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How big things could get done—even in Canada

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From the Fraser Institute

By Philip Cross

From Newfoundland’s Muskrat Falls hydro project, to Ottawa’s Firearms Registry and the Phoenix pay system, to Montreal’s 1976 Olympics, Canada is a gold medal winner when it comes to wasting tax payer dollars.  It doesn’t have to be this way.

Last year, Bent Flyvbjerg, a Danish professor of economic geography specializing in megaprojects, and Canadian journalist Dan Gardner co-authored a book How Big Things Get Done. They investigate what they coin the “Iron Law of Megaprojects,” which holds they routinely come in well over budget, far past projected deadlines, and without the projected benefits.

Unfortunately for taxpayers, the book contains numerous examples of Canadian megaprojects that follow this Law of Megaprojects. The federal government’s infamous firearms registry is a textbook template for how IT projects can go terribly wrong, ending up 590 per cent over budget. The Muskrat Falls hydro project in Newfoundland is cited as a classic demonstration of what happens when hiring a firm with little direct experience managing such a large complex project. Most famously, the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games wins the title for the largest cost overrun in Olympic history, finishing 720 per cent over budget. The authors suggest Montreal’s “Big Owe” stadium “should be considered the unofficial mascot of the modern Olympic Games.”

One thing all these Canadian examples have in common is extensive government involvement. Not that governments learned from their past mistakes. The federal government’s Phoenix pay system fiasco demonstrates that IT remains a black hole, with the government recently announcing it would abandon Phoenix after spending $3.5 billion trying to implement it. Several light train projects across the country have gone off the rails, the poster boy being the system in Ottawa, which is years behind schedule and already $2.5 billion over budget.

There are several reasons why government projects are chronically prone to failure. One is that politicians, especially late in their careers, want legacies in the form of monumental tangible projects irrespective of whether they effectively meet a public need. You can see this dynamic clearly at work today in Canada, as the Trudeau government pushes for a prohibitively expensive (probably more than $100 billion) high-speed rail connection between Windsor and Quebec City. Meanwhile, Ontario Premier Doug Ford promotes a traffic tunnel underneath Highway 401 between Brampton and Scarborough, and Quebec Premier Francois Legault revives plans for a third link connecting Quebec City to the south shore of the St. Lawrence River. While Canada clearly needs more transportation infrastructure, these projects are not the most cost-effective way of meeting the needs of commuters.

Governments deceptively deploy several tricks to help get uneconomic projects built. They routinely produce unrealistically low-cost estimates to make wasteful ego-driven projects appear affordable. Another tried and true tactic is to just “start digging a hole and make it so big, there’s no alternative to coming up with the money to fill it in,” as former San Francisco mayor Willie Brown admitted. This approach preys on the mistaken belief that large sunk costs mean scrapping a project “would be interpreted by the public as ‘throwing away’ the billions of dollars already spent” when it is actually a textbook example of throwing good money after bad.

Unlike other studies of how major infrastructure projects typically are over budget, Flyvbjerg and Gardner have some concrete recommendations on how to manage large projects that respect deadlines and budgets.

These steps include careful consideration of the actual goals of the project (airlines can meet the need for fast transport in the Windsor-Quebec corridor without the expense of high-speed rail), detailed planning and preparation followed by swift execution to minimize costly surprises (summarized by their advice to “think slow, act fast”), accounting for the cost of similar projects in the past, and breaking large projects into smaller modules to allow projects to scale back when they run into trouble. A good example of these principles at work in Canada were several oilsands projects built before 2015, when severe shortages were addressed by firms using modularity and synchronizing their work schedules to free up scarce labour and materials.

However, one major flaw in Flyvbjerg and Gardner’s analysis is their failure to understand the economics of renewable energy. They cite solar and wind projects as examples of projects that routinely finish under budget, a major factor in their declining cost. But building renewable energy is not their only cost to the energy grid, as back-up plants must be maintained for those periods when the sun is not shining or the wind is not blowing, as noted in a recent article by Bjorn Lomborg. The expense of maintaining plants that often are idle raises overall costs. This is why jurisdictions that rely extensively on renewable energy, such as Germany and California, have high energy costs that must be paid either by customers or taxpayers.

However, apart from this mistake, there is much governments and taxpayers can learn from How Big Things Get Done.

Automotive

Federal government should swiftly axe foolish EV mandate

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From the Fraser Institute

By Kenneth P. Green

Two recent events exemplify the fundamental irrationality that is Canada’s electric vehicle (EV) policy.

First, the Carney government re-committed to Justin Trudeau’s EV transition mandate that by 2035 all (that’s 100 per cent) of new car sales in Canada consist of “zero emission vehicles” including battery EVs, plug-in hybrid EVs and fuel-cell powered vehicles (which are virtually non-existent in today’s market). This policy has been a foolish idea since inception. The mass of car-buyers in Canada showed little desire to buy them in 2022, when the government announced the plan, and they still don’t want them.

Second, President Trump’s “Big Beautiful” budget bill has slashed taxpayer subsidies for buying new and used EVs, ended federal support for EV charging stations, and limited the ability of states to use fuel standards to force EVs onto the sales lot. Of course, Canada should not craft policy to simply match U.S. policy, but in light of policy changes south of the border Canadian policymakers would be wise to give their own EV policies a rethink.

And in this case, a rethink—that is, scrapping Ottawa’s mandate—would only benefit most Canadians. Indeed, most Canadians disapprove of the mandate; most do not want to buy EVs; most can’t afford to buy EVs (which are more expensive than traditional internal combustion vehicles and more expensive to insure and repair); and if they do manage to swing the cost of an EV, most will likely find it difficult to find public charging stations.

Also, consider this. Globally, the mining sector likely lacks the ability to keep up with the supply of metals needed to produce EVs and satisfy government mandates like we have in Canada, potentially further driving up production costs and ultimately sticker prices.

Finally, if you’re worried about losing the climate and environmental benefits of an EV transition, you should, well, not worry that much. The benefits of vehicle electrification for climate/environmental risk reduction have been oversold. In some circumstances EVs can help reduce GHG emissions—in others, they can make them worse. It depends on the fuel used to generate electricity used to charge them. And EVs have environmental negatives of their own—their fancy tires cause a lot of fine particulate pollution, one of the more harmful types of air pollution that can affect our health. And when they burst into flames (which they do with disturbing regularity) they spew toxic metals and plastics into the air with abandon.

So, to sum up in point form. Prime Minister Carney’s government has re-upped its commitment to the Trudeau-era 2035 EV mandate even while Canadians have shown for years that most don’t want to buy them. EVs don’t provide meaningful environmental benefits. They represent the worst of public policy (picking winning or losing technologies in mass markets). They are unjust (tax-robbing people who can’t afford them to subsidize those who can). And taxpayer-funded “investments” in EVs and EV-battery technology will likely be wasted in light of the diminishing U.S. market for Canadian EV tech.

If ever there was a policy so justifiably axed on its failed merits, it’s Ottawa’s EV mandate. Hopefully, the pragmatists we’ve heard much about since Carney’s election victory will acknowledge EV reality.

Kenneth P. Green

Senior Fellow, Fraser Institute
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Business

Prime minister can make good on campaign promise by reforming Canada Health Act

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From the Fraser Institute

By Nadeem Esmail

While running for the job of leading the country, Prime Minister Carney promised to defend the Canada Health Act (CHA) and build a health-care system Canadians can be proud of. Unfortunately, to have any hope of accomplishing the latter promise, he must break the former and reform the CHA.

As long as Ottawa upholds and maintains the CHA in its current form, Canadians will not have a timely, accessible and high-quality universal health-care system they can be proud of.

Consider for a moment the remarkably poor state of health care in Canada today. According to international comparisons of universal health-care systems, Canadians endure some of the lowest access to physicians, medical technologies and hospital beds in the developed world, and wait in queues for health care that routinely rank among the longest in the developed world. This is all happening despite Canadians paying for one of the developed world’s most expensive universal-access health-care systems.

None of this is new. Canada’s poor ranking in the availability of services—despite high spending—reaches back at least two decades. And wait times for health care have nearly tripled since the early 1990s. Back then, in 1993, Canadians could expect to wait 9.3 weeks for medical treatment after GP referral compared to 30 weeks in 2024.

But fortunately, we can find the solutions to our health-care woes in other countries such as Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Australia, which all provide more timely access to quality universal care. Every one of these countries requires patient cost-sharing for physician and hospital services, and allows private competition in the delivery of universally accessible services with money following patients to hospitals and surgical clinics. And all these countries allow private purchases of health care, as this reduces the burden on the publicly-funded system and creates a valuable pressure valve for it.

And this brings us back to the CHA, which contains the federal government’s requirements for provincial policymaking. To receive their full federal cash transfers for health care from Ottawa (totalling nearly $55 billion in 2025/26) provinces must abide by CHA rules and regulations.

And therein lies the rub—the CHA expressly disallows requiring patients to share the cost of treatment while the CHA’s often vaguely defined terms and conditions have been used by federal governments to discourage a larger role for the private sector in the delivery of health-care services.

Clearly, it’s time for Ottawa’s approach to reflect a more contemporary understanding of how to structure a truly world-class universal health-care system.

Prime Minister Carney can begin by learning from the federal government’s own welfare reforms in the 1990s, which reduced federal transfers and allowed provinces more flexibility with policymaking. The resulting period of provincial policy innovation reduced welfare dependency and government spending on social assistance (i.e. savings for taxpayers). When Ottawa stepped back and allowed the provinces to vary policy to their unique circumstances, Canadians got improved outcomes for fewer dollars.

We need that same approach for health care today, and it begins with the federal government reforming the CHA to expressly allow provinces the ability to explore alternate policy approaches, while maintaining the foundational principles of universality.

Next, the Carney government should either hold cash transfers for health care constant (in nominal terms), reduce them or eliminate them entirely with a concordant reduction in federal taxes. By reducing (or eliminating) the pool of cash tied to the strings of the CHA, provinces would have greater freedom to pursue reform policies they consider to be in the best interests of their residents without federal intervention.

After more than four decades of effectively mandating failing health policy, it’s high time to remove ambiguity and minimize uncertainty—and the potential for politically motivated interpretations—in the CHA. If Prime Minister Carney wants Canadians to finally have a world-class health-care system then can be proud of, he should allow the provinces to choose their own set of universal health-care policies. The first step is to fix, rather than defend, the 40-year-old legislation holding the provinces back.

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