Business
Competition Bureau recommends bureaucratic power grab over airline industry
From the Fraser Institute
By Matthew Lau
According to the Competition Bureau’s recent market study of Canada’s airline sector, “Competition delivers major benefits to Canadian travellers. Beyond lower prices, competition drives quality improvements and innovation.” This statement about economic competition is correct. Unfortunately, however, some of the Bureau’s other ideas about economic competition are fundamentally wrong and its poor proposals, which would damage the airline industry, are mixed in with beneficial proposals.
Let’s begin with what the Competition Bureau, a law enforcement agency that reports to the federal government, gets right. Three of the 10 recommendations in the Bureau’s market study relate to opening Canada’s airline sector to international competition. Allowing more international competition is an commonly proposed idea (including in a Fraser Institute study earlier this year) and a good one.
Specifically, the Bureau recommends raising the single-investor foreign ownership limit for Canadian airlines to 49 per cent, allowing 100 per cent foreign ownership for domestic-only Canadian airlines, and working with other countries to remove foreign competition restrictions. The Bureau also recommends reducing regulatory costs for northern operators to support northern and remote market access, and opening government contracts to as many bidders as possible to get better value for taxpayer dollars.
Alas, despite these good ideas for protecting or improving competition, the recommendation at the top of the Competition Bureau’s list is negative, founded on a poor understanding of economic competition, and places far too much faith in the power of government intervention to preserve or improve competition.
“We recommend adopting a system of parallel reviews,” reads the study. “Under this system, both the Commissioner of Competition and the Minister of Transport would conduct independent reviews. Either process could block a transaction, and deals could only proceed if they cleared both reviews.”
In other words, the Competition Bureau proposes the Commission of Competition (the head of the Bureau) have veto power over airline mergers and acquisitions. The stated intention is to disallow anti-competitive mergers or collaborations, but this appears to be a bureaucratic power grab that would block transactions that benefit airline passengers and likely reduce investment in the airline sector.
Speaking to a parliamentary committee last year, a deputy commissioner with the Bureau pointed out that it had opposed three airline mergers in recent years—all of which the federal government finally approved despite the Bureau’s opposition, although with onerous political conditions.
The Competition Bureau laments industry concentration (the degree to which a few large players serve a high proportion of the market), but as a Montreal Economic Institute analysis on airline competition noted, “both economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that it is barriers to entry rather than the size and number of firms in a market that matter.”
Indeed, this was a key economic insight explained by Joseph Schumpeter more than eight decades ago. Industry concentration is not inherently negative and may well result from suppliers and consumers freely making decisions with their own money. Government barriers to entry, which tend to cause industry concentration, is the real problem.
If economies of scale allow large airlines to operate more efficiently than small ones, airline passengers may well be better off when two airlines merge. Or, if an airline is financially distressed, its acquisition by another airline may allow it to continue operations and maintain services. And if airline investors realize they may not be able to eventually exit their investments by selling to other airlines, the long-run effect will be to reduce airline-sector competition and investment.
The Competition Bureau seems to grasp that barriers to entry, not concentration, are the problem by saying its goal “is not always to promote multiple carriers on every route” but rather to promote a competitive environment “where the best airline serves each route but knows it can be replaced.” Yet the Bureau’s hostility towards past airline mergers, as well as value-creating mergers in other industries, suggests it does not apply this thinking consistently and seeks to block even transactions that generate significant economic benefits.
The Bureau’s new report gets some things right, but more bureaucratic power over the airline industry will not help Canadians. The Competition Bureau simply should not have veto power over airline mergers and acquisitions.
Addictions
The War on Commonsense Nicotine Regulation
From the Brownstone Institute
Cigarettes kill nearly half a million Americans each year. Everyone knows it, including the Food and Drug Administration. Yet while the most lethal nicotine product remains on sale in every gas station, the FDA continues to block or delay far safer alternatives.
Nicotine pouches—small, smokeless packets tucked under the lip—deliver nicotine without burning tobacco. They eliminate the tar, carbon monoxide, and carcinogens that make cigarettes so deadly. The logic of harm reduction couldn’t be clearer: if smokers can get nicotine without smoke, millions of lives could be saved.
Sweden has already proven the point. Through widespread use of snus and nicotine pouches, the country has cut daily smoking to about 5 percent, the lowest rate in Europe. Lung-cancer deaths are less than half the continental average. This “Swedish Experience” shows that when adults are given safer options, they switch voluntarily—no prohibition required.
In the United States, however, the FDA’s tobacco division has turned this logic on its head. Since Congress gave it sweeping authority in 2009, the agency has demanded that every new product undergo a Premarket Tobacco Product Application, or PMTA, proving it is “appropriate for the protection of public health.” That sounds reasonable until you see how the process works.
Manufacturers must spend millions on speculative modeling about how their products might affect every segment of society—smokers, nonsmokers, youth, and future generations—before they can even reach the market. Unsurprisingly, almost all PMTAs have been denied or shelved. Reduced-risk products sit in limbo while Marlboros and Newports remain untouched.
Only this January did the agency relent slightly, authorizing 20 ZYN nicotine-pouch products made by Swedish Match, now owned by Philip Morris. The FDA admitted the obvious: “The data show that these specific products are appropriate for the protection of public health.” The toxic-chemical levels were far lower than in cigarettes, and adult smokers were more likely to switch than teens were to start.
The decision should have been a turning point. Instead, it exposed the double standard. Other pouch makers—especially smaller firms from Sweden and the US, such as NOAT—remain locked out of the legal market even when their products meet the same technical standards.
The FDA’s inaction has created a black market dominated by unregulated imports, many from China. According to my own research, roughly 85 percent of pouches now sold in convenience stores are technically illegal.
The agency claims that this heavy-handed approach protects kids. But youth pouch use in the US remains very low—about 1.5 percent of high-school students according to the latest National Youth Tobacco Survey—while nearly 30 million American adults still smoke. Denying safer products to millions of addicted adults because a tiny fraction of teens might experiment is the opposite of public-health logic.
There’s a better path. The FDA should base its decisions on science, not fear. If a product dramatically reduces exposure to harmful chemicals, meets strict packaging and marketing standards, and enforces Tobacco 21 age verification, it should be allowed on the market. Population-level effects can be monitored afterward through real-world data on switching and youth use. That’s how drug and vaccine regulation already works.
Sweden’s evidence shows the results of a pragmatic approach: a near-smoke-free society achieved through consumer choice, not coercion. The FDA’s own approval of ZYN proves that such products can meet its legal standard for protecting public health. The next step is consistency—apply the same rules to everyone.
Combustion, not nicotine, is the killer. Until the FDA acts on that simple truth, it will keep protecting the cigarette industry it was supposed to regulate.
Alberta
Canada’s heavy oil finds new fans as global demand rises
From the Canadian Energy Centre
By Will Gibson
“The refining industry wants heavy oil. We are actually in a shortage of heavy oil globally right now, and you can see that in the prices”
Once priced at a steep discount to its lighter, sweeter counterparts, Canadian oil has earned growing admiration—and market share—among new customers in Asia.
Canada’s oil exports are primarily “heavy” oil from the Alberta oil sands, compared to oil from more conventional “light” plays like the Permian Basin in the U.S.
One way to think of it is that heavy oil is thick and does not flow easily, while light oil is thin and flows freely, like fudge compared to apple juice.
“The refining industry wants heavy oil. We are actually in a shortage of heavy oil globally right now, and you can see that in the prices,” said Susan Bell, senior vice-president of downstream research with Rystad Energy.
A narrowing price gap
Alberta’s heavy oil producers generally receive a lower price than light oil producers, partly a result of different crude quality but mainly because of the cost of transportation, according to S&P Global.
The “differential” between Western Canadian Select (WCS) and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) blew out to nearly US$50 per barrel in 2018 because of pipeline bottlenecks, forcing Alberta to step in and cut production.
So far this year, the differential has narrowed to as little as US$10 per barrel, averaging around US$12, according to GLJ Petroleum Consultants.
“The differential between WCS and WTI is the narrowest I’ve seen in three decades working in the industry,” Bell said.
Trans Mountain Expansion opens the door to Asia
Oil tanker docked at the Westridge Marine Terminal in Burnaby, B.C. Photo courtesy Trans Mountain Corporation
The price boost is thanks to the Trans Mountain expansion, which opened a new gateway to Asia in May 2024 by nearly tripling the pipeline’s capacity.
This helps fill the supply void left by other major regions that export heavy oil – Venezuela and Mexico – where production is declining or unsteady.
Canadian oil exports outside the United States reached a record 525,000 barrels per day in July 2025, the latest month of data available from the Canada Energy Regulator.
China leads Asian buyers since the expansion went into service, along with Japan, Brunei and Singapore, Bloomberg reports. 
Asian refineries see opportunity in heavy oil
“What we are seeing now is a lot of refineries in the Asian market have been exposed long enough to WCS and now are comfortable with taking on regular shipments,” Bell said.
Kevin Birn, chief analyst for Canadian oil markets at S&P Global, said rising demand for heavier crude in Asia comes from refineries expanding capacity to process it and capture more value from lower-cost feedstocks.
“They’ve invested in capital improvements on the front end to convert heavier oils into more valuable refined products,” said Birn, who also heads S&P’s Center of Emissions Excellence.
Refiners in the U.S. Gulf Coast and Midwest made similar investments over the past 40 years to capitalize on supply from Latin America and the oil sands, he said.
While oil sands output has grown, supplies from Latin America have declined.
Mexico’s state oil company, Pemex, reports it produced roughly 1.6 million barrels per day in the second quarter of 2025, a steep drop from 2.3 million in 2015 and 2.6 million in 2010.
Meanwhile, Venezuela’s oil production, which was nearly 2.9 million barrels per day in 2010, was just 965,000 barrels per day this September, according to OPEC.
The case for more Canadian pipelines
Worker at an oil sands SAGD processing facility in northern Alberta. Photo courtesy Strathcona Resources
“The growth in heavy demand, and decline of other sources of heavy supply has contributed to a tighter market for heavy oil and narrower spreads,” Birn said.
Even the International Energy Agency, known for its bearish projections of future oil demand, sees rising global use of extra-heavy oil through 2050.
The chief impediments to Canada building new pipelines to meet the demand are political rather than market-based, said both Bell and Birn.
“There is absolutely a business case for a second pipeline to tidewater,” Bell said.
“The challenge is other hurdles limiting the growth in the industry, including legislation such as the tanker ban or the oil and gas emissions cap.”
A strategic choice for Canada
Because Alberta’s oil sands will continue a steady, reliable and low-cost supply of heavy oil into the future, Birn said policymakers and Canadians have options.
“Canada needs to ask itself whether to continue to expand pipeline capacity south to the United States or to access global markets itself, which would bring more competition for its products.”
-
Business1 day agoTrans Mountain executive says it’s time to fix the system, expand access, and think like a nation builder
-
International1 day agoBiden’s Autopen Orders declared “null and void”
-
MAiD1 day agoStudy promotes liver transplants from Canadian euthanasia victims
-
Business1 day agoCanada has given $109 million to Communist China for ‘sustainable development’ since 2015
-
Internet2 days agoMusk launches Grokipedia to break Wikipedia’s information monopoly
-
Business1 day agoCanada’s combative trade tactics are backfiring
-
Automotive1 day agoCarney’s Budget Risks Another Costly EV Bet
-
Business1 day agoYou Won’t Believe What Canada’s Embassy in Brazil Has Been Up To




