Connect with us
[the_ad id="89560"]

Business

Trump’s bizarre 51st state comments and implied support for Carney were simply a ploy to blow up trilateral trade pact

Published

10 minute read

From LifeSiteNews

By Conservative Treehouse

Trump’s position on the Canadian election outcome had nothing to do with geopolitical friendships and everything to do with America First economics.

Note from LifeSiteNews co-founder Steve Jalsevac: This article, disturbing as it is, appears to explain Trump’s bizarre threats to Canada and irrational support for Carney. We present it as a possible explanation for why Trump’s interference in the Canadian election seems to have played a large role in the Liberals’ exploitation of the Trump threat and their ultimate, unexpected success.

To understand President Trump’s position on Canada, you have to go back to the 2016 election and President Trump’s position on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) renegotiation. If you did not follow the subsequent USMCA process, this might be the ah-ha moment you need to understand Trump’s strategy.

During the 2016 election President Trump repeatedly said he wanted to renegotiate NAFTA. Both Canada and Mexico were reluctant to open the trade agreement to revision, but ultimately President Trump had the authority and support from an election victory to do exactly that.

In order to understand the issue, you must remember President Trump, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer each agreed that NAFTA was fraught with problems and was best addressed by scrapping it and creating two separate bilateral trade agreements. One between the U.S. and Mexico, and one between the U.S. and Canada.

In the decades that preceded the 2017 push to redo the trade pact, Canada had restructured their economy to: (1) align with progressive climate change; and (2) take advantage of the NAFTA loophole. The Canadian government did not want to reengage in a new trade agreement.

Canada has deindustrialized much of their manufacturing base to support the “environmental” aspirations of their progressive politicians. Instead, Canada became an importer of component goods where companies then assembled those imports into finished products to enter the U.S. market without tariffs. Working with Chinese manufacturing companies, Canada exploited the NAFTA loophole.

Justin Trudeau was strongly against renegotiating NAFTA, and stated he and Chrystia Freeland would not support reopening the trade agreement. President Trump didn’t care about the position of Canada and was going forward. Trudeau said he would not support it. Trump focused on the first bilateral trade agreement with Mexico.

When the U.S. and Mexico had agreed to terms of the new trade deal and 80 percent of the agreement was finished, representatives from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce informed Trudeau that his position was weak and if the U.S. and Mexico inked their deal, Canada would be shut out.

When they went to talk to the Canadians the CoC was warning them about what was likely to happen. NAFTA would end, the U.S. and Mexico would have a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA), and then Trump was likely to turn to Trudeau and say NAFTA is dead, now we need to negotiate a separate deal for U.S.-Canada.

Trudeau was told a direct bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada was the worst possible scenario for the Canadian government. Canada would lose access to the NAFTA loophole and Canada’s entire economy was no longer in a position to negotiate against the size of the U.S. Trump would win every demand.

Following the warning, Trudeau went to visit Nancy Pelosi to find out if Congress was likely to ratify a new bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico. Pelosi warned Trudeau there was enough political support for the NAFTA elimination from both parties. Yes, the bilateral trade agreement was likely to find support.

Realizing what was about to happen, Prime Minister Trudeau and Chrystia Freeland quickly changed approach and began to request discussions and meetings with USTR Robert Lighthizer. Keep in mind more than 80 to 90 percent of the agreement was already done by the U.S. and Mexico teams. Both President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and President Trump were now openly talking about when it would be finalized and signed.

Nancy Pelosi stepped in to help Canada get back into the agreement by leveraging her Democrats. Trump agreed to let Canada engage, and Lighthizer agreed to hold discussions with Chrystia Freeland on a tri-lateral trade agreement that ultimately became the USMCA.

The key points to remember are: (1) Trump, Ross, and Lighthizer would prefer two separate bilateral trade agreements because the U.S. import/export dynamic was entirely different between Mexico and Canada. And because of the loophole issue, (2) a five-year review was put into the finished USMCA trade agreement. The USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018, and came into effect on July 1, 2020.

TIMELINE: The USMCA is now up for review (2025) and renegotiation in 2026!

This timeline is the key to understanding where President Donald Trump stands today. The review and renegotiation is his goal.

President Trump said openly he was going to renegotiate the USMCA, leveraging border security (Mexico) and reciprocity (Canada) within it.

Following the 2024 presidential election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau traveled to Mar-a-Lago and said if President Trump was to make the Canadian government face reciprocal tariffs, open the USMCA trade agreements to force reciprocity, and/or balance economic relations on non-tariff issues, then Canada would collapse upon itself economically and cease to exist.

In essence, Canada cannot survive as a free and independent north American nation, without receiving all the one-way benefits from the U.S. economy.

To wit, President Trump then said that if Canada cannot survive in a balanced rules environment, including putting together their own military and defenses (which it cannot), then Canada should become the 51st U.S. state. It was following this meeting that President Trump started emphasizing this point and shocking everyone in the process.

However, what everyone missed was the strategy Trump began outlining when contrast against the USMCA review and renegotiation window.

Again, Trump doesn’t like the tri-lateral trade agreement. President Trump would rather have two separate bilateral agreements; one for Mexico and one for Canada. Multilateral trade agreements are difficult to manage and police.

How was President Trump going to get Canada to (a) willingly exit the USMCA; and (b) enter a bilateral trade agreement?

The answer was through trade and tariff provocations, while simultaneously hitting Canada with the shock and awe aspect of the 51st state.

The Canadian government and the Canadian people fell for it hook, line, and sinker.

Trump’s position on the Canadian election outcome had nothing to do with geopolitical friendships and everything to do with America First economics. When asked about the election in Canada, President Trump said, “I don’t care. I think it’s easier to deal, actually, with a liberal and maybe they’re going to win, but I don’t really care.”

By voting emotionally, the Canadian electorate have fallen into President Trump’s USMCA exit trap. Prime Minister Mark Carney will make the exit much easier. Carney now becomes the target of increased punitive coercion until such a time as the USMCA review is begun, and Canada is forced to a position of renegotiation.

Trump never wanted Canada as a 51st state.

Trump always wanted a U.S.-Canada bilateral trade agreement.

Mark Carney said the era of U.S.-Canadian economic ties “are officially declared severed.”

Canada has willingly exited the USMCA trade agreement at the perfect time for President Trump.

Business

Is affirming existing, approved projects truly the best we can do in Canada?

Published on

From Resource Works

By

For major projects, what is old is new again

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s second wave of “nation-building projects” sounds transformative: six new energy and mining proposals, plus a northern corridor, added to the first tranche unveiled in September, and included in the freshly passed federal budget for the fiscal year.

Together, Ottawa says, they amount to more than $116 billion in investment and are central to “realizing Canada’s full potential as an energy superpower.” That is the pitch in the federal news release.

Look closely, though, and a different picture emerges. For major projects, what is old is new again. Almost every file now being “fast-tracked” was already on the books, sometimes for a decade or more.

The new referrals to the Major Projects Office (MPO) are all familiar: the Nisga’a-led Ksi Lisims LNG terminal on B.C.’s north coast; BC Hydro’s North Coast Transmission Line; Canada Nickel’s Crawford project near Timmins; Nouveau Monde Graphite’s Matawinie mine north of Montréal; Northcliff’s Sisson tungsten project in New Brunswick; and the Inuit-owned Iqaluit Nukkiksautiit hydro project in Nunavut. The “Northwest Critical Conservation Corridor” in B.C. and the Yukon is added as a long-range concept.

Long timelines and longstanding obstacles

None of these is a fresh idea. As the Globe and Mail notes in a project-by-project rundown, Ksi Lisims has been in development for years and already faces two Federal Court challenges from nearby First Nations and opposition from Wet’suwet’en hereditary leaders who fought Coastal GasLink. The North Coast Transmission Line was identified in 2023, with B.C. legislation to fast-track it and term-sheet co-ownership deals with First Nations already in place. The Sisson mine has been stalled at the pre-construction stage for more than a decade, despite earlier approvals and new public money to update its feasibility study.

Iqaluit hydro is hardly a novelty either. As Globe reporting shows, dam concepts near the city have been studied since the mid-2000s, with the current Inuit-owned proposal building on that earlier work and backed by federal engineering funds. The Crawford nickel project was acquired in 2019 and has spent years lining up investors and a complex financing stack, documented in both CBC and Financial Post coverage. Matawinie received its Quebec authorization in 2021, has an impact-benefit agreement with the local Atikamekw Nation and now enjoys federal price-floor guarantees on graphite.

The first tranche, announced in September, follows the same pattern. LNG Canada Phase 2 in Kitimat, new nuclear at Darlington, Contrecoeur container capacity at the Port of Montréal, McIlvenna Bay in Saskatchewan and the Red Chris expansion in B.C. were all in various stages of planning long before Carney entered office. The MPO is not inventing a new project pipeline; it is trying to accelerate the one Ottawa already had.

Acceleration is the point — and industry welcomes it

Acceleration is, to be fair, the point. The Calgary-based MPO, led by former Trans Mountain head Dawn Farrell, is designed to run permits in parallel, not one after another, and to coordinate financing through bodies like the Canada Infrastructure Bank and Canada Growth Fund. Farrell told CBC that work which might have taken “five or six more years” could be cut to roughly two. In a country where large projects regularly die of regulatory exhaustion, that is significant.

Industry likes the signal. Canada Nickel CEO Mark Selby says MPO referral “puts us in the fast lane,” even without the more controversial “national interest” label in Bill C-5 that would allow cabinet to set aside parts of the Fisheries Act, Species at Risk Act or Impact Assessment Act. Inuit proponents of the Iqaluit project welcome Carney’s description of their hydro plan as a breakthrough for Arctic sovereignty, replacing millions of litres of diesel.

But a superpower strategy this is not

Still, if this is what becoming an “energy superpower” looks like, it is a modest start.

Notably absent from Carney’s list is any new oil pipeline. Alberta Premier Danielle Smith has spent months pushing a concept for a bitumen pipeline from the oil sands to the northern B.C. coast, doing provincial groundwork in the hope a private proponent will one day take it over. A BBC report sets out the feud with B.C. Premier David Eby, who dismisses the idea as “fictional” and “political” and insists no company wants it, accusing Smith of jeopardizing B.C.’s LNG ambitions. Smith has called that stance “un-Canadian.”

Western frustration is growing. In the National Post, Whitecap Resources chief executive Grant Fagerheim warns of “fury from Alberta and Saskatchewan” if a pipeline to tidewater is never prioritized and argues producers are tired of a U.S.-dominated system where Canadian barrels sell at a discount while others capture the margins. He favours an energy corridor carrying oil, gas, power and rail, not just more rhetoric about nation-building.

Northern ambitions lag behind rhetoric

Another gap is the North. The Indigenous-led Arctic Gateway partnership, Manitoba and Ottawa are already spending heavily on the Hudson Bay Railway and planning new storage and loading systems to expand the Port of Churchill for grain, potash, critical minerals and Arctic resupply. Carney talks up a “huge host of opportunities” in northern Manitoba, but Churchill sits only on the MPO’s lower-profile “transformative strategies” list, with a full plan now pushed out to 2026.

Meanwhile, the one project that has fundamentally shifted Canada’s oil export position is the long-delayed Trans Mountain expansion. As Resource Works points out, TMX now sends diluted bitumen from Burnaby to Asia, shrinking the old “captive discount” and giving Canada genuine leverage in global markets. But TMX predates Carney’s government by more than a decade and only exists because Ottawa nationalized a struggling private pipeline to get it built.

Evolution, not revolution

Carney’s major-projects push is real, and for the companies involved, the prospect of faster permits and clearer federal backing is very good news. Yet for a government that talks about mobilizing a trillion dollars and remaking Canada as an energy superpower, the current list is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. For now, Ottawa is mostly trying to build what was already on the drawing board. The tougher choices on pipelines, ports and interprovincial trade still lie in front of it.

Headline photo credit to THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld

Continue Reading

Business

Taxpayers paying wages and benefits for 30% of all jobs created over the last 10 years

Published on

From the Fraser Institute

By Jason Childs

From 2015 to 2024, the government sector in Canada—including federal, provincial and municipal—added 950,000 jobs, which accounted for roughly 30 per cent of total employment growth in the country, finds a new study published today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan Canadian public policy think-tank.

“In Canada, employment in the government sector has skyrocketed over the last 10 years,” said Jason Childs, a professor of economics at the University of Regina, senior fellow at the Fraser Institute and author of Examining the Growth of Public-Sector Employment Since 2015.

Over the same 10-year period (2015-2024), government-sector employment grew at an annual average rate of 2.7 per cent compared to only 1.7 per cent for the private sector. The study also examines employment growth by province. Government employment (federal, provincial, municipal) grew at a higher annual rate than the private sector in every province except Manitoba over the 10-year period.

The largest gaps between government-sector employment growth compared to the private sector were in Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Quebec and British Columbia. The smallest gaps were in Alberta and Prince Edward Island.
“The larger government’s share of employment, the greater the ultimate burden on taxpayers to support government workers—government does not pay for itself,” Childs said.

A related study (Measuring the Cost to Canadians from the Growth in Public Administration, also authored by Childs) finds that, from 2015 to 2024, across all levels of government in Canada, the number of public administrators (many of who
work in government ministries, agencies and other offices that do not directly provide services to the public) grew by more than 328,000—or 3.5 per cent annually (on average).

“If governments want to reduce costs, they should look closely at the size of their public administration,” Childs said.

Examining the Growth of Public Sector Employment Since 2015

  • The public sector in Canada added 950,000 jobs between 2015 and 2024. This accounted for roughly 30% of all employment gains.
  • Public sector employment as a share of total employment has grown from 19.7% in 2015 to 21.5% in 2024. Moreover, public sector employment grew at an annual average rate of 2.7% per year, while private sector employment grew at 1.7% per year.
  • In all provinces except Manitoba, public sector employment growth outpaced private sector employment growth, exerting increased pressure on government finances.
  • There is significant variation among provinces in the scale of public sector employment. In Atlantic Canada, public sector employment now represents nearly 30% of all employment. In Alberta, the public sector accounted for 18.0% of all employment in 2024.
  • Public administration has grown even faster than overall public sector employment since 2015. There were 328,200 more public administrators in 2024 than there were in 2015. This accounts for almost one-third of the growth in Canadian public sector employment, and for 10% of all net new employment.
  • In 2015, public administration accounted for 5.4% of all employment. That rose to 6% by 2024.
  • The trend toward sustained strong public sector employment growth is worrisome given Canada’s weak productivity and persistent deficits by both provinces and the federal government. The size of the broad public sector workforce will have to shrink, both absolutely and relative to overall Canadian employment.

Jason Childs

Continue Reading

Trending

X