Energy
Canada could have been an energy superpower. Instead we became a bystander
This article was originally published in a collected volume, Canada’s Governance Crisis, which outlines Canada’s policy paralysis across a wide range of government priorities. Read the full paper here.
From the MacDonald-Laurier Institute
By Heather Exner-Pirot
Government has imposed a series of regulatory burdens on the energy industry, creating confusion, inefficiency, and expense
Oil arguably remains the most important commodity in the world today. It paved the way for the industrialization and globalization trends of the post-World War II era, a period that saw the fastest human population growth and largest reduction in extreme poverty ever. Its energy density, transportability, storability, and availability have made oil the world’s greatest source of energy, used in every corner of the globe.
There are geopolitical implications inherent in a commodity of such significance and volume. The contemporary histories of Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq are intertwined with their roles as major oil producers, roles that they have used to advance their (often illiberal) interests on the world stage. It is fair to ask why Canada has never seen fit to advance its own values and interests through its vast energy reserves. It is easy to conclude that its reluctance to do so has been a major policy failure.
Canada has been blessed with the world’s third largest reserves of oil, the vast majority of which are in the oil sands of northern Alberta, although there is ample conventional oil across Western Canada and offshore Newfoundland and Labrador as well. The oil sands contain 1.8 trillion barrels of oil, of which just under 10 percent, or 165 billion barrels, are technically and economically recoverable with today’s technology. Canada currently extracts over 1 billion barrels of that oil each year.
The technology necessary to turn the oil sands into bitumen that could then be exported profitably really took off in the early 2000s. Buoyed by optimism of its potential, then Prime Minister Stephen Harper pronounced in July 2006 that Canada would soon be an “energy superproducer.” A surge of investment came to the oil sands during the commodity supercycle of 2000-2014, which saw oil peak at a price of $147/barrel in 2008. For a few good years, average oil prices sat just below $100 a barrel. Alberta was booming until it crashed.
Two things happened that made Harper’s prediction fall apart. The first was the shale revolution – the combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling that made oil from the vast shale reserves in the United States economical to recover. Until then, the US had been the world’s biggest energy importer. In 2008 it was producing just 5 million barrels of crude oil a day, and had to import 10 million barrels a day to meet its ravenous need. Shale changed that, and the US is now the world’s biggest oil producer, expecting to hit a production level of 12.4 million barrels a day in 2023.
For producers extracting oil from the oil sands, the shale revolution was a terrible outcome. Just as new major oil sands projects were coming online and were producing a couple of million barrels a day, our only oil customer was becoming energy self-sufficient.
Because the United States was such a reliable and thirsty oil consumer, it never made sense for Canada to export its oil to any other nation, and the country never built the pipeline or export terminal infrastructure to do so. Our southern neighbour wanted all we produced. But the cheap shale oil that flooded North America in the 2010s made that dependence a huge mistake as other markets would have proven to be more profitable.
If shale oil took a hatchet to the Canadian oil industry, the election of the Liberals in 2015 brought on its death by a thousand cuts. For the last eight years, federal policies have incrementally and cumulatively damaged the domestic oil and gas sector. With the benefit of hindsight in 2023, it is obvious that this has had major consequences for global energy security, as well as opportunity costs for Canadian foreign policy.
Once the shale revolution began in earnest, the urgency in the sector to be able to export oil to any other market than the United States led to proposals for the Northern Gateway, Energy East, and TMX pipelines. Opposition from Quebec and BC killed Energy East and Northern Gateway, respectively. The saga of TMX may finally end this year, as it is expected to go into service in late 2023, billions of dollars over cost and years overdue thanks to regulatory and jurisdictional hurdles.
Because Canada has been stuck selling all of its oil to the United States, it does so at a huge discount, known as a differential. That discount hit a staggering US$46 per barrel difference in October 2018, when WTI (West Texas Intermediate) oil was selling for $57 a barrel, but we could only get $11 for WCS (Western Canada Select). The lack of pipelines and the resulting differential created losses to the Canadian economy of $117 billion between 2011 and 2018, according to Frank McKenna, former Liberal New Brunswick Premier and Ambassador to the United States, and now Deputy Chairman of TD Bank.
The story is not dissimilar with liquefied natural gas (LNG). While both the United States and Canada had virtually no LNG export capacity in 2015, the United States has since grown to be the world’s biggest LNG exporter, helping Europe divest itself of its reliance on Russian gas and making tens of billions of dollars in the process. Canada still exports none, with regulatory uncertainty and slow timelines killing investor interest. In fact, the United States imports Canadian natural gas – which it buys for the lowest prices in the world due to that differential problem – and then resells it to our allies for a premium.
Canada’s inability to build pipelines and export capacity is a major problem on its own. But the federal government has also imposed a series of regulatory burdens and hurdles on the industry, one on top of the other, creating confusion, inefficiency, and expense. It has become known in Alberta as a “stacked pancake” approach.
The first major burden was Bill C-48, the tanker moratorium. In case anyone considered reviving the Northern Gateway project, the Liberal government banned oil tankers from loading anywhere between the northernmost point of Vancouver Island to the BC-Alaska border. That left a pathway only for TMX, which goes through Vancouver, amidst fierce local opposition. I have explained it to my American colleagues this way: imagine if Texas was landlocked, and all its oil exports had to go west through California, but the federal government banned oil tankers from loading anywhere on the Californian coast except through ports in San Francisco. That is what C-48 did in Canada.
Added to Bill C-48 was Bill C-69, known colloquially as the “no new pipelines” bill and now passed as the Impact Assessment Act, which has successfully deterred investment in the sector. It imposes new and often opaque regulatory requirements, such as having to conduct a gender-based analysis before proceeding with new projects to determine how different genders will experience them: “a way of thinking, as opposed to a unique set of prescribed methods,” according to the federal government. It also provides for a veto from the Environment and Climate Change Canada Minister – currently, Steven Guilbeault – on any new in situ oil sands projects or interprovincial or international pipelines, regardless of the regulatory agency’s recommendation.
The Alberta Court of Appeal has determined that the act is unconstitutional, and eight other provinces are joining in its challenge. But so far it is the law of the land, and investors are allergic to it.
Federal carbon pricing, and Alberta’s federally compatible alternative for large emitters, the TIER (Technology Innovation and Emissions Reduction) Regulation, was added next, though this regulation makes sense for advancing climate goals. It is the main driver for encouraging emission reductions, and includes charges for excess emissions as well as credits for achieving emissions below benchmark. It may be costly for producers, but from an economic perspective, of all the climate policies carbon pricing is the most efficient.
Industry has committed to their shareholders that they will reduce emissions; their social license and their investment attractiveness depends to some degree on it. The major oil sands companies have put forth a credible plan to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. One conventional operation in Alberta is already net zero thanks to its use of carbon capture technology. Having a predictable and recognized price on carbon is also providing incentives to a sophisticated carbon tech industry in Canada, which can make money by finding smart ways to sequester and use carbon.
In theory, carbon pricing should succeed in reducing emissions in the most efficient way possible. Yet the federal government keeps adding more policies on top of carbon pricing. The Canadian Clean Fuel Standard, introduced in 2022, mandates that fuel suppliers must lower the “lifecycle intensity” of their fuels, for example by blending them with biofuels, or investing in hydrogen, renewables, and carbon capture. This standard dictates particular policy solutions, causes the consumer price of fuels to increase, facilitates greater reliance on imports of biofuels, and conflicts with some provincial policies. It is also puts new demands on North American refinery capacity, which is already highly constrained.
The newest but perhaps most damaging proposal is for an emissions cap, which seeks to reduce emissions solely from the oil and gas sector by 42 percent by 2030. This target far exceeds what is possible with carbon capture in that time frame, and can only be achieved through a dramatic reduction in production. The emissions cap is an existential threat to Canada’s oil and gas industry, and it comes at a time when our allies are trying, and failing, to wean themselves off of Russian oil. The economic damage to the Canadian economy is hard to overestimate.
Oil demand is growing, and even in the most optimistic forecasts it will continue to grow for another decade before plateauing. Our European and Asian allies are already dangerously reliant on Russia and Middle Eastern states for their oil. American shale production is peaking, and will soon start to decline. Low investment levels in global oil exploration and production, due in part to ESG (environmental, social, and governance) and climate polices, are paving the way for shortages by mid-decade.
An energy crisis is looming. Canada is not too late to be the energy superproducer the democratic world needs in order to prosper and be secure. We need more critical minerals, hydrogen, hydro, and nuclear power. But it is essential that we export globally significant levels of oil and LNG as well, using carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) wherever possible.
Meeting this goal will require a very different approach than the one currently taken by the federal government: it must be an approach that encourages growth and exports even as emissions are reduced. What the government has done instead is deter investment, dampen competitiveness, and hand market share to Russia and OPEC.
Heather Exner-Pirot is Director of Energy, Natural Resources and Environment at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
Business
The world is no longer buying a transition to “something else” without defining what that is
From Resource Works
Even Bill Gates has shifted his stance, acknowledging that renewables alone can’t sustain a modern energy system — a reality still driving decisions in Canada.
You know the world has shifted when the New York Times, long a pulpit for hydrocarbon shame, starts publishing passages like this:
“Changes in policy matter, but the shift is also guided by the practical lessons that companies, governments and societies have learned about the difficulties in shifting from a world that runs on fossil fuels to something else.”
For years, the Times and much of the English-language press clung to a comfortable catechism: 100 per cent renewables were just around the corner, the end of hydrocarbons was preordained, and anyone who pointed to physics or economics was treated as some combination of backward, compromised or dangerous. But now the evidence has grown too big to ignore.
Across Europe, the retreat to energy realism is unmistakable. TotalEnergies is spending €5.1 billion on gas-fired plants in Britain, Italy, France, Ireland and the Netherlands because wind and solar can’t meet demand on their own. Shell is walking away from marquee offshore wind projects because the economics do not work. Italy and Greece are fast-tracking new gas development after years of prohibitions. Europe is rediscovering what modern economies require: firm, dispatchable power and secure domestic supply.
Meanwhile, Canada continues to tell itself a different story — and British Columbia most of all.
A new Fraser Institute study from Jock Finlayson and Karen Graham uses Statistics Canada’s own environmental goods and services and clean-tech accounts to quantify what Canada’s “clean economy” actually is, not what political speeches claim it could be.
The numbers are clear:
- The clean economy is 3.0–3.6 per cent of GDP.
- It accounts for about 2 per cent of employment.
- It has grown, but not faster than the economy overall.
- And its two largest components are hydroelectricity and waste management — mature legacy sectors, not shiny new clean-tech champions.
Despite $158 billion in federal “green” spending since 2014, Canada’s clean economy has not become the unstoppable engine of prosperity that policymakers have promised. Finlayson and Graham’s analysis casts serious doubt on the explosive-growth scenarios embraced by many politicians and commentators.
What’s striking is how mainstream this realism has become. Even Bill Gates, whose philanthropic footprint helped popularize much of the early clean-tech optimism, now says bluntly that the world had “no chance” of hitting its climate targets on the backs of renewables alone. His message is simple: the system is too big, the physics too hard, and the intermittency problem too unforgiving. Wind and solar will grow, but without firm power — nuclear, natural gas with carbon management, next-generation grid technologies — the transition collapses under its own weight. When the world’s most influential climate philanthropist says the story we’ve been sold isn’t technically possible, it should give policymakers pause.
And this is where the British Columbia story becomes astonishing.
It would be one thing if the result was dramatic reductions in emissions. The provincial government remains locked into the CleanBC architecture despite a record of consistently missed targets.
Since the staunchest defenders of CleanBC are not much bothered by the lack of meaningful GHG reductions, a reasonable person is left wondering whether there is some other motivation. Meanwhile, Victoria’s own numbers a couple of years ago projected an annual GDP hit of courtesy CleanBC of roughly $11 billion.
But here is the part that would make any objective analyst blink: when I recently flagged my interest in presenting my research to the CleanBC review panel, I discovered that the “reviewers” were, in fact, two of the key architects of the very program being reviewed. They were effectively asked to judge their own work.
You can imagine what they told us.
What I saw in that room was not an evidence-driven assessment of performance. It was a high-handed, fact-light defence of an ideological commitment. When we presented data showing that doctrinaire renewables-only thinking was failing both the economy and the environment, the reception was dismissive and incurious. It was the opposite of what a serious policy review looks like.
Meanwhile our hydro-based electricity system is facing historic challenges: long term droughts, soaring demand, unanswered questions about how growth will be powered especially in the crucial Northwest BC region, and continuing insistence that providers of reliable and relatively clean natural gas are to be frustrated at every turn.
Elsewhere, the price of change increasingly includes being able to explain how you were going to accomplish the things that you promise.
And yes — in some places it will take time for the tide of energy unreality to recede. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be improving our systems, reducing emissions, and investing in technologies that genuinely work. It simply means we must stop pretending politics can overrule physics.
Europe has learned this lesson the hard way. Global energy companies are reorganizing around a 50-50 world of firm natural gas and renewables — the model many experts have been signalling for years. Even the New York Times now describes this shift with a note of astonishment.
British Columbia, meanwhile, remains committed to its own storyline even as the ground shifts beneath it. This isn’t about who wins the argument — it’s about government staying locked on its most basic duty: safeguarding the incomes and stability of the families who depend on a functioning energy system.
Resource Works News
Energy
Tanker ban politics leading to a reckoning for B.C.
From Resource Works
That a new oil pipeline from Alberta to BC is being aired by Ottawa and pushed by Alberta has, in turn, critics eagerly pushing carefully crafted scare stories.
Take the Green Party’s Elizabeth May, for one: She insists that oil tankers leaving Prince Rupert would be sailing through “Canada’s most dangerous waters and the fourth most dangerous waters in the world.”
First, this “dangerous waters” claim is unsubstantiated, unproven, and hyperbolic. It is apparently based on a line in a 1992 federal guide to marine-weather hazards on the west coast, but it is not credited or supported there.
Second, who says a new oil pipeline would go to Prince Rupert? No destination is specified in the memorandum of understanding published by Ottawa and Alberta.
It speaks of a commitment to “enable the export of bitumen from a strategic deep-water port to Asian markets.”
Energy Minister Tim Hodgson: “There is no route today. Under the MoU, what (Alberta) would need to do is work with the affected jurisdiction, British Columbia, and work with affected First Nations for that project to move forward. That’s what the work plan in the MoU calls for.”
First Nations concerned
Now, the MoU does say that this could include “if necessary” a change to the federal ban on oil tankers in northwest BC waters.
Some First Nations are strongly fighting the idea of oil tankers in northern BC waters citing fears of a catastrophic spill. The Assembly of First Nations (AFN), for example, is calling for the Canada-Alberta pipeline MoU to be scrapped.
“A pipeline to B.C.’s coast is nothing but a pipe dream,” said Chief Donald Edgars of Old Massett Village Council in Haida Gwaii.
And AFN National Chief Cindy Woodhouse Nepinak said: “Canada can create all the MOUs, project offices, advisory groups that they want: the chiefs are united. . . When it comes to approving large national projects on First Nations lands, there will not be getting around rights holders.”
Alberta group interested
But the Metis Settlements of Alberta say they’re interested in purchasing a stake in the proposed pipeline and want to “work with First Nations in British Columbia who oppose the project.”
The Alberta government’s Indigenous loan agency says a new oil pipeline to the BC coast could deliver “significant” returns for Indigenous Peoples.
Alberta Premier Danielle Smith has suggested the pipeline could bring in $2 billion a year in revenue, and that it could be as much as 50 per cent owned by Indigenous groups — who would thus earn $1 billion a year,
“Can you imagine the impact that would have on those communities in British Columbia and in Alberta? It’s extraordinary.”
And we note that in 2019 the First Nations-proposed Eagle Spirit Energy Corridor, which aimed to connect Alberta’s oilpatch to Kitimat, garnered serious interest among Indigenous groups. It had buy-in from 35 First Nations groups along the proposed corridor, with equity-sharing agreements floated with 400 others. (The project died with passage of the tanker ban.)
Vancouver more likely
More recent chatter, including remarks by BC Premier David Eby, would suggest oil from a new pipeline would more likely be through Vancouver, rather than via Prince Rupert or Kitimat BC. And tankers have been carrying oil from the Trans Mountain Pipeline System’s Burnaby terminal since 1956 — with no spills.
Oft cited by northern-port opponents is the major spill of 258,000 barrels of crude oil (more than 40 million litres) from the tanker Exxon Valdez, which ran aground in Alaska’s Prince William Sound in 1989.
The resulting spill killed native and marine wildlife over 2,100 km of coastline. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board found that the spill occurred due to human error. It cited a tired third mate on watch, and noted the captain had an alcohol problem.
But the Exxon Valdez was a single-hull tanker. Its spill led to the phasing out of single-hull tankers, replaced in the ensuing 36 years by new generations of double-hull vessels (with an inner and outer hull separated to contain spills if the outer hull ruptures), new tanker safety rules — and new ways of dealing with the far-fewer spills.
Among those new ways is the Western Canada Marine Response Corporation: “Our mandate is to ensure there is a state of preparedness in place when a marine spill occurs and to mitigate the impacts on B.C.’s coast. This includes the protection of wildlife, economic and environmental sensitivities, and the safety of both responders and the public.”
What about LNG carriers?
At the same time, fear-mongers are actively flogging scare stories on social media.
One opposition group sees future LNG carrier traffic along the southern BC coast as potentially numbering “in the realm of 800+ transits a year.”
Eight hundred a year? BC Ferries runs more than 185,000 a year. And the ferries don’t have tethered tugs helping them to get safely from LNG terminals. And they don’t have BC Coast Pilots on the bridge to keep progress safe. Oil tankers leaving the Port of Vancouver have both.
As marine captain Duncan MacFarlane of LNG Canada in Kitimat says: “LNG carriers are some of the most sophisticated ships in the world…Once loading operations are complete (at LNG Canada), three BC Pilots will join the ship and start navigating up the Douglas Channel, which is approximately 159 nautical miles out to the Prince Rupert pilot station.”
“LNG Canada has partnered with HaiSea Marine, which is a company formed between the Haisla Nation and Vancouver-based SeaSpan, to provide two escort tugs and three harbour-assist tugs to safely move the vessel out of the Douglas Channel…once the vessel drops the pilots at Prince Rupert, it starts a seven- to ten-day voyage to its discharge port. To assist with this, they’ll use satellite navigation, weather routing, and a variety of other technologies to get to their port the safest and most efficient way.”
The same would apply to oil tankers from any northern port in BC.
BC’s tanker-safety record
As the small-c conservative Fraser Institute points out: “Pipelines are 2.5 times safer than rail for oil transportation, and oil tankers have [the] safest record of all.”
And it adds: “The history of oil transport off of Canada’s coasts is one of incredible safety, whether of Canadian or foreign origin, long predating federal Bill C-48’s tanker ban. . . .new pipelines and additional transport of oil from (and along) B.C. coastal waters is likely very low environmental risk. In the meantime, a regular stream of oil tankers and large fuel-capacity ships have been cruising up and down the B.C. coast between Alaska and U.S. west coast ports for decades with great safety records.”
This last refers to the 200-230 tankers a year that now carry crude oil from Alaska through Canadian waters south of Haida Gwaii and then down BC’s Inside Passage or outer coastal waters to Juan de Fuca Strait and Washington refineries.
While these tankers do not transit Hecate Strait (the north end of which is the area of concern about spills from tankers from Prince Rupert or Kitimat) all these US tankers are double-hulled, must report positions, speeds and routes in real-time, must carry certified pilots, must use traffic-separation routes (like traffic lanes), and must slow to 11 knots in sensitive areas.
And as Pipeline Action says: “Canada is not inferior — If Norway can move tankers safely through fjords, if Japan can operate in some of the busiest waterways on Earth, if Alaska balances ecological protection with responsible shipping and if Eastern Canadian ports manage tankers every day, then Canada’s West Coast, with its governance standards, technical capacity and Indigenous partnership potential, can certainly do so.”
Resource Works News
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