From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro

Based on the rhetoric, the Carney government’s first budget was a “transformative” new plan that will meet and overcome the “generational” challenges facing Canada. Of course, in reality this budget is nothing new, and delivers the same approach to fiscal and economic policy that has been tried and failed for the last decade.

First, let’s dispel the idea that the Carney government plans to manage its finances any differently than its predecessor. According to the budget, the Carney government plans to spend more, borrow more, and accumulate more debt than the Trudeau government had planned. Keep in mind, the Trudeau government was known for its recklessly high spending, borrowing and debt accumulation.

While the Carney government has tried to use different rhetoric and a new accounting framework to obscure this continued fiscal mismanagement, it’s also relied on an overused and misleading talking point about Canada’s debt as justification for higher spending and continued deficits. The talking point goes something like, “Canada has the lowest net debt-to-GDP ratio in the G7” and this “strong fiscal position” gives the government the “space” to spend more and run larger deficits.

Technically, the government is correct—Canada’s net debt (total debt minus financial assets) is the lowest among G7 countries (which include France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) when measured as a share of the overall economy (GDP). The latest estimates put Canada’s net debt at 13 per cent of GDP, while net debt in the next lowest country (Germany) is 49 per cent of GDP.

But here’s the problem. This measure assumes Canada can use all of its financial assets to offset debt—which is not the case.

When economists measure Canada’s net debt, they include the assets of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP), which were valued at a combined $890 billion as of mid-2025. But obviously Canada cannot use CPP and QPP assets to pay off government debt without compromising the benefits of current and future pensioners. And we’re one of the only industrialized countries where pension assets are accounted in such a way that it reduces net debt. Simply put, by falsely assuming CPP and QPP assets could pay off debt, Canada appears to have a stronger fiscal position than is actually the case.

A more accurate measure of Canada’s indebtedness is to look at the total level of debt.

Based on the latest estimates, Canada’s total debt (as a share of the economy) ranked 5th-highest among G7 countries at 113 per cent of GDP. That’s higher than the total debt burden in the U.K. (103 per cent) and Germany (64 per cent), and close behind France (117 per cent). And over the last decade Canada’s total debt burden has grown faster than any other G7 country, rising by 25 percentage points. Next closest, France, grew by 17 percentage points. Keep in mind, G7 countries are already among the most indebted, and continue to take on some of the most debt, in the industrialized world.

In other words, looking at Canada’s total debt burden reveals a much weaker fiscal position than the government claims, and one that will likely only get worse under the Carney government.

Prior to the budget, Prime Minister Mark Carney promised Canadians he will “always be straight about the challenges we face and the choices that we must make.” If he wants to keep that promise, his government must stop using a misleading measure of Canada’s indebtedness to justify high spending and persistent deficits.

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute

Grady Munro

Policy Analyst, Fraser Institute

From the Fraser Institute

By Jason Clemens and Jake Fuss

Under the new budget plan, this wedge between what the government collects in revenues versus what is actually spent on programs will rise to 13.0 per cent by 2029/30. Put differently, slightly more than one in every eight dollars sent to Ottawa will be used to pay interest on debt for past spending.

The Carney government’s much-anticipated first budget landed on Nov. 4. There’s been much discussion by pundits and analysts on the increase in the deficit and borrowing, the emphasis on infrastructure spending (broadly defined), and the continued activist approach of Ottawa. There are, however, several critically important aspects of the budget that are consistently being misstated or misinterpreted, which makes it harder for average Canadians to fully appreciate the consequences and costs of the budget.

One issue in need of greater clarity is the cost of Canada’s indebtedness. Like regular Canadians and businesses, the government must pay interest on federal debt. According to the budget plan, total federal debt will reach an expected $2.9 trillion in 2029/30. For reference, total federal debt stood at $1.0 trillion when the Trudeau government took office in 2015. The interest costs on that debt will rise from $53.4 billion last year to an expected $76.1 billion by 2029/30. Several analyses have noted this means federal interest costs will rise from 1.7 per cent of GDP to 2.1 per cent.

These are all worrying statistics about the indebtedness of the federal government. However, they ignore a key statistic—interest costs as a share of revenues. When the Trudeau government took office, interest costs consumed 7.5 per cent of revenues. This means taxpayers were foregoing 7.5 per cent of the resources they sent to Ottawa (in terms of spending on actual programs) because these monies were used to pay interest on debt accumulated from previous spending.

Under the new budget plan, this wedge between what the government collects in revenues versus what is actually spent on programs will rise to 13.0 per cent by 2029/30. Put differently, slightly more than one in every eight dollars sent to Ottawa will be used to pay interest on debt for past spending. This is one way governments get into financial problems, even crises, by continually increasing the share of revenues consumed by interest payments.

A second and fairly consistently misrepresented aspect of the budget pertains to large spending initiatives such as Build Canada Homes and Build Communities Strong Fund. The former is meant to increase the number of new homes, particularly affordable homes, being built annually and the latter is intended to provide funding to provincial governments (and through them, municipalities) for infrastructure spending. But few analysts question whether or not these programs will produce actual new spending for homebuilding or simply replace or “crowd-out” existing spending by the private sector.

Let’s first explore the homebuilding initiative. At any point in time, there are a limited number of skilled workers, raw materials, land, etc. available for homebuilding. When the federal government, or any government, initiates its own homebuilding program, it directly competes with private companies for that skilled labour (carpenters, electricians, etc.), raw materials (timber, concrete, etc.) and the land needed for development. Put simply, government homebuilding crowds out private-sector activity.

Moreover, there’s a strong argument that the crowding out by government results in less homebuilding than would otherwise be the case, because the incentives for private-sector homebuilding are dramatically different than government incentives. For example, private firms risk their own wealth and wellbeing (and the wellbeing of their employees) so they have very strong incentives to deliver homes demanded by people on time and at a reasonable price. Government bureaucrats and politicians, on the other hand, face no such incentives. They pay no price, in terms of personal wealth or wellbeing if homes, are late, not what consumers demand, or even produce less than expected. Put simply, homebuilding by Ottawa could easily result in less homes being built than if government had stayed out of the way of entrepreneurs, businessowners and developers.

Similarly, it’s debatable that infrastructure spending by Ottawa—specifically, providing funds to the provinces and municipalities—results in an actual increase in total infrastructure spending. There are numerous historical examples, including reports by the auditor general, detailing how similar infrastructure spending initiatives by the federal government were plagued by mismanagement. And in many circumstances, the provinces simply reduced their own infrastructure spending to save money, such that the actual incremental increase in overall infrastructure spending was negligible.

In reality, some of the major and large spending initiatives announced or expanded in the Carney government’s first budget, which will accelerate the deterioration of federal finances, may not deliver anything close to what the government suggests. Canadians should understand the real risks and challenges in these federal spending initiatives, along with the debt being accumulated, and the limited potential benefits.

Jason Clemens

Executive Vice President, Fraser Institute

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute