First-ever BRICS absence deepens questions over internal CCP dissent

Chinese President Xi Jinping will skip the upcoming BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the first time he has ever missed the gathering of major emerging powers—a development that will add to speculation that Xi’s power among elite Chinese Communist circles is being challenged by a faction publicly humiliated by Xi in 2022.

Beijing cited a “scheduling conflict,” according to multiple officials involved in summit planning, South China Morning Post has reported. But Xi’s absence—coming amid intensifying economic pressures and purges within the People’s Liberation Army—has triggered speculation that deeper internal political currents may be at play.

China’s delegation to Brazil will instead be led by Premier Li Qiang, marking the second time in under a year that Xi has delegated such a high-level multilateral forum. Observers note that Li also stood in for Xi at the G20 summit in India in 2023.

The BRICS platform is a key pillar of China’s push for a multipolar world, challenging the Western-led order.

The official explanation for Xi’s absence—that he has already met Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva twice in the past year—has done little to quell questions about the Chinese leader’s standing at home. Those concerns are being amplified by mounting signs of internal dissent within the Chinese Communist Party, as China’s economy falters and long-suppressed questions about Xi’s hardline tactics against the West, including mounting threats to invade Taiwan, gain traction with the reemergence of a sidelined political faction.

As detailed in a recent Jamestown Foundation analysis, Xi Jinping may be facing renewed political friction from within the Party’s elite ranks—specifically, the so-called Tuanpai, or Youth League faction, aligned with former president Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao.

The history of the Xi-Hu rift is punctuated by a theatrical public humiliation: in October 2022, Hu Jintao was forcibly escorted from the closing session of the CCP’s 20th Party Congress. The moment was captured on live television and interpreted globally as Xi’s final symbolic purge of Hu’s faction. Hu, seated next to Xi Jinping, appeared to reach for documents on the table. Li Zhanshu, seated to Hu’s left, took the papers and placed them out of reach. Xi signaled, and two security staff approached Hu, gently lifting him from his seat and escorting him out. Hu appeared reluctant, attempting to retrieve the documents and briefly exchanging words with Xi. He also patted Premier Li Keqiang, a key figure in the Youth League faction, on the shoulder before leaving. The stunning incident lasted about 90 seconds.

Li died less than a year later, in October 2023, reportedly from a sudden heart attack while swimming in Shanghai. His unexpected death at age 68—soon after leaving office—was officially described as natural, but has fueled speculation among Chinese observers and dissidents, with some questioning the timing and circumstances.

Evidence of the Hu faction’s comeback emerged from the secretive Party retreat in Beidaihe in August 2023. According to Nikkei Asia, and later corroborated by additional sources, three senior Communist Party elders delivered pointed criticisms of Xi Jinping’s policies behind closed doors. All three had ties to the former Hu-Wen administration. Their intervention reportedly provoked visible frustration from Xi, according to individuals familiar with the meeting.

In a possible gesture of appeasement—or vulnerability—Xi has more recently echoed terminology traditionally associated with Hu’s tenure. He invoked the phrase “scientific, democratic, and law-based policymaking,” a hallmark of Hu’s governing lexicon, signaling either rhetorical triangulation or a forced concession to resurgent internal pressures.

The most striking signal of renewed factional maneuvering is the quiet reemergence of Hu Chunhua, according to Jamestown’s analysis, the protégé of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao once viewed as a potential future president. Xi sidelined Hu Chunhua in 2022 by excluding him from the Politburo—an unprecedented break from succession norms. But in recent months, Hu has been deployed in high-level diplomatic missions typically reserved for top officials.

In April 2024, Hu led a Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegation to West Africa. The next month, he appeared at the Vietnamese Embassy to pay respects following the death of Vietnam’s former president—a role traditionally carried out by a Politburo-level official.

Xi’s sweeping anti-corruption purges in 2023—many of which targeted military figures linked to the Central Military Commission—have depleted some of his institutional backing. The Jamestown Foundation notes that these purges, rather than consolidating Xi’s grip, may have created new political openings for rivals.

Taken together with broader indicators of factional turbulence, Xi’s BRICS no-show feeds a growing intelligence narrative—shared by The Bureau’s expert sources in the United States and Taiwan—that China’s paramount leader, having consolidated power through sweeping purges, is now encountering mounting signs of blowback from within the Party.