espionage
Scathing Report Reveals How Deadly Pathogens and Sensitive Research Walked Out the Door Under Justin Trudeau’s Watch
And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave.
Imagine for a moment that Canada’s top research lab, handling the most dangerous pathogens in the world—Ebola, Henipah, you name it—was left wide open to foreign actors. Not just any foreign actors, but researchers with direct links to the Chinese Communist Party, its military, and its notorious Thousand Talents Program, which is designed to poach foreign research for China’s own strategic and military gain. It sounds like something out of a bad spy thriller, right? But it’s not fiction; it’s happening in Canada, and no one in Ottawa seemed interested in sounding the alarm.
As detailed in the newly released Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship, titled The Nexus Between Science and National Security in Canada: The Case of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, what we’re seeing is an astonishing lapse in oversight and a clear failure by the Canadian government to protect its own assets. Under the chairmanship of Ken Hardie, this committee has exposed one of the most significant threats to Canada’s national security in recent years. And yet, it’s clear from Ottawa’s inaction that they’re more concerned about diplomacy than defending the integrity of Canada’s scientific research.
Here’s the story: Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng, both highly placed researchers at Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg, were discovered to have sent live samples of deadly pathogens to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Yes, you heard that right—the same lab in China where U.S. officials raised concerns about safety standards, the same lab with ties to China’s military bio-defense programs. The duo apparently facilitated the transfer of these dangerous viruses, without ever informing their Canadian superiors of their deep, undisclosed ties to the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences. And instead of acting immediately, Canada’s Public Health Agency dragged its feet for nearly 18 months, leaving these individuals with full access to our country’s most secure lab until they were finally escorted out.
The kicker? Dr. Qiu was not only tied to China’s state-run labs; she was a part of China’s Thousand Talents Program, an initiative infamous for recruiting scientists to advance Chinese military and technological aims abroad. The intelligence community has been ringing the bell on this program for years, pointing out that it’s often used to extract intellectual property and cutting-edge technology from unsuspecting Western institutions. Yet, for years, our own government allowed researchers with links to this very program to operate freely inside our lab, handling the kinds of materials that could cause a pandemic.
So what did Ottawa do in response to all of this? They waited. The government sat on its hands, allowing these researchers to continue their work, their connections to China notwithstanding. When the red flags became impossible to ignore, what did Ottawa do? They spent another year “investigating” before finally revoking their security clearances and escorting them out of the lab. Incredibly, these two were essentially free to operate, with minimal oversight, until they were finally fired. No public condemnation, no mention of betrayal. Just a quiet, bureaucratic exit.
And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave. The RCMP concluded an investigation but chose not to charge them, despite clear evidence of security breaches, undisclosed foreign affiliations, and access to sensitive biological data. Now, these individuals are reportedly back in China, free to use the knowledge they gained at the NML in any way they—or their government—sees fit. This is what happens when national security is treated as an afterthought.
Think about the stakes here. These scientists facilitated the transfer of live, deadly virus samples—Ebola and Henipah, no less—to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a lab linked to China’s bio-defense ambitions. Had any of these samples been mishandled or compromised during transit, we could have seen an epidemic that would make COVID look like a mild cough. And yet, Ottawa’s response? They let them leave the country, free to take that sensitive information and those deadly pathogens with them.
This isn’t just a case of two rogue scientists. It’s a textbook example of Ottawa’s endless naivety when it comes to China—a government so desperate to avoid rocking the diplomatic boat that it overlooked the most basic principles of national security. And while Canadian leadership dithers, China’s influence operations continue to infiltrate our most secure facilities, capitalizing on our open doors and blind trust. This isn’t about science—it’s about sovereignty. And if Canada’s leaders are too timid to confront the truth about foreign interference, it’s the rest of us who will suffer the consequences.
In any other country, this would have been treated as a scandal of epic proportions. But here in Canada, under Trudeau’s watch, we not only allowed suspected national security threats to operate in a top-level lab, but we gave them the green light to walk away and take their knowledge straight to a foreign power. This report is a wake-up call, but whether Ottawa will finally act to protect Canada’s interests remains to be seen.
The report spells out these security lapses in brutal detail. Not only was cybersecurity alarmingly lax, but access protocols were so outdated that foreign entities had unregulated access to sensitive research and biological materials. This wasn’t just a mishap; this was a failure of leadership on every level, starting at the top. The government’s own Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had flagged China’s intent to poach scientific research for years. And yet, they ignored that, allowing China, a known aggressor in intellectual property theft, to waltz in and access sensitive data with minimal checks.
Then there’s the espionage risk. It’s clear that China has been targeting Canada’s scientific research for its own military development. This is not speculation; it’s reality. China’s Thousand Talents Program, which the report scrutinizes, is essentially a recruitment and resource-gathering initiative. It encourages Chinese researchers to siphon scientific advancements from abroad and bring them home—not for the betterment of the world, but for China’s military ambitions. The report finally calls this out as a threat, recommending that Canada sever research partnerships with Chinese institutions in high-stakes fields like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum science.
But here’s the kicker—the recommendations themselves. They make sense, of course. Canada desperately needs to beef up its lab security and stop outsourcing critical research to hostile nations. The report outlines several sensible measures: enhanced security protocols, regular cybersecurity assessments, and yes, a hard stop on partnerships with Chinese research entities in sensitive areas. But what’s troubling is that it took this long and this much incompetence for these ideas to even make it to paper.
Let’s be clear: updating national security policies shouldn’t be a new idea, yet we learn from this report that Canada’s policies haven’t seen a significant update since 2004. Think about that—back then, the world had barely even heard of Facebook. Since then, we’ve entered an era where China has risen as a global tech superpower, yet Ottawa has done next to nothing to adapt. We’re only now beginning to take steps that would have been considered basic precautions a decade ago.
Another recommendation—the establishment of a “List of Trusted Countries”—highlights just how overdue these changes are. The committee suggests that research access should be limited to trusted allies. It’s a painfully obvious measure, but one the government has been too naïve or complacent to enact. We’re talking about limiting sensitive access to allies, not adversaries—a straightforward move that apparently requires a parliamentary committee to remind the government to consider.
So, here’s the good news buried in this report: finally, someone in Ottawa acknowledges that foreign actors, and particularly China, pose a real threat to Canada’s scientific integrity and national security. The recommendations to update policies, bolster security measures, and increase oversight are crucial first steps to protecting Canadian interests. We finally have a report that states the obvious: Canada’s national labs are vulnerable, and it’s about time we stop treating foreign research partners as benign collaborators.
But the real story here isn’t in the recommendations themselves—it’s in what this report reveals about Canada’s persistent, dangerous naivety. The Canadian government allowed this exposure to go on for years, despite clear signs that Chinese actors were exploiting our openness. And the delays! Eighteen months passed between the initial security breach and the firing of these researchers. That delay isn’t just bureaucratic; it’s reckless. The report also conveniently dances around calling China a direct adversary. This soft language is a transparent attempt to avoid upsetting the diplomatic apple cart, even as the Chinese Communist Party plunders Canadian resources right under our noses.
By failing to designate the NML as a facility of national security interest, Ottawa has, in essence, downplayed the real risks tied to foreign interference. This is a lab that deals with viruses capable of sparking pandemics, and yet, our government didn’t even think to prioritize its protection until foreign espionage scandals blew up in public view.
This report is a reality check, but it’s also an indictment. It reveals that Canada’s leaders have been asleep at the wheel while China set its sights on our labs, our technology, and our national interests. Yes, it’s a step forward—but the fact that it took this level of security failure and foreign interference for Ottawa to even begin addressing these issues is a damning testament to their refusal to confront the truth about China.
And here’s the real kicker: nothing in this report guarantees that these recommendations will be enforced. Without the political will to label China as the strategic adversary it is, all of this could end up as little more than lip service. Meanwhile, we had traitors who betrayed Canada, exposing sensitive research to a foreign power—and what did Justin Trudeau do? He let them walk. No charges, no accountability—just a quiet “thanks for coming.” Once again, it will be Canadians—not the bureaucrats in Ottawa—who pay the price for this government’s cowardice.
If Justin Trudeau can’t stand up to China, then it’s time we find a leader who can.
From LifeSiteNews
Of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s fleet of 1,200 drones, 79% pose national security risks due to them being made in China
Canada’s top police force spent millions on now near-useless and compromised security drones, all because they were made in China, a nation firmly controlled by the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) government.
An internal report by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to Canada’s Senate national security committee revealed that $34 million in taxpayer money was spent on a fleet of 973 Chinese-made drones.
Replacement drones are more than twice the cost of the Chinese-made ones between $31,000 and $35,000 per unit. In total, the RCMP has about 1,228 drones, meaning that 79 percent of its drone fleet poses national security risks due to them being made in China.
The RCMP said that Chinese suppliers are “currently identified as high security risks primarily due to their country of origin, data handling practices, supply chain integrity and potential vulnerability.”
In 2023, the RCMP put out a directive that restricted the use of the made-in-China drones, putting them on duty for “non-sensitive operations” only, however, with added extra steps for “offline data storage and processing.”
The report noted that the “Drones identified as having a high security risk are prohibited from use in emergency response team activities involving sensitive tactics or protected locations, VIP protective policing operations, or border integrity operations or investigations conducted in collaboration with U.S. federal agencies.”
The RCMP earlier this year said it was increasing its use of drones for border security.
Senator Claude Carignan had questioned the RCMP about what kind of precautions it uses in contract procurement.
“Can you reassure us about how national security considerations are taken into account in procurement, especially since tens of billions of dollars have been announced for procurement?” he asked.
“I want to make sure national security considerations are taken into account.”
The use of the drones by Canada’s top police force is puzzling, considering it has previously raised awareness of Communist Chinese interference in Canada.
Indeed, as reported by LifeSiteNews, earlier in the year, an RCMP internal briefing note warned that agents of the CCP are targeting Canadian universities to intimidate them and, in some instances, challenge them on their “political positions.”
The final report from the Foreign Interference Commission concluded that operatives from China may have helped elect a handful of MPs in both the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections. It also concluded that China was the primary foreign interference threat to Canada.
Chinese influence in Canadian politics is unsurprising for many, especially given former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s past admiration for China’s “basic dictatorship.”
As reported by LifeSiteNews, a Canadian senator appointed by Trudeau told Chinese officials directly that their nation is a “partner, not a rival.”
China has been accused of direct election meddling in Canada, as reported by LifeSiteNews.
As reported by LifeSiteNews, an exposé by investigative journalist Sam Cooper claims there is compelling evidence that Carney and Trudeau are strongly influenced by an “elite network” of foreign actors, including those with ties to China and the World Economic Forum. Despite Carney’s later claims that China poses a threat to Canada, he said in 2016 the Communist Chinese regime’s “perspective” on things is “one of its many strengths.”
Shared Labs, Shared Harm names MIT, Oxford and McGill among universities working with Beijing-backed AI institutes linked to Uyghur repression and China’s security services.
Over the past five years, some of the world’s most technologically advanced campuses in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom — including MIT, Oxford and McGill — have relied on taxpayer funding while collaborating with artificial-intelligence labs embedded in Beijing’s security state, including one tied to China’s mass detention of Uyghurs and to the Ministry of Public Security, which has been accused of targeting Chinese dissidents abroad.
That is the core finding of Shared Labs, Shared Harm, a new report from New York–based risk firm Strategy Risks and the Human Rights Foundation. After reviewing tens of thousands of scientific papers and grant records, the authors conclude that Western public funds have repeatedly underwritten joint work between elite universities and two Chinese “state-priority” laboratories whose technologies drive China’s domestic surveillance machinery — an apparatus that, a recent U.S. Congressional threat assessment warns, is increasingly being turned outward against critics in democratic states.
The key Chinese collaborators profiled in the study are closely intertwined with China’s security services. One of the two featured labs is led by a senior scientist from China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), the sanctioned conglomerate behind the platform used to flag and detain Uyghurs in Xinjiang; the other has hosted “AI + public security” exchanges with the Ministry of Public Security’s Third Research Institute, the bureau responsible for technical surveillance and digital forensics.
The report’s message is blunt: even as governments scramble to stop technology transfer on the hardware side, open academic science has quietly been supplying Chinese security organs with new tools to track bodies, faces and movements at scale.
It lands just as Washington and its allies move to tighten controls on advanced chips and AI exports to China. In the Netherlands’ Nexperia case, the Dutch government invoked a rarely used Cold War–era emergency law this fall to take temporary control of a Chinese-owned chipmaker and block key production from being shifted to China — prompting a furious response from Beijing, and supply shocks that rippled through European automakers.
“The Chinese Communist Party uses security and national security frameworks as tools for control, censorship, and suppressing dissenting views, transforming technical systems into instruments of repression,” the report says. “Western institutions lend credibility, knowledge, and resources to Chinese laboratories supporting the country’s surveillance and defense ecosystem. Without safeguards … publicly funded research will continue to support organizations that contribute to repression in China.”
Cameras and Drones
The Strategy Risks team focuses on two state-backed institutes: Zhejiang Lab, a vast AI and high-performance computing campus founded by the Zhejiang provincial government with Alibaba and Zhejiang University, and the Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Research Institute (SAIRI), now led by a senior CETC scientist. CETC designed the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, or IJOP — the data system that hoovered up phone records, biometric profiles and checkpoint scans to flag “suspicious” people in Xinjiang.
United Nations investigators and several Western governments have concluded that IJOP and related systems supported mass surveillance, detention and forced-labor campaigns against Uyghurs that amount to crimes against humanity.
Against that backdrop, the scale of Western collaboration is striking.
Since 2020, Zhejiang Lab and SAIRI have published more than 11,000 papers; roughly 3,000 of those had foreign co-authors, many from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. About 20 universities are identified as core collaborators, including MIT, Stanford, Harvard, Princeton, Carnegie Mellon, Johns Hopkins, UC Berkeley, Oxford, University College London — and Canadian institutions such as McGill University — along with a cluster of leading European technical universities.
Among the major U.S. public funders acknowledged in these joint papers are the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Department of Transportation. For North America, the warning is twofold: U.S. and Canadian universities are far more entangled with China’s security-linked AI labs than most policymakers grasp — and existing “trusted research” frameworks, built around IP theft, are almost blind to the human-rights risk.
In one flagship example, Zhejiang Lab collaborated with MIT on advanced optical phase-shifting — a field central to high-resolution imaging systems used in satellite surveillance, remote sensing and biometric scanning. The paper cited support from a DARPA program, meaning U.S. defense research dollars effectively underwrote joint work with a Chinese lab that partners closely with military universities and the CETC conglomerate behind Xinjiang’s IJOP system.
Carnegie Mellon projects with Zhejiang Lab focused on multi-object tracking and acknowledged funding from the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Office of Naval Research. Multi-object tracking is a backbone technology for modern surveillance — allowing cameras and drones to follow multiple people or vehicles across crowds and city blocks. “In the Chinese context,” the report notes, such capabilities map naturally onto “public security applications such as protest monitoring,” even when the academic papers present them as neutral advances in computer vision.
The report also highlights Zhejiang Lab’s role as an international partner in CAMERA 2.0, a £13-million U.K. initiative on motion capture, gait recognition and “smart cities” anchored at the University of Bath, and its leadership in BioBit, a synthetic-biology and imaging program whose advisory board includes University College London, McGill University, the University of Glasgow and other Western campuses.
Meanwhile, SAIRI has quietly become a hub for AI that blurs public-security, military and commercial lines.
Established in 2018 and run since 2020 by CETC academician Lu Jun — a designer of China’s KJ-2000 airborne early-warning aircraft and a veteran of command-and-control systems — SAIRI specializes in pose estimation, tracking and large-scale imaging.
Under Lu, the institute has deepened ties with firms already sanctioned by Washington for their roles in Xinjiang surveillance. In 2024 it signed cooperation agreements with voice-recognition giant iFlytek and facial-recognition champion SenseTime, as well as CloudWalk and Intellifusion, which market “smart city” policing platforms.
SAIRI also hosted an “AI + public security” exchange with the Ministry of Public Security’s Third Research Institute — the bureau responsible for technical surveillance and digital forensics — and co-developed what Chinese media billed as the country’s first AI-assisted shooting training system. That platform, nominally built for sports, was overseen by a Shanghai government commission that steers AI into defense and public-security applications, raising the prospect of its use in paramilitary or police training.
Outside the lab, MPS officers have been charged in the United States with running online harassment and intimidation schemes targeting Chinese dissidents, and MPS-linked “overseas police service stations” in North America and Europe have been investigated for pressuring exiles and critics to return to China.
Meanwhile, Radio-Canada, drawing on digital records first disclosed to Australian media in 2024 by an alleged Chinese spy, has reported new evidence suggesting that a Chinese dissident who died in a mysterious kayaking accident near Vancouver was being targeted for elimination by MPS officers and agents embedded in a Chinese conglomerate that the U.S. Treasury accuses of running a money-laundering and modern-slavery empire out of Cambodia.
The new reporting focuses on a former undercover agent for Office No. 1 of China’s Ministry of Public Security — the police ministry at the core of so-called “CCP police stations” in global and Canadian cities, and reportedly tasked with hunting dissidents abroad.
Taken together, cases of alleged Chinese “police station” networks operating globally, new U.S. Congressional reports on worldwide threats from the Chinese Communist Party, and the warnings in Shared Labs, Shared Harm suggest that Western universities are not only helping to build China’s domestic repression apparatus with U.S. taxpayer funds, but may also be contributing to global surveillance tools that can be paired with Beijing’s operatives abroad.
To counter this trend, the paper urges a reset in research governance: broaden due diligence to weigh human-rights risk, mandate transparency over all international co-authorships and joint labs, condition partnerships with security-linked institutions on strict safeguards and narrow scopes of work, and strengthen university ethics bodies so they take responsibility for cross-border collaborations.
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