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How big things could get done—even in Canada

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From the Fraser Institute

By Philip Cross

From Newfoundland’s Muskrat Falls hydro project, to Ottawa’s Firearms Registry and the Phoenix pay system, to Montreal’s 1976 Olympics, Canada is a gold medal winner when it comes to wasting tax payer dollars.  It doesn’t have to be this way.

Last year, Bent Flyvbjerg, a Danish professor of economic geography specializing in megaprojects, and Canadian journalist Dan Gardner co-authored a book How Big Things Get Done. They investigate what they coin the “Iron Law of Megaprojects,” which holds they routinely come in well over budget, far past projected deadlines, and without the projected benefits.

Unfortunately for taxpayers, the book contains numerous examples of Canadian megaprojects that follow this Law of Megaprojects. The federal government’s infamous firearms registry is a textbook template for how IT projects can go terribly wrong, ending up 590 per cent over budget. The Muskrat Falls hydro project in Newfoundland is cited as a classic demonstration of what happens when hiring a firm with little direct experience managing such a large complex project. Most famously, the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games wins the title for the largest cost overrun in Olympic history, finishing 720 per cent over budget. The authors suggest Montreal’s “Big Owe” stadium “should be considered the unofficial mascot of the modern Olympic Games.”

One thing all these Canadian examples have in common is extensive government involvement. Not that governments learned from their past mistakes. The federal government’s Phoenix pay system fiasco demonstrates that IT remains a black hole, with the government recently announcing it would abandon Phoenix after spending $3.5 billion trying to implement it. Several light train projects across the country have gone off the rails, the poster boy being the system in Ottawa, which is years behind schedule and already $2.5 billion over budget.

There are several reasons why government projects are chronically prone to failure. One is that politicians, especially late in their careers, want legacies in the form of monumental tangible projects irrespective of whether they effectively meet a public need. You can see this dynamic clearly at work today in Canada, as the Trudeau government pushes for a prohibitively expensive (probably more than $100 billion) high-speed rail connection between Windsor and Quebec City. Meanwhile, Ontario Premier Doug Ford promotes a traffic tunnel underneath Highway 401 between Brampton and Scarborough, and Quebec Premier Francois Legault revives plans for a third link connecting Quebec City to the south shore of the St. Lawrence River. While Canada clearly needs more transportation infrastructure, these projects are not the most cost-effective way of meeting the needs of commuters.

Governments deceptively deploy several tricks to help get uneconomic projects built. They routinely produce unrealistically low-cost estimates to make wasteful ego-driven projects appear affordable. Another tried and true tactic is to just “start digging a hole and make it so big, there’s no alternative to coming up with the money to fill it in,” as former San Francisco mayor Willie Brown admitted. This approach preys on the mistaken belief that large sunk costs mean scrapping a project “would be interpreted by the public as ‘throwing away’ the billions of dollars already spent” when it is actually a textbook example of throwing good money after bad.

Unlike other studies of how major infrastructure projects typically are over budget, Flyvbjerg and Gardner have some concrete recommendations on how to manage large projects that respect deadlines and budgets.

These steps include careful consideration of the actual goals of the project (airlines can meet the need for fast transport in the Windsor-Quebec corridor without the expense of high-speed rail), detailed planning and preparation followed by swift execution to minimize costly surprises (summarized by their advice to “think slow, act fast”), accounting for the cost of similar projects in the past, and breaking large projects into smaller modules to allow projects to scale back when they run into trouble. A good example of these principles at work in Canada were several oilsands projects built before 2015, when severe shortages were addressed by firms using modularity and synchronizing their work schedules to free up scarce labour and materials.

However, one major flaw in Flyvbjerg and Gardner’s analysis is their failure to understand the economics of renewable energy. They cite solar and wind projects as examples of projects that routinely finish under budget, a major factor in their declining cost. But building renewable energy is not their only cost to the energy grid, as back-up plants must be maintained for those periods when the sun is not shining or the wind is not blowing, as noted in a recent article by Bjorn Lomborg. The expense of maintaining plants that often are idle raises overall costs. This is why jurisdictions that rely extensively on renewable energy, such as Germany and California, have high energy costs that must be paid either by customers or taxpayers.

However, apart from this mistake, there is much governments and taxpayers can learn from How Big Things Get Done.

Business

Canada’s climate agenda hit business hard but barely cut emissions

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This article supplied by Troy Media.

Troy Media By Gwyn Morgan

Canada is paying a steep economic price for climate policies that have delivered little real environmental progress

In 2015, the newly elected Trudeau government signed the Paris Agreement. The following year saw the imposition of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, which included more than 50 measures aimed at “reducing carbon emissions and fostering clean technology solutions.” Key among them was economy-wide carbon “pricing,” Liberal-speak for taxes.

Other measures followed, culminating last December in the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan, targeting emissions of 40 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050. It included $9.1 billion for retrofitting structures, subsidizing zero-emission vehicles, building charging stations and subsidizing solar panels and windmills. It also mandated the phaseout of coal-fired power generation and proposed stringent emission standards for vehicles and buildings.

Other “green initiatives” included the “on-farm climate action fund,” a nationwide reforestation initiative to plant two billion trees, the “Green and Inclusive Community Buildings Program” to promote net-zero standards in new construction, and a “Green Municipal Fund” to support municipal decarbonization. That’s a staggering list of nation-impoverishing subsidies, taxes and restrictions.

Those climate measures come at a real cost to the industry that drives the nation’s economy.

The Trudeau government cancelled the Northern Gateway oil pipeline to the northwest coast, which had been approved by the Harper government, costing sponsors hundreds of millions of dollars in preconstruction expenditures. The political and regulatory morass the Liberals created eventually led to the cancellation of all but one of the 12 LNG export proposals.

Have all those taxes and regulatory measures reduced Canada’s fossil-fuel consumption? No. As Bjorn Lomborg has reported, between the election of the Trudeau government in 2015 through 2023, fossil fuels’ share of Canada’s energy supply increased from 75 to 77 per cent.

That dismal result wasn’t for lack of trying. The Fraser Institute has found that Ottawa and the four biggest provinces have either spent or forgone a mind-numbing $158 billion to create just 68,000 “clean” jobs, increasing the “green economy” by a minuscule 0.3 percentage points to 3.6 per cent of GDP at an eye-watering cost of more than $2.3 million per job.

That’s Canada’s emissions reduction debacle. What’s the global picture? A decade after Paris, 80 per cent of the world’s energy still comes from fossil fuels. World energy demand is up 150 per cent. Canada, which produces roughly 1.5 per cent of global emissions, cannot influence that trajectory. And, as Lomborg writes: “achieving net zero emissions by 2050 would require the removal of the equivalent of the combined emissions of China and the United States in each of the next five years. This puts us in the realm of science fiction.”

Does this mean our planet will become unlivable? A U.S. Department of Energy report issued in July is grounds for optimism. It finds that “claims of increased frequency or intensity of hurricanes, tornadoes, floods and droughts are not supported by U.S. historical data.” And it goes on: “CO2-induced warming appears to be less damaging economically than commonly believed and aggressive mitigation policies could be more detrimental than beneficial.”

U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright responded to the report by saying: “Climate change is real … but it is not the greatest threat facing humanity … (I)mproving the human condition depends on access to reliable, affordable energy.”

That leaves no doubt as to where our largest trading partner stands on carbon emissions. But don’t expect Prime Minister Mark Carney, who helped launch the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) at COP 26 in that city in 2021 and co-chaired it until this January, to soften his stand on carbon taxes. His just-released budget imposes carbon tax increases of $80 to $170 per ton by 2030 on our already struggling industries.

Doing so increases Canadian businesses’ competitive disadvantage with our most important trading partner while doing essentially nothing to help the environment.

Gwyn Morgan is a retired business leader who has been a director of five global corporations.

Troy Media empowers Canadian community news outlets by providing independent, insightful analysis and commentary. Our mission is to support local media in helping Canadians stay informed and engaged by delivering reliable content that strengthens community connections and deepens understanding across the country.

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Is Carney Falling Into The Same Fiscal Traps As Trudeau?

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From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Jay Goldberg

Rosy projections, chronic deficits, and opaque budgeting. If nothing changes, Carney’s credibility could collapse under the same weight.

Carney promised a fresh start. His budget makes it look like we’re still stuck with the same old Trudeau playbook

It turns out the Trudeau government really did look at Canada’s economy through rose-coloured glasses. Is the Carney government falling into the same pattern?

New research from the Frontier Centre for Public Policy shows that federal budgets during the Trudeau years “consistently overestimated [Canada’s] fiscal health” when it came to forecasting the state of the nation’s economy and finances over the long term.

In his research, policy analyst Conrad Eder finds that, when looking specifically at projections of where the economy would be four years out, Trudeau-era budgets tended to have forecast errors of four per cent of nominal GDP, or an average of $94.4 billion.

Because budgets were so much more optimistic about long-term growth, they consistently projected that government revenue would grow at a much faster pace. The Trudeau government then made spending commitments, assuming the money would be there. And when the forecasts did not keep up, deficits simply grew.

As Eder writes, “these dramatic discrepancies illustrate how the Trudeau government’s longer-term projections consistently underestimated the persistence of fiscal challenges and overestimated its ability to improve the budgetary balance.”

Eder concludes that politics came into play and influenced how the Trudeau government framed its forecasts. Rather than focusing on the long-term health of Canada’s finances, the Trudeau government was focused on politics. But presenting overly optimistic forecasts has long-term consequences.

“When official projections consistently deviate from actual outcomes, they obscure the scope of deficits, inhibit effective fiscal planning, and mislead policymakers and the public,” Eder writes.

“This disconnect between projected and actual fiscal outcomes undermines the reliability of long-term planning tools and erodes public confidence in the government’s fiscal management.”

The public’s confidence in the Trudeau government’s fiscal management was so low, in fact, that by the end of 2024 the Liberals were polling in the high teens, behind the NDP.

The key to the Liberal Party’s electoral survival became twofold: the “elbows up” rhetoric in response to the Trump administration’s tariffs, and the choice of a new leader who seemed to have significant credibility and was disconnected from the fiscal blunders of the Trudeau years.

Mark Carney was recruited to run for the Liberal leadership as the antidote to Trudeau. His résumé as governor of the Bank of Canada during the Great Recession and his subsequent years leading the Bank of England seemed to offer Canadians the opposite of the fiscal inexperience of the Trudeau years.

These two factors together helped turn around the Liberals’ fortunes and secured the party a fourth straight mandate in April’s elections.

But now Carney has presented a budget of his own, and it too spills a lot of red ink.

This year’s deficit is projected to be a stunning $78.3 billion, and the federal deficit is expected to stay over $50 billion for at least the next four years.

The fiscal picture presented by Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne was a bleak one.

What remains to be seen is whether the chronic politicking over long-term forecasts that plagued the Trudeau government will continue to be a feature of the Carney regime.

As bad as the deficit figures look now, one has to wonder, given Eder’s research, whether the state of Canada’s finances is even worse than Champagne’s budget lets on.

As Eder says, years of rose-coloured budgeting undermined public trust and misled both policymakers and voters. The question now is whether this approach to the federal budget continues under Carney at the helm.

Budget 2025 significantly revises the economic growth projections found in the 2024 fall economic statement for both 2025 and 2026. However, the forecasts for 2027, 2028 and 2029 were left largely unchanged.

If Eder is right, and the Liberals are overly optimistic when it comes to four-year forecasts, then the 2025 budget should worry Canadians. Why? Because the Carney government did not change the Trudeau government’s 2029 economic projections by even a fraction of a per cent.

In other words, despite the gloomy fiscal numbers found in Budget 2025, the Carney government may still be wearing the same rose-coloured budgeting glasses as the Trudeau government did, at least when it comes to long-range fiscal planning.

If the Carney government wants to have more credibility than the Trudeau government over the long term, it needs to be more transparent about how long-term economic projections are made and be clear about whether the Finance Department’s approach to forecasting has changed with the government. Otherwise, Carney’s fiscal credibility, despite his résumé, may meet the same fate as Trudeau’s.

Jay Goldberg is a fellow with the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.

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