75,000 per month are still entering through just these two ad hoc, congressionally unauthorized, and politically controversial admission programs.

Those two cousin programs have drawn some controversyopposition, and calls by Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump to end at least the flights program after the Center for Immigration Studies forced the Biden administration to reveal details through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.

But the SMO program is far less known and, probably as a result, has yet to draw similar critiques. Those rejected for refugee status might well be referred to the land and air parole programs.

Nayla Rush, senior researcher for the Center and its refugee policy expert, told me current approvals for refugee status warrant questioning as to whether recipients are eligible.

“They want to bring people from Central America as refugees to decrease illegal entry when we are supposed to be bringing people in who are the most vulnerable,” Rush said. “Are we admitting the most vulnerable, those in real need of resettlement, or is it another policy or diplomatic move undertaken by the Biden administration to address the ‘root causes’ of immigration in the region?”

Deviations from the Norm

Historically, the U.S. State Department and USCIS have reserved refugee resettlement mainly for those fleeing active war zones or violent political upheavals in home countries.

Top nationalities over the two decades have featured people from war-torn Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iraq, Bhutan, Syria, Somalia, and some republics of the former Soviet Union, according to published government data. In the last 10 years, Burma, DRC, and Iraq were the nationalities most often granted refugee status.

By contrast, refugee grants in Latin America have long been scant or even nonexistent for decades right up until this year.

From 2002 to 2022, for example, the U.S. has granted refugee status to comparatively tiny numbers of Haitians (49), Nicaraguans (7), Venezuelans (183), Colombians (3,638), and Guatemalans (1,322), albeit sometimes more to Cubans (46,600, due to unique diplomatic considerations).

Most are already safely resettled in third nations, such as Haitians in Chile and Brazil, and were long regarded as not warranting special U.S. protection. Only four Haitians, for instance, were granted refugee status between 2012 and 2022. The U.S. granted only 173 Venezuelans refugee status during that time, few even in the years following that country’s 2017 economic collapse that sent more than seven million of them into 15 nearby countries.

Now, a seemingly great urgency powers approvals of Venezuelans in unprecedented numbers and in record time.

Most SMO applicants are Venezuelans who have been living for years safely and often prosperously in Colombia and Ecuador, hardly refugee material. (See Video: “U.S. Enabling Mass Asylum and Humanitarian Permit Fraud”).

UNHCR screens them all and makes referrals to USCIS adjudicators in the SMO storefronts. On average, the offices were processing some 8,000 cases monthly, including 3,000 at just one local SMO office in Bogota, Colombia, according to a University of Wisconsin policy brief titled “Year One of Safe Mobility Offices in Colombia”.

Of the 3,000 a month whom UNHCR refers to the local SMO office in Colombia, the U.S. government approves 95 percent for refugee resettlement, the university’s brief reported.

Many tens of thousands are Guatemalans and Nicaraguans, who have not suffered war in decades, are registering, too.

A State Department spokesman told CBS News in late May that Safe Mobility Offices in mid-May had “enabled a six-fold increase in the number of refugees resettled from the Western Hemisphere”. In the first half of FY2024, October 2023 through March 2024, more refugees from Latin America and the Caribbean were admitted (8,518) than in any previous full year.

In addition to the oddity of bestowing refugee status on those long regarded as ineligible economic migrants is the speed at which U.S. authorities are processing them. This is perhaps the fastest refugee processing in program history.

“In Just Nine Days!” Breaking Speed Records? Approvals for refugee resettlement, which include security vetting and needs assessments, often took an average of between 18-24 months or even longer. USRAP had already been using technology to reduce processing time for many to as short as six months, Nayla Rush has reported.

But the boasted “expedited” process for Latin Americans seems to be breaking all records.

“USCIS in Colombia processes refugee resettlement applications in only 9 days!” boasts a sub headline in the University of Wisconsin’s policy brief about the first year of SMO. Final arrangements for transportation afterward may require another month or two.

In Colombia and elsewhere where SMO offices are operating, the Associated Press has reported, traditional refugee screening has gone from a “yearslong effort” to “only months”.

“These refugee applicants undergo the same rigorous and multi-layered interagency screening and vetting process as all other refugees and, if eligible, most will arrive in the United States in just a matter of months,” the State Department’s Marta Youth testified.

Free Taxpayer-Backed Airfare?

The previously off-limits U.S. refugee status is especially appealing to Latin Americans because, in addition to providing beneficiaries with a bonanza of U.S. resettlement assistance and a path to U.S. citizenship, the State Department offers interest-free “travel loans” for airline tickets that can exceed $10,000 for families. There is no penalty for failure to pay.

The “loan” program was first set up in the 1950s to help people escape Eastern European Communist countries and is used to help refugees travel in from all over the world. Today, the UN’s International Organization for Migration administers the money on behalf of the State Department, and non-governmental resettlement agencies collect the payments, for commissions of up to 25 percent, according to the New York Times and other reports.

But repayment and loan default rates remain a public mystery, as the State Department under several past administrations has never willingly published this information. In response to litigation by Judicial Watch seeking the default and repayment information for 2016-2017, the State Department asserted that it did not track the information. At the time, Judicial Watch cited a private review of records provided by a whistleblower showing that from 1952 to 2002, IOM issued $1,020,803,910 in loans and had recovered only about half of it.

Under the Biden administration, the State Department has continued its resistance to releasing the information. It has ignored a Center for Immigration Studies Freedom of Information Act request for default rates and a 2022 information request by a dozen Republican members of Congress led by Rep. Lance Gooden (R-Texas).

The Immediate Future

The future of these programs hangs in the balance of the upcoming presidential election. Donald Trump, the Republican nominee, has promised to reverse all of Biden’s border-related immigration policies, and this one would likely not escape the Republican’s hatchet. While a Trump administration likely cannot legally reverse refugee grants, it can quickly return USRAP to its prior norm of focusing on higher-priority populations suffering actual war and persecution in their homelands.

But should another Democrat win office, such as Vice President Kamala Harris, expect further expansion of the refugee program in Latin America, as well as the other two humanitarian parole programs. I expect further increases in the Latin America refugee allocation beyond 50,000 to meet the far greater demand for its benefits, as well as more SMO offices in both existing countries and new ones in Latin America. And skyrocketing taxpayer burdens for all of it, on both sides of the American border.


The author would like to thank Eric Gordy for his research assistance.

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Inside Xi’s Fifth Column: How Beijing Uses Gangsters to Wage Political Warfare in Taiwan — and the West

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A new Jamestown Foundation report details how China’s Ministry of State Security and allied triads have been used to subvert Taiwan’s democracy as part of Beijing’s united front.

Editor’s Note

The Bureau has previously reported on how Chinese state-linked crime networks have exploited Canada’s real estate market, casinos, and diaspora associations, often under the cover of united front work. One of these groups, the Chinese Freemasons, has been linked to meetings with Canadian politicians, as reported by The Globe and Mail ahead of the 2025 federal election. The Globe noted that the Toronto chapter explicitly advocates for the “peaceful reunification of Taiwan.” The Jamestown Foundation’s new findings on groups active in Taiwan — including the Chinese Freemasons, also known as the Hongmen, the related Bamboo Union triad, and the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) — show that Taiwan is the epicenter of a strategy also visible, though less intensively, across democracies including the United States. The parallels — from Vancouver to Sydney to New York to Taipei — should alert governments that the “fifth column” problem is international, and it is growing.

TAIPEI — At a banquet in Shenzhen more than two decades ago, Chang An-lo — the Bamboo Union boss known as “Big Brother Chang” or “White Wolf” — raised a glass to one of the Communist Party’s princelings. His guest, Hu Shiying, was the son of Mao Zedong’s propaganda chief. “Big Brother Chang,” Hu reportedly toasted him, an episode highlighted in a new report from the Jamestown Foundation.

Hu would later be described by Australian journalist John Garnaut as an “old associate of Xi Jinping.” That link — through Hu and other princelings Chang claimed to have met — placed the Bamboo Union leader within the orbit of Party elites. Garnaut also reported that the Ministry of State Security (MSS) had used the Bamboo Union to channel lucrative opportunities to Taiwanese politicians. According to Jamestown researcher Martin Purbrick, a former Royal Hong Kong Police intelligence officer, such episodes show how the CCP has systematically co-opted Taiwanese organized crime as part of its united front strategy.

“The long history of links between the CCP and organized crime groups in Taiwan,” Purbrick writes, “shows that United Front strategy has embedded itself deeply into Taiwan’s political life.”

Chang’s global influence is not a relic of the past. The Bureau reported, drawing on leaked 1990s Canadian immigration records, that intelligence indicated Chang’s triad had effectively “purchased” the state of Belize, on Mexico’s southern border, for use in smuggling illegal immigrants into the United States. But Chang is more relevant than ever as fears of Beijing invading Taiwan grow. In August 2025, seated in his Taipei office before a PRC flag, he appeared on a YouTube program to deny he led any “fifth column.” Instead, he insisted Taiwan must “embrace” Beijing and cast himself as a “bridge for cross-strait peace.”

His denial came just months after Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice accused CUPP of acting as a political front for organized crime and foreign interference. Police suspected more than 130 members of crimes ranging from homicide to drug trafficking. Prosecutors charged CUPP operatives with taking $2.3 million from the CCP to fund propaganda. In January, the Ministry of the Interior moved to dissolve the party outright, submitting the case to Taiwan’s Constitutional Court. By March, a Kaohsiung court sentenced CUPP deputy secretary-general Wen Lung and two retired military officers for recruiting Taiwanese personnel on behalf of the PRC. According to court filings, Wen had been introduced by Chang to the Zhuhai Taiwan Affairs Office, which in turn connected him to a PLA liaison officer.

President Lai Ching-te, in a March national security address, warned that Beijing was attempting to “divide, destroy, and subvert us from within.” Intelligence assessments in Taipei describe the Bamboo Union and CUPP as part of a potential “fifth column,” prepared to foment unrest and manipulate opinion in the event of an invasion.

The historical record shows why Taipei is so concerned. Chang’s name has shadowed some of Taiwan’s darkest chapters. In the 1980s, he was suspected of involvement in the assassination of dissident writer Henry Liu in California. He was later convicted of heroin smuggling in the United States, serving ten years in prison. After returning to Taiwan, he fled again in 1996 when authorities sought his arrest, spending 17 years in Shenzhen. During those years, he cultivated ties with influential Party families. At the Shenzhen banquet, Washington Post journalist John Pomfret wrote, Hu Shiying introduced him as “Big Brother Chang,” signaling acceptance in elite circles. Garnaut, writing over a decade later, noted that Hu was an “old associate of Xi Jinping” and that Chang had moved comfortably among other princelings, including sons of a former CCP general secretary and a top revolutionary general.

These connections translated into political capital. When Chang returned to Taiwan in 2013, he launched the China Unification Promotion Party — a pro-Beijing group openly advocating “one country, two systems.” He declared his mission was to “cultivate red voters.” CUPP cadres and Bamboo Union affiliates became visible in street politics, clashing with independence activists and disrupting rallies. During U.S. Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2021 visit, they staged counter-protests echoing Beijing’s line.

The ideological warfare runs even deeper. A Phoenix TV segment from 2011 recalled how a Bamboo Union elder declared in 1981 that he “would rather the CCP rule Taiwan than have Taiwan taken away by Taiwan independents.” Chang himself has echoed this sentiment for decades. In 2005, he launched a Guangzhou-based group called the Defending China Alliance, later rebranded in Taipei as CUPP. His activism has spanned disruptive protests, nationalist rallies, and propaganda campaigns amplified through China-linked media channels.

Purbrick situates these developments within a wider united front playbook. Taiwanese triads and Chinese Freemason associations are courted as grassroots mobilizers, intermediaries, and psychological enforcers. A recent report from the Washington Post has also linked the Chinese Freemasons to the powerful 14K Triad, a global network deeply implicated in Chinese underground banking networks accused of laundering fentanyl proceeds for Mexican cartels through the United States. The triad–Hongmen nexus complements other CCP efforts: online influence campaigns, cultural outreach, and intelligence recruitment inside Taiwan’s military.

The implications extend beyond Taiwan. In Canada, Australia, the United States, Southeast Asia, and beyond, intelligence agencies have documented how PRC-linked triads launder drug profits, fund political donations, and intimidate diaspora critics. These groups benefit from tacit state protection: their criminality overlooked so long as they advance Beijing’s strategic objectives. It is hybrid warfare by stealth — not soldiers storming beaches, but criminal syndicates reshaping politics from within.

For Taiwan, the Bamboo Union and CUPP remain immediate threats. For other democracies, they serve as case studies of how united front tactics adapt across borders. President Lai’s warning that Beijing seeks to “create the illusion that China is governing Taiwan” resonates internationally.

Before leaving journalism to establish an advisory firm, John Garnaut himself became entangled in the political fallout of his reporting. He was sued by a Chinese-Australian real estate developer from Shenzhen, who had funneled large donations to Australian political parties. The developer, later publicly implicated in the case by an Australian lawmaker under parliamentary privilege, successfully sued Garnaut for defamation in 2019. Subsequent disclosures confirmed the tycoon’s implication in an FBI indictment involving United Nations influence schemes and notorious Chinese operative Patrick Ho, later linked to a Chinese oil conglomerate accused of targeting the Biden family in influence operations. Together, these episodes highlight the global reach of united front networks.

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A Nation Built on Sand: How Canada Squanders Its Abundance

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By Garry Clement

Columnist Garry Clement, former RCMP anti–money laundering expert, argues Canada’s leaders have built prosperity on sand — leaving the nation exposed to collapse unless urgent reforms are made.

Canada is celebrated abroad as a safe, prosperous, and open society. But beneath the surface, a far more precarious reality is taking shape. The pillars of our economy — land, real estate, natural resources, and immigration — have been left vulnerable to foreign manipulation, criminal exploitation, and political negligence. The result is what can only be described as a sandcastle economy — striking at first glance, but fragile. Like the parable of the house built on sand, it is a foundation vulnerable to give way when the storm comes.

Investigative journalist Sam Cooper has long warned that foreign capital and organized crime have deeply infiltrated Canada’s real estate market. On Prince Edward Island, the Bliss and Wisdom Buddhist group quietly acquired swaths of farmland and property, raising questions about how religious fronts with Chinese connections gained such leverage in a province with limited oversight. In Saskatchewan, Chinese investors have been buying up valuable farmland, raising alarms about food sovereignty and the lack of restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land. Meanwhile in British Columbia, governments continue to downplay or outright ignore the extent to which transnational money laundering has fueled a housing market now completely detached from local incomes.

All of this has unfolded against a backdrop of minimal transparency, weak beneficial ownership registries, and virtually no effective enforcement. The same blind spots that allowed casinos and luxury real estate in Vancouver to become laundromats for dirty money are now being replicated nationwide.

The most urgent threat tied to these financial blind spots is fentanyl. Canada has become one of the world’s top destinations for proceeds from synthetic drug trafficking — a crisis that has devastated families from coast to coast. Chinese triads, Mexican cartels, and local gangs launder profits through casinos, shell companies, and real estate deals. Yet federal legislation continues to lag behind, leaving law enforcement outgunned. Every toxic opioid death in Canada is not only a health tragedy, but also a reminder of how organized crime is exploiting our lax financial controls. While other countries have implemented tough anti-money laundering regimes, Canada remains dangerously complacent.

That same complacency extends to national security. Canada has repeatedly delayed designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, despite overwhelming evidence of its involvement in financing terrorism and conducting influence operations abroad. Our allies — including the United States — have acted. Canada, however, remains an outlier, seemingly unwilling to confront the risk of Iranian proxy activity operating in plain sight within our borders.

Immigration policy reveals similar weaknesses. Foreign students, particularly from India, have become central to the financial survival of colleges and universities. Yet a growing number are not here primarily to study. Instead, education visas have become a backdoor into Canada’s workforce, particularly in industries such as trucking. The tragic Humboldt Broncos bus crash in 2018 exposed gaps in training and licensing in the trucking sector. Since then, reports have continued to surface of foreign students entering the industry without adequate skills — a risk not only to public safety but to the integrity of our immigration system. Ottawa has failed to adequately regulate this pipeline, preferring instead to rely on the tuition dollars and temporary labour it generates.

Editor’s Note: Forthcoming Bureau investigations, citing U.S. government sources, question how widespread fraud and Indian transnational crime capture of Canada’s commercial trucking industry have fueled the flow of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine — turning the country into a weak link for its international allies.

The threads running through these crises are clear: willful blindness, weak laws, and short-term political expediency. Land and natural resources are being sold without regard for sovereignty. Real estate markets are distorted by laundered money. Organized crime groups funnel fentanyl profits into Canada with ease. The IRGC operates without effective restriction. And the education system is exploited as a labour channel, with little oversight. Canada is, in effect, trading away its long-term security for short-term economic gains.

Politicians, bureaucrats, and regulators too often dismiss warnings as alarmist or xenophobic, when in fact they reflect real risks to the stability of the country. A sandcastle can stand tall on the shore, admired in the moment, but everyone knows what comes next. Unless urgent steps are taken — enforcing transparency in land ownership, restricting foreign control of farmland and resources, tightening anti-money laundering measures, confronting hostile foreign actors, and restoring integrity to the education and immigration systems — collapse is inevitable.

The signs are already here: families priced out of homes, farmers squeezed out of land, fentanyl overdoses climbing, and a public losing faith in the fairness of the system. Canada prides itself on being open and inclusive. But openness without vigilance is vulnerability. Like unwise stewards, our leaders have been gifted with a land of overflowing abundance, and yet they have squandered its potential through short-sighted choices. That failure must be corrected — immediately and wisely — if the nation is to not only thrive, but survive.

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Former senior RCMP officer Garry Clement consults with corporations on anti-money laundering, contributed to the Canadian academic text Dirty Money, and wrote Canada Under Siege, and Undercover, In the Shady World of Organized Crime and the RCMP

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