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MacDonald Laurier Institute

Weaponizing human rights tribunals

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Stéphane Sérafin for Inside Policy

If adopted, Bill C-63 could unleash a wave of “hate speech” complaints that persecute – and prosecute – citizens, businesses, or organizations while stifling online expression.

Much has already been written on Bill C-63, the Trudeau government’s controversial Bill proposing among other things to give the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal jurisdiction to adjudicate “hate speech” complaints arising from comments made on social media. As opponents have noted, the introduction of these new measures presents a significant risk to free expression on many issues that ought to be open to robust public debate.

Proponents, for their part, have tended to downplay these concerns by pointing to the congruence between these new proposed measures and the existing prohibition contained in the Criminal Code. In their view, the fact that the definition of “hate speech” provided by Bill C-63 is identical to that already found in the Criminal Code means that these proposed measures hardly justify the concerns expressed.

This response to critics of Bill C-63 largely misses the point. Certainly, the existing Criminal Code prohibitions on “hate speech” have and continue to raise difficult issues from the standpoint of free expression. However, the real problem with Bill C-63 is not that it adopts the Criminal Code definition, but that it grants the jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints arising under this definition to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.

Established in 1977, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal is a federal administrative tribunal based on a model first implemented in Ontario in 1962 and since copied in every other Canadian province and territory. There is a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, just as there is an Ontario Human Rights Tribunal and a British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, among others. Although these are separate institutions with different jurisdictions, their decisions proceed from similar starting points embedded in nearly identical legislation. In the case of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, that legislation is the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Tribunals such as the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal are administrative bodies, not courts. They are part of the executive branch, alongside the prime minister, Cabinet, and the public service. This has at least three implications for the way the Tribunal is likely to approach the “hate speech” measures that Bill C-63 contemplates. Each of these presents significant risks for freedom of expression that do not arise, or do not arise to the same extent, under the existing Criminal Code provisions.

The first implication is procedural. As an administrative body, the Tribunal is not subject to the same stringent requirements for the presentation of evidence that are used before proper courts, and certainly not subject to the evidentiary standard applied in the criminal law context. But more importantly still, the structure of the Canadian Human Rights Act is one that contemplates a form of hybrid public-private prosecution, in which the decision to bring a complaint falls to a given individual, while its prosecution is taken up by another administrative body, called the Human Rights Commission.

This model differs from both the criminal law context, where both the decision to file charges and prosecute them rest with the Crown, and from the civil litigation context, where the plaintiff decides to bring a claim but must personally bear the cost and effort of doing so. With respect to complaints brought before the Tribunal, it is the complainant who chooses to file a complaint, and the Human Rights Commission that then takes up the burden of proof and the costs of prosecution.

In the context of the existing complaints process, which deals mainly with discriminatory practices in employment and the provision of services, this model is intended to alleviate burdens that might deter individuals from bringing otherwise valid discrimination complaints before the Tribunal. Whatever the actual merits of this approach, however, it presents a very real risk of being weaponized under Bill C-63. Notably, the fact that complainants are not expected to prosecute their own complaints means that there is little to discourage individuals (or activist groups acting through individuals) from filing “hate speech” complaints against anyone expressing opinions with which they disagree.

This feature alone is likely to create a significant chilling effect on online expression. Whether a complaint is ultimately substantiated or not, the model under which the Tribunal operates dispenses complainants from the burden of prosecution but does not dispense defendants from the burden of defending themselves against the complaint in question. Again, this approach may or may not be sensible under existing anti-discrimination measures, which are primarily aimed at businesses with generally greater means. But it becomes obviously one-sided in relation to the “hate speech” measures contemplated by Bill C-63, which instead target anyone engaging in public commentary using online platforms. Anyone who provides public commentary, no matter how measured or nuanced, will thus have to risk personally bearing the cost and effort of defending against a complaint as a condition of online participation. Meanwhile, no such costs exist for those who might want to file complaints.

A second implication arising from the Tribunal’s status as an administrative body with significant implications for Bill C-63 is that its decisions attract “deference” on appeal. By this, I mean that its decisions are given a certain latitude by reviewing courts that appeal courts do not generally give to decisions from lower tribunals, including in criminal matters. “Deference” of this kind is consistent with the broad discretion that legislation confers upon administrative decision-makers such as the Tribunal. However, it also raises significant concerns in relation to Bill C-63 that its proponents have failed to properly address.

In particular, the deference granted to the Tribunal means that proponents of Bill C-63 have been wrong to argue that the congruence between its proposed definition of “hate speech” and existing provisions of the Criminal Code provides sufficient safeguards against threats to freedom of expression.

Deference means that it is possible, and indeed likely, that the Tribunal will develop an interpretation of “hate speech” that diverges significantly from that applied under the Criminal Code. Even if the language used in Bill C-63 is identical to the language found in the Criminal Code, the Tribunal possesses a wide latitude in interpreting what these provisions mean and is not bound by the interpretation that courts give to the Criminal Code. It may even develop an interpretation that is far more draconian than the Criminal Code standard, and reviewing courts are likely to accept that interpretation despite the fact that it diverges from their own.

This problem is exacerbated by the deferential approach that reviewing courts have lately taken towards the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to administrative bodies such as the Tribunal. This approach contrasts to the direct application of the Charter that remains characteristic of decisions involving the Criminal Codeincluding its “hate speech” provisions. It also contrasts with the approach previously applied to provincial Human Rights Tribunal decisions dealing with the distribution of print publications that were found to amount to “hate speech” under provincial human rights laws. Decisions such as these have frequently been criticized for not taking sufficiently seriously the Charter right to freedom of expression. However, they at least involve a direct application of the Charter, including a requirement that the government justify any infringement of the Charter right to free expression as a reasonable limit in a “free and democratic society.”

Under the approach now favoured by Canadian courts, these same courts now extend the deference paradigm to administrative decision-makers, such as the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, even where the Charter is potentially engaged. In practice, this means that instead of asking whether a rights infringement is justified in a “free and democratic society,” courts ask whether administrative-decision makers have properly “balanced” even explicitly enumerated Charter rights such as the right to freedom of expression against competing “Charter values” whenever a particular administrative decision is challenged.

This approach to Charter-compliance has led to a number of highly questionable decisions in which the Charter rights at issue have at best been treated as a secondary concern. Notably, it led the Supreme Court of Canada to affirm the denial of the accreditation of a new law school at a Christian university in British Columbia, on the basis that this university imposed a covenant on students requiring them to not engage in extra-marital sexual relations that was deemed discriminatory against non-heterosexual students. Four of the nine Supreme Court of Canada judges would have applied a similar approach to uphold a finding by the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that a Quebec comedian had engaged in discriminatory conduct because of a routine in which he made jokes at the expense of a disabled child who had cultivated a public image. (With recent changes to the composition of the court, that minority would now likely be a majority). This approach to Charter-compliance only increases the likelihood that the proposed online hate speech provisions will develop in a manner that is different from, and more repressive than, the existing Criminal Code standard.

Finally, the third and potentially most consequential difference to arise from the Tribunal’s status as an administrative rather than judicial body concerns the remedies that the Tribunal can order if a particular complaint is substantiated. Notably, the monetary awards that the Tribunal can impose – currently capped at $20,000 – are often imposed on the basis of standards that are more flexible than those applicable to civil claims brought before judicial bodies. An equivalent monetary remedy is contemplated for the new online “hate speech” provisions. This remedy is in addition to the possibility, also currently contemplated by Bill C-63, of ordering a defendant to pay a non-compensatory penalty (in effect, a fine payable to the complainant, rather than the state) of up to $50,000. This last remedy especially adds to the incentives created by the Commission model for individuals (and activist groups) to file complaints wherever possible.

That said, the monetary remedies contemplated by Bill C-63 are perhaps not the most concerning remedies as far as freedom of expression is concerned. Bill C-63 also provides the Tribunal with the power to issue “an order to cease the discriminatory practice and take measures, in consultation with the Commission on the general purposes of the measures, to redress the practice or to prevent the same or a similar practice from recurring.” This remedy brings to mind the Tribunal’s existing power to under the anti-discrimination provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

It is not entirely clear how this kind of directed remedy will be applied in the context of Bill C-63. The Bill provides for a number of exemptions to the application of the new “hate speech” measures, most notably to social media platforms, which may limit their scope of application to some extent. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable that remedies might be sought against other kinds of online content distributors in an effort to have them engage in proactive censorship or otherwise set general policy with little or no democratic oversight. This possibility is certainly heightened by the way in which the existing directed remedies for anti-discrimination have been used to date.

A prominent example of directed remedies being implemented in a way that circumvents democratic oversight is provided by the Canada Research Chairs (“CRC”) program endowed by the federal government at various Canadian universities. That program has recently come under scrutiny due to the on appointments under the CRC program. In reality, those implementing the quotas are merely proceeding in accordance with a settlement agreement entered into by the federal government following a complaint made by individuals alleging discrimination in CRC appointments. That complaint was brought before the Tribunal and sought precisely the kind of redress to which the government eventually consented.

Whatever the merits of the settlement reached in the CRC case, the results achieved by the complainants through their complaint to the Tribunal were far more politically consequential than the kinds of monetary awards that have been the focus of most discussion in the Bill C-63 context. As with the one-sidedness of the procedural incentives to file complaints and the deference that courts show to Tribunal decisions, the true scope of the Tribunal’s remedial jurisdiction presents significant risks to freedom of expression that simply have no equivalent under the Criminal Code. These issues must be kept in mind when addressing the content of that Bill, which in its current form risks being weaponized by politically motivated individuals and activist groups to stifle online expression with little to no democratic oversight.


Stéphane Sérafin is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and assistant professor in the Common Law Section of the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa. He holds a Bachelor of Social Science, Juris Doctor, and Licentiate in Law from the University of Ottawa and completed his Master of Laws at the University of Toronto. He is a member of the Law Society of Ontario and the Barreau du Québec.

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Housing

Government, not greed, is behind Canada’s housing problem

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Macdonald-Laurier Institute

By Anthony De Luca-Baratta for Inside Policy

When it comes to housing unaffordability in Canada, Prime Minister Mark Carney has correctly diagnosed the problem – but prescribed the wrong solution. The cost of new homes across the country increasingly exceeds the average family’s budget. But Carney’s proposal to establish a new federal entity, Build Canada Homes, to “get the government back in the business of homebuilding,” will make matters worse.

During the recent election campaign, the Liberal leader promised to make the federal government into an affordable housing developer by, among other proposals, offering low-cost financing to affordable-housing builders. This approach falsely implies that housing is what economists call a public good – something governments provide because the market cannot.

National defence is a perfect example of a public good: private contractors alone would be unable to withhold protection from those who failed to pay for their services, incentivizing many to welcome the security without paying a dime. In economics jargon, this is known as the “free-rider problem.” Defence contractors would quickly go bankrupt, and the nation would be left defenceless. For this reason, the government is the primary provider of national defence in all functioning states.

If housing suffered from the same market failure as national defence, the government’s approach would have some merit. But it does not, indicating that housing is not, in fact, a public good. The laws of supply and demand are thus the most efficient way of determining both the quantity and price of housing.

In a free housing market, when prices begin to rise, builders build more units to earn higher profits. Over time, competition among builders, homeowners, and landlords forces prices back down because individuals who overcharge lose customers to those who do not. Because overcharging is bad for business, the market provides an abundance of housing at prices negotiated among millions of buyers and sellers. The result is a natural supply of affordable housing – no special incentives needed.

Some in Canada might dismiss this logic as hopelessly naïve. According to these individuals, inflated prices come primarily from landlords and developers squeezing Canadians for more profit and greed is running rampant in the Canadian housing market.

The truth is that developers and landlords are responding rationally to bad economic policy, and homebuyers and renters are footing the bill. Municipalities across Canada limit building heights, set aesthetic standards, ban certain types of construction in designated areas, impose parking requirements, and legislate minimum lot sizes, among a host of other land-use regulations.

These rules make housing harder and more costly to build, constraining supply and radically inflating prices. The C.D. Howe Institute estimates that these regulations cost homebuyers an average of $230,000 in Vancouver, Abbotsford, Victoria, Kelowna, Calgary, Toronto, and Ottawa-Gatineau. In Vancouver, that figure is an eye-watering $1 million.

It is this economic reality, not an unwillingness to build affordable housing, that lies at the root of Canada’s housing crisis.

Housing Minister Gregor Robertson inadvertently admitted as much when he cautioned that there would be no quick solution to Canada’s housing crisis because “projects take years to approve and build.” The minister failed to acknowledge that these delays are due to cumbersome municipal regulations.

To solve Canada’s housing crisis, Carney must begin by recognizing that affordable housing in Canada is in short supply because local governments have made it impossible to build. The housing market could provide affordable housing on its own – no taxpayer-funded subsidies required – if only the government would reduce burdensome industry regulations. Just look at jurisdictions with virtually no land-use regulations, like Houston, Texas, where housing is abundant and affordable. Studies have consistently shown that wherever land-use regulations are low, so are home prices.

To be fair, the Liberal Party’s election platform did acknowledge the need to cut federal housing regulations. It also suggested that it wanted local governments to streamline development, though it was short on specifics. But since the election, there is no sign that the government is moving forward with any of these proposals.

The prime minister needs to tell local governments that their federal funds will dry up if they don’t start getting out of the way of housing development. He should also offer bonuses to cities that are especially quick to build new units. Canadians need shovels in the ground now. It is time for the prime minister to use the bully pulpit to put them there.


Anthony De Luca-Baratta is a contributor to the Center for North American Prosperity and Security, a project of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, and a Young Voices Contributor based in Montreal. He holds a master’s degree in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

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Alberta

A misinformation bubble in action—Egale Canada v. Alberta

Published on

Macdonald-Laurier Institute

By Geoffrey Sigalet for Inside Policy

Justice Kuntz completely set aside the question of whether the medical benefits of these procedures are supported by evidence… That these identities are highly fluid, and the adverse consequences of pursuing these procedures are serious and irreversible, was ostensibly of little to no importance

A pair of recent judicial rulings – one in Canada and the other in the United States, both on the matter of gender medicine – saw the courts reach dramatically different conclusions. But each case tells the story of the yet-to-be-burst “liberal misinformation bubble” that exists around this issue.

On June 18, 2025, the United States Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in United States v. Skrmetti. A 6-3 majority upheld Tennessee’s ban on puberty blocking drugs, cross-sex hormones, and sex reassignment surgeries for minors.

Nine days later, Justice Allison Kuntz – who was appointed to the Alberta Court of King’s Bench by the federal government in 2023 – issued an interlocutory decision in Egale Canada v. Alberta. It’s a case brought to challenge Alberta’s controversial Health Statutes Amendment Act 2024 (the HSAA), which would have implemented the province’s own restrictions on puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and sex transition surgeries for minors. The decision granted an interim injunction to prevent certain sections of the law from coming into force while the legal challenge is heard.

Advocacy groups have celebrated Justice Kuntz’s ruling as a landmark win. For now, there remain reasons for them to be optimistic she will also decide the case’s merits very differently from the majority in Skrmetti. However, in the big picture, that confidence may not be warranted given mounting evidence against their cause and the options open to Alberta.

Indeed, to say the Egale and Skrmetti decisions are worlds apart is to state the obvious. But while it is tempting to explain the diverging outcomes by reference to the distinct legal regimes in place in the US and Canada, such a conclusion ignores significant similarities between the factual and procedural context of the American and Canadian cases.

Notably, there was a request for an interlocutory injunction in both the Egale Canada and Skrmetti cases. All the more striking, the United States District Court initially awarded the injunction in Skrmetti before the Sixth Circuit overturned it on appeal.

Moreover, the evidence tendered in both cases was fundamentally similar. Ultimately, the differing outcomes can be attributed primarily to the manner in which the judges interpreted evidence before them, and especially the assumptions they brought to bear in their analysis.

In Skrmetti, a majority of the Sixth Circuit and US Supreme Court judges straightforwardly appreciated the significant evidence that’s accrued demonstrating the harm caused by these interventions, and the continuing lack of evidence regarding benefits. For her part, Justice Kuntz, like the dissenting American judges in Skrmetti, took the administration of puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and sex transition surgeries on minors to be, if not an absolute good, then at least a good that strongly outweighs potential adverse consequences.

In both cases, their assessments appear to reflect what journalist Helen Lewis of The Atlantic has recently labelled a “liberal misinformation bubble” – in which assumptions concerning these procedures’ benefits and risks remain frozen in time, while evidence of harm mounts and a lack of evidence of benefits becomes clearer.

As Lewis’ exposé highlights, and as others have also noted, there is in fact almost no evidence to support these interventions’ claimed benefits. Moreover, what evidence exists has been cast into doubt by revelations – including in documents obtained through discoveries in an Alabama case – that the organizations setting standards of care and commissioning most research have been compromised by a political commitment to what they tellingly call “gender-affirming care.” Even the claim that these interventions are necessary to avert suicide in trans-identifying minors – once the primary argument made by supporters, and still often invoked against detractors, including in a recent Globe and Mail editorial – has little to no evidentiary support. In fact, the lack of supporting evidence for this claim was even conceded by counsel arguing against the Tennessee law in Skrmetti.

While claims of benefits appear dubious and politically motivated, the evidence of harm, meanwhile, continues to mount. Notably, just as the US Supreme Court’s decision in Skrmetti was about to be released, a new paper was published outlining the serious long-term health complications caused by administering estrogen to biological males. These findings only added to the known long-term consequences of administering puberty blocking drugs and cross-sex hormones to minors, which can include permanent infertilityanorgasmiabone density loss, and other permanent physiological changes.

Consistent with Lewis’ thesis, these developments have been resisted by large swaths of the political left in the United States and elsewhere. Such resistance to this information is also evident in the dissenting judges’ assertions in Skrmetti, who continue to characterize these procedures as a “question of life or death” despite the absence of evidence.

But even they (the dissenting judges) did not go quite as far as Justice Kuntz in Egale, particularly in her analysis of whether the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not granted. In Justice Kuntz’s estimation, “[t]he evidence shows that the Ban will cause irreparable harm by causing gender diverse youth to experience permanent changes to their body that do not align with their gender identity.” To this, she adds in the very next paragraph: “the evidence shows that singling out health care for gender diverse youth and making it subject to government control will cause irreparable harm to gender diverse youth by reinforcing the discrimination and prejudice that they are already subjected to. Intentionally or not, the Ban will signal that there is something wrong with or suspect about having a gender identity that is different than the sex you were assigned at birth.”

These statements suggest that Justice Kuntz completely set aside the question of whether the medical benefits of these procedures are supported by evidence. Instead, she appears to have taken it as a given that “gender diverse youth” have an innate and immutable gender identity and will suffer irreparable injury if they are simply allowed to go through a natural puberty. That these identities are highly fluid, and the adverse consequences of pursuing these procedures are serious and irreversible, was ostensibly of little to no importance at this stage of her analysis. Meanwhile, her findings assume these restrictions would increase discrimination and prejudice towards children experiencing gender dysphoria – even if no evidence was tendered to support this conclusion.

The confidence with which Justice Kuntz reaches these conclusions is all the more remarkable. A ruling on a preliminary injunction requires only a “high degree of probability,” yet she speaks with apparent certainty when she asserts “there will be irreparable harm to transgender youth if an injunction is not granted.” In fact, there is a tension between the certainty of this statement, and her own recognition earlier in her ruling that the “merits” of the parties’ expert evidence regarding hormone therapy “cannot be, nor should they be, resolved on this application.”

Moreover, unlike other recent Charter cases in which Canadian courts have issued interlocutory injunctions on dubious grounds – such as the prohibition on drug use in public parks in British Columbia, and the removal of bike lanes in Toronto – the Egale case is not even an instance that pits the purported “harm” faced by a discrete group of persons against the broader good of the community. The individuals involved in Egale – minor children – are the very same persons for whose benefit the Alberta legislature has intervened. On balance, it was thus entirely reasonable for Alberta’s legislative measures to be allowed to come into force, so as to prevent further harm being done to some of the most vulnerable members of society until such time as a full hearing could be given to the merits of the case.

To be fair, in her later discussion of the “balance of convenience” – the court’s assessment of whether granting or refusing the injunction would cause greater harm – Justice Kuntz addresses Alberta’s argument that the HSAA’s relevant sections in fact prevent harm. But even considering these nuances, the judge’s analysis still succumbs to the “liberal misinformation bubble” Lewis identified. To contradict Alberta’s evidence on this argument, the justice leans on “the professional standards of Alberta’s health-care professions,” which she suggests will be sufficient to counteract the harms raised by Alberta while awaiting a decision on the merits. However, this conclusion ignores a key factor that Lewis highlights, and which Alberta presented: the claim that the medical profession has been politicized on this issue, and its professional standards are therefore not trustworthy.

Furthermore, Justice Kuntz mischaracterizes the evidence about the types of harm Alberta’s legislation is meant to address, by claiming that it is only meant to benefit “the small group of people” who are prescribed hormone therapy and “later regret it.” In reality, Alberta’s evidence shows its policies are meant to mitigate a host of serious health risks, including for those minors who later in life do not regret transitioning. If the administration of cross-sex hormones to minors unacceptably increases the risk of sterility, bone density deterioration, or other health risks, it will do so both for minors who detransition and those who do not.

Finally, these mischaracterizations of the harms that would be caused and prevented by the HSAA are further exacerbated by Justice Kuntz’s decision to pre-emptively block the relevant sections, instead of waiting to prohibit their operation once already in force. Her decision results from a clever choice made by Egale Canada to proactively challenge the relevant provisions of the HSAA prior to their coming into force. This allowed the law to be considered without accompanying ministerial orders the Alberta government had announced. These would have notably included an order allowing the administration of cross-sex hormones in exceptional cases, such as where children are already in the midst of the intervention, or where minors aged 16-17 have parental, physician, and psychologist approval. By excluding the order from the court’s consideration, Egale was able to make a superficially more compelling case against the law, arguing it was not tailored to the complex needs of children experiencing gender dysphoria.

Under these circumstances, it would at minimum have been much more appropriate for Justice Kuntz to exercise her judicial discretion to refuse an injunction, until such a time as the ministerial orders were issued and a full accounting of the HSAA’s impacts could be made. After all, no one was being irreparably harmed by legislation not in force. It was certainly plausible that the proclamation and ministerial orders would have reduced the risk of irreparable harm that Justice Kuntz identified. This is to say nothing of the possibility that Justice Kuntz may have acted in a manner contrary to law, and contrary to the constitution, in preventing the law’s coming into force in this way. Notably, the Supreme Court has held that Canadian courts are not to issue “private references” about potential legal issues. Less than four years ago, the Alberta Court of Appeal further held in somewhat analogous circumstances that it was inappropriate for the King’s Bench to hear a constitutional challenge to the Kenney government’s Critical Infrastructure Defence Act based on only “hypothetical scenarios”.

Justice Kuntz’s reasoning is unfortunate. It suggests a failure to grasp the core issues underlying the HSAA’s contested provisionsIt abdicates the pressing need to protect minors from unnecessary, irreversible, and potentially devasting interventions that the medical profession has, for one reason or another, failed to adequately regulate on its own. Moreover, it poses a serious risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice. As polls have confirmed, a majority of people in Alberta – and across Canada – are supportive of either full or partial restrictions on puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and sex reassignment surgeries for minors. A decision like this one will inevitably be seen as an instance of judicial overreach into the realm of provincial democratic decision-making, aligning with the beliefs of the federal Liberal government which has made no secret of its eagerness to see courts strike down this law.

In the aftermath of Justice Kuntz’s decision, Alberta is left with two options which it may wish to pursue simultaneously. One is to appeal the injunction, including the claim that the HSAA’s coming into force can be pre-emptively halted. The other is to re-enact the relevant sections of the HSAA, ideally while invoking Section 33 of the Charter – also known as the notwithstanding clause or parliamentary supremacy clause. The great Alberta premier Peter Lougheed most notably championed the clause to address instances of Ottawa-appointed judges overstepping their legitimate authority or making serious errors of judgement affecting provincial jurisdiction. By invoking Section 33 to protect its own interpretation of Charter rights, Alberta would be following the intentions of one of the key architects of the notwithstanding clause.

As a practical matter, the first option may take too long and will become moot if amendments are implemented. But the second option presents challenges of its own. Particularly if Section 33 is invoked, such action would no doubt give rise to what have become entirely predictable protests by members of the Canadian legal and political establishment who view the clause as an illegitimate device used by governments to violate rights. In the context of Egale, specifically, establishment opposition to Section 33 will only be reinforced by the “liberal misinformation bubble” which continues to surround the medical transition of minors.

However, this establishment outrage is becoming a less effective constraint as electorates become more comfortable with provincial invocations of Section 33 to contest judicial decisions offside with common sense. Voters recently re-elected governments in Saskatchewan and Ontario that had invoked Section 33.

When combined with the serious harms caused by the interventions at issue, the Alberta government has a strong mandate to move forward in the hope this misinformation bubble will finally burst.


Geoffrey Sigalet is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, director of the UBC Research Group for Constitutional Law, and an assistant professor of political science at the University of British Columbia Okanagan.

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