Frontier Centre for Public Policy
Mark Carney’s Leadership Win Mirrors Past Liberal Failures
From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
By Lee Harding
The Liberal Party has crowned Mark Carney leader, but his path to victory is riddled with obstacles
The Liberal Party of Canada has selected a non-MP to become prime minister, but precedent suggests he won’t last long. Mark Carney represents the worst aspects of both John Turner’s and Michael Ignatieff’s political rises and appears destined for the same electoral futility.
When Pierre Trudeau stepped down as Liberal leader in 1984 after more than 15 years as prime minister, he left behind a parting gift: over 200 Liberal patronage appointments. His successor, John Turner, agreed to another 70. These appointments became a burden, weighing down Turner’s leadership before it had even begun. Like Carney, Turner was not a sitting MP when he became leader. Forced to call a snap election, he watched the Progressive Conservatives secure the first of two successive majorities.
Now, history is repeating itself. Justin Trudeau’s cabinet made 70 appointments in its final days, including 12 judges. That number doesn’t include the 10 senators he appointed while Parliament was prorogued—nearly 10 per cent of the 105-seat chamber. Like Turner, Carney must navigate a leadership legacy tainted by patronage and an unpopular outgoing prime minister.
But does Carney’s experience, reputation, and distance from Trudeau offer him a fresh start? It seems unlikely. Unlike Turner, Carney has never held elected office.
Turner at least had a political track record. As a cabinet minister under two prime ministers, he handled high-profile Justice and Finance portfolios. He also benefited from a nine-year break from politics, distancing himself from the unpopular Trudeau. None of it mattered. Turner still lost.
Liberals hope Carney can ride a wave of popularity after a dominant leadership victory, securing 85 per cent support. But what did he really win? A former central banker, he climbed atop a heap of ruins.
His victory over Chrystia Freeland, Karina Gould, and former MP Frank Baylis was less a competitive race and more a coronation. Freeland carried the baggage of Trudeau’s policies, while the other two lacked national recognition. Carney, the only contender without direct ties to Trudeau’s government, was the default choice. The Liberal Party is adrift, and he simply took the helm.
But winning an uncontested leadership race is no guarantee of electoral success. Turner’s rise in 1984 was far more hard-fought—he overcame political heavyweights, including Jean Chrétien and four other cabinet ministers, in a real contest for the party’s future. Yet despite his credentials and broad support within the party, Canadians still rejected him.
And unlike Turner, Carney’s leadership victory raises serious legitimacy concerns. Liberal leadership races allow votes from permanent residents (non-citizens) and minors aged 14 to 17—groups that have no say in a general election. Even more troubling, of the 400,000 votes cast, only 147,000 were verified. Carney received 126,000 of those votes, but nearly two-thirds of ballots were rejected. Had those votes gone to any of his opponents, Carney’s win would have been far from certain.
A Rebel News petition calling for Elections Canada, CSIS, and the RCMP to audit the leadership vote is already circulating. While skepticism over the process is reasonable, it’s doubtful that meaningful answers will emerge.
Beyond legitimacy issues, Carney shares another unfortunate trait with a failed Liberal leader: Michael Ignatieff.
Ignatieff followed Stéphane Dion, whose push for a carbon tax proved deeply unpopular. The Conservatives quickly branded Ignatieff, a long-time Harvard professor, as an elitist disconnected from ordinary Canadians. Their “He didn’t come back for you” attack ads stuck, and Ignatieff led the Liberals to a historic defeat, falling to third-party status.
Carney faces the same vulnerability. After years in England, he will struggle to shake the image of an out-of-touch globalist. His French, weaker than Ignatieff’s, will also hurt him in Quebec, a province that abandoned the Liberals in 2011 in favour of the NDP.
History suggests Carney’s leadership will pave the way for another Conservative majority government—just as Turner and Ignatieff’s failures did.
Carney’s leadership campaign combines the worst aspects of 1984 and 2011. As an unelected, elitist ex-pat with weak French, he carries a Liberal banner weighed down by both Trudeau’s baggage and the deeply unpopular carbon tax.
A Conservative government with a mandate for reform is increasingly likely. A slimmed-down civil service, reduced regulations, the abolition of the carbon tax, and renewed pipeline construction could all be on the horizon. After nearly a decade of Liberal rule, Canada’s political pendulum seems set to swing back once again.
Lee Harding is Research Fellow for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.
armed forces
Canada At Risk Of Losing Control Of Its Northern Territories
From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
By Gerry Bowler
Canada has left the North wide open to foreign powers eager to grow their Arctic foothold
Canada is in danger of losing the Arctic because Ottawa has ignored the North for far too long.
The Canadian North makes up 40 per cent of our land mass and includes more than 19,000 islands in the Arctic Archipelago. Yet only about 120,000 people live across this enormous stretch of wilderness. Canada took control of the region in the late 19th century through territorial transfers from the Hudson’s Bay Company and the British Crown, one of the largest land transfers in history.
For decades afterward, the North received little federal attention. The Second World War briefly changed that, prompting construction of the Alcan Highway to Alaska and bringing new airfields and telephone lines.
The Cold War, along with the threat of Soviet bombers crossing the Pole, led to multiple radar lines. Still, Prime Minister St-Laurent admitted in the 1950s that Canadian governments had treated the North “in an almost continuing state of absence of mind.”
John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative administration tried to reverse that neglect. In 1958, he told a Winnipeg audience: “I see a new Canada—a Canada of the North! … We intend to carry out the legislative program of Arctic research, to develop Arctic routes, to develop those vast hidden resources the last few years have revealed.”
Plans for a research and industrial city in Frobisher Bay, new roads and railway lines and wide-ranging surveys were ambitious but ultimately unaffordable. In the years that followed, both Liberal and Conservative governments again set northern development aside.
Foreign interest, however, continued to grow. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service recently reported Russian and Chinese attempts at influence and subversion in our northern territories.
American governments over the past 20 years have shown serious interest in the region’s resources, which include significant oil, gas and mineral deposits, along with control of the Northwest Passage, a shipping route becoming increasingly accessible as Arctic sea ice recedes.
Canada considers those waters national; the United States, the European Union and at times China argue it is an international strait.
For all practical purposes, Canada has what amounts to no meaningful presence north of the tree line, leaving the field open to countries with far more ambition and far better-equipped forces.
Canada is in no position to defend its claims. We have no icebreakers capable of operating through the Arctic winter. We have no submarines that can work under the ice cap. We have no permanent air base for fighter jets.
And to cover two million square kilometres of Arctic territory, we have only 300 troops stationed there. The chance they could detect, let alone repel, a serious intruder is essentially zero. Without these capabilities, Canada cannot properly monitor activity in the region or enforce its sovereignty claims.
In the last federal budget, Ottawa announced a $1-billion Arctic infrastructure fund for new airports, seaports and all-season roads. Our foreign affairs minister has urged NATO to pay more attention to the Arctic, saying it “must be an organization not only that focuses on the eastern flank, but also that looks north.”
These steps are gestures, not strategy. Canadian governments excel at promises but struggle with procurement, and the idea that European allies might fill the gap, considering their weak response to Russia’s assault on Ukraine, is unlikely.
Our northern territory is under threat. We must use it or lose it.
Gerry Bowler is a Canadian historian and a senior fellow of the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.
Crime
How Global Organized Crime Took Root In Canada
From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
Weak oversight and fragmented enforcement are enabling criminal networks to undermine Canada’s economy and security, requiring a national-security-level response to dismantle these systems
A massive drug bust reveals how organized crime has turned Canada into a source of illicit narcotics production
Canada is no longer just a victim of the global drug trade—it’s becoming a source. The country’s growing role in narcotics production exposes deep systemic weaknesses in oversight and enforcement that are allowing organized crime to take root and threaten our economy and security.
Police in Edmonton recently seized more than 60,000 opium poppy plants from a northeast property, one of the largest domestic narcotics cultivation operations in Canadian history. It’s part of a growing pattern of domestic production once thought limited to other regions of the world.
This wasn’t a small experiment; it was proof that organized crime now feels confident operating inside Canada.
Transnational crime groups don’t gamble on crops of this scale unless they know their systems are solid. You don’t plant 60,000 poppies without confidence in your logistics, your financing and your buyers. The ability to cultivate, harvest and quietly move that volume of product points to a level of organization that should deeply concern policymakers. An operation like this needs more than a field; it reflects the convergence of agriculture, organized crime and money laundering within Canada’s borders.
The uncomfortable truth is that Canada has become a source country for illicit narcotics rather than merely a consumer or transit point. Fentanyl precursors (the chemical ingredients used to make the synthetic opioid) arrive from abroad, are synthesized domestically and are exported south into the United States. Now, with opium cultivation joining the picture, that same capability is extending to traditional narcotics production.
Criminal networks exploit weak regulatory oversight, land-use gaps and fragmented enforcement, often allowing them to operate in plain sight. These groups are not only producing narcotics but are also embedding themselves within legitimate economic systems.
This isn’t just crime; it’s the slow undermining of Canada’s legitimate economy. Illicit capital flows can distort real estate markets, agricultural valuations and financial transparency. The result is a slow erosion of lawful commerce, replaced by parallel economies that profit from addiction, money laundering and corruption. Those forces don’t just damage national stability—they drive up housing costs, strain health care and undermine trust in Canada’s institutions.
Canada’s enforcement response remains largely reactive, with prosecutions risk-averse and sentencing inadequate as a deterrent. At the same time, threat networks operate with impunity and move seamlessly across the supply chain.
The Edmonton seizure should therefore be read as more than a local success story. It is evidence that criminal enterprise now operates with strategic depth inside Canada. The same confidence that sustains fentanyl synthesis and cocaine importation is now manifesting in agricultural narcotics production. This evolution elevates Canada from passive victim to active threat within the global illicit economy.
Reversing this dynamic requires a fundamental shift in thinking. Organized crime is a matter of national security. That means going beyond raids and arrests toward strategic disruption: tracking illicit finance, dismantling logistical networks that enable these operations and forging robust intelligence partnerships across jurisdictions and agencies.
It’s not about symptoms; it’s about knocking down the systems that sustain this criminal enterprise operating inside Canada.
If we keep seeing narcotics enforcement as a public safety issue instead of a warning of systemic corruption, Canada’s transformation into a threat nation will be complete. Not because of what we import but because of what we now produce.
Scott A. McGregor is a senior fellow with the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and managing partner of Close Hold Intelligence Consulting Ltd.
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