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Government laws designed to rescue Canadian media have done the opposite

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From the MacDonald-Laurier Institute

This article first appeared as the cover story to our September 2023 issue of Inside Policy. You can download the full issue here.

By Peter MenziesOctober 4, 2023

The federal government has made a regulatory mess with wrongheaded legislation targeting digital media content.

Few things are more fundamental to a nation’s economic prosperity and social cohesion than a robust communications framework.

Canada has its challenges in terms of rural and northern internet and mobile connectivity, but the nation’s overall communications mainframe is, by most international measures, in good shape. The rest of the story involving what gets carried on the mainframe (i.e., the actual content) isn’t as pretty. In fact, two recent communications policy initiatives proposed by the federal government have put tens of thousands of jobs at risk in the creative and news industries.

Money goes where it is likely to generate profit, and if some key arteries aren’t unclogged quickly, the flow of communications investment dollars in Canada could seize up. Worse, the future of what has been a thriving creative economy, driven by independent content creators, is now uncertain.

Meanwhile, the news industry is on the cusp of becoming permanently reliant on government subsidies – a dependency that’s certain to undermine the public’s already wavering trust in its independence.

But first, the good news. While measures vary by source and date, Canada consistently ranks among the world’s top 20 nations when it comes to fixed broadband connectivity, and as high as No. 1 in the world when it comes to mobile internet capacity. Given that most of nations in the top ten for broadband connectivity are smaller in landmass than Prince Edward Island, this is a considerable achievement for a country the size of Canada. This connectivity, however, has come at a premium – consumer in this country are historically among those paying the highest rates anywhere in the world, particularly when it comes to mobile plans. Costs to consumers remain high but have been trending downward in recent years as carriers shift strategic priorities from acquiring new consumers to retaining existing ones.

Far more challenging is a regulatory environment that is less than friendly when it comes to attracting private investment. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) has been risk-averse in its dealings with Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) and smaller Internet Service Providers (ISPs) looking for competitive access rates to incumbent networks. Still, competition is one area that appears to be a priority for the CRTC. The regulator’s new chair, Vicky Eatrides, has a background in competition policy; a new vice chair, Adam Scott, is thoroughly familiar with the Telecom industrial framework; and the new Ontario Regional Commissioner, Bram Abramson, has experience as a regulatory officer for a smaller telco. (Abramson’s former employer, TekSavvy Solutions, recently waved the white flag in its efforts to compete in the Canadian market and put itself up for sale.)

Now the bad news – and, fair warning, there’s a lot of it.

Canada is aggressively regulating the internet – not in priority areas such as privacy, algorithms and data collection, but in terms of its content and its users’ freedom of navigation. The Online Streaming Act (Bill C-11) came into force in the spring, amending the Broadcasting Act to define the internet’s audio and video content as “broadcasting” and, as such, placing all this content under the authority of the CRTC. The goals remain the same as they did during the broadcast radio and cable television world of the early 1990s: the funding of certified TV and film properties, ensuring Canadian content (CanCon) gets priority over foreign programming and ensuring designated groups – BIPOC and LGBTQ2S, among other acronyms – and official language minorities are represented. How exactly the CRTC intends to achieve this without disrupting what has been a booming decade for film and television production in a freewheeling global market remains to be seen. As does how it will give its supply-managed content priority without imposing economic harm on the 100,000 Canadians who earn a living in the unlicensed, uncertified world of YouTube and other major streaming platforms.

While the CRTC has promised to provide at least preliminary answers to these questions by the end of next year, years of regulatory haggling and court challenges await and the regulator’s reputation for the timely resolution of matters is spotty at best. As of September 22, for instance, it still hadn’t dealt with a cabinet order to review its CBC licensing decision; a decision which, itself, which took 18 months for the regulator to reach (following a January 2021 hearing that was held three years after the term of the CBC’s previous license had expired). Regulatory sloth of this nature on a routine matter does not inspire much optimism for the expedient handling of the far more complex issue of online streaming.

Indeed, the burden of the Online Streaming Act has already overwhelmed the CRTC’s administrative capacities. In August, it autorenewed the licenses of 343 television channels, discretionary services, and cable and satellite services for two to three years each. It subsequently announced it wouldn’t be dealing with any radio matters at all for “at least” two years. It even nervously punted a demand for the cancellation of Fox News’ Canadian carriage into the future by declaring it necessary to re-do the entire framework involving cable carriage of foreign television channels. It has clearly signaled that it plans to manage nothing other than telecom and Online Streaming Act issues for years to come. Everything else is on hold until such time comes to initiate a catch-up process that, in turn, will itself take years to clear the logjam. All this at a time of significant disruption that demands corporate and regulatory nimbleness.

But even what appears to be catastrophic regulatory arrest pales in comparison to the impact of the federal government’s second significant piece of new internet legislation: the Online News Act. Rarely has legislation designed to assist a sector – news production – been so poorly constructed that it has managed to make everything worse for everyone involved.

Based on the unproven premise that Big Tech companies were profiting from “stealing” content from news organizations, the Act was designed to force Meta (Facebook’s parent company) and Google to redistribute their considerable advertising revenue to those who used to receive the lion’s share of this revenue – newspapers and broadcasters. From the beginning, Meta indicated that the premise and the cost of the legislation, unless amended, would force it to cease the carriage of links to news stories and suspend its existing support programs for Canadian journalism.

The government and the news industry lobbyists who backed the bill grossly overestimated their economic value to Meta and insisted the tech giant was bluffing. Last week, however, Brian Myles, Director of Le Devoir, told an online panel hosted by the Canadian Journalism Foundation that it was clear Meta wasn’t bluffing and, going forward, news organizations would have to adapt to its exit from the market and the considerable financial impact it will have on their industry. He nevertheless held out hope that a rapprochement of some kind might still be possible with Google.

Like Meta, Google has indicated that it, too, will suspend both news linkage and its current partnerships with Canadian news organizations, unless the federal government can provide more economically acceptable options than what it has heretofore offered. As much financial harm as Meta’s departure will cause, there is consensus that Google’s departure – if it occurs – would be a disaster on a nuclear scale.

Even if a deal is reached, the best the news industry can hope for is that Google’s financial concessions will offset a portion of the losses suffered from losing access to Facebook, Instagram and Threads (among other Meta properties). Any money that can be squeezed out of an agreement with Google would be meaningful but a far cry from the hundreds of millions the industry was dreaming of a year ago. The largest recipients of any such windfall, of course, will be those who least need it – namely CBC and Bellmedia.

The bottom line is that, following passage the Online News Act, there will be less revenue for Canadian news organizations than there was just a few months ago. As a result, publishers are pleading for “temporary” measures such as the Journalism Labour Tax Credit and Local Journalism Initiative to be not just extended but enhanced. Up to 35 percent of legacy newsrooms costs would be covered by the federal government while, without Facebook, it will be near impossible for local news innovators outside of the legacy bubble to build audiences.

Next up is an anticipated Online Harms Act, designed to control “lawful but awful” speech through a government-appointed Digital Safety Commissioner. Expect more policy mayhem in the months to come.

Peter Menzies is a senior fellow at MLI and a former vice-chair of the CRTC.

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Economic progress stalling for Canada and other G7 countries

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From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss

For decades, Canada and other countries in the G7 have been known as the economic powerhouses of the world. They generally have had the biggest economies and the most prosperous countries. But in recent years, poor government policy across the G7 has contributed to slowing economic growth and near-stagnant living standards.

Simply put, the Group of Seven countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States—have become complacent. Rather than build off past economic success by employing small governments that are limited and efficient, these countries have largely pursued policies that increase or maintain high taxes on families and businesses, increase regulation and grow government spending.

Canada is a prime example. As multiple levels of government have turned on the spending taps to expand programs or implement new ones, the size of total government has surged ever higher. Unsurprisingly, Canada’s general government spending as a share of GDP has risen from 39.3 per cent in 2007 to 42.2 per cent in 2022.

At the same time, federal and provincial governments have increased taxes on professionals, businessowners and entrepreneurs to the point where the country’s top combined marginal tax rate is now the fifth-highest among OECD countries. New regulations such as Bill C-69, which instituted a complex and burdensome assessment process for major infrastructure projects and Bill C-48, which prohibits producers from shipping oil or natural gas from British Columbia’s northern coast, have also made it difficult to conduct business.

The results of poor government policy in Canada and other G7 countries have not been pretty.

Productivity, which is typically defined as economic output per hour of work, is a crucial determinant of overall economic growth and living standards in a country. Over the most recent 10-year period of available data (2013 to 2022), productivity growth has been meagre at best. Annual productivity growth equaled 0.9 per cent for the G7 on average over this period, which means the average rate of growth during the two previous decades (1.6 per cent) has essentially been chopped in half. For some countries such as Canada, productivity has grown even slower than the paltry G7 average.

Since productivity has grown at a snail’s pace, citizens are now experiencing stalled improvement in living standards. Gross domestic product (GDP) per person, a common indicator of living standards, grew annually (inflation-adjusted) by an anemic 0.7 per cent in Canada from 2013 to 2022 and only slightly better across the G7 at 1.3 per cent. This should raise alarm bells for policymakers.

A skeptic might suggest this is merely a global phenomenon. But other countries have fared much better. Two European countries, Ireland and Estonia, have seen a far more significant improvement than G7 countries in both productivity and per-person GDP.

From 2013 to 2022, Estonia’s annual productivity has grown more than twice as fast (1.9 per cent) as the G7 countries (0.9 per cent). Productivity in Ireland has grown at a rapid annual pace of 5.9 per cent, more than six times faster than the G7.

A similar story occurs when examining improvements in living standards. Estonians enjoyed average per-person GDP growth of 2.8 per cent from 2013 to 2022—more than double the G7. Meanwhile, Ireland’s per-person GDP has surged by 7.9 per cent annually over the 10-year period. To put this in perspective, living standards for the Irish grew 10 times faster than for Canadians.

But this should come as no surprise. Governments in Ireland and Estonia are smaller than the G7 average and impose lower taxes on individuals and businesses. In 2019, general government spending as a percentage of GDP averaged 44.0 per cent for G7 countries. Spending for governments in both Estonia and Ireland were well below this benchmark.

Moreover, the business tax rate averaged 27.2 per cent for G7 countries in 2023 compared to lower rates in Ireland (12.5 per cent) and Estonia (20.0 per cent). For personal income taxes, Estonia’s top marginal tax rate (20.0 per cent) is significantly below the G7 average of 49.7 per cent. Ireland’s top marginal tax rate is below the G7 average as well.

Economic progress has largely stalled for Canada and other G7 countries. The status quo of government policy is simply untenable.

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Proposed changes to Canada’s Competition Act could kneecap our already faltering economy

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

Aaron Wudrick, for Inside Policy

No party wants to be seen as soft on “big business” but that is a bad reason to pass potentially harmful, counterproductive competition policy legislation.

The recent federal budget was widely panned – in particular by the entrepreneurial class – for its proposal to raise the capital gains inclusion rate. As it turns out, “soak the rich” might sound like clever politics (it’s not) but it’s definitely a poor narrative if your goal is to incentivize and encourage risk-taking and investment.

But while this damaging measure in the federal budget has at least drawn plenty of public ire, other harmful legislative changes are afoot that are getting virtually no attention at all. They’re contained in Bill C-59 – the omnibus bill still wending its way through Parliament to enact measures contained in last fall’s economic statement – and consist of major proposed amendments to Canada’s Competition Act. The lack of coverage and debate on these changes is all the more concerning given that, if enacted, they could have a long-term negative impact on our economy comparable to the capital gains inclusion rate hike.

Worst of all, the most potentially damaging changes weren’t even in the original bill, but were brought forward by the NDP at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, and are lifted directly from a previous submission made to the committee by the Commissioner of Competition himself. In effect, they would change competition law to put a new onus on businesses to prove a negative: that having a large market share isn’t harmful to consumers.

MPs on the committee have acknowledged they don’t really understand the changes – they involve a “concentration index” described as “the sum of the squares of the market shares of the suppliers or customers” – but the government itself previously cast doubt on the need for this additional change. It’s obvious that a lot of politics are at play here: no party wants to be seen as soft on “big business.” But this is about much more than “big business.” It’s about whether we want to enshrine in law unfounded, and potentially very harmful, assumptions about how competition operates in the real world.

The changes in question are what are known in legal circles as “structural presumptions” – which, as the name implies, involve creating presumptions in law based on market “structure” – in this case, regarding the concentration level of a given market. Presumptions in law matter, because they determine which side in a competition dispute – the regulatory authority, or the impugned would-be merging parties – bears the burden of proof.

So why is this a bad idea? There are at least three reasons.

First of all, the very premise is faulty: most economists consider concentration measures alone (as opposed to market power) to be a poor proxy for the level of competition that prevails in a given market. In fact, competition for customers often increases concentration.

This may strike most people as counterintuitive. But because robust competition often leads to one company in particular offering lower prices, higher quality, or more innovative products, those who break from the pack tend to attract more customers and increase their market share. In this respect, higher concentration can actually signal more, rather than less, competition.

Second, structural presumptions for mergers are not codified in the US or any other developed country other than Germany (and even then, at a 40 percent combined share rather than 30 percent). In other words, at a time when Canada’s economy is suffering from the significant dual risks of stalled productivity growth and net foreign investment flight, the amendments proposed by the NDP would introduce one of the most onerous competition laws in the world.

There is a crucial distinction between parliamentarians putting such wording into legislation – which bind the courts – and regulatory agencies putting them in enforcement guidelines, which leave courts with a degree of discretion.

Incorporating structural presumptions into legislation surpasses what most advanced economies do and could lead to false negatives (blocking mergers that would, if permitted, actually benefit consumers), chill innovation (as companies seeking to up their game in the hopes of selling or merging are deterred from even bothering), and result in more orphaned Canadian businesses (as companies elect not to acquire Canadian operations on global transactions).

Finally, the impact on merger review will not be a simplification but will likely just fetter the discretion and judgment of the expert and impartial Competition Tribunal in determining which mergers are truly harmful for consumers and give more power to the Competition Bureau, the head of which is appointed by the federal Cabinet. Although the Competition Bureau is considered an independent law enforcement agency, it must still make its case before a court (the Tribunal, in this case).The battleground at the Tribunal will shift from focusing on the likely effect of the merger on consumers to instead entertaining arguments between the Bureau’s and companies’ opposing arguments about defining the relevant market and shares.

Even if, after further study, the government decided that rebuttable structural presumptions are desirable, C-59 already repeals subsection 92(2) of the Competition Act, which allows the Tribunal to develop the relevance of market shares through case law – a far better process than a blanket rule in legislation. Nothing prevents the Bureau from incorporating structural presumptions as an enforcement screen for mergers in its guidelines, which is what the United States has done for decades, rather than putting strict (and therefore inflexible) metrics into statute and regulations.

No one disputes that Canada needs a healthy dose of competition in a wide range of sectors. But codifying dubious rules around mergers risks doing more harm than good. In asking for structural presumptions to be codified, the Competition Bureau is missing the mark. Most proposed mergers that will get caught by these changes should in fact be permitted on the basis that consumers would be better off – and the uncertainty of being an extreme outlier on the global stage in terms of competition policy will create yet another disincentive to start and grow businesses in Canada.

This is the opposite of what Canada needs right now. Rather than looking for ill-advised shortcuts that entangle more companies in litigation and punt disputes about market definition rather than effects to the Tribunal, the Bureau should be focusing on doing its existing job better: building evidence-backed cases against mergers that would actually harm Canadians.


Aaron Wudrick is the domestic policy director at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. 

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