David Clinton

Remember when thinking about our debt crisis was just scary?

During his recent election campaign, Mark Carney announced plans to add $225 billion (with a “b”) to federal debt over the next four years. That, to put it mildly, is a consequential number. I thought it would be useful to put it into context, both in terms of our existing debt, and of some social and political changes those plans could spark.

How much money does Canada currently owe? According to Statistics Canada’s statement of government operations and balance sheet, as of Q4 2024, that number would be nearly $954 billion. That’s compared with the $621 billion we owed back in 2015.

How much does interest on our current debt cost us each year? The official Budget 2024 document predicted that we’d pay around $51 billion each year to just service our debt. But that’s before piling on the new $225 billion.

We – and the governments we elect – might be tempted to imagine that the cash behind public loans just magically appears out of thin air. In fact, most Canadian government debt is financed through debt securities such as marketable bonds, treasury bills, and foreign currency debt instruments. And those bonds and bills are owned by buyers.

Who are those buyers? Many of them are probably Canadian banks and other financial institutions. But as of February 2025, according to Statistics Canada, it was international portfolio investors who owned $527 billion of Canadian federal government debt securities.

Most of those foreign investors are probably from (relatively) friendly countries like the U.S. and U.K. But that’s certainly not the whole story. Although I couldn’t find direct data breaking down the details, there are some broadly related investment income numbers that might be helpful.

Specifically, all foreign investments into both public and private entities in Canada in 2024 amounted to $219 billion dollars. In that same year, investments from “all other countries” totaled $51 billion. What Statistics Canada means by “all other countries” covers all countries besides the US, UK, EU, Japan, and the 38 OECD nations.

The elephant in the “all other countries” room has to be China.

So let’s break this down. The $527 billion foreign-owned investment debt I mentioned earlier represents around 55 percent of our total debt.¹ And if the “all other countries” ratio in general foreign investments holds true² for federal public debt, then it’s realistic to assume that the federal government currently owes around 11 percent of its debt to government and business entities associated with the Chinese Communist Party.

By all accounts, an 11 percent share in a government’s debt counts as leverage. Given China’s recent history, our ability to act independently in international and even domestic affairs could be compromised. But it could also be destabilizing, exposing us to risk if China’s economy faces turmoil which could disrupt our ability to roll over debt or secure new financing.

Mark Carney’s plan to add another 20 percent to our debt over the next four years will only increase our exposure to these – and many more – risks. Canadian voters have made an interesting choice.

“Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.” – H.L. Mencken

Sam Cooper

CHARLOTTE, N.C. — Striking a cell capable of washing $100 million within what U.S. counter-narcotics officials describe as a half-trillion-dollar global enterprise, federal prosecutors have secured convictions against three men tied to a China-based transnational laundering syndicate, exposing how Mexican cartel drug proceeds flowed quietly through Charlotte banks as overdose deaths surged across the Carolinas.

The case, centered in Charlotte, North Carolina, reveals the concealed infrastructure enabling Mexican cartels to convert fentanyl profits into clean capital, aided by sophisticated Chinese professional launderers operating like underwriters and rogue accountants—embedding illicit funds in regional banks using fake identities and a dense lattice of shell companies.

Prosecutors say Maoxuan Xia, 29, of China; Shao Neng Lin, 58, of Baldwin Park, California; and Zhou Yu, 42, of China, laundered more than $92 million in drug proceeds through this underground system. Court records show the trio used false documentation and coordinated deposits to move over $700,000 through Charlotte-area financial institutions alone.

Donald Im, a former top DEA illicit finance expert, said the system is designed so that all roads ultimately lead to Beijing’s treasury—with narcotics proceeds flowing back to China through laundering networks, while cartels handle the production and distribution of synthetic opioids sourced from Chinese factories.

The Charlotte case offers a rare, granular view into how that system functions on the ground. Xia served as a primary collector, retrieving cash from cartel-linked operatives across the United States. In less than two years, he laundered over $30 million. Lin and Yu operated back-end accounts, managing shell firms that each moved approximately $20 million. All three men entered guilty pleas this spring.

Investigators describe the laundering structure as part of a wider financial ecosystem anchored in Chinese underground banking hubs—active in cities such as Vancouver, Toronto, Mexico City, New York and Los Angeles. These operations pair U.S. drug money with Chinese nationals looking to move renminbi out of the mainland, exploiting capital flight demand to create an opaque, dollar-based network of cash flow. Funds are then reinvested in electronics exports, real estate, and layered wire transfers—largely beyond the reach of Western regulators.

The Charlotte convictions come amid a regional overdose emergency. In 2023, South Carolina reported 44.7 overdose deaths per 100,000 residents, far exceeding the U.S. average of 31.3. Georgia recorded 2,687 overdose deaths in 2022, a 300 percent increase since 2010. In North Carolina, more than 36,000 people have died from drug overdoses since 2000, with over 4,000 deaths recorded in 2021 alone. Fentanyl now accounts for nearly 80 percent of opioid fatalities in the Carolinas.

Taken together, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia form one of the most intensely affected overdose corridors in North America. Only British Columbia—where Vancouver’s urban fentanyl crisis remains in declared emergency—and West Virginia report comparably higher death rates. British Columbia recorded 48.5 overdose deaths per 100,000 residents in 2024; West Virginia reached 80.9 per 100,000 in 2022.

A parallel indictment in South Carolina, unsealed in April, further illustrates China’s financial blueprint. Prosecutors charged Nasir Ullah, 28, and Naim Ullah, 32, of Sumter, along with Puquan Huang, 49, of Buford, Georgia, with laundering millions in cartel-linked proceeds. According to court filings, the men concealed cash in Sumter-area properties before converting it into overseas electronics shipments to Hong Kong and Dubai. Investigators allege the group was linked to broader laundering cells stretching into Asia and the Middle East.

While no financial institutions were charged in the Charlotte case, the use of fraudulent documents and synthetic identities to move large sums underscores continuing vulnerabilities in U.S. bank compliance systems—particularly in regional markets where oversight mechanisms may lag behind the sophistication of illicit finance networks.

The case was prosecuted under Operation Take Back America, a multi-agency U.S. initiative focused on dismantling the financial backbone of transnational fentanyl trafficking. Officials involved say targeting launderers may yield more strategic disruption than intercepting drug shipments alone—striking directly at the revenue pipelines keeping the trade alive.

Im, who led transnational threat targeting units within DEA’s Special Operations Division, has long studied the convergence of criminal enterprise and state-sanctioned economic leverage. In his assessment, Chinese laundering brokers serve both cartel clients and parallel financial objectives of the state—helping the proceeds of Western fentanyl sales find their way into Belt and Road infrastructure loans, real estate portfolios, and capital-export schemes tied to China’s global influence-building.