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Auditor General: $3.5 Billion in CEBA Loans Went to Ineligible Businesses, Recovery Efforts Lacking.

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The Opposition with Dan Knight

A $3.5 Billion Disaster Exposes Government Negligence, Corporate Greed, and a Total Lack of Accountability

Welcome to the latest edition of “What the Government Doesn’t Want You to Know.” Tonight, we’re talking about Canada’s Canada Emergency Business Account (CEBA) program—a pandemic-era scheme that was supposed to help struggling businesses. Instead, it’s a case study in waste, corruption, and outright negligence.

Here’s what we learned during a bombshell hearing of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (PACP) Wednesday: $3.5 billion in taxpayer money was handed out to ineligible businesses, 92% of the contracts went to one company, Accenture, without any competitive bidding, and there’s virtually no accountability for any of it.

Let’s break it down.


$3.5 Billion Vanishes, and No One Cares

Here’s what we learned from the Auditor General: The Canada Emergency Business Account program—$49 billion handed out to almost a million small businesses during the pandemic—was a mixed bag. On the one hand, they moved fast. Great. But on the other hand, it was a fiscal train wreck in terms of accountability. And let’s be clear: “accountability” is supposed to be their job.

Now, here’s the kicker. We find out that $3.5 billion—yes, billion with a “B”—went to businesses that didn’t even qualify. That’s our money, taxpayer money, handed over to ineligible recipients. What’s their excuse? Well, they were in a rush, they say. Of course, they were. Crises always become the justification for sloppy governance and waste.

Then there’s Export Development Canada—the folks running this show. They outsourced 92% of their contracts for this program to one company, Accenture. No competitive bidding, no oversight, just one big fat sweetheart deal. And get this: Accenture essentially got to write its own terms. They gave themselves the keys to the vault. They even built systems that made EDC dependent on them until 2028. That’s right—they locked themselves in for years, turning a pandemic emergency into a lucrative, long-term cash cow.

What about the Department of Finance and Global Affairs Canada? Were they stepping in, asking tough questions, setting clear limits? Nope. They were nowhere to be found. Total accountability vacuum. And by the way, administrative costs for this program? Over $850 million. Think about that. You can’t make this stuff up.

And when the Auditor General says, “Hey, maybe you should track down that $3.5 billion and recover it,” EDC just shrugs. They “partially agree.” Partially? Imagine if you told the CRA you “partially agree” with paying your taxes. See how that goes.

Here’s the reality: This is what happens when a government prioritizes speed over basic responsibility. They let the fox guard the henhouse, and now they want us to move on and forget about it. But we shouldn’t. This isn’t just bad management—it’s a betrayal of public trust. It’s our money, and they treated it like Monopoly cash.

So, who’s going to be held accountable? Who’s going to pay the price for this colossal mess? The answer, as usual, is probably no one.

Accenture’s Sweetheart Deal

Here’s the part that should really make your blood boil: $342 million worth of CEBA contracts went to consulting giant Accenture. No competitive bidding. No oversight. Nothing. Just a blank check from EDC with your money.

And it gets worse. Accenture didn’t just get the money—they subcontracted work to themselves. That’s right, they paid themselves with your money. And here’s the kicker: EDC is locked into contracts with Accenture until 2028. So, for the next four years, taxpayers will keep paying this consulting giant, all because EDC couldn’t be bothered to shop around or demand accountability.

Lavery’s excuse? “We needed speed and expertise during the pandemic.” Speed doesn’t justify corruption. It doesn’t justify giving one private company complete control over a multi-billion-dollar program. This isn’t just incompetence; it’s a rigged system designed to enrich consultants at the expense of taxpayers.


$853 Million in Administrative Costs

Let’s talk about efficiency—or the lack thereof. The CEBA program cost $853 million to administer. That’s $300 per loan, according to EDC. Lavery called that “reasonable.” Reasonable? For what? Businesses reported that the call center EDC spent $27 million on barely worked. Think about that: $27 million for a call center where you can’t even get someone to pick up the phone.

Conservative MP Brad Vis summed it up perfectly: “For $27 million, you’d expect a call center that actually answers calls.” But instead, Canadians got more of the same—an expensive, inefficient system that’s great for consultants and terrible for everyone else.


Conservatives Demand Accountability for CEBA Mismanagement: ‘A Blank Check for Consultants’

The Conservatives didn’t hold back in yesterday’s hearing, demanding accountability for what they called a blatant misuse of taxpayer dollars. Conservative MP Brad Vis led the charge, grilling EDC President Mairead Lavery on the $3.5 billion in loans that went to ineligible businesses. He didn’t mince words, calling out the government’s failure to put basic safeguards in place. “How did this happen, and what’s being done to recover this money?” Vis asked repeatedly, only to be met with vague assurances that EDC was “working with Finance Canada” on the issue. Translation: Nothing is actually happening.

MP Kelly McCauley took aim at the $342 million handed to Accenture without a single competitive bid. “How can you justify giving 92% of CEBA contracts to one company without opening it up to competition?” he asked, pointing out that Accenture even subcontracted work to itself, effectively turning the program into a taxpayer-funded cash cow for consultants. McCauley wasn’t buying Lavery’s excuses about pandemic urgency, pointing out that this kind of procurement failure wasn’t just a one-time mistake—it was a systemic problem.

John Nater, another Conservative MP, zeroed in on the long-term fallout. He expressed outrage that EDC is locked into a contract with Accenture until 2028, ensuring that taxpayers will continue funding this flawed system for years to come. Nater demanded to know why no one at EDC or in government thought it necessary to implement oversight mechanisms once the initial rollout phase had passed. “This isn’t just about speed. It’s about accountability. Where was the oversight? Where was the plan to safeguard public money?” Nater asked.

The Conservatives’ message was clear: this wasn’t just a case of pandemic-related haste—it was a failure of leadership, oversight, and governance. They demanded consequences for those responsible and reforms to prevent similar disasters in the future. As McCauley aptly put it, “This wasn’t an emergency response. It was a blank check for consultants, and taxpayers are the ones paying the price.”


Liberals Spin CEBA Disaster as a Success: ‘Sweeping It Under the Rug

The Liberal response to this mess was as predictable as it was infuriating: deny, deflect, and downplay. Instead of addressing the core issues—like the $3.5 billion in loans to ineligible businesses or the sweetheart contracts handed to Accenture—Liberal MPs spent their time patting themselves on the back for the program’s “success” and running interference for Export Development Canada (EDC).

Take Francis Drouin, for example. He spent his time emphasizing how quickly the CEBA program got money into the hands of struggling businesses. Sure, the program distributed $49.1 billion, but at what cost? When confronted with the Auditor General’s findings about fraud, waste, and mismanagement, Drouin brushed past the hard questions and pivoted back to the pandemic. It was a textbook move: ignore the billions lost and focus on how hard the government worked. Typical.

Then there was Valerie Bradford, who followed the same script. Instead of demanding answers about why 92% of contracts went to one consulting firm without competitive bidding, she lobbed softball questions that gave EDC President Mairead Lavery the chance to repeat her excuses about “urgency” and “unprecedented circumstances.” Bradford didn’t challenge the inflated administrative costs, the useless $27 million call center, or the lack of oversight. Instead, she chose to frame the discussion as if this was all just the price of doing business in a crisis.

This wasn’t accountability. This was damage control. The Liberals weren’t there to ask hard questions—they were there to protect their narrative. To them, it doesn’t matter that taxpayers got fleeced. It doesn’t matter that consultants got rich while businesses were left waiting for answers. All that matters is spinning this disaster into a success story, no matter how far from the truth that is.

What’s most galling is the arrogance. The Liberals seem to think Canadians should be grateful for a program that wasted billions, enriched corporations, and locked taxpayers into a disastrous contract until 2028. It’s as if they expect a thank-you card for their incompetence.

Here’s the reality: the Liberal response wasn’t about addressing the scandal. It was about sweeping it under the rug. And unless Canadians demand better, this is the kind of governance they’ll keep getting: one where failure is rebranded as success, and no one ever takes responsibility for the consequences.


Final Thoughts

So, what did we learn from this so-called committee meeting? We learned that billions of taxpayer dollars can be wasted, handed out to ineligible businesses, and funneled into the pockets of consultants without anyone in government blinking an eye. We learned that accountability is a foreign concept in Ottawa, where “working on it” is the go-to excuse for incompetence and outright negligence.

Export Development Canada failed. The Department of Finance failed. The Liberals in charge failed. But here’s the kicker—no one will pay for it. Not the bureaucrats who bungled the program, not the consultants who profited from it, and certainly not the politicians who allowed this circus to happen.

Instead, we got a performance. A parade of excuses, vague promises, and shameless spin. The Conservatives tried to hold the government’s feet to the fire, but the Liberals spent their time running cover for the mess they created. And the Bloc and NDP, while occasionally landing a punch, ultimately let the bureaucrats wiggle off the hook. This wasn’t accountability; it was theater.

The CEBA program wasn’t just a failure—it was a lesson in how the system really works. When there’s no oversight, no consequences, and no urgency to fix anything, corruption and incompetence become the norm. Consultants get rich, bureaucrats get a pass, and taxpayers get the bill.

And the people running this committee? They’re part of the problem. They don’t want to fix the system because the system works perfectly for them. It rewards their friends, protects their power, and keeps them unaccountable. This wasn’t a hearing; it was a farce. And unless Canadians demand real change, this won’t be the last time their government lets them down.

So, ask yourself this: How much more are you willing to let them get away with? Because as long as you stay quiet, they’ll keep doing exactly what they did here—wasting your money, spinning their failures, and walking away without a scratch.

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Canada’s future prosperity runs through the northwest coast

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Prince Rupert Port Authority CEO Shaun Stevenson. Photo courtesy Prince Rupert Port Authority

From the Canadian Energy Centre

By Deborah Jaremko

A strategic gateway to the world

Tucked into the north coast of B.C. is the deepest natural harbour in North America and the port with the shortest travel times to Asia.

With growing capacity for exports including agricultural products, lumber, plastic pellets, propane and butane, it’s no wonder the Port of Prince Rupert often comes up as a potential new global gateway for oil from Alberta, said CEO Shaun Stevenson.

Thanks to its location and natural advantages, the port can efficiently move a wide range of commodities, he said.

That could include oil, if not for the federal tanker ban in northern B.C.’s coastal waters.

The Port of Prince Rupert on the north coast of British Columbia. Photo courtesy Prince Rupert Port Authority

“Notwithstanding the moratorium that was put in place, when you look at the attributes of the Port of Prince Rupert, there’s arguably no safer place in Canada to do it,” Stevenson said.

“I think that speaks to the need to build trust and confidence that it can be done safely, with protection of environmental risks. You can’t talk about the economic opportunity before you address safety and environmental protection.”

Safe Transit at Prince Rupert

About a 16-hour drive from Vancouver, the Port of Prince Rupert’s terminals are one to two sailing days closer to Asia than other West Coast ports.

The entrance to the inner harbour is wider than the length of three Canadian football fields.

The water is 35 metres deep — about the height of a 10-storey building — compared to 22 metres at Los Angeles and 16 metres at Seattle.

Shipmasters spend two hours navigating into the port with local pilot guides, compared to four hours at Vancouver and eight at Seattle.

“We’ve got wide open, very simple shipping lanes. It’s not moving through complex navigational channels into the site,” Stevenson said.

A Port on the Rise

The Prince Rupert Port Authority says it has entered a new era of expansion, strengthening Canada’s economic security.

The port estimates it anchors about $60 billion of Canada’s annual global trade today. Even without adding oil exports, Stevenson said that figure could grow to $100 billion.

“We need better access to the huge and growing Asian market,” said Heather Exner-Pirot, director of energy, natural resources and environment at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

“Prince Rupert seems purpose-built for that.”

Roughly $3 billion in new infrastructure is already taking shape, including the $750 million rail-to-container CANXPORT transloading complex for bulk commodities like specialty agricultural products, lumber and plastic pellets.

The Ridley Island Propane Export Terminal, Canada’s first marine propane export terminal, started shipping in May 2019. Photo courtesy AltaGas Ltd.

Canadian Propane Goes Global

A centrepiece of new development is the $1.35-billion Ridley Energy Export Facility — the port’s third propane terminal since 2019.

“Prince Rupert is already emerging as a globally significant gateway for propane exports to Asia,” Exner-Pirot said.

Thanks to shipments from Prince Rupert, Canadian propane – primarily from Alberta – has gone global, no longer confined to U.S. markets.

More than 45 per cent of Canada’s propane exports now reach destinations outside the United States, according to the Canada Energy Regulator.

“Twenty-five per cent of Japan’s propane imports come through Prince Rupert, and just shy of 15 per cent of Korea’s imports. It’s created a lift on every barrel produced in Western Canada,” Stevenson said.

“When we look at natural gas liquids, propane and butane, we think there’s an opportunity for Canada via Prince Rupert becoming the trading benchmark for the Asia-Pacific region.”

That would give Canadian production an enduring competitive advantage when serving key markets in Asia, he said.

Deep Connection to Alberta

The Port of Prince Rupert has been a key export hub for Alberta commodities for more than four decades.

Through the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, the province invested $134 million — roughly half the total cost — to build the Prince Rupert Grain Terminal, which opened in 1985.

The largest grain terminal on the West Coast, it primarily handles wheat, barley, and canola from the prairies.

The Prince Rupert Grain Terminal. Photo courtesy Prince Rupert Port Authority

Today, the connection to Alberta remains strong.

In 2022, $3.8 billion worth of Alberta exports — mainly propane, agricultural products and wood pulp — were shipped through the Port of Prince Rupert, according to the province’s Ministry of Transportation and Economic Corridors.

In 2024, Alberta awarded a $250,000 grant to the Prince Rupert Port Authority to lead discussions on expanding transportation links with the province’s Industrial Heartland region near Edmonton.

Handling Some of the World’s Biggest Vessels

The Port of Prince Rupert could safely handle oil tankers, including Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), Stevenson said.

“We would have the capacity both in water depth and access and egress to the port that could handle Aframax, Suezmax and even VLCCs,” he said.

“We don’t have terminal capacity to handle oil at this point, but there’s certainly terminal capacities within the port complex that could be either expanded or diversified in their capability.”

Market Access Lessons From TMX

Like propane, Canada’s oil exports have gained traction in Asia, thanks to the expanded Trans Mountain pipeline and the Westridge Marine Terminal near Vancouver — about 1,600 kilometres south of Prince Rupert, where there is no oil tanker ban.

The Trans Mountain expansion project included the largest expansion of ocean oil spill response in Canadian history, doubling capacity of the West Coast Marine Response Corporation.

The K.J. Gardner is the largest-ever spill response vessel in Canada. Photo courtesy Western Canada Marine Response Corporation

The Canada Energy Regulator (CER) reports that Canadian oil exports to Asia more than tripled after the expanded pipeline and terminal went into service in May 2024.

As a result, the price for Canadian oil has gone up.

The gap between Western Canadian Select (WCS) and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has narrowed to about $12 per barrel this year, compared to $19 per barrel in 2023, according to GLJ Petroleum Consultants.

Each additional dollar earned per barrel adds about $280 million in annual government royalties and tax revenues, according to economist Peter Tertzakian.

The Road Ahead

There are likely several potential sites for a new West Coast oil terminal, Stevenson said.

“A pipeline is going to find its way to tidewater based upon the safest and most efficient route,” he said.

“The terminal part is relatively straightforward, whether it’s in Prince Rupert or somewhere else.”

Under Canada’s Marine Act, the Port of Prince Rupert’s mandate is to enable trade, Stevenson said.

“If Canada’s trade objectives include moving oil off the West Coast, we’re here to enable it, presuming that the project has a mandate,” he said.

“If we see the basis of a project like this, we would ensure that it’s done to the best possible standard.”

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Ottawa’s gun ‘buyback’ program will cost billions—and for no good reason

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From the Fraser Institute

By Gary Mauser

The government told Cape Bretoners they had two weeks to surrender their firearms to qualify for reimbursement or “buyback.” The pilot project netted a grand total of 22 firearms.

Five years after then-prime minister Justin Trudeau banned more than 100,000 types of so-called “assault-style firearms,” the federal government recently made the first attempt to force Canadians to surrender these firearms.

It didn’t go well.

The police chief in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, volunteered to run a pilot “buyback” project, which began last month. The government told Cape Bretoners they had two weeks to surrender their firearms to qualify for reimbursement or “buyback.” The pilot project netted a grand total of 22 firearms.

This failure should surprise no one. Back in 2018, a survey of “stakeholders” warned the government that firearms owners wouldn’t support such a gun ban. According to Prime Minister Carney’s own Privy Council Office  the “program faces a risk of non-compliance.” And federal Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree was recently recorded admitting that the “buyback” is a partisan maneuver, and if it were up to him, he’d scrap it. What’s surprising is Ottawa’s persistence, particularly given the change in the government and the opportunity to discard ineffective policies.

So what’s really going on here?

One thing is for certain—this program is not, and never has been, about public safety. According to a report from the federal Department of Justice, almost all guns used in crimes in Canada, including in big cities such as Toronto, are possessed illegally by criminals, with many smuggled in from the United States. And according to Ontario’s solicitor general, more than 90 per cent of guns used in crimes in the province are illegally imported from the U.S. Obviously, the “buyback” program will have no effect on these guns possessed illegally by criminals.

Moreover, Canadian firearms owners are exceptionally law-abiding and less likely to commit murder than other Canadians. That also should not be surprising. To own a firearm in Canada, you must obtain a Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL) from the RCMP after initial vetting and daily monitoring for possible criminal activity. Between 2000 and 2020, an average of 12 PAL-holders per year were accused of homicide, out of approximately two million PAL-holders. During that same 10-year period, the PAL-holder firearms homicide rate was 0.63 (per 100,000 PAL-holders) compared to 0.72 (per 100,000 adult Canadians)—that’s 14 per cent higher than the rate for PAL-holders.

In other words, neither the so-called “assault-style firearms” nor their owners pose a threat to the public.

And the government’s own actions belie its claims. If these firearms are such a threat to Canadians, why slow-roll the “buyback” program? If inaction increased the likelihood of criminality by law-abiding firearms owners, why wait five years before launching a pilot program in a small community such as Cape Breton? And why continue to extend the amnesty period for another year, which the government did last month at the same time its pilot project netted a mere 22 firearms?

To ask those questions is to answer them.

Another question—how much will the “buyback” program cost taxpayers?

The government continues to block any attempt to disclose the full financial costs (although the Canadian Taxpayers Federation has launched a lawsuit to try to force the government to honour its Access to Information Act request). But back in 2020 the Trudeau government said it would cost $200 million to compensate firearms owners (although the Parliamentary Budget Officer said compensation costs could reach $756 million). By 2024, the program had spent $67.2 million—remember, that’s before it collected a single gun. The government recently said the program’s administrative costs (safe storage, destruction of hundreds of thousands of firearms, etc.) would reach an estimated $1.8 billion. And according to Carney’s first budget released in November, his government will spend $364 million on the program this fiscal year—at a time of massive federal deficits and debt.

This is reminiscent of the Chretien government’s gun registry fiasco, which wound up costing more than $2 billion even after then-justice minister Allan Rock promised the registry program would “almost break even” after an $85 million initial cost. The Harper government finally scrapped the registry in 2012.

As the Carney government clings to the policies of its predecessor, Canadians should understand the true nature of Ottawa’s gun “buyback” program and its costs.

Gary Mauser

Professor Emeritus, Simon Fraser University
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