MacDonald Laurier Institute
Liberalism’s civil war in the reaction to Hamas’ attack
From the MacDonald Laurier Institute
By Michael Bonner
Where is the “fine line” between free speech and offence or hatred and what does it mean not to feel safe sharing an opinion?
Are we living through an illiberal or anti-liberal moment? Observers on both poles of the political spectrum say that we are. They cite things like pulling down statues, cancel culture, contests about pronouns, online or in-person mobs, campus social justice crusades, and so on. Leftists are “woke authoritarians”, and the Right are all inspired by Hitler. Both sides assert their positions are nothing more than a defence of fundamental freedoms and accuses the other of trying to crush it. Words like “fascist”, “communist”, and “Nazi” are thrown about without clarity or precision, and each side accuses the other of undermining liberal democracy.
Now, each side in this contest is right that liberalism is under strain, but not in the way they think. Or at least, not always. Most of the strife that we have been witnessing for the past decade is not a barbarian horde hammering away at the outer defences of the liberal empire, but a civil war unfolding within it. Those on the Left who demand “safe spaces”, trigger warnings, deplatforming speakers, or cancelling of opponents with views deemed offensive often do so in the name of protecting of individual freedom or autonomy, as they understand them. And their antagonists do not oppose those things because they reject individual freedom. Far from it. Their opposition amounts to asserting other liberal values, most especially free speech and academic freedom. The outcome is a conflict between antithetical visions of liberal freedoms.
Ideally, the liberal civil war could be ended easily. Everybody would accept some reasonable limit on his or her own personal freedoms, and respect those of everybody else. Those reasonable limits used to be determined by inherited custom and habit — what some people still vestigially refer to as “norms”. You should be able to say and do what you want, but there were things that you ought not to want to say or do. Consensus held that deliberate obscenity, blasphemy, insult, and so forth, should be avoided. Such things did not always need to be outlawed; but, if they were, it was simply because law aligned with custom.
Now, it is doubtful whether any such consensual norms still exist in the postmodern West where so much emphasis is placed on individual preferences to the detriment of a harmonious society. Or, if norms still obtain, their power to shape public morality and behaviour seems greatly diminished. In the absence of shared norms, the purpose of the law becomes simply to punish the infringement of a code of conduct which a society, or a part thereof, is incapable of understanding or doesn’t see any valuing in adhering to, and this is a serious problem.
We have a symbol of this problem in the reaction to Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7 last year. Governments, police, and university authorities have struggled to differentiate between antithetical, but equally permissible, political views and expressions of hatred or efforts to intimidate others. Former president of Harvard, Claudine Gay, was asked at an American congressional hearing whether a hypothetical call for the genocide of Jews would be a violation of Harvard’s code of conduct. “It can be, depending on the context” was her answer, and this can be taken as the high-water mark of the confusion — especially in contrast with Harvard’s iron-fisted policy on “sizeism,” “fatphobia”, “cisheterosexism,” and Hallowe’en costumes. An ever-expanding list of new crimes that no one had heard of a few years ago must always be punished severely, but a demand for mass-murder may be allowed in certain contexts, apparently.
In Canada, we have seen many emotive reactions both to the attack of October 7 and Israel’s campaign against Hamas. The death of civilians has provoked disgust and condemnation, and there have been many public protests. But some of these seem to have less to do with sympathy for victims than hatred for the other side, and their form and venue are wholly inappropriate. Ostensibly pro-Gazan demonstrations have been directed at Jewish community centres, schools, and restaurants which have no connection with Israeli military policy. A protest on the overpass at Avenue Road and the 401 in Toronto was effectively a blockade of a predominately Jewish neighbourhood.
Meanwhile, the Canadian Senate recently released a report alleging a substantial rise in incidents of Islamophobia. A mosque in Toronto was vandalised, and faeces was smeared on an Islamic centre in Ottawa — two institutions that have no connection with Hamas.
Observers unsurprisingly demand moderation. Canada’s Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs has called for “reasonable limits” to public protest, so as to exclude deliberate intimidation. Israel’s ambassador to Canada has warned of a “fine line” between freedom of speech and what he calls “freedom of hate.” And Amira Elghawaby, Canada’s federal Anti-Islamophobia Envoy, seems to encourage a renewed commitment to free speech, which seems to have been stifled, since “Canada’s Muslim, Arab and Palestinian communities right now do not feel fully safe to share their views on what’s happening in Gaza”.
Unfortunately, such exhortations, well-meaning and reasonable though they may be, will probably not have any beneficial effect. No moderation or limitation will be possible unless people can agree on where that “fine line” is, what it means to be “fully safe”, what public protest ought to look like, and where it should take place. In the absence of public consensus on those matters, governments may be forced to legislate. Karamveer Lalh has argued that spontaneous protest could be restricted to areas around government buildings and possibly forbidden elsewhere without a permit. Such a policy would not be above criticism, but it would at least attempt a balance between civil liberties and the state’s duty to protect its citizens. But if this failed, as it very well could, more draconian measures would surely follow.
Increasingly rigorous guidance and crackdowns on the location of public protests, though, would not address the other questions. Where is the “fine line” between free speech and offence or hatred and what does it mean not to feel safe sharing an opinion? Society cannot define and punish mere offence by relying on the subjective experience of individuals, as there is no form of speech that will not potentially offend someone.
Hate speech is a different matter. But the bar for hate speech is already so high that it is not even clear where it is. Our present law is directed against very extreme expressions of vilification and detestation, not mere disliking or antipathy. Obviously, it would be bad to find oneself on the wrong side of this law, but that happens rarely. Nevertheless, the fear that political opinions could potentially be construed as support for mass-murder has been enough to get some people fired or censured. Amira Elghawaby’s implication that one should feel safe to utter an opinion seems reasonable in principle, but this cannot mean that there should no prospect of objection or reaction.
And so, we find ourselves back in the middle of the liberal civil war. Though it is tempting to assert that the main solution to the problem is a renewed commitment to liberal freedoms, this cannot be right. Everyone already seems to believe in one vision or another of those freedoms, even —perhaps especially — when they conflict. The law may succeed in punishing people, and it may even reimpose order for a time. But can it teach us to be civil and to disagree peacefully? We are going to find out soon.
Dr Michael Bonner is a political consultant and former Director of Policy within the Government of Ontario. He is also a historian of ancient Iran and is the author of the new book In Defense of Civilization: How Our Past Can Renew Our Present.
Indigenous
Residential school burials controversy continues to fuel wave of church arsons, new data suggests
By Edgardo Sepulveda for Inside Policy
Church arsons surged again in 2024 according to new data released by Statistics Canada—continuing a disturbing trend first uncovered by a Macdonald-Laurier Institute investigation published last year.
Scorched Earth: A quantitative analysis of arson at Canadian religious institutions and its threat to reconciliation, which I published last April, warned that the arson wave – almost certainly spurred by ongoing anger over potential unmarked burials of children at residential schools –would not disappear without concerted government policy intervention.
Unfortunately, my prediction is proving accurate.
Newly available custom data from Statistics Canada confirms that arsons in 2024 continued at nearly double the baseline level established from 2011–17.
This persistent elevation is particularly concerning given that arson is a dangerous crime with significant financial costs and, in the case of religious institutions, broader implications for Canadian society and political discourse. Most importantly for those committed to Indigenous reconciliation, the apparent lack of effective policy response risks undermining public support for reconciliation efforts—suggesting these crimes are not being treated with the seriousness they deserve, particularly because many targets are Catholic churches associated with residential school legacies.
Scorched Earth developed specific terms and a conceptual framework to analyze arsons at religious institutions. First, I refer to “potential unmarked burials” rather than other terminology, including “mass graves” – language suggesting verified remains and, potentially, the site of clandestine burials. Neither has been established. No remains have been verified at any of the 21 announced sites. The Tk’emlúps te Secwépemc First Nation revised its own characterization of the Kamloops, BC, announcements in May 2024 to “probable unmarked burial sites,” a significant shift from its initial May 2021 announcement of “remains of 215 children.” This precipitated announcement, together with some of the initial media coverage in Canada and elsewhere, likely contributed to the intensity of the arson response.
Second, the conceptual framework, updated with the latest Statistics Canada data, separates “baseline” from “excess” arson associated with specific shocks, such as the announcements. It shows that arsons at religious institutions have remained elevated since the initial spike in 2021. Based on careful geographic statistical analysis presented in Scorched Earth, I demonstrated that the most likely explanation for elevated arsons was a criminal response prompted by the 17 announcements of potential unmarked burials at former residential schools, beginning in Kamloops, B.C., in May 2021. Four additional announcements occurred in 2024, bringing the total to 21. While data through 2023 showed no detectable increase in arsons related to the Israel-Gaza conflict, analysis of 2024 data suggests this changed: arsons in response to that conflict now constitute a minority of the increase above baseline levels, with the majority remaining those related to announcements of potential unmarked burials.
Investigation and Prosecution Rates Remain Insufficient for Effective Deterrence
Statistics Canada’s newly released custom clearance data for arson at religious institutions provides the first comprehensive official view of law enforcement effectiveness in these cases, superseding the preliminary compilation included in Scorched Earth.
Crimes in Canada are considered “solved” when police identify a suspect with sufficient evidence to support charges. Cases are then classified as “cleared” through two mechanisms: laying charges (“cleared by charge”) or alternative processes such as diversion programs (“cleared otherwise”).
As Figure 2 illustrates, the cleared-by-charge rate for all arson averaged 13.1 per cent over the 2011–24 period. For religious institutions, the yearly average reached 14.4 per cent—marginally higher but still concerning. The clearance rate for religious institutions shows significant year-over-year variability, reflecting the smaller statistical base compared to all arsons. The “cleared otherwise” category adds an average of 4.7 per cent for both arson types.
While these low clearance rates align with those for other property crimes, the continuing elevated arson rate suggests they provide insufficient deterrence for either first-time or serial arsonists. Evidence from Scorched Earth indicates that sustained clearance rates in the mid-30 per cent range—achieved by the National Church Arson Task Force (NCATF) in the United States during the 1990s—effectively reduced church arsons targeting predominantly Black congregations in the American South.
While my statistical analysis indicates that announcements of potential unmarked burials likely motivated many incidents, this remains circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence would require confessions or explicit statements of rationale from arrested arsonists, or credible claims of responsibility from organized groups. Out of the 306 arsons at religious institutions over the 2021-24 period, 53 resulted in charges and 13 were cleared through alternative processes, totaling 64 cleared incidents—an overall clearance rate of 21 per cent.
A clearance rate at this level, while insufficient for effective deterrence, makes it unlikely that most arsons during this period resulted from organized political, ideological, or anti-religious campaigns. A coordinated campaign would likely be visible to investigators even at this clearance level. Since police identify suspects in far more cases than they prosecute, investigators develop a broader perspective on potential culprits than clearance rates alone suggest. Law enforcement officials have not provided any indication of such organized campaigns.
Federal and Provincial Funding Addresses Searches But Ignores Consequences
Neither federal nor provincial governments have introduced policy initiatives addressing elevated arson rates at religious institutions, despite substantial new funding for related matters.
Following the Kamloops announcement, the federal government launched the Residential Schools Missing Children Community Support program, providing $246 million to hundreds of communities, including for research and field investigations. Separately, British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and other provinces have committed hundreds of millions in additional dollars, including programs to address mental health effects from the search process and announcements.
This funding inventory highlights a significant policy gap: substantial resources address the cause—announcements of potential unmarked burials—while none target the effect: arsons at religious institutions.
Even viewed narrowly as a crime issue, recent government responses to other property crimes demonstrate available policy tools. When auto theft peaked in 2023, the federal government announced $121 million in federal support, convened a national summit with all levels of government and law enforcement, and released a National Action Plan by May 2024.
Policy Gaps and a Call to Action
The NCATF, created in response to arsons targeting Black churches in the 1990s United States, achieved clearance rates sufficient to reduce incidents. Canada possesses the same policy tools but has not deployed them for residential school-related arsons.
This is not a matter of capacity or institutional precedent. Recent government responses to other serious property crimes, such as auto theft, demonstrate that Canada can mobilize coordinated federal-provincial action when it chooses to. The apparent policy inaction since 2021 for residential school-related arsons must end.
Canada is not powerless to stop the arsonists. The policy recommendations set out in Scorched Earth continue to be valid:
- Create a national or regional integrated police/fire investigations unit focused specifically on arson at religious institutions. This integrated unit would investigate arsons at all religious institutions—Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and others.
- Improve Indigenous police and fire protection services, including to ensure full Indigenous participation in the integrated unit.
- Complete the long-running project of building and maintaining a comprehensive and timely national and on-reserve database of fire statistics.
Law enforcement officials must thoroughly investigate and prosecute the arsonists. The attacks threaten reconciliation and full Indigenous equality—and they must be condemned by all Canadians.
Economist Edgardo Sepulveda has more than 30 years of experience advising clients in more than forty countries. He has written for Jacobin magazine, TVO Today, and the Alberta Federation of Labour, and has been lead author of three peer-reviewed academic articles in the last five years. He received his BA (Hon) from the University of British Columbia and his MA from Queen’s University, both in Economics. He established Sepulveda Consulting Inc. in 2006.
Business
Too nice to fight, Canada’s vulnerability in the age of authoritarian coercion
By Stephen Nagy for Inside Policy
Beijing understands what many Canadians still resist: that our greatest national virtues, including our desire to be an “honest broker” on the world stage, have become our most exploitable weaknesses.
On December 1, 2018, RCMP officers arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou at Vancouver International Airport. As Canadians know well, within days, China seized two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, on fabricated espionage charges. For 1,019 days, they endured arbitrary detention while Canada faced an impossible choice of abandoning the rule-of-law or watching its citizens suffer in Chinese prisons.
This was hostage diplomacy. But more insidiously, it was also the opening move in a broader campaign against Canada, guided by the ancient Chinese proverb “借刀杀人” (Jiè dāo shā rén), or “Kill with a borrowed knife.” Beijing’s strategy, like the proverb, exploits others to do its bidding while remaining at arm’s length. In this case, it seeks to exploit Canadian vulnerabilities such as our resource-dependent economy, our multicultural identity, our loosely governed Arctic territories, and our naïve belief that we can balance relationships with all major powers – even when those powers are in direct conflict with one another.
With its “borrowed knife” campaign, Beijing understands what many Canadians still resist: that our greatest national virtues, including our desire to be an “honest broker” on the world stage, have become our most exploitable weaknesses.
The Weaponization of Canadian Niceness
Canadian foreign policy rests on the Pearsonian tradition. It is the belief that our lack of imperial history and (now irrelevant) middle-power status uniquely positions us as neutral mediators. We pride ourselves on sending peacekeepers, not warfighters. We build bridges through dialogue and compromise.
Beijing exploited this subjective, imagined identity. When Canada arrested Meng pursuant to our extradition treaty with the United States, Chinese state media framed it as Canada “choosing sides” and betraying its honest broker role. This narrative trapped Canadian political culture. Our mythology says we transcend conflicts through enlightened multilateralism. But the modern world increasingly demands choosing sides.
When former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and former Ambassador John McCallum advocated releasing Meng to free the “Two Michaels,” they weren’t acting as Chinese agents. They were expressing a genuinely Canadian impulse that conflict resolves through compromise. Yet this “Canadian solution” was precisely what Beijing sought, abandoning legal principles under pressure.
China’s economic coercion has followed a similar logic. When Beijing blocked Canadian canola, pork, and beef exports – targeting worth $2.7 billion worth of Prairie agricultural products – the timing was transparently political. However, China maintained the fiction of “quality concerns,” making it extremely difficult for Canada to challenge the restrictions via the World Trade Organization. At the same time, Prairie farmers pressured Ottawa to accommodate Beijing.
The borrowed knife was Canadian democratic debate itself, turned against Canadian interests. Beijing didn’t need to directly change policy, it mobilized Canadian farmers, business lobbies, and opposition politicians to do it instead.
The Arctic: Where Mythology Meets Reality
No dimension better illustrates China’s strategy than the Arctic. Canada claims sovereignty over vast northern territories while fielding six icebreakers to Russia’s forty. We conduct summer sovereignty operations that leave territories ungoverned for nine months annually. Chinese state-owned enterprises invest in Arctic mining, Chinese research vessels map Canadian waters, and Beijing now calls itself a “near-Arctic state,” a term appearing nowhere in international law.
This campaign weaponizes the gap between Canadian mythology and capacity. When China proposes infrastructure investment, our reflex is “economic opportunity.” When Chinese researchers request Arctic access, our instinct is accommodation because we’re co-operative multilateralists. Each accommodation establishes precedent, each precedent normalizes Chinese presence, and each normalized presence constrains future Canadian options.
Climate change accelerates these dynamics. As ice melts, the Northwest Passage becomes navigable. Canada insists these are internal waters. China maintains they’re international straits allowing passage. The scenario exposes Canada’s dilemma perfectly. Does Ottawa escalate against our second-largest trading partner over waters we cannot patrol, or accept Chinese transits as fait accompli? Either choice represents failure.
The Diaspora Dilemma
Canada’s multiculturalism represents perhaps our deepest national pride. The Chinese Communist Party has systematically weaponized this openness through United Front Work Department operations, an ostensibly independent community organization that provides genuine services while advancing Beijing’s agenda including: monitoring dissidents, mobilizing Chinese-Canadians for CCP-approved candidates, organizing counter-protests against Tibetan and Uyghur activists, and creating environments where criticism of Beijing risks community ostracism and threats to relatives in China.
The establishment of illegal Chinese police stations in Toronto and Vancouver represents this operation’s logical endpoint. These “overseas service centres” conducted intimidation operations, pressured targets to return to China, and maintained surveillance on diaspora communities.
Canada’s response illuminates our vulnerability. When investigations exposed how Chinese organized crime groups, operating with apparent CCP protection, laundered billions through Vancouver real estate while financing fentanyl trafficking, initial reactions accused investigators of anti-Chinese bias. When CSIS warned that MPs might be compromised, debate focused on whether the warning represented racial profiling rather than whether compromise occurred.
Beijing engineered this trap brilliantly. Legitimate criticism of CCP operations becomes conflated with anti-Chinese racism. Our commitment to multiculturalism gets inverted into paralysis when a foreign government exploits ethnic networks for political warfare. The borrowed knife is Canadian anti-racism, wielded against Canadian sovereignty and this leaves nearly two million Chinese-Canadians under a cloud of suspicion while actual operations continue with limited interference.
What Resistance Requires
Resisting comprehensive pressure demands abandoning comfortable myths and making hard choices.
First, recognize that 21st-century middle-power independence is increasingly fictional. The global order is re-polarizing. Canada cannot maintain equidistant relationships with Washington and Beijing during strategic competition. We can trade with China, but not pretend shared rhetoric outweighs fundamental disagreements about sovereignty and human rights. The Pearsonian honest-broker role is obsolete when major powers want you to choose sides.
Second, invest in sovereignty capacity, not just claims. Sovereignty is exercised or forfeited. This requires sustained investment in military forces, intelligence services, law enforcement, and Arctic infrastructure. It means higher defence spending, more robust counterintelligence, and stricter foreign investment screening, traditionally un-Canadian approaches, which is precisely why we need them.
Third, build coalitions with countries facing similar pressures. Australia, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, and others have faced comparable campaigns. When China simultaneously blocks Canadian canola, Australian wine, and Lithuanian dairy, that’s not separate trade disputes but a pattern requiring coordinated democratic response. The borrowed knife only works when we’re isolated.
Fourth, Ottawa must do much more to protect diaspora communities while confronting foreign operations. Effective policy must shut down United Front operations and illegal police stations while ensuring actions don’t stigmatize communities. Success requires clear communication that we’re targeting a foreign government’s operations, not an ethnic community.
Finally, we must accept the necessity of selective economic diversification. Critical infrastructure, sensitive technologies, and strategic resources cannot be integrated with an authoritarian state weaponizing interdependence. This means higher costs and reduced export opportunities – but maximum efficiency sometimes conflicts with strategic resilience. Canada can achieve this objective with a synergistic relationship with the US and other allies and partners that understand the tangential link between economic security and national security.
Conclusion
Canada’s myths, that we transcend conflicts, that multiculturalism creates only strength, that resource wealth brings pure prosperity and positivity, coupled with our deep vein of light-but-arrogant anti-Americanism, have become exploitable weaknesses. Beijing systematically tested each myth and used the gap between self-conception and reality as leverage.
The borrowed knife strategy works because we keep handing over the knife. Our openness becomes the vector for interference. Our trade dependence becomes the lever for coercion. Our niceness prevents us from recognizing we’re under attack.
Resistance doesn’t require abandoning Canadian values. It requires understanding that defending them demands costs we’ve historically refused to pay. The Chinese “Middle Kingdom” that tells the world it has had 5,000 years of peaceful history has entered a world that doesn’t reward peaceability, it exploits it. The question is whether we’ll recognize the borrowed knife for what it is and put it down before we bleed out from self-inflicted wounds.
Stephen R. Nagy is a professor of politics and international studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo and a senior fellow and China Project lead at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI). The title for his forthcoming monograph is “Japan as a Middle Power State: Navigating Ideological and Systemic Divides.”
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