Ottawa’s proposed emission cap lacks any solid scientific or economic rationale

From the Fraser Institute

By Jock Finlayson and Elmira Aliakbari

Forcing down Canadian oil and gas emissions within a short time span (five to seven years) is sure to exact a heavy economic price, especially when Canada is projected to experience a long period of weak growth in inflation-adjusted incomes and GDP per person.

After two years of deliberations, the Trudeau government (specifically, the Environment and Climate Change Canada department) has unveiled the final version of Ottawa’s plan to slash greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) from the oil and gas sector.

The draft regulations, which still must pass the House and Senate to become law, stipulate that oil and gas producers must reduce emissions by 35 per cent from 2019 levels by between 2030 and 2032. They also would establish a “cap and trade” regulatory regime for the sector. Under this system, each oil and gas facility is allocated a set number of allowances, with each allowance permitting a specific amount of annual carbon emissions. These allowances will decrease over time in line with the government’s emission targets.

If oil and gas producers exceed their allowances, they can purchase additional ones from other companies with allowances to spare. Alternatively, they could contribute to a “decarbonization” fund or, in certain cases, use “offset credits” to cover a small portion of their emissions. While cutting production is not required, lower oil and gas production volumes will be an indirect outcome if the cost of purchasing allowances or other compliance options becomes too high, making it more economical for companies to reduce production to stay within their emissions limits.

The oil and gas industry accounts for almost 31 per cent of Canada’s GHG emissions, while transportation and buildings contribute 22 and 13 per cent, respectively. However, the proposed cap applies exclusively to the oil and gas sector, exempting the remaining 69 per cent of the country’s GHG emissions. Targeting a single industry in this way is at odds with the policy approach recommended by economists including those who favour strong action to address climate change.

The oil and gas cap also undermines the Trudeau government’s repeated claims that carbon-pricing is the main lever policymakers are using to reduce GHG emissions. In its 2023 budget (page 71), the government said “Canada has taken a market-driven approach to emissions reduction. Our world-leading carbon pollution pricing system… is highly effective because it provides a clear economic signal to businesses and allows them the flexibility to find the most cost-effective way to lower their emissions.”

This assertion is vitiated by the expanding array of other measures Ottawa has adopted to reduce emissions—hefty incentives and subsidies, product standards, new regulations and mandates, toughened energy efficiency requirements, and (in the case of oil and gas) limits on emissions. Most of these non-market measures come with a significantly higher “marginal abatement cost”—that is, the additional cost to the economy of reducing emissions by one tonne—compared to the carbon price legislated by the Trudeau government.

And there are other serious problems with the proposed oil and gas emissions gap. For one, emissions have the same impact on the climate regardless of the source; there’s no compelling reason to target a single sector. As a group of Canadian economists wrote back in 2023, climate policies targeting specific industries (or regions) are likely to reduce emissions at a much higher overall cost per tonne of avoided emissions.

Second, forcing down Canadian oil and gas emissions within a short time span (five to seven years) is sure to exact a heavy economic price, especially when Canada is projected to experience a long period of weak growth in inflation-adjusted incomes and GDP per person, according to the OECD and other forecasting agencies. The cap stacks an extra regulatory cost on top of the existing carbon price charged to oil and gas producers. The cap also promises to foster complicated interactions with provincial regulatory and carbon-pricing regimes that apply to the oil and gas sector, notably Alberta’s industrial carbon-pricing system.

The Conference Board of Canada think-tank, the consulting firm Deloitte, and a study published by our organization (the Fraser Institute) have estimated the aggregate cost of the federal government’s emissions cap. All these projections reasonably assume that Canadian oil and gas producers will scale back production to meet the cap. Such production cuts will translate into many tens of billions of lost economic output, fewer high-paying jobs across the energy supply chain and in the broader Canadian economy, and a significant drop in government revenues.

Finally, it’s striking that the Trudeau government’s oil and gas emissions cap takes direct aim at what ranks as Canada’s number one export industry, which provides up to one-quarter of the country’s total exports. We can’t think of another advanced economy that has taken such a punitive stance toward its leading export sector.

In short, the Trudeau government’s proposed cap on GHG emissions from the oil and gas industry lacks any solid scientific, economic or policy rationale. And it will add yet more costs and complexity to Canada’s already shambolic, high-cost and ever-growing suite of climate policies. The cap should be scrapped, forthwith.

Authors:

Jock Finlayson

Senior Fellow, Fraser Institute

Elmira Aliakbari

Director, Natural Resource Studies, Fraser Institute

Related Topics:#DraymondGreen #ElmiraAliakbari #FraserInstitute #JockFinlayson CanadaOilAndGasSector OttawaEmissionCap

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Why Japan wants Western Canadian LNG

Published on December 31, 2025

Todayville

From Resource Works

By Ian Biana

In a Dec. 22, 2025 article, influential Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun laid out why Japan is placing growing strategic weight on liquefied natural gas exports from Western Canada – and why the start of full-scale operations at LNG Canada marks a significant shift in Japan’s energy-security calculus.

The article, written by staff writer Shiki Iwasawa, approaches Canadian LNG not as a climate story or an industrial milestone, but as a response to the vulnerabilities Japan has experienced since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended global gas markets.

1. Shorter distance and faster delivery

The most immediate advantage identified is geography. LNG shipped from British Columbia’s Pacific coast reaches Japan in about 10 days, roughly half the time required for cargoes originating in the Middle East or the U.S. Southeast, which can take 16 to 30 days.

For Japan – the world’s largest LNG importer – shorter voyages mean lower transportation costs, tighter inventory management, and reduced exposure to disruptions while cargoes are at sea.

2. Avoidance of global maritime choke points

Just as important, Canadian LNG avoids the world’s most precarious shipping bottlenecks.

The Asahi report emphasizes that shipments from B.C. do not pass through either:

the Strait of Hormuz, increasingly volatile amid Middle East conflict, or
the Panama Canal, where climate-driven water shortages have already led to passage restrictions.

Japanese officials explicitly frame these routes as strategic liabilities. As one senior government official responsible for energy security told the newspaper: “We, the government, have high hopes. It means a lot not having to go through the choke points.”

From Japan’s perspective, Canada’s Pacific-facing terminals offer a rare combination of proximity and route resilience.

3. Political reliability and allied status

The article contrasts Canada sharply with Russia, once a significant LNG supplier to Japan through the Sakhalin-2 project.

Before the Ukraine war, Russia accounted for about 10 per cent of Japan’s LNG imports. When Japan joined international sanctions, Moscow responded by restructuring the project’s ownership – a move that underscored how energy supplies can be weaponized.

A government source reflected on that experience bluntly: “We had thought it would be OK if we diversified procurement sources, but we were at risk of power outages even if only 10 percent (of LNG) didn’t reach Japan.”

Canada, by contrast, is described as a friendly and politically stable nation, free from sanctions risk and viewed as a long-term, rules-based partner.

4. Scale, certainty, and investment momentum

The Asahi article devotes considerable attention to the fundamentals of LNG Canada itself.

Key features highlighted include:

approximately $14 billion in total development costs,
14 million tonnes per year of production capacity,
two liquefaction trains already operating,
natural gas sourced from inland Canada and transported via a 670-kilometre pipeline to the coast,
and the successful shipment of first cargoes in mid-2025.

Mitsubishi Corp., which holds a 15 per cent stake, has rights to market 2.1 million tonnes annually to Japan and other Asian buyers. Mitsubishi expects the project to generate tens of billions of yen in annual profits starting in the fiscal year beginning April 2026.

At a Nov. 4 news conference, Mitsubishi president Katsuya Nakanishi said the company is actively considering additional investment to expand capacity, with internal sources indicating output could eventually double.

5. LNG’s continuing role in Japan’s energy system

The article situates Canadian LNG within Japan’s broader energy strategy. Under Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Law, LNG is designated a “specified critical product.” The government maintains dedicated funds to secure supply during emergencies.

While nuclear power remains central to long-term planning, officials acknowledge LNG’s indispensable role. A senior economy ministry official told Asahi: “Nuclear power is the key player in the spotlight, but thermal power (mainly fueled by LNG) is the key player behind the scenes.”

Japan’s latest Basic Energy Plan projects LNG imports rising to 74 million tonnes by 2040, roughly 10 per cent higher than today, underscoring why secure, politically insulated suppliers matter.

What Japan’s view tells Canada

In a recent Canada-Japan leaders’ meeting on the sidelines of APEC, Prime Minister Mark Carney and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi discussed expanding economic ties, with energy cooperation specifically highlighted around the LNG Canada project as a key element of their bilateral relationship. While Takaichi didn’t make a detailed public statement about Canadian LNG itself, the joint statement underscored Japan’s interest in stable and diversified LNG supplies—of which Canadian exports are a part of the broader Indo-Pacific energy security context.

What emerges from Asahi Shimbun’s reporting is a pragmatic assessment shaped by recent shocks. Japan values Canadian LNG because it is closer, less exposed to conflict-prone routes, backed by a stable political system, and already delivering cargoes at scale.

For Canadian readers, the message is unambiguous: Western Canadian LNG is not being embraced because of rhetoric or aspiration, but because it aligns with the operational, geopolitical, and economic priorities of one of the world’s most energy-dependent nations.

Energy

Canada’s debate on energy levelled up in 2025

Published on December 30, 2025

Todayville

From Resource Works

By Geoff Russ

Compared to last December, Canadians are paying far more attention.

Canada’s energy conversation has changed in a year, not by becoming gentler, but by becoming real. In late 2024, pipelines were still treated as symbols, and most people tuned out. By December 2025, Canadians are arguing about tolls, tariffs, tanker law, carbon pricing, and Indigenous equity in the same breath, because those details now ultimately decide what gets built and what stays in the binder. Prime Minister Mark Carney has gone from a green bureaucrat to an ostensible backer of another pipeline from Alberta to the West Coast.

From hypothetical to live instrument

The pivot began when the Trans Mountain expansion started operating in May 2024, tripling capacity from Alberta to the B.C. coast. The project’s C$34 billion price tag, and the question of who absorbs the overrun, forced a more adult debate than the old slogans ever allowed. With more barrels moving and new Asian cargoes becoming routine, the line stopped being hypothetical and became a live economic instrument, complete with uncomfortable arithmetic about costs, revenues, and taxpayer exposure.

The American election cycle then poured gasoline on the discussion. Talk in Washington about resurrecting Keystone XL, alongside President-elect Donald Trump’s threats of 25 percent tariffs, reminded Canadians how quickly market access can be turned into leverage.

In that context, Trans Mountain is being discussed not just as infrastructure, but as an emergency outlet if U.S. refiners start pricing in new levies.

The world keeps building

Against that backdrop, the world kept building. Global pipeline planning has not paused for Canadian anxieties, with more than 233,000 kilometres of large diameter oil and gas lines announced or advancing for 2024 to 2030. The claim that blocking Canadian projects keeps fossil fuels in the ground sounds thinner when other jurisdictions are plainly racing ahead.

The biggest shift, though, is domestic. Ottawa and Alberta signed a memorandum of understanding in late November 2025 that sketches conditions for a potential new oil pipeline to the West Coast, alongside a strengthened industrial carbon price and a Pathways Alliance carbon capture requirement. One Financial Post column argued the northwest coast fight may be a diversion, because cheaper capacity additions are on the table. Another argued the MOU is effectively a set of investment killers, because tanker ban changes, Indigenous co ownership, B.C. engagement, and CCUS preconditions create multiple points of failure.

This is where Margareta Dovgal deserves credit. Writing about the Commons vote where Conservatives tabled a motion echoing the Liberals’ own MOU language, she captured the new mood. Canadians are no longer impressed by politicians who talk like builders and vote like blockers. Symbolic yeses and procedural noes are now obvious, and voters are keeping score.

Skills for a new era

The same sharper attention is landing on carbon capture, once a technocratic sidebar. Under the MOU, a new bitumen corridor is tied to Pathways Alliance scale carbon management, and that linkage is already shaping labour planning. A Calgary based training initiative backed by federal funding aims to prepare more than 1,000 workers for carbon capture and storage roles, a sign that contested policy is producing concrete demand for skills.

British Columbia is no longer watching from the bleachers. It flared again at Carney’s December 18 virtual meeting, after Environment Minister Steven Guilbeault resigned from cabinet over it. Premier David Eby has attacked the Alberta Ottawa agreement as unacceptable, and Prime Minister Mark Carney has been forced into talks with premiers amid trade uncertainty. Polling suggests the public mood is shifting, too, with a slim majority of Canadians, and of British Columbians, saying they would support a new Alberta to West Coast pipeline even if the B.C. government opposed it, and similar support for lifting the tanker ban.

None of this guarantees a new line, or even an expanded one. But compared with last year’s tired trench warfare, the argument now has stakes, participants, and facts. Canadians have woken up to the reality that energy policy is not a culture war accessory. It is industrial policy, trade policy, and national unity policy, all at once.

Resource Works News