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Proposed changes to Canada’s Competition Act could kneecap our already faltering economy

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

Aaron Wudrick, for Inside Policy

No party wants to be seen as soft on “big business” but that is a bad reason to pass potentially harmful, counterproductive competition policy legislation.

The recent federal budget was widely panned – in particular by the entrepreneurial class – for its proposal to raise the capital gains inclusion rate. As it turns out, “soak the rich” might sound like clever politics (it’s not) but it’s definitely a poor narrative if your goal is to incentivize and encourage risk-taking and investment.

But while this damaging measure in the federal budget has at least drawn plenty of public ire, other harmful legislative changes are afoot that are getting virtually no attention at all. They’re contained in Bill C-59 – the omnibus bill still wending its way through Parliament to enact measures contained in last fall’s economic statement – and consist of major proposed amendments to Canada’s Competition Act. The lack of coverage and debate on these changes is all the more concerning given that, if enacted, they could have a long-term negative impact on our economy comparable to the capital gains inclusion rate hike.

Worst of all, the most potentially damaging changes weren’t even in the original bill, but were brought forward by the NDP at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, and are lifted directly from a previous submission made to the committee by the Commissioner of Competition himself. In effect, they would change competition law to put a new onus on businesses to prove a negative: that having a large market share isn’t harmful to consumers.

MPs on the committee have acknowledged they don’t really understand the changes – they involve a “concentration index” described as “the sum of the squares of the market shares of the suppliers or customers” – but the government itself previously cast doubt on the need for this additional change. It’s obvious that a lot of politics are at play here: no party wants to be seen as soft on “big business.” But this is about much more than “big business.” It’s about whether we want to enshrine in law unfounded, and potentially very harmful, assumptions about how competition operates in the real world.

The changes in question are what are known in legal circles as “structural presumptions” – which, as the name implies, involve creating presumptions in law based on market “structure” – in this case, regarding the concentration level of a given market. Presumptions in law matter, because they determine which side in a competition dispute – the regulatory authority, or the impugned would-be merging parties – bears the burden of proof.

So why is this a bad idea? There are at least three reasons.

First of all, the very premise is faulty: most economists consider concentration measures alone (as opposed to market power) to be a poor proxy for the level of competition that prevails in a given market. In fact, competition for customers often increases concentration.

This may strike most people as counterintuitive. But because robust competition often leads to one company in particular offering lower prices, higher quality, or more innovative products, those who break from the pack tend to attract more customers and increase their market share. In this respect, higher concentration can actually signal more, rather than less, competition.

Second, structural presumptions for mergers are not codified in the US or any other developed country other than Germany (and even then, at a 40 percent combined share rather than 30 percent). In other words, at a time when Canada’s economy is suffering from the significant dual risks of stalled productivity growth and net foreign investment flight, the amendments proposed by the NDP would introduce one of the most onerous competition laws in the world.

There is a crucial distinction between parliamentarians putting such wording into legislation – which bind the courts – and regulatory agencies putting them in enforcement guidelines, which leave courts with a degree of discretion.

Incorporating structural presumptions into legislation surpasses what most advanced economies do and could lead to false negatives (blocking mergers that would, if permitted, actually benefit consumers), chill innovation (as companies seeking to up their game in the hopes of selling or merging are deterred from even bothering), and result in more orphaned Canadian businesses (as companies elect not to acquire Canadian operations on global transactions).

Finally, the impact on merger review will not be a simplification but will likely just fetter the discretion and judgment of the expert and impartial Competition Tribunal in determining which mergers are truly harmful for consumers and give more power to the Competition Bureau, the head of which is appointed by the federal Cabinet. Although the Competition Bureau is considered an independent law enforcement agency, it must still make its case before a court (the Tribunal, in this case).The battleground at the Tribunal will shift from focusing on the likely effect of the merger on consumers to instead entertaining arguments between the Bureau’s and companies’ opposing arguments about defining the relevant market and shares.

Even if, after further study, the government decided that rebuttable structural presumptions are desirable, C-59 already repeals subsection 92(2) of the Competition Act, which allows the Tribunal to develop the relevance of market shares through case law – a far better process than a blanket rule in legislation. Nothing prevents the Bureau from incorporating structural presumptions as an enforcement screen for mergers in its guidelines, which is what the United States has done for decades, rather than putting strict (and therefore inflexible) metrics into statute and regulations.

No one disputes that Canada needs a healthy dose of competition in a wide range of sectors. But codifying dubious rules around mergers risks doing more harm than good. In asking for structural presumptions to be codified, the Competition Bureau is missing the mark. Most proposed mergers that will get caught by these changes should in fact be permitted on the basis that consumers would be better off – and the uncertainty of being an extreme outlier on the global stage in terms of competition policy will create yet another disincentive to start and grow businesses in Canada.

This is the opposite of what Canada needs right now. Rather than looking for ill-advised shortcuts that entangle more companies in litigation and punt disputes about market definition rather than effects to the Tribunal, the Bureau should be focusing on doing its existing job better: building evidence-backed cases against mergers that would actually harm Canadians.


Aaron Wudrick is the domestic policy director at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. 

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It’s time to finally free the beer

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This article supplied by Troy Media.

Troy MediaBy Samantha Dagres and Alessia Iafano

Canada’s booze trade is a protectionist mess.

Have you ever stopped to wonder who decides what beers you’re allowed to buy? Probably not. But every time you wander into a beer store you’re browsing a lineup handpicked not just by brewers, but by bureaucrats. Your choices are less about your taste and more about politics.

Sure, you’ll find Ontario staples like Mill Street. But if you’ve got a taste for an award-winning B.C. wine, a Quebec microbrew or a small-batch rye from Saskatchewan, prepare for disappointment. Welcome to the great Canadian alcohol paradox: it’s easier to buy French wine than a bottle of craft gin from the next province over.

This absurdity gave rise to the “free the beer” movement: an effort to let Canadian alcohol flow across provincial borders like, well, an actual country. The issue hit the headlines a few years back when Gérard Comeau of New Brunswick had the gall to go on a beer run to Quebec. Instead of paying a nearly $300 fine for that cross-border booze crime, he lawyered up and took the fight to the Supreme Court. Spoiler alert: he lost. The court ruled that there’s no constitutional right to free trade within Canada. Yes, you read that correctly.

Still, Comeau’s case lit a fire under the debate. Losing the battle doesn’t always mean losing the war. Since then, there’s been modest movement toward sanity. Ottawa even announced it wanted to liberalize domestic alcohol trade earlier this year. One problem: it can’t. Canada’s Constitution gives provinces—not the federal government—control over alcohol sales. And many provinces are still clinging to their liquor fiefdoms.

To be fair, a few have started to uncork their markets. Manitoba lets you order from out-of province businesses. B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia have partially openmarkets. The rest—including Ontario—are still stuck in prohibition-era thinking.

Want to know how much Ontario’s LCBO monopoly costs you? Check your next receipt. Then subtract about one-third of the pre-tax price: that’s the LCBO’s average markup. While grocery stores survive on razor-thin margins, the government liquor store is pouring itself a nice fat profit at your expense. But it’s not just your wallet that suffers. That monopoly also limits your choices. In Ontario it’s easier to get wine from Spain than from Quebec. Welcome to Canada.

Yes, there’s been some progress. Ontario has cracked open the door to reform with recent steps to expand direct-to-consumer sales. And now, it’s making noise about taking the lead on building a national framework that would finally let Canadians buy booze from across provincial borders without jumping through flaming hoops.

Earlier this year, Ontario signed memoranda of understanding with B.C., Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, P.E.I. and Nova Scotia—agreements aimed at reducing trade barriers and building bilateral deals. Several other provinces have done the same.

The goal? A pan-Canadian framework to allow direct-to-consumer alcohol sales, where producers can ship across the country and consumers can buy what they actually want.

As of 2024, the domestic alcohol market was worth $15.5 billion for Canadian-made products—or $26.2 billion when you include imports. It’s not just common sense—it’s good economics. Smaller producers in particular stand to gain. In fact, 76 per cent of Canadian wineries say direct-to-consumer sales would increase their revenue in the next year.

And for consumers? Better access, better variety and—brace yourself—possibly lower prices.

The first framework agreement was promised with Manitoba by the end of June. That deadline has come and gone Still, for those who’ve been fighting to pry Canada’s alcohol trade from the grip of protectionism and provincial monopolies, the finish line is at least on the horizon. If Premier Doug Ford wants to live up to his “open for business” motto, now’s the time. Honour the commitments. Finish the job. Then maybe—just maybe—Canadians will finally be able to toast with a beer from another province without breaking the law.

Samantha Dagres is the communications manager and Alessia Iafano is a research intern at the Montreal Economic Institute, a think tank with offices in Montreal, Ottawa and Calgary.

Troy Media empowers Canadian community news outlets by providing independent, insightful analysis and commentary. Our mission is to support local media in helping Canadians stay informed and engaged by delivering reliable content that strengthens community connections and deepens understanding across the country.

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Health-care costs for typical Canadian family will reach over $19,000 this year

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From the Fraser Institute

By Nadeem Esmail, Nathaniel Li and Milagros Palacios

A typical Canadian family of four will pay an estimated $19,060 for public health-care insurance this year, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.

“Canadians pay a substantial amount of money for health care through a variety of taxes—even if we don’t pay directly for medical services,” said Nadeem Esmail, director of health policy studies at the Fraser Institute and co-author of The Price of Public Health Care Insurance, 2025.

Most Canadians are unaware of the true cost of health care because they never see a bill for medical services, may only be aware of partial costs collected via employer health taxes and contributions (in provinces that impose them), and because general government revenue—not a dedicated tax—funds Canada’s public health-care system.

The study estimates that a typical Canadian family consisting of two parents and two children with an average household income of $188,691 will pay $19,060 for public health care this year. Couples without dependent children will pay an estimated $17,338. Single Canadians will pay $5,703 for health care insurance, and single parents with one child will pay $5,934.

Since 1997, the first year for which data is available, the cost of healthcare for the average Canadian family has increased substantially, and has risen more quickly than its income. In fact, the cost of public health care insurance for the average Canadian family increased 2.2 times as fast as the cost of food, 1.6 times as fast as the cost of housing, and 1.6 times as fast as the average income.

“Understanding how much Canadians actually pay for health care, and how much that amount has increased over time, is an important first step for taxpayers to assess the value and performance of the health-care system, and whether it’s financially sustainable,” Esmail said.

The Price of Public Health Care Insurance, 2025

  • Canadians often misunderstand the true cost of our public health care system. This occurs partly because Canadians do not incur direct expenses for their use of health care, and partly because Canadians cannot readily determine the value of their contribution to public health care insurance.
  • In 2025, preliminary estimates suggest the average payment for public health care insurance ranges from $5,213 to $19,060 for six common Canadian family types, depending on the type of family.
  • Between 1997 and 2025, the cost of public health care insurance for the average Canadian family increased 2.2 times as fast as the cost of food, 1.6 times as fast as the average income, and 1.6 times as fast as the cost of shelter. It also increased much more rapidly than the average cost of clothing, which has fallen in recent years.
  • The 10 percent of Canadian families with the lowest incomes will pay an average of about $702 for public health care insurance in 2025. The 10 percent of Canadian families who earn an average income of $88,725 will pay an average of $8,292 for public health care insurance, and the families among the top 10 percent of income earners in Canada will pay $58,853.
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