Connect with us
[the_ad id="89560"]

International

U.S. Secret Service report finds multiple failures before first Trump assassination attempt

Published

5 minute read

From The Center Square

By 

A report from the U.S. Secret Service said multiple communication and operational failures happened on the day a lone gunman shot at former President Donald Trump in Pennsylvania in July.

A summary of the agency’s investigation pointed to a cascade of errors that preceded the attempt on Trump’s life while he spoke at a rally on July 13 in Butler, Pennsylvania. One of the gunman’s shots struck Trump’s ear.

“It is important that we hold ourselves to account for the failures of July 13 and that we take the lessons learned to make sure that we do not have another mission failure like this again,” Acting Director Ronald Rowe said.

Rowe said the agency needs “a shift in paradigm in how we conduct our operations.” That will include more people, equipment and technology.

The internal report, which is separate from other congressional investigations, first pointed at communication failures. For example, the report noted that some local police didn’t know there were two separate communications centers on site and mistakenly thought the Secret Service was directly receiving their radio transmissions.

Another communication problem was that the local tactical team, operating on the second floor of the AGR building where the shooter attacked from the roof, had yet to contact Secret Service personnel before the rally.

“Multiple law enforcement entities involved in securing the rally questioned the efficacy of that local sniper team’s positioning in the AGR building, yet there was no follow-up discussion about modifying their position,” according to the report.

Thomas Matthew Crooks, 20, of Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, shot at Trump from a nearby rooftop. U.S. Secret Service agents returned fire and killed Crooks. A firefighter attending the rally was killed and two others were injured.

The report noted concerns about the July 13 rally’s venue at the Butler Farm Show site. An advance team recognized those concerns, but measures to address those problems weren’t taken.

“There was a lack of detailed knowledge by Secret Service personnel regarding the state or local law enforcement presence that would be present in and around the AGR complex,” according to the report. “There was also a lack of knowledge regarding the specific footprint of resources that would buttress the secure area of the venue and separate it from the AGR complex, which was outside of the site’s secure perimeter.”

The internal report said communication problems were the cause of the failures. It said, “different radio frequencies used at the Butler Farm Show venue were not conducive for quickly sharing real-time information.”

“The failure of personnel to broadcast via radio the description of the assailant, or vital information received from local law enforcement regarding a suspicious individual on the roof of the AGR complex, to all federal personnel at the Butler site inhibited the collective awareness of all Secret Service personnel,” the report said.

Better communication could have made a difference.

“If this information was passed over Secret Service radio frequencies it would have allowed [Trump’s] protective detail to determine whether to move their protectee while the search for the suspicious suspect was in progress,” according to the report. “Vital information was transmitted via mobile/cellular devices in staggered or fragmented fashion instead of being relayed via the Secret Service radio network.”

An advance drone team reported technical problems that could have spotted Crooks before the rally.

“It is possible that if this element of the advance had functioned properly, the shooter may have been detected as he flew his drone near the Butler Farm Show venue earlier in the day,” according to the report.

The agency will finalize the report in the coming weeks.

Crime

The Uncomfortable Demographics of Islamist Bloodshed—and Why “Islamophobia” Deflection Increases the Threat

Published on

By Ian Bradbury

Addressing realities directly is the only path toward protecting communities, confronting extremism, and preventing further loss of life, Canadian national security expert argues.

After attacks by Islamic extremists, a familiar pattern follows. Debate erupts. Commentary and interviews flood the media. Op-eds, narratives, talking points, and competing interpretations proliferate in the immediate aftermath of bloodshed. The brief interval since the Bondi beach attack is no exception.

Many of these responses condemn the violence and call for solidarity between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as for broader societal unity. Their core message is commendable, and I support it: extremist violence is horrific, societies must stand united, and communities most commonly targeted by Islamic extremists—Jews, Christians, non-Muslim minorities, and moderate Muslims—deserve to live in safety and be protected.

Yet many of these info-space engagements miss the mark or cater to a narrow audience of wonks. A recurring concern is that, at some point, many of these engagements suggest, infer, or outright insinuate that non-Muslims, or predominantly non-Muslim societies, are somehow expected or obligated to interpret these attacks through an Islamic or Muslim-impact lens. This framing is frequently reinforced by a familiar “not a true Muslim” narrative regarding the perpetrators, alongside warnings about the risks of Islamophobia.

These misaligned expectations collide with a number of uncomfortable but unavoidable truths. Extremist groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and decentralized attackers with no formal affiliations have repeatedly and explicitly justified their violence through interpretations of Islamic texts and Islamic history. While most Muslims reject these interpretations, it remains equally true that large, dynamic groups of Muslims worldwide do not—and that these groups are well prepared to, and regularly do, use violence to advance their version of Islam.

Islamic extremist movements do not, and did not, emerge in a vacuum. They draw from the broader Islamic context. This fact is observable, persistent, and cannot be wished or washed away, no matter how hard some may try or many may wish otherwise.

Given this reality, it follows that for most non-Muslims—many of whom do not have detailed knowledge of Islam, its internal theological debates, historical divisions, or political evolution—and for a considerable number of Muslims as well, Islamic extremist violence is perceived as connected to Islam as it manifests globally. This perception persists regardless of nuance, disclaimers, or internal distinctions within the faith and among its followers.

THE COST OF DENIAL AND DEFLECTION

Denying or deflecting from these observable connections prevents society from addressing the central issues following an Islamic extremist attack in a Western country: the fatalities and injuries, how the violence is perceived and experienced by surviving victims, how it is experienced and understood by the majority non-Muslim population, how it is interpreted by non-Muslim governments responsible for public safety, and how it is received by allied nations. Worse, refusing to confront these difficult truths—or branding legitimate concerns as Islamophobia—creates a vacuum, one readily filled by extremist voices and adversarial actors eager to poison and pollute the discussion.

Following such attacks, in addition to thinking first of the direct victims, I sympathize with my Muslim family, friends, colleagues, moderate Muslims worldwide, and Muslim victims of Islamic extremism, particularly given that anti-Muslim bigotry is a real problem they face. For Muslim victims of Islamic extremism, that bigotry constitutes a second blow they must endure. Personal sympathy, however, does not translate into an obligation to center Muslim communal concerns when they were not the targets of the attack. Nor does it impose a public obligation or override how societies can, do, or should process and respond to violence directed at them by Islamic extremists.

As it applies to the general public in Western nations, the principle is simple: there should be no expectation that non-Muslims consider Islam, inter-Islamic identity conflicts, internal theological disputes, or the broader impact on the global Muslim community, when responding to attacks carried out by Islamic extremists. That is, unless Muslims were the victims, in which case some consideration is appropriate.

Quite bluntly, non-Muslims are not required to do so and are entitled to reject and push back against any suggestion that they must or should. Pointedly, they are not Muslims, a fact far too many now seem to overlook.

The arguments presented here will be uncomfortable for many and will likely provoke polarizing discussion. Nonetheless, they articulate an important, human-centered position regarding how Islamic extremist attacks in Western nations are commonly interpreted and understood by non-Muslim majority populations.

Non-Muslims are free to give no consideration to Muslim interests at any time, particularly following an Islamic extremist attack against non-Muslims in a non-Muslim country. The sole exception is that governments retain an obligation to ensure the safety and protection of their Muslim citizens, who face real and heightened threats during these periods. This does not suggest that non-Muslims cannot consider Muslim community members; it simply affirms that they are under no obligation to do so.

The impulse for Muslims to distance moderate Muslims and Islam from extremist attacks—such as the targeting of Jews in Australia or foiled Christmas market plots in Poland and Germany—is understandable.

Muslims do so to protect their own interests, the interests of fellow Muslims, and the reputation of Islam itself. Yet this impulse frequently collapses into the “No True Scotsman” fallacy, pointing to peaceful Muslims as the baseline while asserting that the attackers were not “true Muslims.”

Such claims oversimplify the reality of Islam as it manifests globally and fail to address the legitimate political and social consequences that follow Islamic extremist attacks in predominantly non-Muslim Western societies. These deflections frequently produce unintended effects, such as strengthening anti-Muslim extremist sentiments and movements and undermining efforts to diminish them.

The central issue for public discourse after an Islamic extremist attack is not debating whether the perpetrators were “true” or “false” Muslims, nor assessing downstream impacts on Muslim communities—unless they were the targets.

It is a societal effort to understand why radical ideologies continue to emerge from varying—yet often overlapping—interpretations of Islam, how political struggles within the Muslim world contribute to these ideologies, and how non-Muslim-majority Western countries can realistically and effectively confront and mitigate threats related to Islamic extremism before the next attack occurs and more non-Muslim and Muslim lives are lost.

Addressing these realities directly is the only path toward protecting communities, confronting extremism, and preventing further loss of life.

Ian Bradbury, a global security specialist with over 25 years experience, transitioned from Defence and NatSec roles to found Terra Nova Strategic Management (2009) and 1NAEF (2014). A TEDx, UN, NATO, and Parliament speaker, he focuses on terrorism, hybrid warfare, conflict aid, stability operations, and geo-strategy.

The Bureau is a reader-supported publication.

To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Continue Reading

International

Bondi Beach Shows Why Self-Defense Is a Vital Right

Published on

Reason.com - Free Minds and Free Markets

By  

Individuals and communities must take responsibility for their own safety.

At Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia, a father-son team of ISIS-inspired terrorists murdered attendees at a celebration of the first day of Hanukkah. One of the attackers was disarmed by a heroic civilian who was shot in the process, while others lost their lives trying to help.

Contrasting Responses to Threats

Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese responded to the shooting with promises to further tighten gun laws in the already restrictive country—a measure more likely to disarm potential victims than to inconvenience those planning a homicidal attack. In the U.S., by contrast, Jews stepped up security by themselves and alongside police. At the request of my wife’s rabbi, I recruited a friend who served as a Force Recon Marine. We strapped on armor and pistols to patrol the crowd at the menorah lighting in Sedona, Arizona. Members of the congregation carried concealed weapons of their own.

Nothing happened, but we were there to deter problems and respond if necessary. There’s a big difference between doubling down on failed state policies and taking responsibility for your own safety.

According to Prime Minister Albanese’s office, after the attack, “leaders agreed that strong, decisive and focused action was needed on gun law reform as an immediate action” and promised “to strengthen gun laws” with further restrictions. Of course, that’s what Australia did in 1996 after the Port Arthur mass shooting. The government banned a variety of firearms, with compensation for their surrender. Compliance was limited and the effort spawned a significant black market for guns.

But Australia’s millions of guns didn’t kill 15 people at Bondi Beach. Two men with known Islamist ties who traveled last month to the Philippines for training at terrorist summer camp committed the murders. They chose guns as their tools, but they could just as easily have used explosives, vehicles, incendiaries, or something else to cause mayhem.

“The issue is not gun laws. It’s hatred of Jews,” Rabbi Daniel Greyber of Durham, North Carolina commented after the Bondi Beach attack.

A Government That Can’t Be Trusted

And there’s little reason Australian Jews should trust the Australian government.

At a December 14 press conference responding to the Bondi Beach terrorist attack, Prime Minister Albanese denounced the perpetrators and assured Jews “you have every right to be proud of who you are and what you believe.” But then a journalist pointed out inconvenient facts:

“In September, your government recognized a Palestinian State. Your ministers have attacked the Israeli Government. Senior ministers refused to visit the sites of the October 7 massacres. And you created a Special Islamophobia Envoy alongside an Antisemitism Envoy. Have you taken the threat of antisemitism seriously? And can you guarantee the safety of Jewish Australians?”

Albanese’s reply wasn’t impressive and didn’t matter anyway. Rabbi Eli Schlanger, among those murdered at Bondi Beach, wrote to Albanese in September as his government rewarded Hamas’ attack on Israel by recognizing a Palestinian state: “As a Rabbi in Sydney, I implore you not to betray the Jewish people.” Schlanger wasn’t alone in his concerns—other members of the community share them.

Whether or not the Australian government’s policy choices promote the country’s interests in the long run, it’s clear the country’s Jews can’t look to the state for protection. It’s not especially sympathetic to their situation to begin with. Nor does the Australian government much care for people defending themselves. As JB Solicitors, a Sydney law firm, advises: “In Australia, the law generally forbids an individual to carry or use weapons for self-defence.” Had Ahmed al Ahmed, the brave man who was wounded while disarming one of the Bondi Beach attackers, used a knife or a pipe to take down the terrorist, he might have faced charges himself.

And yet, Albanese’s government plans to further tighten laws that might be obeyed by the peaceful citizens of Australia but will have little effect on people who plan mass murder.

Deference to Authorities Is Foolish in the U.S., Too

Even citizens of the United States, where self-defense rights are better recognized than in most other countries, can fall afoul of demands that we rely on the authorities to protect us. As I write, police in Rhode Island are still looking for a shooter who killed two students and injured nine others.

Brown University policy infamously dictates that “the possession, use, or storage of Weapons or Firearms is strictly prohibited on all University Property and at University-sponsored events.” Instead of carrying the means of self-defense, students, faculty, staff, and visitors are expected to defer to the university’s extensive surveillance camera system and the help it will supposedly summon in case of emergency.

Not only did help not arrive on time on Saturday, but the cameras apparently didn’t capture a clear picture of the attacker. Brown University officials may (or may not) be better-intentioned than those of the Australian government, but their promises of protection are just as empty.

Defend Yourself and Your Community

Such promises are inevitably empty. The only people well positioned to respond to a homicidal attack are those there when it happens. If they have the tools and training to do something, they can deter some people with bad intentions and react appropriately to the crimes of others.

In 2019, Jack Wilson shot a gunman who opened fire in the West Freeway Church of Christ in Texas. At the time he commented, “I don’t feel like I killed a human. I killed an evil” when he stopped the attack.

Ideally, nobody would ever have to rise to such an occasion. But we should all consider Ahmed al Ahmed and Jack Wilson as inspirations if it’s necessary. Like Boris and Sofia Gurman, who were killed at Bondi Beach, they engaged attackers when the situation called for intervention.

Wilson’s big advantage is that he was armed and prepared for such a situation.

Jews in Australia and elsewhere should draw on that lesson; they are the only people they can count on to have their own backs. But so should everybody, even if they trust their local authorities. They will be the people on the scene if something happens—not police or politicians with dedicated security details.

And so, my friend and I will soon be at another menorah lighting, along with armed members of the congregation. I’m confident nothing will happen. But we’ll be ready if it does.

By the way, If you like this newsletter and want to support it, you can: 

Contribute to Reason. This newsletter (and everything Reason produces) relies on the support of readers like you. Contributions help us spread commentary like this to more people. 

Forward this newsletter. Know of someone who needs to read it? They can sign up for free at this link.

Continue Reading

Trending

X