armed forces
Canadians are finally waking up to the funding crisis that’s sent the Canadian Armed Forces into a “death spiral”

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute
By By J.L. Granatstein
Must we wait for Trump to attack free trade between Canada and the US before our politicians get the message that defence matters to Washington?
Nations have interests – national interests – that lay out their ultimate priorities. The first one for every country is to protect its population and territory. It is sometimes hard to tell, but this also applies to Canada. Ottawa’s primary job is to make sure that Canada and Canadians are safe. And Canada also has a second priority: to work with our allies to protect their and our freedom. As we share this continent with the United States, this means that we must pay close attention to our neighbouring superpower.
Regrettably for the last six decades or so we have not done this very well. During the 1950s, the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent in some years spent more than 7 percent of GDP on defence, making Canada the most militarily credible of the middle powers. His successors whittled down defence spending and cut the numbers of troops, ships, and aircraft. By the end of the Cold War, in the early 1990s, our forces had shrunk, and their equipment was increasingly obsolescent.
Another Liberal prime minister, Jean Chrétien, balanced the budget in 1998 by slashing the military even more, and by getting rid of most of the procurement experts at the Department of National Defence, he gave us many of the problems the Canadian Armed Forces face today. Canadians and their governments wanted social security measures, not troops with tanks, and they got their wish.
There was another factor of significant importance, though it is one usually forgotten. Lester Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize for helping to freeze the Suez Crisis of 1956 convinced Canadians that they were natural-born peacekeepers. Give a soldier a blue beret and an unloaded rifle and he could be the representative of Canada as the moral superpower we wanted to be. The Yanks fought wars, but Canada kept the peace, or so we believed, and Canada for decades had servicemen and women in every peacekeeping operation.
There were problems with this. First, peacekeeping didn’t really work that well. It might contain a conflict, but it rarely resolved one – unless the parties to the dispute wanted peace. In Cyprus, for example, where Canadians served for three decades, neither the Greek- or Turkish-Cypriots wanted peace; nor did their backers in Athens and Ankara. The Cold War’s end also unleashed ethnic nationalisms, and Yugoslavia, for one, fractured into conflicts between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Christians, and Muslims, leading to all-out war. Peacekeepers tried to hold the lid on, but it took NATO to bash heads to bring a truce if not peace.
And there was a particular Canadian problem with peacekeeping. If all that was needed was a stock of blue berets and small arms, our governments asked, why spend vast sums on the military? Peacekeeping was cheap, and this belief sped up the budget cuts.
Even worse, the public believed the hype and began to resist the idea that the Canadian Armed Forces should do anything else. For instance, the Chrétien government took Canada into Afghanistan in 2001 to participate in what became a war to dislodge the Taliban, but huge numbers of Canadians believed that this was really only peacekeeping with a few hiccups.
Stephen Harper’s Conservative government nonetheless gave the CAF the equipment it needed to fight in Afghanistan, and the troops did well. But the casualties increased as the fighting went on, and Harper pulled Canada out of the conflict well before the Taliban seized power again in 2021.
Harper’s successor, Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, clearly has no interest in the military except as a somewhat rogue element that needs to be tamed, made comfortable for its members, and to act as a social laboratory with quotas for visible minorities and women.
Is this an exaggeration? This was Trudeau’s mandate letter to his defence minister in December 2021: “Your immediate priority is to take concrete steps to build an inclusive and diverse Defence Team, characterized by a healthy workplace free from harassment, discrimination, sexual misconduct, and violence.” DND quickly permitted facial piercings, coloured nail polish, beards, long hair, and, literally, male soldiers in skirts, so long as the hem fell below the knees. This was followed by almost an entire issue of the CAF’s official publication, Canadian Military Journal, devoted to culture change in the most extreme terms. You can’t make this stuff up.
Thus, our present crisis: a military short some 15,000 men and women, with none of the quotas near being met. A defence minister who tells a conference the CAF is in a “death spiral” because of its inability to recruit soldiers. (Somehow no one in Ottawa connects the culture change foolishness to a lack of recruits.) Fighter pilots, specialized sailors, and senior NCOs, their morale broken, taking early retirement. Obsolete equipment because of procurement failures and decade-long delays. Escalating costs for ships, aircraft, and trucks because every order requires that domestic firms get their cut, no matter if that hikes prices even higher. The failure to meet a NATO accord, agreed to by Canada, that defence spending be at least 2 percent of GDP, and no prospect that Canada will ever meet this threshold.
But something has changed.
Three opinion polls at the beginning of March all reported similar results: the Canadian public – worried about Russia and Putin’s war against Ukraine, and anxious about China, North Korea, and Iran (all countries with undemocratic regimes and, Iran temporarily excepted, nuclear weapons) – has noticed at last that Canada is unarmed and undefended. Canadians are watching with concern as Ottawa is scorned by its allies in NATO, Washington, and the Five Eyes intelligence sharing alliance.
At the same time, official Department of National Defence documents laid out the alarming deficiencies in the CAF’s readiness: too few soldiers ready to respond to crises and not enough equipment that is in working order for those that are ready.
The bottom line? Canadians finally seem willing to accept more spending on defence.
The media have been hammering at the government’s shortcomings. So have retired generals. General Rick Hillier, the former chief of the defence staff, was especially blunt: “[The CAF’s] equipment has been relegated to sort-of-broken equipment parked by the fence. Our fighting ships are on limitations to the speed that they can sail or the waves that they can sail in. Our aircraft, until they’re replaced, they’re old and sort of not in that kind of fight anymore. And so, I feel sorry for the men and women who are serving there right now.”
The Trudeau government has repeatedly demonstrated that it simply does not care. It offers more money for the CBC and for seniors’ dental care, pharmaceuticals, and other vote-winning objectives, but nothing for defence (where DND’s allocations astonishingly have been cut by some $1 billion this year and at least the next two years). There is no hope for change from the Liberals, their pacifistic NDP partners, or from the Bloc Québécois.
The Conservative Party, well ahead in the polls, looks to be in position to form the next government. What will they do for the military? So far, we don’t know – Pierre Poilievre has been remarkably coy. The Conservative leader has said he wants to cut wasteful spending and eliminate foreign aid to dictatorial regimes and corrupted UN agencies like UNRWA. He says he will slash the bureaucracy and reform the procurement shambles in Ottawa, and he will “work towards” spending on the CAF to bring us to the equivalent of 2 percent of GDP. His staff say that Poilievre is not skeptical about the idea of collective security and NATO; rather, he is committed to balancing the books.
What this all means is clear enough. No one should expect that a Conservative government will move quickly to spend much more on defence than the Grits. A promise to “work towards” 2 percent is not enough, and certainly not if former US President Donald Trump ends up in the White House again. Must we wait for Trump to attack free trade between Canada and the US before our politicians get the message that defence matters to Washington? Unfortunately, it seems so, and Canadians will not be able to say that they weren’t warned. After all, it should be obvious that it is in our national interest to protect ourselves.
J.L. Granatstein taught Canadian history, was Director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum, and writes on military and political history. His most recent book is Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. (3rd edition).
armed forces
Underfunded and undermanned, Canada’s Reserves are facing a crisis

The Macdonald Laurier Institute
By J.L. Granatstein for Inside Policy
With the new threats facing Canada and NATO, change must come quickly: Canada needs to fix the Army Reserves.
Canada’s once-proud Reserves force is fading fast – and without urgent action, it risks becoming irrelevant.
The Canadian Armed Forces Primary Reserves have an authorized strength of 30,000, but the present numbers of the Army, Navy and Air Force Reserves as of November 2024 are only 22,024. The RCN Reserves number 3,045, the RCAF 2,162, and the Army 16,817. This is frankly pathetic, all the more so as the regular forces are sadly understrength as well.
The Army Reserves have a long history, with some units dating back before Confederation. Before both world wars the Militia’s strength was roughly 50,000, generated by populations of eight million in 1914 and eleven million in 1939. Amazingly, despite a lack of training and equipment, the Militia provided many of the Army’s officers, up to and including successful division and regimental commanders, and large numbers of the senior non-commissioned officers. A century ago, even after some consolidation following the Great War, almost every town and city had an armoury and a Militia unit with a cadre of officers, good numbers of enlisted men, and some social status in their community. The factory owners, bankers, and well-off were heavily represented, and the Militia had real clout with representation in Parliament and easy access to the defence minister.
Not any longer. The armouries in most of Canada have disappeared, sold off by governments and levelled by developers, and those that still stand are in serious need of maintenance. The local elites – except for honorary colonels who donate funds for extra kit, travel, celebratory volumes, and to try to stop Ottawa from killing their regiment – are noticeably absent.
So too are the working men and women and students. As a result, there are Army Reserve units commanded by a lieutenant-colonel with three majors, half a dozen captains, ten lieutenants, a regimental sergeant major and any number of warrant officers, and under seventy in the ranks. It is a rare Reserve regiment, even those in Canada’s largest cities, which has a strength above 200, and ordinarily when a unit trains on a weeknight or a weekend only half that number turn up. Even in summer, when reservists do their serious training at Petawawa or other large bases, there will be many absentees.
And when a unit is asked to raise soldiers for an overseas posting – say for the Canadian-led brigade in Latvia – it might be able to find ten or so volunteers, but it will be highly unlikely to be able to do so when the next call comes. Reservists have families, jobs or school classes, and few are able and willing to go overseas and even fewer to do so for subsequent deployments.
Without reservists filling the ranks (and even with them providing up to 20 per cent of a battalion’s strength), the undermanned regulars must cobble together a battalion of 600 or so by seconding troops from another Regular unit. After being brought up to Regular force standards before deployment, the reservists have performed well in operations, for example, in Afghanistan.
So why can’t the Army Reserves find the men and women to join their ranks? The reasons are many and much the same as the recruitment difficulties facing the Regular Army. Sexual harassment cases have abounded, affecting the highest ranks and the lowest. Modern equipment has been and is continuing to be lacking.
Procurement is still bogged down with process, paperwork, and long timelines – for instance, approving a new pistol took a decade. And the Reserves get modern equipment only after the Regulars’ needs are met, which unfortunately means never. Instead of a tank or a Light Armoured Vehicle, units get pickup vehicles painted in dark green and see anything more only on their rare days of training in the field.
Leaders of the Reserves have called for a separate budget for years, demanding that they decide how the funds are allocated. National Defence Headquarters has refused, rightly claiming that the underfunded Regulars have higher priority. But the Reserves point to official documents that in 2019-20 demonstrated that of $3.018 million allocated to the Reserves, only $1.3 billion reached them, the rest being unspent or re-allocated to the Regulars.
With some reason this infuriates Reservists who point to this happening every fiscal year.
So too does what they see as the condescension with which they are treated. A Reserve major is equal in rank to a Regular major, but both know that the Regular is almost always far better trained and experienced for his job and that rankles. (Many years ago, when I was a junior officer, I remember another Regular referring to “the ****ing Militia.” I know that Reserve officers reverse the compliment.)
Today with unemployment above nine per cent and with young Canadians’ unemployment rate even higher, the Reserves pay a new private a daily rate of some $125 (The Carney government recently promised a substantial pay raise). This ought to be a good option to earn some money. The Toronto Scottish, an old and established infantry unit, for example, has a website that lists other benefits: up to $8,000 for educational expenses and up to $16,000 for full-time summer employment. The Toronto Scottish has two armouries in the western suburbs, a female Commanding Officer, but under 200 soldiers. There should be a real opportunity in the current circumstances to increase those numbers by a good advertising campaign pitched directly at young men and women in the Toronto suburbs. The same can be said for every big city.
But the small town and rural units, tiny regiments whatever their storied histories, are unlikely to be able to grow very much. National Defence Headquarters needs to set a number – say 150, 200, or 250 – above which a unit will keep its command structure. Below that standard, however, units will be stripped of their higher ranks and effectively consolidated under the Reserve brigade in their area.
Reservists have fought such suggestions for years, but if the Reserves are to become an efficient and effective force, this is a change that must come. One such experiment has combined the Princess of Wales Own Regiment in Kingston, Ontario, and the Brockville Rifles by putting the Commanding Officer of the first and the Regimental Sergeant Major of the second in charge. Unit badges can remain, but this reduces the inflated command staffs.
In reality, these small regiments are nothing more than company-sized sub-units, and sub-units of less than a hundred simply cannot train effectively or draw enough new members from their small town and rural catchment areas. Combined they can function effectively.
The federal government will soon release an army modernization plan. Change is always difficult but with the new threats facing Canada and NATO, change must come quickly. Canada needs to fix the Army Reserves.
Historian J.L. Granatstein is a member of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Research Advisory Board. A bestselling author, Granatstein was the director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum. In 1995, he served on the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.
armed forces
Secretive Lockheed Martin Skunk Works reveals latest high-tech military drone

THE MAKICHUK REPORT
Unmanned Vectis to ride shotgun with next-gen fighters
When Lockheed Martin’s super secret Skunk Works© advanced development arm unveils a new project, the aviation world stops and listens.
As always, it is very hush-hush, and, quite often, groundbreaking.
This week’s announcement didn’t disappoint.
It’s called “Vectis” — a stealthy autonomous drone that Lockheed intends to fly by the end of 2027.
As with most Skunk Works projects, officials declined to comment on certain aspects of the aircraft’s design, such as its engine or top speed, though it was noted that Lockheed’s analysis “doesn’t point toward supersonic [speeds]” as a requirement.
What do we know about it, aside from it’s very cool, futuristic design?
The first Vectis prototype is currently “in progress,” and is envisioned as a large “Category 5” reusable drone designed to be customizable to match shifts in the threat environment, said OJ Sanchez, Skunk Works’s vice president and general manager.
“Vectis provides best-in-class survivability at the CCA [Collaborative Combat Aircraft] price point,” Sanchez told reporters ahead of the Air Force Association’s Air Space and Cyber conference in Washington, D.C. “Prototype parts are ordered, the team is in work, and we intend to fly in the next two years.”
According to Breaking Defense, Lockheed sees the range, endurance and flexibility of Vectis’s design as key to its appeal.
It is being developed for the US and international markets based on feedback from multiple customers about the future battlefield.
One has to only look at the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to see that things have changed.
Vectis can carry out mission sets ranging from air-to-air, air-to-ground and ISR, and has an open systems architecture allowing it to interface with platforms and mission systems not built by Lockheed Martin, Breaking Defense, reported.
Certain aspects of the drone — such as which payloads it can carry, or whether it is optimized for regular operations or used less frequently on deployments — can be fine-tuned to meet a customer’s specific requirements.
For instance, “we will have built into it the ability for it to be a daily flyer, reliably work alongside its crew teammates, to be able to integrate into operations for training, as well as for deployment,” Sanchez said.
“At the same time, if the requirement is ease of storage and ease of assembly, it’s absolutely built into the design. … That’s where we’ll work closely to listen with any individual customers and go from there on their operations choice, but the flexibility is built in.”
With the lessons of Ukraine in mind, Vectis is designed to be maintainable in a deployed environment, with a simple design made of “and durable, reliable materials” and easy access to the aircraft’s internal systems if repairs need to be made.
While it has not flown, Lockheed has conducted operational analysis and simulations that paired the drone with the F-22 and F-35, with Sanchez noting that its low-observable signature and communications gear are “compatible” with fifth- and sixth-generation aircraft.
It was also informed by previous experience designing tailless aircraft like the X-44 MANTA, Lockheed’s sixth-generation fighter prototype for the Air Force’s Next Generational Air Dominance program, Sanchez said.
“We’re building in that kind of autonomy, that flexible autonomy, if you will, so that we can work with more countries, more partners, to really listen to what their needs are,” he said.
“That flexibility has been demonstrated through multiple demonstrations. Now we’ll go out and build it, and we’ll work to prove in the open air.”
In the U.S. military’s parlance, Group 5 uncrewed aerial systems are the largest and most capable, covering anything pilotless with a maximum takeoff weight of 1,320 pounds or more, and that can fly at altitudes of 18,000 feet or higher.
When asked, Sanchez declined to offer any hard dimensions or other specifications for Vectis. He did say it was smaller than a Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter, but larger than one of the company’s Common Multi-Mission Truck (CMMT, pronounced ‘comet’) missile-like drones, which is a very broad size range.
According to experts at TWZ.com, renderings of Vectis from Skunk Works show a tailless drone with a lambda wing planform and a top-mounted air intake.
There is a pronounced chine line around the forward end of the fuselage and a shovel-like shape to the nose, as well as various conformal antennas and/or sensor apertures, all of which are indicative of low-observable (stealthy) design considerations.
A short promotional video also includes a cutaway view showing an S-shaped duct behind the air intake and exhaust shrouding, features that offer further radar cross-section and infrared signature reducing benefits.
Vectis’ core planform is interestingly reminiscent, in some broad strokes, of a rendering of a stealthy aerial refueling tanker concept Skunk Works first showed publicly last year.
That aircraft had a much larger design, in line with its intended mission, with large clipped wings that had some lambda-wing attributes, as well as small outwardly-canted twin vertical tails.
There has been something of an uptick in recent years in new crewed and uncrewed tactical aircraft designs with lambda or at least lambda-like planforms.
This includes one of the several air combat drone designs that emerged around a massive military parade in China earlier this month, as well as one of the two Chinese next-generation crewed combat jets that broke cover in December 2024.
Vectis also has “endurance ranges compatible with Indo-Pacific, European, and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] theaters,” according to a Lockheed Martin press release.
What munitions and other payloads Vectis might be able to carry is unclear. Skunk Works’ Sanchez mentioned “reusable or flexible payloads,” but did not elaborate.
The promotional video shows a vignette in which the drones, operating together with an F-22, use unspecified sensors to spot and track aerial threats before being ordered to fire air-to-air missiles, presumably from internal bays, at those targets.
Electronic warfare suites and signal relay packages might also be among the payload options for Vectis drones.
Sanchez did not provide any hard cost metrics for Vectis. The Air Force has said in the past that it is aiming for a unit cost roughly in the US$20 million range for drones being developed under the first phase, or Increment 1, of its CCA program.
In discussing how Vectis could be adaptable to multiple U.S. and foreign operator requirements, Sanchez also spoke in more detail about the drone’s current dependence on traditional runways, as well as its ability to operate from more austere locations.
“Our analysis aligns with the U.S. Air Force, that runway accessibility is incredibly important in every theatre, particularly in INDOPACOM [the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility]. So we’re very intentional about the flexibility that this system would enable in the theaters of interest,” Sanchez explained.
“And so the amount of runways that will be available, the amount of flexibility to implement, whether it be an Agile Combat Employment approach, or a hub and spoke for other countries, depending on how it is, Vectis will be very capable in those spaces.”
Exactly how Skunk Works envisions the Vectis will handle counter-drone weapons, such as Israel’s Iron Dome, Iron Beam, or David’s Sling, remains uncertain.
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