MxM News

Quick Hit:

A Defense Intelligence Agency official has been arrested for allegedly attempting to leak classified material to a foreign government out of political opposition to President Donald Trump. The FBI says the man sought foreign citizenship and called the Trump Administration “disturbing.”

Key Details:

• Nathan Villas Laatsch, an IT worker in the DIA’s Insider Threat Division, was arrested after offering to pass classified data to a “friendly” foreign government.
• Laatsch expressed political frustration in his outreach, writing: “I do not agree or align with the values of this administration.”
• The FBI posed as foreign agents and arrested him after a pre-arranged handoff of sensitive materials.

Today, an IT specialist employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency was arrested for attempting to transmit classified national defense information to a foreign government.

This case underscores the persistent risk of insider threats. The FBI remains steadfast in protecting our…

— FBI Director Kash Patel (@FBIDirectorKash) May 29, 2025

Diving Deeper:

A Defense Intelligence Agency employee tasked with protecting national secrets is facing federal charges after allegedly trying to pass classified information to a foreign government—because he was upset with President Donald Trump.

Nathan Villas Laatsch, a civilian DIA employee working in the Insider Threat Division, was arrested in northern Virginia on Thursday after the FBI said he attempted to share sensitive materials with a foreign country he considered an ally. According to court documents, Laatsch first made contact through an unsolicited email, criticizing the Trump administration and offering cooperation.

“The recent actions of the current administration are extremely disturbing to me,” Laatsch wrote. “I do not agree or align with the values of this administration and intend to act to support the values that the United States at one time stood for.”

Unbeknownst to Laatsch, the FBI intercepted the message and launched a sting operation, posing as foreign intelligence agents. An undercover FBI operative responded, “Good afternoon, I received your message and share your concerns,” according to an affidavit from Special Agent Matthew T. Johnson.

Laatsch’s position made the breach especially serious. The Insider Threat Division is the DIA unit responsible for identifying individuals who may pose a national security risk—a division he now allegedly violated himself.

Authorities say Laatsch went so far as to begin seeking citizenship in the unnamed country, citing his disillusionment with America’s political trajectory. “I’ve given a lot of thought to this before any outreach, and despite the risks, the calculus has not changed,” he reportedly wrote. “I do not see the trajectory of things changing, and do not think it is appropriate or right to do nothing when I am in this position.”

FBI agents arrested him following a meeting in which he handed over classified materials. He’s scheduled to appear in federal court in Alexandria, Virginia.

FBI Director Kash Patel underscored the severity of the situation, writing on X: “This case underscores the persistent risk of insider threats. The FBI remains steadfast in protecting our national security and thanks our law enforcement partners for their critical support.”

The case raises new concerns about political ideology interfering with national security work—especially from those entrusted with detecting internal threats.

Sam Cooper

This chain of command suggests the halt originated in the Prime Minister’s Office—not from the CSIS Director or Public Safety Minister, as required under the CSIS Act.

An explosive intelligence review indicates that senior political actors surrounding Prime Minister Justin Trudeau unlawfully intervened in a high-risk Canadian Security Intelligence Service operation targeting foreign threats abroad in coordination with allied nations—a politicized act that placed Canadian operatives in immediate danger and inflicted lasting damage on the country’s international reputation and trust among intelligence partners.

According to the redacted report released Thursday by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), the order to halt the operation was the result of “political-level discussions” and “first came from the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister to the Director of CSIS.”

This chain of command suggests the halt originated in the Prime Minister’s Office—not from the CSIS Director or Public Safety Minister, as required under the CSIS Act.

This latest blow to Canada’s intelligence integrity—suggesting the inappropriate politicization of national security operations—comes amid growing tensions with key allies. In recent months, senior Trump administration official Peter Navarro reportedly raised the possibility of removing Canada from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, the historic intelligence-sharing partnership founded among Allied nations during the Second World War.

The NSIRA review was triggered in September 2022, when then–Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino requested an examination of whether CSIS and his department had fulfilled their legal responsibilities. Both Prime Minister Trudeau and Mendicino have already faced scrutiny in a separate RCMP external review, which raised questions about whether their government inappropriately politicized national security responses during the so-called “Freedom Convoy” protests that descended on Ottawa during the pandemic.

NSIRA’s months-long investigation into the foreign operation suggests a disturbing pattern: a CSIS mission was suspended or delayed midstream—possibly for partisan or diplomatic reasons—without legal authority. The intervention endangered CSIS personnel, disrupted the agency’s mandate to protect Canada from serious threats, and damaged intelligence cooperation with international allies.

“NSIRA found that the decision to halt this active CSIS operation [REDACTED] was not made by the CSIS Director under section 6(1) of the CSIS Act, and for which there is no written record of a direction coming from the Minister of Public Safety under… the CSIS Act,” the review concluded. “Moreover, [REDACTED] to halt this active operation created unnecessary danger for the CSIS team [REDACTED] and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation.”

The Bureau’s analysis of the redacted report echoes patterns scrutinized during the Hogue Commission, where Trudeau government officials were accused of suppressing or delaying intelligence related to foreign interference in Canadian democracy—reportedly to protect Liberal Party interests. The concerns also recall the SNC-Lavalin affair, in which the Prime Minister and his staff were found by the Ethics Commissioner to have improperly pressured the Attorney General to halt a corruption prosecution.

In a strikingly similar pattern, The Globe and Mail has reported from Canadian military sources that then-defence minister Harjit Sajjan allegedly pressured Canadian special forces during the fall of Kabul in 2021 to prioritize the rescue of Afghan Sikhs—individuals not considered operational priorities at the time.

The new review of CSIS’s compromised foreign operation also revealed a dangerous collapse in control while Canadian officers and a source were evidently in serious danger.

NSIRA wrote: “The review revealed that CSIS senior officials had difficulty in grappling with [REDACTED] to halt the operation; so much so, in fact, that management and control of the operation appeared to cease functioning properly. The Director of CSIS, for instance, evidently no longer had decision-making control over the active operation, when on [REDACTED] he sent an email to senior officials within key security and intelligence portfolios stating: ‘time is quickly running out and the situation is getting much more tense on the ground. We need a decision tomorrow.’”

The Canadian intelligence community is tight-lipped on this sensitive case, but indicating deep concerns, former CSIS counterterrorism officer Andrew Kirsch—who previously worked in both field and policy roles—flagged the report’s most alarming findings on social media, highlighting the unlawful direction from political actors and the operational danger that followed. While Kirsch did not comment further, he linked the report and wrote: “NSIRA’s review identified several significant concerns, including the appropriateness of direction given to CSIS by political-level actors outside the Minister of Public Safety.”

While much of the NSIRA report is redacted, several critical passages offer a glimpse into the scale and complexity of the abandoned CSIS mission. The review states: “The [REDACTED] story commences… when CSIS first learned of [information that required the planning of a specific category of operation]. CSIS started working with domestic and foreign partners [on an] operation involving [REDACTED].”

The operational consequences were acute. NSIRA wrote: “The CSIS team told NSIRA that they felt abandoned and, they believed that the absence of a Government decision ‘was a decision.’ Facing this untenable situation, the CSIS team felt forced to plan alternative actions to help ensure [their own] safety.”

Other CSIS officers warned that continuing the operation under those conditions would have “caused grave diplomatic harm to Canada’s relationship [REDACTED]” and that the shutdown “would have also signalled that CSIS could not be trusted.” NSIRA concluded that the halt introduced unnecessary danger to the CSIS team and caused harm to Canada’s international reputation.

The review also documents a deeper rift between frontline CSIS operators and their civilian oversight ministry. While Public Safety and CSIS headquarters insisted the relationship remained strong, CSIS employees directly involved in the operation told NSIRA the experience had left a “chilling effect” on their trust in Public Safety Canada. NSIRA warned that confusion between political decision-making and operational independence had created long-term damage.

SIRC, the former review body to NSIRA, had previously examined similar cases and issued recommendations to address legality, internal oversight, risk management, identity management, and foreign strategic orientation. CSIS accepted those recommendations. NSIRA’s findings now suggest those protections were ignored—undone not by technical failure, but by high-level political actors.