From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss and Alex Whalen

In the latest chapter of a seemingly never-ending saga, Canada Post workers are on strike again for the second time in less than a year, after the federal government allowed the Crown corporation to close some rural offices and end door-to-door deliveries. These postal strikes are highly disruptive given Canada Post’s near monopoly on letter mail across the country. It’s well past time to privatize the organization.

From 2018 to the mid-point of 2025, Canada Post has lost more than $5.0 billion, and it ran a shortfall of $407 million in the latest quarter alone. Earlier this year, the federal government loaned Canada Post $1.034 billion—a substantial sum of taxpayer money—to help keep the organization afloat.

As a Crown corporation, Canada Post operates at the behest of the federal government and faces little competition in the postal market. Canadians have nowhere to turn if they’re unhappy with service quality, prices or delivery times, particularly when it comes to “snail mail.”

Consequently, given its near-monopoly over the postal market, Canada Post has few incentives to keep costs down or become profitable because the government (i.e. taxpayers) is there to bail it out. The lack of competition also means Canada Post lacks incentives to innovate and improve service quality for customers, and the near-monopoly prohibits other potential service providers from entering the letter-delivery market including in remote areas. It’s clearly a failing business that’s unresponsive to customer needs, lacks creativity and continuously fails to generate profit.

But there’s good news. Companies such as Amazon, UPS, FedEx and others deliver more than two-thirds of parcels in the country. They compete for individuals and businesses on price, service quality and delivery time. There’s simply no justification for allowing Canada Post to monopolize any segment of the market. The government should privatize Canada Post and end its near-monopoly status on letter mail.

What would happen if Ottawa privatized Canada Post?

Well, peer countries including the Netherlands, Austria and Germany privatized their postal services two decades ago. Prices for consumers (adjusted for inflation) fell by 11 per cent in Austria, 15 per cent in the Netherlands and 17 per cent in Germany.

Denmark has taken it a step further and plans to end letter deliveries altogether. The country has seen a steep 90 per cent drop in letter volumes since 2000 due to the rise of global e-commerce and online shopping. In other words, the Danes are adapting to the times rather than continuing to operate an archaic business model.

In light of the latest attempt by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers to shakedown Canadian taxpayers, it’s become crystal clear that Canada Post should leave the stone age and step into the twenty-first century. A privately owned and operated Canada Post could follow in the footsteps of its European counterparts. But the status quo will only lead to further financial ruin, and Canadians will be stuck with the bill.

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute

Alex Whalen

Director, Atlantic Canada Prosperity, Fraser Institute

Marco Navarro-Génie

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The Justin Trudeau and Jagmeet Singh charges of “greedflation” collapses under scrutiny.

“It’s not okay that our biggest grocery stores are making record profits while Canadians are struggling to put food on the table.” —PM Justin Trudeau, September 13, 2023.

A couple of days after the above statement, the then-prime minister and his government continued a campaign to blame rising food prices on grocery retailers.

The line Justin Trudeau delivered in September 2023, triggered a week of political theatre. It also handed his innovation minister, François-Philippe Champagne, a ready-made role: defender of the common shopper against supposed corporate greed. The grocery price problem would be fixed by Thanksgiving that year. That was two years ago. Remember the promise?

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But as Ian Madsen of the Frontier Centre for Public Policy has shown, the numbers tell a different story. Canada’s major grocers have not been posting “record profits.” They have been inching forward in a highly competitive, capital-intensive sector. Madsen’s analysis of industry profit margins shows this clearly.

Take Loblaw. Its EBITDA margin (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) averaged 11.2 per cent over the three years ending 2024. That is up slightly from 10 per cent pre-COVID. Empire grew from 3.9 to 7.6 per cent. Metro went from 7.6 to 9.6. These are steady trends, not windfalls. As Madsen rightly points out, margins like these often reflect consolidation, automation, and long-term investment.

Meanwhile, inflation tells its own story. From March 2020 to March 2024, Canada’s money supply rose by 36 per cent. Consumer prices climbed about 20 per cent in the same window. That disparity suggests grocers helped absorb inflationary pressure rather than drive it. The Justin Trudeau and Jagmeet Singh charges of “greedflation” collapses under scrutiny.

Yet Ottawa pressed ahead with its chosen solution: the Grocery Code of Conduct. It was crafted in the wake of pandemic disruptions and billed as a tool for fairness. In practice, it is a voluntary framework with no enforcement and no teeth. The dispute resolution process will not function until 2026. Key terms remain undefined. Suppliers are told they can expect “reasonable substantiation” for sudden changes in demand. They are not told what that means. But food inflation remains.

This ambiguity helps no one. Large suppliers will continue to settle matters privately. Small ones, facing the threat of lost shelf space, may feel forced to absorb losses quietly. As Madsen observes, the Code is unlikely to change much for those it claims to protect.

What it does serve is a narrative. It lets the government appear responsive while avoiding accountability. It shifts attention away from the structural causes of price increases: central bank expansion, regulatory overload, and federal spending. Instead of owning the crisis, the state points to a scapegoat.

This method is not new. The Trudeau government, of which Carney’s is a continuation, has always shown a tendency to favour symbolism over substance. Its approach to identity politics follows the same pattern. Policies are announced with fanfare, dissent is painted as bigotry, and inconvenient facts are set aside.

The Grocery Code fits this model. It is not a policy grounded in need or economic logic. It is a ritual. It gives the illusion of action. It casts grocers as villains. It gives the impression to the uncaring public that the government is “providing solutions,” and that “it has their backs.” It flatters the state.

Madsen’s work cuts through that illusion. It reminds us that grocery margins are modest, inflation was monetary, and the public is being sold a story.

Canadians deserve better than fables, but they keep voting for the same folks. They don’t think to think that they deserve a government that governs within its limits; a government that accept its role in the crises it helped cause, and restores the conditions for genuine economic freedom. The Grocery Code is not a step in that direction. It was always a distraction, wrapped in a moral pose.

And like most moral poses in Ottawa, it leaves the facts behind.

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