Salted Ducks, Supercars, and State Access: How FBI Agents Say Beijing Bought Influence in the Heart of New York Government

The upcoming trial of Linda Sun — also known as Wen Sun — may prove to be the most sophisticated and high-level political infiltration operation in the United States publicly tied to Beijing’s United Front system. A youthful, naturalized immigrant from China, Sun rose through New York State’s bureaucracy to become a senior diversity official. Now, she stands accused of secretly manipulating two Democratic governors — effectively scripting Andrew Cuomo’s praise of Chinese pandemic mask shipments, while blocking Governor Kathy Hochul from meeting Taiwanese officials and ensuring her silence on the Chinese Communist Party’s mass detention of Uyghurs.

According to a sweeping superseding indictment filed in June 2025, Sun and her husband Chris Hu began enriching themselves through large-scale money laundering and corruption as early as March 2020, just weeks into the COVID-19 emergency. Prosecutors allege that Sun exploited her insider position to steer over $34 million in pandemic-era PPE contracts to companies tied to her husband and relatives — all while concealing her financial interests. In exchange, Sun and Hu allegedly received more than $8 million in kickbacks, routed through a constellation of opaque bank accounts and disguised as legitimate business revenue.

Luxury perks included gifts of Nanjing ducks and high-end travel to China, including a stay in a Beijing hotel suite previously used by former First Lady Michelle Obama. According to federal agents, much of the couple’s illicit income was funneled from China through underground banking and masked wire transfers into Leivine Wine & Spirits, a high-end boutique liquor store in Flushing that allegedly operated as a laundering front for Chinese-backed capital.

A criminal trial for Sun, 41, and Hu, 40, is scheduled for November.

The government further alleges that Sun’s influence reached into the core of New York’s executive branch. Under then-Governor Cuomo, Sun allegedly coordinated with senior officials from the Chinese Consulate in New York to orchestrate public expressions of gratitude toward Beijing during the early COVID-19 crisis. This culminated in Cuomo’s April 4, 2020 tweet: “We finally got some good news today. The Chinese government helped facilitate a donation of 1,000 ventilators that are coming in today. We thank @ConsulGeneralNY and the Chinese government.” According to FBI agents, this statement was not spontaneous — it was part of a covert diplomatic effort Sun was tasked with securing, even as she and her husband were allegedly profiting from tens of millions of dollars in pandemic-era contracts awarded to entities secretly tied to them.

Sun and Hu deny all allegations. Their attorneys have mounted a vigorous defense, filing numerous motions to dismiss the charges and suppress evidence obtained through federal search warrants. The most recent failed motion, filed a week ago, asked the government “to retract and delete its June 26, 2025 press release” regarding the new PPE-fraud and money-laundering allegations, and accused FBI Director Kash Patel of prejudicing the case with this post to X: “While Americans were locked down and desperate for PPE, Linda Sun and Chris Hu cashed in – allegedly lining their pockets while serving CCP interests. This is corruption that endangered lives. The FBI will not tolerate public officials who sell out their country.”

Under Governor Hochul, Sun’s alleged covert activities reportedly accelerated. Federal prosecutors say she obtained unauthorized gubernatorial proclamations honoring PRC officials, used back-channels to attempt to arrange an official visit to China’s Henan Province for Hochul while she served as lieutenant governor, and allowed PRC consular officials to preview and influence Hochul’s public remarks. In one instance, agents allege, Sun ensured Hochul made no public mention of China’s mass detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, after consular feedback was relayed to her directly.

Together, these allegations portray a striking level of access and manipulation. Operating from within her official diversity, equity, and inclusion role, Sun allegedly ran a parallel influence campaign that touched the highest levers of power in New York — the fourth-largest U.S. economy, with an annual budget exceeding $230 billion and nearly 180,000 employees.

If proven, Sun’s efforts would amount to the most successful Chinese influence campaign yet documented in open court — directly advancing President Xi Jinping’s foreign-policy objectives under the banner of United Front political warfare.

Yet a deeper investigation by The Bureau — combing through hundreds of pages of court records, financial exhibits, and suppression filings — suggests that money laundering, more than political access, may be the case’s more sophisticated and entrenched operational spine.

As striking as Sun’s apparent success in realigning New York’s political posture toward Beijing may be, that influence appears to be just one layer within a larger machinery — an engine designed not only to exert political leverage but to move massive flows of illicit capital, benefitting both the conspirators and their state-linked patrons.

In this context, Sun’s foreign-influence campaign increasingly resembles a node within a broader financial architecture — one that suggests Chinese intelligence may be providing the hidden hand behind similar cross-border dealings across North America. The pattern aligns with tactics long attributed to the United Front Work Department, which fuses economic infiltration with political co-option, often through trusted intermediaries embedded in diaspora communities and public institutions.

In Sun’s case, federal investigators say the FBI identified more than 80 financial accounts linked to the couple, tracking complex movements of capital between the U.S. and China, with the use of shell companies, luxury real estate, and boutique storefronts to disguise covertly sourced funds.

What emerges is not simply a corruption case — but a revealing blueprint of how modern state-backed influence operations can be financed, layered, and laundered through global finance and trade.

According to filings, the main unidentified Chinese diplomat and United Front conspirators included, CC-1, a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from China, playing a central behind-the-scenes role in Linda Sun’s alleged influence operation. As president of a New York–based nonprofit representing individuals from China’s Henan Province, CC-1 led an organization that federal prosecutors say was tightly linked to the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department — or UFWD — a political warfare unit tasked with cultivating support for Beijing among influential elites worldwide. According to the indictment, CC-1 issued strategic directives to Sun, including instructing her to draft invitation letters for Chinese delegations, organize official visits, and tailor communications to suit CCP interests. The UFWD, prosecutors noted, “attempted to manage relationships with and generate support for the CCP among elite individuals inside and outside the PRC, including by gathering human intelligence.”

CC-2, meanwhile, was a U.S. legal permanent resident who maintained active business interests in China’s Shandong Province. Identified as a principal in several U.S.-based Chinese associations — including a chamber of commerce for Chinese immigrants — CC-2 allegedly operated as another key intermediary in the broader influence network. Federal prosecutors also identified at least four high-ranking officials at the Chinese Consulate in New York — PRC Official-1 through PRC Official-4 — as central actors in the alleged foreign interference scheme. PRC Official-1 and PRC Official-2 held senior leadership roles, while PRC Official-3 and PRC Official-4 were assigned to the consulate’s Political Section. Based on similar job titles in Canada, such Political Section diplomats may fit the profile of undercover intelligence handlers of diaspora United Front agents — trained to operate within embassies and consulates as covert operatives.

In a statement to The New York Times following June’s superseding indictment, Jarrod Schaeffer, Sun’s attorney, said prosecutors were “publicizing feverish accusations unmoored from the facts.” Seth DuCharme, representing Hu, said the government was “scrambling to try to come up with some new charging theory” ahead of trial.

The Money Trail: From Pandemic Profits to Wine Cellars and Real Estate

Federal prosecutors say Linda Sun and Chris Hu built a life of stunning opulence — allegedly financed by laundering proceeds from covertly awarded pandemic contracts and PRC-connected business activity. Among the assets now under federal forfeiture: a $3.6 million mansion in Manhasset, a $1.9 million condo in Honolulu’s prestigious Ala Moana district, and a $1.5 million home in Forest Hills, Queens. Their vehicle collection rivaled that of global elites — including a 2024 Ferrari Roma, a new Range Rover, and a 2022 Mercedes SUV.

Agents also recovered $140,000 in cash, including $130,000 from a TD Bank safe-deposit box in Flushing, and nearly $83,000 frozen across various personal and brokerage accounts. Investigators uncovered a pattern of carefully orchestrated gifts from senior Chinese officials — most strikingly, the delivery of at least 18 salted ducks between 2021 and 2022. In Chinese culture, such ducks — especially the revered Nanjing variety — are not just festive delicacies, but symbols of insider favor and elite status.

The money trail, prosecutors allege, began in China. As laid out in the June 2025 indictment, Chris Hu’s business operations — including a PPE venture with an unnamed partner and a lobster-export business tied to China-based buyers — generated millions in revenue. Rather than transferring those funds legally, Hu allegedly relied on unlicensed money remitters — the hallmarks of Byzantine underground banking systems documented by DEA probes such as “Project Sleeping Giant.” These funds were then funneled into U.S. banks, including TD and Bank of America, via shell companies and family-linked accounts — among them, one associated with Leivine Wine & Spirits.

“There were no mortgage loans taken in connection with these acquisitions,” the indictment notes.

“Hu repatriated this wealth to the United States by, among other measures, using one or more unlicensed money-remitting businesses; depositing cash payments into multiple accounts associated with Hu’s family and businesses, including into an account associated with the Wine Store,” the indictment explains. The couple’s real-estate spree, prosecutors add, “occurred soon after Hu received a series of wire transfers totaling more than $2.1 million from a PRC-based account bearing the name of [Hu’s Chinese business partner].”

At the center of this alleged laundering web sits Leivine Wine & Spirits, a boutique liquor store inside an upscale Flushing development. Though marketed as a premium destination — with a temperature-controlled cellar housing bottles priced between $20,000 and $50,000, and a rare $5,200 Dalmore single malt — Hu’s reported financials, supposedly based largely on bulk-cash sales and $80,000 in monthly cash deposits, raised red flags.

“We partner with world-renowned brands to offer exclusive tastings, have sections of curated and rare bottles, and a knowledgeable staff to assist with your every need,” the store’s website declares. But as FBI Special Agent Devin Perry wrote in his affidavit: “Wine and liquor stores, such as Leivine, generally conduct primarily cashless transactions. Given Leivine’s location in a high-end development in Flushing, I assess it is unlikely that the large volume of cash Hu has been depositing in Leivine accounts constitutes Leivine’s actual income.”

That assessment proved pivotal. In May 2025, U.S. District Judge Brian Cogan denied Hu’s motion to suppress evidence gathered in the FBI’s 2024 warrant targeting the wine store — a ruling that cleared the path for expanded money-laundering and PPE-fraud charges in the June superseding indictment. Cogan’s decision laid out in striking detail how Leivine allegedly served as a conduit for cash flowing from Sun’s covert foreign-influence activities, presenting a textbook case of illicit financial engineering.

Among the key findings:

• $10,000 in unexplained cash was seized from Hu’s residence, which he claimed was store revenue awaiting deposit.
• More than $200,000 in cash deposits had been made into Leivine’s accounts before its official opening in November 2022.
• From August 2022 to February 2024, the store averaged $77,000 in monthly cash deposits.
• Hu personally wired $1.123 million from his private accounts into Leivine’s business accounts.
• Seven feeder accounts — all in Leivine’s name — funneled funds into a central Bank of America account, with four of them transferring over 97 percent of their deposits to that destination.

Judge Cogan found these flows consistent with structured layering techniques widely associated with professional money laundering. The transactions, he ruled, were sufficient to uphold the warrant, writing that “the affidavit still established probable cause,” and that Hu’s suppression arguments failed to overcome the weight of evidence.

Suppression and Dismissal

Beyond the 2024 Leivine warrant, federal investigators had been collecting evidence for years. The affidavit supporting the search of the couple’s Manhasset mansion laid out a web of digital communications, financial records, and testimonial evidence pointing to Sun’s role as an undeclared foreign agent for the People’s Republic of China.

FBI Special Agent Devin Perry cited messages between Sun and her parents as key proof that she “acted to benefit the PRC government and traded access for various PRC government representatives and agents, in return for economic considerations.” These communications included “numerous WeChat messages” in which Sun and her parents discussed her alleged assignments — such as when a figure referred to as “Chairman Xia” upgraded her airfare, and Sun assumed Xia “would start asking her to do him favors such as arranging peoples’ visits (to the Governor’s office).”

WeChat logs also allegedly showed Sun, Hu, and Sun’s parents receiving gifts from PRC officials, and Sun and Hu using her parents as straw purchasers for vehicles. Judge Cogan ruled that Hu’s motion to dismiss the related warrant lacked foundation.

While Sun sought to dismiss all charges, claiming there was no evidence she knowingly acted as an unregistered foreign agent, Judge Cogan disagreed. In a sweeping May 5 ruling, he rejected her motion and dismantled her core argument — that she lacked authority to influence New York’s highest offices and therefore could not qualify as a foreign agent under U.S. law.

Among the most explosive allegations: Sun boasted to senior Chinese consular officials that she had blocked Taiwan’s representative office, known as TECO, from any contact with top New York officials. In January 2019, she wrote to a senior Chinese diplomat, “Certainly I have managed to stop all relations between the TECO and the state. I have denied all requests from their office.” By February 27, 2019, she went further, instructing a staffer for Governor Cuomo to reject a meeting request from a visiting Taiwanese mayor: “No to the request. Explain in person.”

Judge Cogan highlighted what may be the most damning element of the case: many of Sun’s alleged clandestine acts occurred after she had been explicitly warned by federal authorities. On July 15, 2020, Sun voluntarily sat for an FBI interview, during which agents advised her of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and warned that “if someone operated on behalf of the Chinese government without registering as a foreign agent, they could be in violation of FARA.”

But the FBI was already watching long before that warning. The indictment cites a 2018 episode in which a senior United Front agent, identified as CC-1, allegedly tasked Sun with arranging an official visit to New York for a Henan Province delegation — including a meeting with then-Lieutenant Governor Kathy Hochul. Sun allegedly drafted two versions of an invitation letter on official governor’s-office letterhead — despite having no authority to issue such invitations.

The scheme deepened in 2018 and 2019. CC-1 again tasked Sun — this time with coordinating a return visit for Hochul to Henan, a trip aimed at showcasing Beijing’s ties with a prominent U.S. state. On November 26, 2018, CC-1 instructed Sun to send Hochul’s résumé and propose an itinerary. She complied immediately, sending both the résumé and Hochul’s official email address. She was then instructed to update and reissue invitation letters on May 17 and September 16, 2019, tailoring them to Chinese diplomatic preferences.

Judge Cogan also cited Sun’s alleged role in facilitating fraudulent invitation letters to support illegal visa applications for the Henan delegation. The diplomatic trip, pitched as part of a proposed $1 billion joint-campus project with New York universities, appeared to be a United Front cover operation to deepen Beijing’s political and economic influence in America.

Through these efforts, Sun allegedly used her access not only to open doors for Chinese officials — but to slam them shut on geopolitical rivals, especially Taiwan.

The indictment also shows that Sun, even after the FBI warning, allegedly continued acting on behalf of PRC officials — including repeated interventions to shape New York State policy toward Taiwan and giving consular officials advance access to official state communications.

In early 2021, Sun allegedly provided the Chinese consulate with a draft of Governor Hochul’s public remarks, allowing Beijing to sanitize the language and strip references to sensitive topics such as the Uyghur detentions. “Based on feedback from a PRC government official, [Hochul] did not publicly address the detention of Uyghurs in PRC state-run camps in Xinjiang,” the judge noted, citing FBI evidence.

“These actions, as alleged, demonstrate Sun using her authority and power to induce action or change the decisions or acts of another,” Judge Cogan wrote, concluding that they were “sufficient to constitute the ‘influence’ element of a FARA offense, even as Sun defines it.”

Finally, Judge Cogan emphasized that the indictment establishes Sun’s understanding that her alleged United Front handlers — CC-1 and CC-2 — were acting as agents of the PRC and the Communist Party. As the indictment puts it: “Sun understood that CC-1 and CC-2 were themselves acting as agents of the PRC government and the CCP when they made requests of Sun.”

Sam Cooper

 A Hollywood-style DEA sting revealed a seamless pipeline from Vancouver brokers to Los Angeles cartel operatives and Australian drug markets.

A senior Indo-Canadian gangster from an ultra-violent British Columbia–based fentanyl trafficking gang with ties to Latin cartels, Chinese Triads, and Hezbollah was taken down in a stunning U.S. government sting that saw a thick-accented Chinese narco casually promise an undercover agent at a Vancouver café that he could ship 100 kilograms of fentanyl precursors per month from Vancouver to Los Angeles, using his trucking company fronted by an Indo-Canadian associate.

The case is detailed in a sprawling DEA probe spanning Turkey, Mexico City, Dubai, Australia, Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, Hong Kong, and Los Angeles — all captured in a 29-page affidavit with scenes so surreal they could rival a Hollywood script, complete with underworld nicknames like “Burger,” “Queen,” and “Darth Vader.”

At the center is Opinder Singh Sian, a Canadian national and longtime Lower Mainland underworld figure who survived targeted shootings and reportedly leads the Brothers Keepers gang — a key proxy for the Sinaloa cartel in Canada, interoperable with other Latin American cartels, Chinese Communist Party chemical suppliers, and working alongside the Kinahans, a notorious Irish crime family now based in Dubai and closely linked to Hezbollah finance networks.

Sian has been arrested in Arizona and indicted in a sweeping U.S. case that underscores British Columbia’s critical role as a global trafficking hub, bringing together Mexican cartels and Chinese precursor suppliers that operate with near impunity in Vancouver but are increasingly the focus of elite U.S. law enforcement.

The affidavit illustrates how Vancouver’s criminal networks have funneled Chinese precursors into the United States and directly tied them to methamphetamine deals with Mexican gangsters on Los Angeles streets — part of one of the most sophisticated narcotics smuggling conspiracies ever uncovered in North America.

The explosive details are laid out in a newly unsealed affidavit filed by U.S. federal agent Albert Polito in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant against Sian. Sworn in 2024, the document offers a rare inside look at how Vancouver’s street-level crews transformed into global brokers bridging continents and more sophisticated criminal syndicates.

Much of the case focuses on methamphetamine shipments from Los Angeles to Australia, orchestrated by Sian, who acted as a proxy for more senior transnational Mexican, Chinese, and Iranian networks, experts say.

But the penultimate finding — likely of high interest in Washington political circles — came from a stunning investigative meeting. In August 2023, the DEA affidavit describes how a shadowy U.S. undercover source known as “Queen” or CS-1 sat across from a man in Vancouver speaking with a thick Chinese accent.

The man, later identified as Peter Peng Zhou, explained in detail how he could “receive fentanyl precursor chemicals from China into Vancouver” and “send 100 kilos of chemicals per month to Los Angeles” using his British Columbia trucking company run by an Indo-Canadian associate.

Zhou allegedly told CS-1 that he had been doing this for about ten years and remembered when these kilograms of chemicals were upwards of $300,000 each. He claimed he knew how to make fentanyl and methamphetamine from the chemicals and emphasized that he would require upfront payment before sending any shipments south to Los Angeles.

Demonstrating how casually Vancouver’s narcos blend into upscale environments, the affidavit describes how Sian first dined at a downtown restaurant with his wife, child, and CS-1 before taking “The Queen” to meet his precursor suppliers at a coffee house.

The investigation began in June 2022 when DEA agents in Ankara, Turkey, received intelligence about an opportunity to embed a confidential source into a global trafficking organization. This network needed help moving large shipments of methamphetamine and cocaine from Southern California to Australia — one of the world’s most lucrative drug markets.

DEA agents provided their Ankara counterparts with the phone number of CS-1 — known in global gang networks as “Queen” — who posed as an international logistics coordinator. A Turkish narco, Ibrahim Ozcelik, made initial contact and then passed CS-1’s details to a North American leader: Opinder Singh Sian.

After initial communications, Sian and CS-1 arranged an in-person meeting in Vancouver on February 1, 2023. During this pivotal encounter, Sian claimed to work closely with Irish organized crime — specifically the Kinahan family — as well as Italian groups and other powerful Canadian gangs. Outside Canada, he described sourcing drugs directly from major Mexican and South American cartels, reinforcing his role as a cross-border broker capable of linking multiple criminal networks. He also said he collaborated with a known Turkish drug kingpin, Hakan Arif, highlighting the global scope of his alliances.

While in Vancouver, Sian introduced CS-1 to two male associates. They explained they had about 500 kilograms of cocaine stockpiled and needed help moving it through Los Angeles ports and on to Australia. CS-1 claimed they could facilitate offloading in Los Angeles, repackaging, and onward shipping via container vessel — a scheme designed to tap into Australia’s sky-high wholesale prices, which exceed $200,000 per kilogram.

In March 2023, Sian and CS-1 met again at a restaurant in Manhattan Beach, California, to discuss expanding into methamphetamine smuggling. “Queen” also brought along a DEA undercover agent (“UC-1”), posing as a cousin who worked at the Port of Long Beach and helped move narcotics undetected.

At the meeting, Sian expressed caution, acknowledging they could get in trouble just for meeting. He said his first shipment would be “200,” consistent with earlier encrypted text conversations. UC-1 advised doing fewer but larger shipments to reduce detection risk, emphasizing this was only done for CS-1 as “family.”

Sian pressed for details about the port, probed UC-1’s connections, and mentioned knowing other contacts at the port, the DEA alleges.

By June 2023, the plan to move large methamphetamine shipments into the U.S. began to accelerate. Sian advised that he and his associates would deliver an estimated 500 to 750 kilograms of methamphetamine in separate drops coordinated by his network. On June 13, 2023, Sian created an encrypted chat group using the alias “Cain,” adding “Sticks” (later identified as Sebastian Rollin, a Canadian based in Montreal) and CS-1.

Rollin allegedlly informed CS-1 that his crew would soon deliver 30 pounds of methamphetamine in Southern California as part of the first staged shipment.

Another trafficker known as “El R” or “The R,” later identified as Ruben Chavez Ibarra, entered the operation.

The DEA’s Los Angeles operation revealed gritty street-level deals directly tying Sian’s Indo-Canadian group to “Queen’s” Mexican networks. On July 6, 2023, after days of negotiation, Jorge Orozco-Santana arranged a pick-up in Anaheim using a white Mercedes. He verified the deal with the serial number of a dollar bill token, handed over two plastic bins containing 84.6 kilograms of methamphetamine. The DEA tied this deal to the Montreal network involved in Sian’s encrypted chats.

On July 29, 2023, Sian created a new Threema group chat including a new associate using the moniker “AAA,” later identified as Tien Vai Ty Truong — a dual citizen of Vietnam and Canada, with narco operations in Toronto and Vancouver directed from Hong Kong, according to the DEA affidavit.

The group discussed the 30-pound and 200-pound loads and planned their shipment to Australia. On August 1, Sian asked CS-1 to call an associate named Kular to manage mounting anxiety among Mexican sources over shipment delays.

Meanwhile, CS-1 began discussing fentanyl precursor chemicals with Kular and Sian.

This line of discussion began because Kular had first asked CS-1 whether her networks could receive direct ketamine shipments into Mexico City — a question that suggested to the DEA that Sian’s network likely had direct access to Chinese Communist Party–linked drug suppliers and large-scale chemical manufacturing channels.

In response, the DEA’s High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Group 48 team prompted “Queen” to pivot and ask about fentanyl precursors. Queen did so, requesting prices on two critical compounds: 1-BOC-4-piperidone and 1-BOC-4-anilinopiperidine. Kular replied that the price would be $225 for the first chemical and $750 for the second, plus $1,000 for shipping.

Shortly after, on July 25, 2023, Sian himself directly contacted Queen, claiming he could supply those same precursors directly and even provide initial samples. He said he could get the chemicals “straight from China,” and proposed shipping them by container into the Port of Long Beach.

To build trust, Sian offered to mail a sample first. On July 29, Queen provided Sian with an undercover DEA-controlled PO box. That same day, Sian confirmed he had sent 20 grams of 1-BOC-4-piperidone and said he would accept cryptocurrency (specifically USDT, also known as Tether) for future large orders. By August 10, Sian informed Queen that the sample shipment had been sent, though it might not arrive until the following week — further confirming the group’s operational capacity to source Chinese precursors and move them into the U.S.

This was the evidence the DEA needed to take the Vancouver port fentanyl sting into high gear.

Returning to Vancouver in August, the headline-making fentanyl meeting came into full context. On August 16, 2023, CS-1 met Sian and his wife and child for lunch in downtown Vancouver. After lunch, Sian drove CS-1 to meet two individuals capable of sending bulk fentanyl precursor chemicals into the United States.

At a coffee shop, Peter Peng Zhou — speaking with a heavy Chinese accent — described how he could receive precursor shipments from China into Vancouver and move 100 kilograms per month to Los Angeles using his British Columbia trucking company.

In an almost absurdly candid aside, Zhou introduced his partner, known as “Burger,” described as a Southeast Asian male who managed “the money side” of the business for him. According to the DEA affidavit, Burger bluntly said he was involved because “his wife was very greedy and wanted him to make more money.”

The pivotal Vancouver coffee meeting also brought in more connections to Mexican operatives in California. During the same meeting, Sian mentioned a contact named Orlando, referring to Orlando Escutia, a Bakersfield, California–based associate. Sian explained that Escutia would be delivering CS-1 an additional 50 kilograms of methamphetamine the following week for shipment to Australia.

Zhou further revealed he could start acquiring a new fentanyl precursor with a CAS number ending in 228, describing it as a “newer and better” chemical for making fentanyl. He elaborated that when he shipped these chemicals by mail, he used a special bag designed to evade law enforcement detection, the DEA alleges.

Later that same day, CS-1 and Sian met with another key figure known as “ABC,” later identified as Kular, at a restaurant in downtown Vancouver. Kular claimed that his own boss, “AAA” — later identified as Tien Truong — was a Chinese national about 55 years old, mainly operating in the Toronto area. According to Kular, Truong’s bosses were ultimately based out of Hong Kong and specialized in moving large quantities of cocaine and methamphetamine around the world.