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Top Brass Is On The Run Ahead Of Trump’s Return

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From the Daily Caller News Foundation

By Morgan Murphy

With less than a month to go before President-elect Donald Trump takes office, the top brass are already running for cover. This week the Army’s chief of staff, Gen. Randy George, pledged to cut approximately a dozen general officers from the U.S. Army.

It is a start.

But given the Army is authorized 219 general officers, cutting just 12 is using a scalpel when a machete is in order. At present, the ratio of officers to enlisted personnel stands at an all-time high. During World War II, we had one general for every 6,000 troops. Today, we have one for every 1,600.

Right now, the United States has 1.3 million active-duty service members according to the Defense Manpower Data Center. Of those, 885 are flag officers (fun fact: you get your own flag when you make general or admiral, hence the term “flag officer” and “flagship”). In the reserve world, the ratio is even worse. There are 925 general and flag officers and a total reserve force of just 760,499 personnel. That is a flag for every 674 enlisted troops.

The hallways at the Pentagon are filled with a constellation of stars and the legions of staffers who support them. I’ve worked in both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Starting around 2011, the Joint Staff began to surge in scope and power. Though the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is not in the chain of command and simply serves as an advisor to the president, there are a staggering 4,409 people working for the Joint Staff, including 1,400 civilians with an average salary of $196,800 (yes, you read that correctly). The Joint Staff budget for 2025 is estimated by the Department of Defense’s comptroller to be $1.3 billion.

In contrast, the Secretary of Defense — the civilian in charge of running our nation’s military — has a staff of 2,646 civilians and uniformed personnel. The disparity between the two staffs threatens the longstanding American principle of civilian control of the military.

Just look at what happens when civilians in the White House or the Senate dare question the ranks of America’s general class. “Politicizing the military!” critics cry, as if the Commander-in-Chief has no right to question the judgement of generals who botched the withdrawal from Afghanistan, bought into the woke ideology of diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) or oversaw over-budget and behind-schedule weapons systems. Introducing accountability to the general class is not politicizing our nation’s military — it is called leadership.

What most Americans don’t understand is that our top brass is already very political. On any given day in our nation’s Capitol, a casual visitor is likely to run into multiple generals and admirals visiting our elected representatives and their staff. Ostensibly, these “briefs” are about various strategic threats and weapons systems — but everyone on the Hill knows our military leaders are also jockeying for their next assignment or promotion. It’s classic politics

The country witnessed this firsthand with now-retired Gen. Mark Milley. Most Americans were put off by what they saw. Milley brazenly played the Washington spin game, bragging in a Senate Armed Services hearing that he had interviewed with Bob Woodward and a host of other Washington, D.C. reporters.

Woodward later admitted in an interview with CNN that he was flabbergasted by Milley, recalling the chairman hadn’t just said “[Trump] is a problem or we can’t trust him,” but took it to the point of saying, “he is a danger to the country. He is the most dangerous person I know.” Woodward said that Milley’s attitude felt like an assignment editor ordering him, “Do something about this.”

Think on that a moment — an active-duty four star general spoke on the record, disparaging the Commander-in-Chief. Not only did it show rank insubordination and a breach of Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 88, but Milley’s actions represented a grave threat against the Constitution and civilian oversight of the military.

How will it play out now that Trump has returned? Old political hands know that what goes around comes around. Milley’s ham-handed political meddling may very well pave the way for a massive reorganization of flag officers similar to Gen. George C. Marshall’s “plucking board” of 1940. Marshall forced 500 colonels into retirement saying, “You give a good leader very little and he will succeed; you give mediocrity a great deal and they will fail.”

Marshall’s efforts to reorient the War Department to a meritocracy proved prescient when the United States entered World War II less than two years later.

Perhaps it’s time for another plucking board to remind the military brass that it is their civilian bosses who sit at the top of the U.S. chain of command.

Morgan Murphy is military thought leader, former press secretary to the Secretary of Defense and national security advisor in the U.S. Senate.

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Canada could cut deal with U.S.—increase defence spending, remove tariffs

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From the Fraser Institute

By John Ibbitson

Because we live in dangerous times, and because an honest country keeps its word, Canada should meet its NATO commitment to spend at least 2 per cent of GDP on defence. But there’s another reason to live up to that promise—it’s good for trade.

Countries that are able to defend themselves earn the respect of their allies. That respect can provide tangible benefits. Consider Cyprus and the Auto Pact.

In the winter of 1964, in the depths of the Cold War, violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots threatened to escalate into war between Turkey and Greece. President Lyndon Johnson, anxious to prevent war between two NATO members, was hugely grateful when Prime Minister Lester Pearson agreed to dispatch a peacekeeping force to the island.

“You’ll never know what this may have prevented,” said Johnson. “Now what can I do for you?” As Pearson noted in his memoirs, “I had some credit in the bank.”

A year later, Canada and the United States signed the Auto Pact, which guaranteed minimum levels of production for the Canadian auto industry. “I believe that Johnson’s willingness to agree to the Auto Pact the next year, an agreement that hugely benefited Canada’s auto sector, may well have been Pearson’s reward for Cyprus,” wrote historian J.L. Granatstein years later.

Canada’s relations with its NATO allies cooled in the years when Pierre Trudeau was prime minister. Trudeau considered pulling out of NATO entirely, but in the end contented himself with greatly reducing Canada’s troop presence in Europe. But Trudeau began to show new respect for NATO when he sought to diversify Canada’s trading relationships. “No tanks, no trade,” West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reportedly told him. Trudeau subsequently boosted defence spending and Canada acquired German Leopard tanks.

In the 1980s, as Brian Mulroney sought to improve relations with the U.S., his government maintained  defence spending at or near 2 per cent of GDP, even as the government reduced spending in other areas to bring down a chronic deficit. On Mulroney’s watch, Canada retained a robust commitment to NATO and NORAD. In February 1990, former Cold War antagonists agreed to a process for German reunification during the Open Skies conference in Ottawa; six months later, Canada joined a U.S.-led coalition that ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

And in the midst of this stalwart support, Canada and the U.S. negotiated their historic free trade agreement.

Then came the so-called Decade of Darkness, as Jean Chretien’s government cut funding to the military to help balance the budget. In the 2000s, Stephen Harper ensured that the Canadian mission in Afghanistan was properly equipped, but his government further cut spending in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis. By the time Justin Trudeau came to power, defence spending was at 1 per cent of GDP.

While it appears Justin Trudeau’s government increased defence spending, part of that is the  accounting trick of putting veterans’ benefits in the budget. In fact, Canada remains virtually the sole outlier among NATO members in having no credible plan to get to 2 per cent any time soon.

Last spring, 23 U.S. senators (both Democrat and Republican) issued a letter taking Canada to task for failing to meet its defence commitments. And they spoke plainly. “We are concerned and profoundly disappointed that Canada’s most recent projection indicated that it will not reach its two percent commitment this decade.”

In that sense, Donald Trump was speaking for everyone in Washington when, as president-elect, he told reporters that “we basically protect Canada… we’re spending hundreds of billions a year to take care of Canada.”

That doesn’t in any way excuse the punitive tariffs the administration imposed on Canada and Mexico over the weekend. Those economic sanctions are capricious, vindictive and mutually damaging. Canada had no choice to but to respond in kind.

But it’s also true that other countries no longer take this country seriously. During the Biden administration, the U.S., the United Kingdom and Australia entered into the AUKUS security pact. Canada wasn’t invited. And QUAD security dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. is not QUINT, because we weren’t asked to join.

Canada will have a new federal government within months. Its highest priority must be to restore free trade with the U.S. One way to negotiate seriously with the Trump administration may be to offer a specific concrete program of investment in the NORAD partnership, in exchange for the removal of tariffs.

If the Americans agree, it wouldn’t be the first time that trade and defence were intertwined.

John Ibbitson

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State of federal finances make NATO spending target very challenging

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From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro

Defence Minister Bill Blair recently claimed the federal government could “absolutely” achieve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defence spending target of 2.0 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP—a measure of the size of the economy) by 2027. However, the dismal state of Canada’s finances makes this accelerated timeline very costly to Canadians.

First, some background. In 2014, Canada (along with the other NATO members) formally pledged to increase spending on defence up to a target of 2.0 per cent of GDP by 2024. At the time, Canada spent 1.01 per cent of GDP on defence. A decade has passed and Canada has failed to fulfill that pledge. Indeed, based on the current defence spending plan and the latest GDP projections, Canada’s defence spending is expected to reach just 1.34 per cent of GDP ($41.0 billion) in 2024/25.

Based on the latest spending estimates from NATO, Canada is one of only eight NATO members (out of 31 in total) to spend less than 2.0 per cent of GDP on defence. As the large majority of the alliance has now met the spending target, and President Donald Trump has called for the target to be raised even further to 5 per cent of GDP, Canada will have to dramatically increase defence spending (lest we be at complete odds with our allies).

However, meeting the NATO 2.0 per cent target by 2027/28 would require billions more in annual federal spending (see the following figure).Over the next three years, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), the federal government will increase defence spending from a projected $41.0 billion in 2024/25 to $53.5 billion in 2027/28—with the majority of this increase occurring in the first year. This means, based on the current plan, Canada’s defence spending would only reach 1.55 per cent of GDP by 2027/28.

To reach 2.0 per cent of GDP in 2027/28, the government would need to spend $68.8 billion on defence during that fiscal year. Assuming the initial jump remains the same, this implies the government would need to increase annual defence spending by $16.5 billion from 2025/26 to 2027/28—$15.3 billion more than currently planned.

The federal government plans to run four consecutive budget deficits from 2024/25 to 2027/28 that add up to $151.9 billion in expected borrowing. In other words, the government already plans to spend more than it collects in revenues. Assuming the government adopts the spending plan shown in the above figure, reaching the NATO target by 2027/28 would require an additional $22.7 billion in borrowing.

Increasing the amount borrowed will impose substantial costs on Canadians. In the near-term it results in higher debt interest payments. Government must pay interest on its debt—same as a family with a mortgage—and rising interest costs leave less money available for programs and services. For perspective, largely due to past borrowing under the Trudeau government, federal debt interest payments are expected to equal all Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenues (and then some) in 2024/25. Longer-term, an increase in borrowed money will also burden future generations of taxpayers who will likely face higher taxes to pay for today’s spending.

Clearly, borrowing money to fund higher defence spending will only worsen the state of federal finances, meaning Canada is in a lose-lose situation when it comes to meeting the NATO 2.0 per cent target—risk the consequences of further disappointing our allies or take on billions more in debt.

Instead, Ottawa should identify and cut wasteful spending and use those savings for national defence. Simply put, smaller and smarter government spending could help get Canada out of this lose-lose situation.

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute

Grady Munro

Policy Analyst, Fraser Institute
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