Connect with us

espionage

Trudeau Admits Missing At Least Five Crucial Reports Or Memos Intended For Him to Authorize Defensive Briefs to MPs

Published

7 minute read

Justin Trudeau Describes For First Time His View of “PRC Targeting Paper” Held Back By His Advisor in 2023

For the first time, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has testified on his view of two explosive Canadian intelligence reports, including the “Targeting Paper,” which described how Chinese diplomats assessed Canadian MPs based on how helpful or hurtful they could be to Beijing. Trudeau confirmed that this report was not shared with him by his key security advisor, Jody Thomas.

Additionally, Trudeau addressed three memos starting in 2019 that intended to brief him on foreign interference threats, all of which he claimed never reached his desk, with the intended briefings for Parliamentarians, which he was requested to authorize, only occurring in June 2024.

The inquiry into foreign interference in Canada’s elections has uncovered deep, ongoing divisions between Trudeau’s top aides and Canada’s intelligence community, with particular focus on two pivotal reports: the CSIS Targeting Paper and the PCO January 2022 Special Report. These documents, which detail how Beijing has sought to influence Canadian politics, have become central to understanding how the government responded—or failed to respond—to the growing threat of interference.

The CSIS Targeting Paper, drafted in 2021 and circulated to a small number of public servants in 2023, “named names” and outlined how Chinese diplomats categorized Canadian parliamentarians into three groups: those friendly towards Beijing, those neutral or potentially persuadable, and those deemed antagonistic due to their criticism of China’s human rights record, particularly on issues like the Uyghurs and Hong Kong. During his testimony, Trudeau played down the significance of this report, arguing that such categorization is a normal part of diplomacy.

“What the targeting paper actually talks about is that China has broadly classified parliamentarians in their diplomatic activities—some as being positive towards China, others who are neutral or convincible, and others who have spoken out against China,” Trudeau said. He noted that this diplomatic behavior was not surprising or new to him, comparing it to Canada’s own tactics during the NAFTA negotiations with the Trump administration. “That’s just a part of diplomacy right there,” he claimed.

However, Trudeau acknowledged that despite some “interesting tidbits” in the report, his National Security Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) had decided not to pass it on to him in 2021, deeming it not significantly relevant to his understanding of China’s behavior. “I have faith, having looked at the paper, that it was indeed the right decision by the National Security Intelligence Advisor—that it wasn’t a document that significantly added in a relevant way to my understanding of the situation.”

The actual contents of this paper are unknown, and blocked from the Commission by Trudeau’s Attorney General.

The PCO January 2022 Special Report, reviewed by The Bureau, outlines an alarming situation. Based on over 100 CSIS reports, it detailed a covert network that implicated 11 Toronto-area candidates in the 2019 federal election in interference operations, involving clandestine fund transfers from the Toronto Chinese Consulate into proxy networks. This report stemmed from a sensitive investigation in the Greater Toronto Area, culminating in CSIS seeking a technical surveillance warrant in March 2021. The Special Report was flagged as highly sensitive and formed the backbone of the inquiry’s scrutiny of Chinese influence in Canadian elections.

Both of these reports became focal points in the inquiry, revealing deep disagreements between Trudeau’s political aides and intelligence officials. Katie Telford, Trudeau’s Chief of Staff, testified that Global Affairs Canada held a divergent view from CSIS, particularly regarding the scope of foreign interference threats. The inquiry has exposed a consistent reluctance within the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to act on intelligence warnings, reflecting a broader divide between diplomacy and national security.

Three Memos and Delayed Briefings

In addition to the two reports, Trudeau faced questioning over three memos that called for him to authorize broad briefings on foreign interference risks and plans to brief Parliamentarians. Commission Counsel pressed him on why these memos, intended to reach him in 2019, 2020, and 2021, were not acted on.

“These decision points didn’t get to me,” Trudeau stated, acknowledging the breakdown. “But I made it very clear throughout conversations that I would have approved of, and encouraged, briefings.”

“Nobody flagged this was something of importance that was stalled, and therefore, as you pointed out, they weren’t acted on in my office,” Trudeau concluded.

As a result, Parliamentarians were not briefed on foreign interference threats until June 2024, years after the intelligence reports had first raised the alarm.

“Do you have any idea why no reply was given to all of those seeking authorization?” Commissioner Hogue asked.

“In the third case, it actually didn’t get to my office,” Trudeau said, while offering no explanation for the second, and pointing to COVID-19 in the first.

Trudeau’s testimony, which continues today, combined with that of senior aides such as Telford and Brian Clow, highlighted the troubling rifts between the PMO and Canada’s intelligence agencies. The intelligence community, led by CSIS, has consistently sounded the alarm about Chinese interference in Canadian politics, while the PMO and Global Affairs have often pushed back on CSIS’s assessments.

The inquiry has revealed that Global Affairs and the PMO tended to downplay foreign interference concerns, particularly those involving China, in favor of maintaining diplomatic and economic ties. This stance has been at odds with CSIS, which has taken a much more hawkish view, warning of serious threats to Canada’s democratic system.

The Bureau is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Todayville is a digital media and technology company. We profile unique stories and events in our community. Register and promote your community event for free.

Follow Author

Business

Ottawa Is Still Dodging The China Interference Threat

Published on

From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Lee Harding

Alarming claims out of P.E.I. point to deep foreign interference, and the federal government keeps stalling. Why?

Explosive new allegations of Chinese interference in Prince Edward Island show Canada’s institutions may already be compromised and Ottawa has been slow to respond.

The revelations came out in August in a book entitled “Canada Under Siege: How PEI Became a Forward Operating Base for the Chinese Communist Party.” It was co-authored by former national director of the RCMP’s proceeds of crime program Garry Clement, who conducted an investigation with CSIS intelligence officer Michel Juneau-Katsuya.

In a press conference in Ottawa on Oct. 8, Clement referred to millions of dollars in cash transactions, suspicious land transfers and a network of corporations that resembled organized crime structures. Taken together, these details point to a vulnerability in Canada’s immigration and financial systems that appears far deeper than most Canadians have been told.

P.E.I.’s Provincial Nominee Program allows provinces to recommend immigrants for permanent residence based on local economic needs. It seems the program was exploited by wealthy applicants linked to Beijing to gain permanent residence in exchange for investments that often never materialized. It was all part of “money laundering, corruption, and elite capture at the highest levels.”

Hundreds of thousands of dollars came in crisp hundred-dollar bills on given weekends, amounting to millions over time. A monastery called Blessed Wisdom had set up a network of “corporations, land transfers, land flips, and citizens being paid under the table, cash for residences and property,” as was often done by organized crime.

Clement even called the Chinese government “the largest transnational organized crime group in the history of the world.” If true, the allegation raises an obvious question: how much of this activity has gone unnoticed or unchallenged by Canadian authorities, and why?

Dean Baxendale, CEO of the China Democracy Fund and Optimum Publishing International, published the book after five years of investigations.

“We followed the money, we followed the networks, and we followed the silence,” Baxendale said. “What we found were clear signs of elite capture, failed oversight and infiltration of Canadian institutions and political parties at the municipal, provincial and federal levels by actors aligned with the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, the Ministry of State Security. In some cases, political donations have come from members of organized crime groups in our country and have certainly influenced political decision making over the years.”

For readers unfamiliar with them, the United Front Work Department is a Chinese Communist Party organization responsible for influence operations abroad, while the Ministry of State Security is China’s main civilian intelligence agency. Their involvement underscores the gravity of the allegations.

It is a troubling picture. Perhaps the reason Canada seems less and less like a democracy is that it has been compromised by foreign actors. And that same compromise appears to be hindering concrete actions in response.

One example Baxendale highlighted involved a PEI hotel. “We explore how a PEI hotel housed over 500 Chinese nationals, all allegedly trying to reclaim their $25,000 residency deposits, but who used a single hotel as their home address. The owner was charged by the CBSA, only to have the trial shut down by the federal government itself,” he said. The case became a key test of whether Canadian authorities were willing to pursue foreign interference through the courts.

The press conference came 476 days after Bill C-70 was passed to address foreign interference. The bill included the creation of Canada’s first foreign agent registry. Former MP Kevin Vuong rightly asked why the registry had not been authorized by cabinet. The delay raises doubts about Ottawa’s willingness to confront the problem directly.

“Why? What’s the reason for the delay?” Vuong asked.

Macdonald-Laurier Institute foreign policy director Christopher Coates called the revelations “beyond concerning” and warned, “The failures to adequately address our national security challenges threaten Canada’s relations with allies, impacting economic security and national prosperity.”

Former solicitor general of Canada and Prince Edward Island MP Wayne Easter called for a national inquiry into Beijing’s interference operations.

“There’s only one real way to get to the bottom of what is happening, and that would be a federal public inquiry,” Easter said. “We need a federal public inquiry that can subpoena witnesses, can trace bank accounts, can bring in people internationally, to get to the bottom of this issue.”

Baxendale called for “transparency, national scrutiny, and most of all for Canadians to wake up to the subtle siege under way.” This includes implementing a foreign influence transparency commissioner and a federal registry of beneficial owners.

If corruption runs as deeply as alleged, who will have the political will to properly respond? It will take more whistleblowers, changes in government and an insistent public to bring accountability. Without sustained pressure, the system that allowed these failures may also prevent their correction.

Lee Harding is a research fellow for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.

Continue Reading

Artificial Intelligence

UK Police Pilot AI System to Track “Suspicious” Driver Journeys

Published on

logo

By

AI-driven surveillance is shifting from spotting suspects to mapping ordinary life, turning everyday travel into a stream of behavioral data

Police forces across Britain are experimenting with artificial intelligence that can automatically monitor and categorize drivers’ movements using the country’s extensive number plate recognition network.
Internal records obtained by Liberty Investigates and The Telegraph reveal that three of England and Wales’s nine regional organized crime units are piloting a Faculty AI-built program designed to learn from vehicle movement data and detect journeys that algorithms label “suspicious.”
For years, the automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) system has logged more than 100 million vehicle sightings each day, mostly for confirming whether a specific registration has appeared in a certain area.
The new initiative changes that logic entirely. Instead of checking isolated plates, it teaches software to trace entire routes, looking for patterns of behavior that resemble the travel of criminal networks known for “county lines” drug trafficking.
The project, called Operation Ignition, represents a change in scale and ambition.
Unlike traditional alerts that depend on officers manually flagging “vehicles of interest,” the machine learning model learns from past data to generate its own list of potential targets.
Official papers admit that the process could involve “millions of [vehicle registrations],” and that the information gathered may guide future decisions about the ethical and operational use of such technologies.
What began as a Home Office-funded trial in the North West covering Merseyside, Greater Manchester, Cheshire, Cumbria, Lancashire, and North Wales has now expanded into three regional crime units.
Authorities describe this as a technical experiment, but documents point to long-term plans for nationwide adoption.
Civil liberty groups warn that these kinds of systems rarely stay limited to their original purpose.
Jake Hurfurt of Big Brother Watch said: “The UK’s ANPR network is already one of the biggest surveillance networks on the planet, tracking millions of innocent people’s journeys every single day. Using AI to analyse the millions of number plates it picks up will only make the surveillance dragnet even more intrusive. Monitoring and analysing this many journeys will impact everybody’s privacy and has the potential to allow police to analyse how we all move around the country at the click of a button.”
He added that while tackling organized drug routes is a legitimate goal, “there is a real danger of mission creep – ANPR was introduced as a counter-terror measure, now it is used to enforce driving rules. The question is not whether should police try and stop gangs, but how could this next-generation use of number plate scans be used down the line?”
The find and profile app was built by Faculty AI, a British technology firm with deep ties to government projects.
The company, which worked with Dominic Cummings during the Vote Leave campaign, has since developed data analysis tools for the NHS and Ministry of Defence.
Faculty recently drew attention after it was contracted to create software that scans social media for “concerning” posts, later used to monitor online debate about asylum housing.
Faculty declined to comment on its part in the ANPR initiative.
Chief constable Chris Todd, chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s data and analytics board, described the system as “a small-scale, exploratory, operational proof of concept looking at the potential use of machine learning in conjunction with ANPR data.”
He said the pilot used “a very small subset of ANPR data” and insisted that “data protection and security measures are in place, and an ethics panel has been established to oversee the work.”
William Webster, the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, said the Home Office was consulting on new legal rules for digital and biometric policing tools, including ANPR.
“Oversight is a key part of this framework,” he said, adding that trials of this kind should take place within “a ‘safe space’” that ensures “transparency and accountability at the outset.”
A Home Office spokesperson said the app was “designed to support investigations into serious and organised crime” and was “currently being tested on a small scale” using “a small subset of data collected by the national ANPR network.”
From a privacy standpoint, the concern is not just the collection of travel data but what can be inferred from it.
By linking millions of journeys into behavioral models, the system could eventually form a live map of how people move across the country.
Once this analytical capacity becomes part of routine policing, the distinction between tracking suspects and tracking citizens may blur entirely.
Continue Reading

Trending

X