espionage
Ex-NYPD Cop Jailed in Beijing’s Transnational Repatriation Plot, Canada Remains Soft Target
Sam Cooper
A former NYPD sergeant was sentenced to 18 months in prison this week for his role in a shadowy Chinese government operation that sought to coerce a political exile in New Jersey to return to the mainland. The conviction of Michael McMahon marks the first successful prosecution of a current or former American law enforcement officer accused of profiting from Beijing’s covert repatriation campaign, known as Operation Fox Hunt—a global manhunt that has ensnared operatives from Vancouver and Toronto to Los Angeles.
McMahon, 57, was convicted alongside two Chinese-American co-conspirators, Zhu Yong and Congying Zheng, who were previously sentenced to 24 and 16 months in prison, respectively. The trio was found guilty of interstate stalking and acting as unregistered agents of the People’s Republic of China, after a federal jury heard how they aided Beijing’s secret police—using Chinese businessmen and hired thugs based in the Tri-State area and California—to track and psychologically terrorize their target: a former Wuhan official named Xu Jin.
While McMahon’s sentencing concludes one legal chapter, The Bureau’s investigation into court records and national security sources reveals a far broader and ongoing web of espionage, coercion, and transnational repression—directed by senior Chinese Communist Party officials and bolstered by diaspora operatives and criminal proxies across North America.
McMahon and his family have fiercely denied his culpability as a tool of China’s secret police, insisting he was an unwitting pawn in a clandestine war that U.S. authorities failed to warn domestic citizens—including former law enforcement officers—about.
In private messages to The Bureau, following months of in-depth reporting into sealed court documents, McMahon’s wife, Martha Byrne, emphasized their belief that he had done nothing wrong.
“My husband, Michael McMahon, committed no crime,” she wrote. “There’s plenty of media to expose this grave injustice on my family.” She added a stark warning directed at law enforcement and intelligence communities: “It’s extremely important you use your platform to warn private investigators and local law enforcement of these patterns. Our government did nothing to warn us, and they knew my husband was being used. They knew since as early as 2015/16 these Chinese actors were using PIs. They put our family in danger and in turn the security of the entire country.”
But the sentencing judge in Brooklyn emphasized McMahon’s witting participation—and the fact that he profited from the scheme.
The case centered on Xu Jin, a former municipal official from Wuhan who fled China with his wife in 2010, seeking refuge in the United States. By 2015, his face appeared on a China Daily “most wanted” list—alongside dozens of Canada-based targets—part of Beijing’s sweeping Fox Hunt campaign to repatriate ex-officials accused of corruption, dissidents, and political rivals of President Xi Jinping. While Chinese authorities accused Xu of accepting bribes, he maintained he was not a criminal but a political target caught in a purge masked as anti-graft enforcement.
By 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security escalated its efforts, dispatching emissaries, threatening Xu’s relatives in China, and launching a North American rendition operation. That’s when Zhu Yong, a 66-year-old Chinese national living in New York, hired McMahon—then working as a private investigator—to locate Xu.
Tapping law enforcement databases and traditional surveillance tactics, McMahon began tracking Xu and his family. The key break came in April 2017, when Xu’s elderly father—who had recently suffered a brain hemorrhage—was flown to the U.S. by the PRC, accompanied by a government doctor. His role: deliver a threatening message in person to his son. If Xu refused to return to China, his family would suffer the consequences.
These same tactics have been deployed in Canada, according to a January 2022 “Special Report” by the Privy Council Office on Chinese Fox Hunt operations, obtained by The Bureau.
McMahon surveilled the father’s arrival at a New Jersey home, then followed him to Xu Jin’s residence. Within days, the Chinese team had the address they needed.
Soon after, Congying Zheng and another associate showed up at Xu’s front door. They pounded on it, peered through the windows, and left a note that read: “If you are willing to go back to the mainland and spend 10 years in prison, your wife and children will be all right. That’s the end of this matter!”
By that point, McMahon’s role had deepened. Text messages recovered by federal investigators confirmed that he understood the objective of the operation. In one exchange with another investigator he had contracted, McMahon acknowledged that the goal was to repatriate the target to China “so they could prosecute him.”
After providing the address of Xu Jin, McMahon told his surveillance partner that he was “waiting for a call” to determine next steps. The partner replied, “Yeah. From NJ State Police about an abduction,” to which McMahon responded: “Lol.”
He later suggested further intimidation tactics to a Chinese co-conspirator, advising: “Park outside his home and let him know we are there.” According to prosecutors, McMahon also conducted background research on the victim’s daughter, including details about her university residence and academic major.
In total, McMahon was paid over $19,000 for his role in the PRC-directed operation. To obscure the origin of the funds, he deposited the payments into his son’s bank account—an arrangement prosecutors noted he had never used with any other client.
Court filings in the case traced troubling connections northward—to Canada—where suspects linked to Fujian-based organized crime networks, long known to Canadian police and senior elected officials, have been under investigation since at least 2022. Yet despite mounting intelligence, no charges have been laid.
The same Interpol “red notice” that named Xu also listed Chinese nationals living in Canada. According to Canadian law enforcement sources who spoke to The Bureau, multiple individuals now targeted by Fox Hunt reside in Vancouver and Toronto—cities with large mainland Chinese communities and a documented history of interference concerns.
“In Canada, we just knock on doors and talk to people,” one RCMP officer told The Bureau. “In the U.S., they go in and make arrests.” The officer pointed to a critical gap in Canadian law: the absence of a foreign agent registry—one of the FBI’s key legal tools in dismantling Fox Hunt cells on U.S. soil.
Beyond McMahon and Zhu Yong, the FBI investigation revealed a sprawling web of operatives functioning as “cutouts”—deniable intermediaries who provide a buffer between Chinese intelligence and the dirty work of coercion.
Even as the New Jersey operation began to falter—after Xu’s ailing father reportedly resisted efforts to pressure his son and Chinese operatives grew wary of U.S. law enforcement closing in—officials in Beijing leveraged McMahon’s surveillance to identify a new target: Xu’s daughter, a university student in Northern California. A second Fox Hunt pressure campaign was soon launched.
In California, the Ministry of Public Security dispatched Rong Jing—a PRC national and permanent U.S. resident—who had operated with apparent impunity across the U.S. as a bounty hunter for Beijing’s global rendition program.
This time, Rong sought to hire a new American private investigator.
On May 22, 2017, Rong met with the PI at a restaurant in Los Angeles. He didn’t know the man was an undercover FBI informant—and agreed to let their four-hour conversation be recorded.
When Rong proposed video surveillance on Xu’s daughter, the informant began to ask probing questions. Rong opened up—not only about the mission, but about the entire Fox Hunt apparatus behind it.
Asked how payment would be arranged, Rong said it would depend on what the PRC decided to do once the daughter was located. “Say, if the next step somebody asks me to catch [Xu’s] daughter,” he speculated. “When we get there, they wouldn’t feel comfortable to arrest her… So we need to be there on their behalf.”
According to Rong, successful Fox Hunt collaborators could submit for reward money—paid out inside China and split with U.S.-based operatives. The funds, he said, were controlled by Party officials, with the Communist Party overseeing all payments.
Rong contrasted his own freelance status with another class of agents—PRC “lobbyists” sent abroad as salaried civil servants. These operatives, he said, traveled under false names and work visas, sometimes posing as academics or trade representatives. Their job was to persuade overseas Chinese to return “voluntarily.”
“These lobbyists explain the advantages of returning to the PRC,” Rong said, euphemistically.
And then he pointed north.
Rong told the informant he had personally met one such PRC lobbyist in Canada. Though he did not name the individual, he described the tactic: use false identities, operate under official cover, and insulate the PRC government from any legal risk.
As the conversation turned back to Xu’s daughter, the informant asked the most pressing question: would she be safe?
“If there was an accident,” Rong replied, “in truth, you could claim that you were just investigating her.”
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MxM News
Quick Hit:
A Defense Intelligence Agency official has been arrested for allegedly attempting to leak classified material to a foreign government out of political opposition to President Donald Trump. The FBI says the man sought foreign citizenship and called the Trump Administration “disturbing.”
Key Details:
- Nathan Villas Laatsch, an IT worker in the DIA’s Insider Threat Division, was arrested after offering to pass classified data to a “friendly” foreign government.
- Laatsch expressed political frustration in his outreach, writing: “I do not agree or align with the values of this administration.”
- The FBI posed as foreign agents and arrested him after a pre-arranged handoff of sensitive materials.
Today, an IT specialist employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency was arrested for attempting to transmit classified national defense information to a foreign government.
This case underscores the persistent risk of insider threats. The FBI remains steadfast in protecting our…
— FBI Director Kash Patel (@FBIDirectorKash) May 29, 2025
Diving Deeper:
A Defense Intelligence Agency employee tasked with protecting national secrets is facing federal charges after allegedly trying to pass classified information to a foreign government—because he was upset with President Donald Trump.
Nathan Villas Laatsch, a civilian DIA employee working in the Insider Threat Division, was arrested in northern Virginia on Thursday after the FBI said he attempted to share sensitive materials with a foreign country he considered an ally. According to court documents, Laatsch first made contact through an unsolicited email, criticizing the Trump administration and offering cooperation.
“The recent actions of the current administration are extremely disturbing to me,” Laatsch wrote. “I do not agree or align with the values of this administration and intend to act to support the values that the United States at one time stood for.”
Unbeknownst to Laatsch, the FBI intercepted the message and launched a sting operation, posing as foreign intelligence agents. An undercover FBI operative responded, “Good afternoon, I received your message and share your concerns,” according to an affidavit from Special Agent Matthew T. Johnson.
Laatsch’s position made the breach especially serious. The Insider Threat Division is the DIA unit responsible for identifying individuals who may pose a national security risk—a division he now allegedly violated himself.
Authorities say Laatsch went so far as to begin seeking citizenship in the unnamed country, citing his disillusionment with America’s political trajectory. “I’ve given a lot of thought to this before any outreach, and despite the risks, the calculus has not changed,” he reportedly wrote. “I do not see the trajectory of things changing, and do not think it is appropriate or right to do nothing when I am in this position.”
FBI agents arrested him following a meeting in which he handed over classified materials. He’s scheduled to appear in federal court in Alexandria, Virginia.
FBI Director Kash Patel underscored the severity of the situation, writing on X: “This case underscores the persistent risk of insider threats. The FBI remains steadfast in protecting our national security and thanks our law enforcement partners for their critical support.”
The case raises new concerns about political ideology interfering with national security work—especially from those entrusted with detecting internal threats.
espionage
Trudeau Government Unlawfully Halted CSIS Foreign Operation, Endangering Officers and Damaging Canada’s Standing With Allies, Review Finds
Sam Cooper
This chain of command suggests the halt originated in the Prime Minister’s Office—not from the CSIS Director or Public Safety Minister, as required under the CSIS Act.
An explosive intelligence review indicates that senior political actors surrounding Prime Minister Justin Trudeau unlawfully intervened in a high-risk Canadian Security Intelligence Service operation targeting foreign threats abroad in coordination with allied nations—a politicized act that placed Canadian operatives in immediate danger and inflicted lasting damage on the country’s international reputation and trust among intelligence partners.
According to the redacted report released Thursday by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), the order to halt the operation was the result of “political-level discussions” and “first came from the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister to the Director of CSIS.”
This chain of command suggests the halt originated in the Prime Minister’s Office—not from the CSIS Director or Public Safety Minister, as required under the CSIS Act.
This latest blow to Canada’s intelligence integrity—suggesting the inappropriate politicization of national security operations—comes amid growing tensions with key allies. In recent months, senior Trump administration official Peter Navarro reportedly raised the possibility of removing Canada from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, the historic intelligence-sharing partnership founded among Allied nations during the Second World War.
The NSIRA review was triggered in September 2022, when then–Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino requested an examination of whether CSIS and his department had fulfilled their legal responsibilities. Both Prime Minister Trudeau and Mendicino have already faced scrutiny in a separate RCMP external review, which raised questions about whether their government inappropriately politicized national security responses during the so-called “Freedom Convoy” protests that descended on Ottawa during the pandemic.
NSIRA’s months-long investigation into the foreign operation suggests a disturbing pattern: a CSIS mission was suspended or delayed midstream—possibly for partisan or diplomatic reasons—without legal authority. The intervention endangered CSIS personnel, disrupted the agency’s mandate to protect Canada from serious threats, and damaged intelligence cooperation with international allies.
“NSIRA found that the decision to halt this active CSIS operation [REDACTED] was not made by the CSIS Director under section 6(1) of the CSIS Act, and for which there is no written record of a direction coming from the Minister of Public Safety under… the CSIS Act,” the review concluded. “Moreover, [REDACTED] to halt this active operation created unnecessary danger for the CSIS team [REDACTED] and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation.”
The Bureau’s analysis of the redacted report echoes patterns scrutinized during the Hogue Commission, where Trudeau government officials were accused of suppressing or delaying intelligence related to foreign interference in Canadian democracy—reportedly to protect Liberal Party interests. The concerns also recall the SNC-Lavalin affair, in which the Prime Minister and his staff were found by the Ethics Commissioner to have improperly pressured the Attorney General to halt a corruption prosecution.
In a strikingly similar pattern, The Globe and Mail has reported from Canadian military sources that then-defence minister Harjit Sajjan allegedly pressured Canadian special forces during the fall of Kabul in 2021 to prioritize the rescue of Afghan Sikhs—individuals not considered operational priorities at the time.
The new review of CSIS’s compromised foreign operation also revealed a dangerous collapse in control while Canadian officers and a source were evidently in serious danger.
NSIRA wrote: “The review revealed that CSIS senior officials had difficulty in grappling with [REDACTED] to halt the operation; so much so, in fact, that management and control of the operation appeared to cease functioning properly. The Director of CSIS, for instance, evidently no longer had decision-making control over the active operation, when on [REDACTED] he sent an email to senior officials within key security and intelligence portfolios stating: ‘time is quickly running out and the situation is getting much more tense on the ground. We need a decision tomorrow.’”
The Canadian intelligence community is tight-lipped on this sensitive case, but indicating deep concerns, former CSIS counterterrorism officer Andrew Kirsch—who previously worked in both field and policy roles—flagged the report’s most alarming findings on social media, highlighting the unlawful direction from political actors and the operational danger that followed. While Kirsch did not comment further, he linked the report and wrote: “NSIRA’s review identified several significant concerns, including the appropriateness of direction given to CSIS by political-level actors outside the Minister of Public Safety.”
While much of the NSIRA report is redacted, several critical passages offer a glimpse into the scale and complexity of the abandoned CSIS mission. The review states: “The [REDACTED] story commences… when CSIS first learned of [information that required the planning of a specific category of operation]. CSIS started working with domestic and foreign partners [on an] operation involving [REDACTED].”
The operational consequences were acute. NSIRA wrote: “The CSIS team told NSIRA that they felt abandoned and, they believed that the absence of a Government decision ‘was a decision.’ Facing this untenable situation, the CSIS team felt forced to plan alternative actions to help ensure [their own] safety.”
Other CSIS officers warned that continuing the operation under those conditions would have “caused grave diplomatic harm to Canada’s relationship [REDACTED]” and that the shutdown “would have also signalled that CSIS could not be trusted.” NSIRA concluded that the halt introduced unnecessary danger to the CSIS team and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation.
The review also documents a deeper rift between frontline CSIS operators and their civilian oversight ministry. While Public Safety and CSIS headquarters insisted the relationship remained strong, CSIS employees directly involved in the operation told NSIRA the experience had left a “chilling effect” on their trust in Public Safety Canada. NSIRA warned that confusion between political decision-making and operational independence had created long-term damage.
SIRC, the former review body to NSIRA, had previously examined similar cases and issued recommendations to address legality, internal oversight, risk management, identity management, and foreign strategic orientation. CSIS accepted those recommendations. NSIRA’s findings now suggest those protections were ignored—undone not by technical failure, but by high-level political actors.
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