As President Donald Trump readies sweeping tariffs against Canada on Saturday—citing Ottawa’s failure to secure its shared North American borders from fentanyl originating in China—The Bureau has obtained a remarkable December 1999 document from a senior law enforcement official, revealing Ottawa’s longstanding negligence in securing Vancouver’s port against drug trafficking linked to Chinese shipping entities.
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The letter, drafted by former Crown prosecutor Scott Newark and addressed to Ottawa’s Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), urged the body to reconsider explosive findings from a leaked RCMP and CSIS report detailing the infiltration of Canada’s “porous” borders by Chinese criminal networks.
Titled “Re: S.I.R.C. Review in relation to Project Sidewinder,” Newark’s letter alleges systemic failures that enabled Chinese State Council owned shipping giant COSCO and Triads with suspected Chinese military ties to penetrate Vancouver’s port system. He further asserts that federal authorities ignored repeated briefings and warnings from Canadian law enforcement—warnings based on intelligence gathered by Canadian officials in Hong Kong, who initiated the Sidewinder review.
Newark also warned that Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s decision to dismantle Canada’s specialized Ports Police and privatize national port control had left the country dangerously exposed to foreign criminal networks, noting he had personally briefed the Canadian government on these concerns as early as 1996.
Addressing his letter to SIRC’s chair, Quebec lawyer Paule Gauthier, Newark wrote:
“As the former (1994-98) Executive Officer of the Canadian Police Association, I was assigned responsibility for dealing with the issue of the federal government’s changes to control of the national ports and policing therein.”
“This involved close examination of matters such as drug, weapon, and people smuggling through the national ports and, in particular, both the growing presence of organized criminal groups at ports and the ominous hazard control of those ports by such groups represented.”
Newark’s letter goes on to allege widespread failures in Ottawa that facilitated Chinese Triad infiltration of Vancouver’s port, revealing federal authorities’ reluctance to act on warnings from RCMP officer Garry Clement and immigration control officer Brian McAdam—former Canadian officials based in Hong Kong who had sounded the alarm, prompting the Sidewinder review.
Newark explained to SIRC’s chair that, during his tenure as Executive Officer of the Canadian Police Association, he prepared approximately fifty detailed policy briefs for the government and regularly appeared before parliamentary committees and in private ministerial briefings.
“I can assure you that in all of that time, no clearer warning was ever given by Canada’s rank and file police officers to the national government than what was done in our unsuccessful attempt to prevent the disbandment of the specialized Canada Ports Police in combination with the privatization of the ports themselves,” Newark’s letter to SIRC states.
The letter continues, noting that in October 1996, Newark met with Chrétien’s Transport Minister David Anderson—later addressing the Transport Committee—to highlight the imminent threat posed by Asian organized crime’s infiltration of port operations. Newark’s written briefing to the Minister underscored the gravity of the situation with a blunt question:
“Who exactly are the commercial port operators?”
Citing the Anderson briefing document, Newark’s letter to SIRC states that Anderson had been warned:
“We are, for example, aware of serious concerns amongst the international law enforcement community surrounding the ownership of ports and container industries in Asia and, in particular, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China. There is simply no longer any doubt that drugs like heroin are coming from these destinations through the Port of Vancouver, moved by organized criminal gangs whose assets include ‘legitimate’ properties.”
The Anderson briefing also referenced a British Columbia anti-gang unit report, titled “Organized Crime on Vancouver Waterfront,” which made clear that the Longshoreman’s Union had been infiltrated by the Hells Angels.
“The movement of goods through Canada’s ports requires an independence in policing that is impossible without public control,” the report warned.
It concluded:
“This report should be taken as a specific warning to this Government that, prior to downloading operational control over the ports themselves to private interests, Government be absolutely certain as to who owns what—and that it can continue that certainty with power to refuse acquisition of port assets in the future.”
Scott Newark’s letter to SIRC then turns to new intelligence—gathered from Canadian and U.S. officials—that further underscored the vulnerability created by Chrétien’s border policies.
“To now learn that law enforcement and public officials in Canada and the United States have linked a company (COSCO), granted docking and other facilities in Vancouver, to Asian organized crime, arms and drug smuggling is, to say the least, disturbing,” Newark’s December 1999 letter states.
“That this company, its principals, subsidiaries, and partners have been associated with various military agencies of a foreign government—agencies themselves identified by Canadian and American officials as having unhealthy connections to Triad groups—makes a bad situation even worse.”
Newark next addressed the broader implications of Canada’s failure to enforce border security, particularly in relation to the deportation of foreign criminals—a process he had sought to reform while serving with the Canadian Police Association.
Drawing on his experience, he described a deeply flawed immigration enforcement system, one that allowed individuals with serious criminal records to remain in Canada indefinitely. The problem, he wrote, was twofold: not only were foreign criminals able to enter Canada with ease, but authorities also failed to deport those with outstanding arrest warrants.
Newark recounted how, in 1996, a Cabinet Minister requested that he meet with Brian McAdam, a former senior foreign service officer in Hong Kong who had spent years uncovering organized crime’s grip on Canada’s immigration system. McAdam’s detailed revelations, he wrote, had directly led to the launch of Project Sidewinder.
Newark told SIRC that even after leaving the Canadian Police Association in 1998, he remained in contact with McAdam and other officials working to expose this vast and complex national security risk posed by foreign criminal networks.
It was this ongoing communication that led to an even more alarming discovery. Newark wrote that he was stunned to learn that Canada’s government had not only terminated Project Sidewinder but had gone so far as to destroy some related files.
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Newark suggests SIRC’s chair, in her review of Sidewinder, should determine whether “Sidewinder should not have been cancelled … why such inappropriate action was taken and at whose direction this was done.”
He concludes that SIRC should also freshly examine why intelligence reporting from the Canadian officials in Hong Kong, Brian McAdam and Garry Clement had been ignored in Ottawa.
Newark’s letter to SIRC says these failures to act on intelligence included the “Inappropriate granting of visas to Triad members or associates” and “Granting of docking facilities with attendant consequences to COSCO”—and “Failure of CIC and Foreign Affairs to respond appropriately to the various information supplied by McAdam and Clement in relation to material pertaining to Sidewinder.”
In an exclusive interview with The Bureau, Garry Clement, who contributed to investigations referenced in Newark’s letter, corroborated many of its claims and provided further insight. Clement recalled his role in Project Sunset, a 1990s investigation into Chinese Triads’ efforts to gain control over Vancouver’s ports.
“I can remember having a discussion with Scott when he wrote that to SIRC because Scott and I go back a long time,” Clement said. “I knew about him writing on it, but I knew it was also buried.”
He described his own intelligence work during the same period:
“I wrote in the nineties when I was the liaison officer in Hong Kong, a very long intelligence brief on the Chinese wanting to basically acquire or build out a port at the Surrey Fraser Docks area. And it was going to be completely controlled by that time, with Triad influence, but it was going to be controlled by China.”
Clement expressed frustration that decades of warnings had gone unheeded:
“The bottom line is that here we are almost 40 years later, talking about an issue that was identified in the ‘90s about our ports and allowing China to have free access—and nothing has been done over that period of time.”
Newark’s urgent recommendation for SIRC to reconsider Sidewinder’s warnings on Vancouver’s ports was never acted upon.
“We still don’t have Port Police. We got nobody overseeing them,” Clement added. “The ports themselves, it’s sort of like putting a fox in the hen house and saying, ‘Behave yourself.’”
Finally, when asked about the Trudeau government’s claim this week that Canada is responsible for only one percent of the fentanyl entering the United States—a figure reported widely in Canadian media—Clement’s response was unequivocal.
“The fact that we’ve become a haven for transnational organized crime, it’s internationally known,” he said. “So when I read that, with the fentanyl—Trump is wrong in that there’s less than 1% of our fentanyl going to the United States. That’s a crock of shit. If you look at the two super labs that were taken down in British Columbia—I think there’s three now—the amount they were capable of producing was more than the whole Vancouver population could have used in 10 years. So we know that Vancouver has become a transshipment point to North America for opiates and cocaine and other drugs because it’s a weak link, and enforcement is not capable of keeping up with transnational organized crime.”
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That opinion is evidently acknowledged by British Columbia Premier David Eby, according to documents from Canada’s Foreign Interference Commission that say Eby sought meetings with Justin Trudeau’s National Security Advisor.
A record from the Hogue Commission, sanitized for public release, outlines the “context and drivers” behind Eby’s concerns, including “foreign interference; election security; countering fentanyl, organized crime, money laundering, corruption.”
The documents state Ottawa’s Privy Council Office—which provides advice to Justin Trudeau’s cabinet—had recommended that British Columbia continue to work with the federal government on initiatives like the establishment of a new Canada Financial Crimes Agency to bolster the nation’s ability to respond swiftly to complex financial crimes.
Additionally, the PCO highlighted that Canada, the United States, and Mexico were supposedly collaborating on strategies to reduce the supply of fentanyl, including addressing precursor chemicals and preventing the exploitation of commercial shipping channels—a critical area where British Columbia, and specifically the Port of Vancouver, plays a significant role.
Eby acknowledged the concerns again this week in an interview with Macleans.
“I understood Trump’s concerns about drugs coming in. We’ve got a serious fentanyl problem in B.C.; we see the precursor chemicals coming into B.C. from China and Mexico. We see ties to Asian and Mexican organized crime groups. We’d been discussing all of that with the American ambassador and fellow governors. That’s why it was such a strange turnaround, from ‘Hey, we’re working together on this!’ to suddenly finding ourselves in the crosshairs.”
Yet, despite Eby’s claims of intergovernmental efforts, critics—including Garry Clement—argue that nothing has changed. Vancouver’s port remains alarmingly vulnerable, a decades-old concern that continues to resurface as fentanyl and other illicit drugs flood North American markets.
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President Donald Trump signed an executive order moving marijuana from a Schedule I to a Schedule III controlled substance, despite many Republican lawmakers urging him not to.
“I want to emphasize that the order I am about to sign is not the legalization [of] marijuana in any way, shape, or form – and in no way sanctions its use as a recreational drug,” Trump said. “It’s never safe to use powerful controlled substances in recreational manners, especially in this case.”
“Young Americans are especially at risk, so unless a drug is recommended by a doctor for medical reasons, just don’t do it,” he added. “At the same time, the facts compel the federal government to recognize that marijuana can be legitimate in terms of medical applications when carefully administered.”
Under the Controlled Substances Act, Schedule I drugs are defined as having a high potential for abuse and no accepted medical use. Schedule III drugs – such as anabolic steroids, ketamine, and testosterone – are defined as having a moderate potential for abuse and accepted medical uses.
Although marijuana is still illegal at the federal level, 24 states and the District of Columbia have fully legalized marijuana within their borders, while 13 other states allow for medical marijuana.
Advocates for easing marijuana restrictions argue it will accelerate scientific research on the drug and allow the commercial marijuana industry to boom. Now that marijuana is no longer a Schedule I drug, businesses will claim an estimated $2.3 billion in tax breaks.
Chair of The Marijuana Policy Project Betty Aldworth said the reclassification “marks a symbolic victory and a recalibration of decades of federal misclassification.”
“Cannabis regulation is not a fringe experiment – it is a $38 billion economic engine operating under state-legal frameworks in nearly half of the country that has delivered overall positive social, educational, medical, and economic benefits, including correlation with reductions in youth use in states where it’s legal,” Aldworth said.
Opponents of the reclassification, including 22 Republican senators who sent Trump a warning letter Wednesday, point out the negative health impact of marijuana use and its effects on occupational and road safety.
“The only winners from rescheduling will be bad actors such as Communist China, while Americans will be left paying the bill. Marijuana continues to fit the definition of a Schedule I drug due to its high potential for abuse and its lack of an FDA-approved use,” the lawmakers wrote. “We cannot reindustrialize America if we encourage marijuana use.”
Marijuana usage is linked to mental disorders like depression, suicidal ideation, and psychotic episodes; impairs driving and athletic performance; and can cause permanent IQ loss when used at a young age, according to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration.
Additionally, research shows that “people who use marijuana are more likely to have relationship problems, worse educational outcomes, lower career achievement, and reduced life satisfaction,” SAMHA says.
Canadians are told dairy farmers need protection. The newest numbers tell a different story
Every once in a while, someone inside a tightly protected system decides to say the quiet part out loud. That is what Joel Fox, a dairy farmer from the Trenton, Ont., area, did recently in the Ontario Farmer newspaper.
In a candid open letter, Fox questioned why established dairy farmers like himself continue to receive increasingly large government payouts, even though the sector is not shrinking but expanding. For readers less familiar with the system, supply management is the federal framework that controls dairy production through quotas and sets minimum prices to stabilize farmer income.
His piece, titled “We continue to privatize gains, socialize losses,” did not come from an economist or a critic of supply management. It came from someone who benefits from it. Yet his message was unmistakable: the numbers no longer add up.
Fox’s letter marks something we have not seen in years, a rare moment of internal dissent from a system that usually speaks with one voice. It is the first meaningful crack since the viral milk-dumping video by Ontario dairy farmer Jerry Huigen, who filmed himself being forced to dump thousands of litres of perfectly good milk because of quota rules. Huigen’s video exposed contradictions inside supply management, but the system quickly closed ranks until now. Fox has reopened a conversation that has been dormant for far too long.
In his letter, Fox admitted he would cash his latest $14,000 Dairy Direct Payment Program cheque, despite believing the program wastes taxpayer money. The Dairy Direct Payment Program was created to offset supposed losses from trade agreements like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA).
During those negotiations, Ottawa promised compensation because the agreements opened a small share of Canada’s dairy market, roughly three to five per cent, to additional foreign imports. The expectation was that this would shrink the domestic market. But those “losses” were only projections based on modelling and assumptions about future erosion in market share. They were predictions, not actual declines in production or demand. In reality, domestic dairy demand has strengthened.
Which raises the obvious question: why are we compensating dairy farmers for producing less when they are, in fact, producing more?
This month, dairy farmers received another one per cent quota increase, on top of several increases totalling four to five per cent in recent years. Quota only goes up when more milk is needed.
If trade deals had actually harmed the sector, quota would be going down, not up. Instead, Canada’s population has grown by nearly six million since 2015, processors have expanded and consumption has held steady. The market is clearly expanding.
Understanding what quota is makes the contradiction clearer. Quota is a government-created financial asset worth $24,000 to $27,000 per kilogram of butterfat. A mid-sized dairy farm may hold about $2.5 million in quota. Over the past few years, cumulative quota increases of five per cent or more have automatically added $120,000 to $135,000 to the value of a typical farm’s quota, entirely free.
Larger farms see even greater windfalls. Across the entire dairy system, these increases represent hundreds of millions of dollars in newly created quota value, likely exceeding $500 million in added wealth, generated not through innovation or productivity but by a regulatory decision.
That wealth is not just theoretical. Farm Credit Canada, a federal Crown corporation, accepts quota as collateral. When quota increases, so does a farmer’s borrowing power. Taxpayers indirectly backstop the loans tied to this government-manufactured asset. The upside flows privately; the risk sits with the public.
Yet despite rising production, rising quota values, rising equity and rising borrowing capacity, Ottawa continues issuing billions in compensation. Between 2019 and 2028, nearly $3 billion will flow to dairy farmers through the Dairy Direct Payment Program. Payments are based on quota holdings, meaning the largest farms receive the largest cheques. New farmers, young farmers and those without quota receive nothing. Established farms collect compensation while their asset values grow.
The rationale for these payments has collapsed. The domestic market did not shrink. Quota did not contract. Production did not fall. The compensation continues only because political promises are easier to maintain than to revisit.
What makes Fox’s letter important is that it comes from someone who gains from the system. When insiders publicly admit the compensation makes no economic sense, policymakers can no longer hide behind familiar scripts. Fox ends his letter with blunt honesty: “These privatized gains and socialized losses may not be good for Canadian taxpayers … but they sure are good for me.”
Canada is not being asked to abandon its dairy sector. It is being asked to face reality. If farmers are producing more, taxpayers should not be compensating them for imaginary declines. If quota values keep rising, Ottawa should not be writing billion-dollar cheques for hypothetical losses.
Fox’s letter is not a complaint; it is an opportunity. If insiders are calling for honesty, policymakers should finally be willing to do the same.
Dr. Sylvain Charlebois is a Canadian professor and researcher in food distribution and policy. He is senior director of the Agri-Food Analytics Lab at Dalhousie University and co-host of The Food Professor Podcast. He is frequently cited in the media for his insights on food prices, agricultural trends, and the global food supply chain.
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