The foreign interference inquiry’s initial report, for example, establishes clear evidence of Chinese involvement in several electoral constituencies during the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. One particularly egregious example is Trudeau’s refusal to act on CSIS warnings about possible Chinese interference at a Liberal nomination meeting in the Toronto riding of Don Valley North (DVN) in 2019 because, as inquiry commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue wrote, doing so could “have direct electoral consequences as the [Liberal Party of Canada] is expected to win DVN.” In other words, Trudeau put his party’s election prospects – and his own desire to remain prime minister – ahead of concerns about China’s influence over Canada’s democratic processes.

That the Liberals are soft on China is hardly a revelation. As Burton notes, it dates back to Trudeau’s failed attempt to open free trade talks with China in 2017. Since then, his Liberal government has been reluctant to treat China as the threat to Canada it has repeatedly proved itself to be. Instead, Ottawa has gone to great lengths to avoid angering Beijing. Examples include the long delay in banning Huawei from Canada’s 5G networks, China’s years-long detention of the Two Michaels, the lingering presence of secret Chinese police stations in Canada, the David Johnson special rapporteur debacle, and on and on.

The Liberals’ soft spot: Following Trudeau’s failed attempt to obtain a free trade deal with China – shown here meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, December 2017 – his government has repeatedly avoided confronting China on many significant issues related to Canada’s national security. (Source of photo: The Canadian Press/Sean Kilpatrick)

Asked if the recent blitz of activity on the China file represents a sea change in the current government’s attitude towards China, Burton remains deeply skeptical. “I don’t think the Liberals are prepared to do anything that would ever permanently compromise their larger project of Canada gaining significant market share in China,” he says, adding, “the Liberal Party still doesn’t get the message that China is not a nation we can engage with, without significant cost to the integrity of Canadian values.”

The Weakest Link

While clearly damning, the incremental damage done by the NML files to the Liberals’ reputation on China is likely minimal. It’s hard to imagine it getting any worse. The more significant blow, says Christian Leuprecht, is to Canada’s international reputation as a vigilant and reliable ally. “For years the Liberals have been accused of not taking the China threat seriously,” says Leuprecht, a national security expert and professor of political science at Queen’s University and the Royal Military College of Canada, both located in Kingston, Ontario. “As a result, Canada is currently under significant international scrutiny, especially from our allies in NATO and the U.S., who are concerned about the extent of Chinese infiltration of Canadian political institutions.”

In friendly Western countries, Leuprecht observes in an interview, the Trudeau government’s passivity in the face of Chinese aggression has created the perception Canada does not take matters of national security or defence seriously. And this is weakening the country’s stature abroad. Perhaps the biggest consequence is that Canada is no longer treated as a top-tier member of NATO, the premier Western military alliance. “We are increasingly being left out of meetings, our speaking time is vastly reduced and information is not being shared,” Leuprecht observes.

“Our worst fears”: According to national security expert Christian Leuprecht, the NML spy scandal is a significant blow to Canada’s international reputation; the revelation that Chinese agents penetrated Canada’s highest-security biohazard lab reinforces the belief that Canada is “the weak link” among Western allies.

This contention is backed by Kerry Buck, Canada’s former ambassador to NATO. In a recent interview with the CBC Buck explained that Canada currently occupies NATO’s so-called “quadrant of shame” due to its poor track record on both defence spending and military research. Other evidence of Canada’s waning relevance among its allies includes its exclusion from the expanding Australia/UK/U.S. (AUKUS) defence relationshipand from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an informal pact among the U.S., Australia, Japan and India meant to contain Chinese expansion in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

At a time when our allies seem less willing to engage with Canada on defence matters, evidence that our highest-security biohazard lab was exploited by federally-employed Chinese agents strikes to the very core of our reliability. “This is confirmation of our worst fears,” says Leuprecht. “No other country, at least from what we know, has experienced the same degree of infiltration. Everything in these documents reinforces the perception that Canada is the weak link.”

Leuprecht emphasizes that Canada is a small player in the intelligence world, and the worsening perception that the country can’t be trusted to keep its own secrets safe will give allied countries further pause when considering whether to share intelligence with Canada or to include it in operational plans. “None of our allies really needs Canada [in order] to do the things they want to do,” Leuprecht says. “So this significantly reduces our leverage and influence to do the things we want to do internationally. That’s what’s really at stake here.”

“Quadrant of shame”: Kerry Buck (left), Canada’s former ambassador to NATO, notes that her country belongs to a special category of underperforming NATO members due to its lack of commitment on defence spending and military research; this perception has also seen Canada excluded from newly-established security partnerships such as the Australia/UK/U.S. (AUKUS) defence relationship. Shown at right, an AUKUS meeting in March 2023. (Sources of photos: (left) The Foreign Policy Project; (right) Chad J. McNeeley, DOD)

Who Dropped the Ball?

Beyond the harm done to Canada’s political and international reputations, the release of the Qiu-Cheng files puts the performance of domestic agencies involved in the affair, including CSIS, the RCMP and Canada’s federal bureaucracy, under the microscope as well.

Alongside the many Canadian journalists and politicians who have been pouring through the documents, Leuprecht notes that foreign intelligence services will also be studying them carefully and making their own judgements. “What will German intelligence or MI6 or the CIA think about collaborating with Canada in the future when they read these files?” asks Leuprecht. “The first thing they will see is a bunch of rookie mistakes.”