Energy
Why are Western Canadian oil prices so strong?
By Rory Johnston for Inside Policy
While Canadian crude markets are as optimistic as they’ve been in months regarding US tariffs, the industry is still far from safe.
Western Canadian heavy crude oil prices are remarkably strong at the moment, providing a welcome uplift to the Canadian economy at a time of acute macroeconomic uncertainty. The price of Western Canadian Select (WCS) crude recently traded at less than $10/bbl (barrel) under US Benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI): a remarkably narrow differential (i.e., “discount”) for the Canadian barrel, which more commonly sits around $13/bbl but has at moments of crisis blown out to as much as $50/bbl.
Stronger prices mean greater profits for Canadian oil producers and, in turn, both higher royalty and income tax revenues for Canadian governments as well as more secure employment for the tens of thousands of Canadians employed across the industry. For example, a $1/bbl move in the WCS-WTI differential drives an estimated $740 million swing in Alberta government budget revenues.
Why are Canadian oil prices so strong today? It’s due to the perfect storm of three distinct yet beneficial conditions:
- Newly sufficient pipeline capacity following last summer’s start-up of the Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline, which eliminated – albeit temporarily – the effect of egress constraint-driven discounting of Western Canadian crude;
- Globally, the bolstered value of heavy crudes relative to lighter grades – driven by production cuts, shipping activity, sanctions, and other market forces – has benefited the fundamental backdrop against which Canadian heavy crude is priced; and
- The near elimination of tariff-related discounting as threat of US tariffs has diminished, after weighing on the WCS differential to the tune of $4–$5/bbl between late-January through early March.
We break down each of these factors below.
A quick primer: differentials, decomposed
Before we dive in, let’s quickly review how Canadian crude pricing works. WCS crude is Canada’s primary export grade and is virtually always priced at a discount to WTI, the US benchmark for oil prices, for two structural reasons outlined below. More accurately referred to as the differential (in theory, the price difference could go both ways), this price difference is a fact of life for Canadian crude producers and sits between $11–$15/bbl in “normal” times. Over the past decade, WCS has only sported a sub-$10/bbl differential less than 10 per cent of the time and most such instances reflected unique market conditions, like the Alberta government’s late-2018 production curtailment and the depths of COVID in early 2020.
The structurally lower value of WCS relative to WTI is driven by two main structural factors: quality and geography.
First and very simply, WCS is extremely heavy oil – diluted bitumen, to be specific – in contrast to WTI, which is a light crude oil blend. Furthermore, WCS has a high sulphur content (“sour,” in industry parlance) compared to the virtually sulphur-free WTI (“sweet”). WCS crude requires specialized equipment to be effectively processed into larger shares of higher-value transportation fuels like diesel as well as the remove the sulphur, which is environmentally damaging (see: acid rain)l; so, WCS is “discounted” to reflect the cost of that additional refining effort. Quality-related discounting typically amounts to $5-$8/bbl and can be seen in its pure form in the price of a barrel of WCS is Houston, Texas, where it enjoys easy market access.
Second, Western Canadian oil reserves are landlocked and an immense distance from most major refining centers. Unlike most global oil producers that get their crude to market via tanker, virtually all Canadian crude gets to end markets via pipeline. So, this higher cost of transportation away from where the crude is produced (aka “egress”) represents the second “discount” borne by the relative price of Canadian crude, required to keep it competitive with alternative feedstocks. Transportation-related discounting typically amounts to $7-$10/bbl and can be seen in the difference between the price of a barrel of WCS in the main hub of Hardisty, Alberta and the same barrel in Houston, Texas.
Moreover, transportation-related discounting is worse when pipeline capacity is insufficient, which has so frequently been the case over the past decade and a half. When there isn’t enough pipeline space to go around, barrels are forced to use more expensive alternatives like rail and that adds at least another $5/bbl to the required industry-wide pricing discounting – because prices are always set at the margin, or in other words by the weakest barrel. In especially acute egress scarcity, the geographic-driven portion of the differential can blow out, as we saw in late-2018 when the differential rose to more than $50/bbl before the Alberta government forcibly curtailed provincial production to reduce that overhang.
Additionally, the election of US President Donald Trump – and, specifically, the threat of US tariffs on Canadian exports – has introduced a third factor in the differential calculation. Over the past few months, shifts in the WCS differential have also been reflecting the market’s combined handicapping of (i) the probability of tariffs hitting Canadian crude and (ii) the rough share of the tariff burden borne by Canadian exporters.
All three of these factors – global quality, egress availability, and market anticipation of tariff US risk – have shifted decisively and strongly in favour of WCS over the recent weeks and months.
More pipelines, fewer problems
The first reason that Canadian oil prices are remarkably strong at the moment is sufficient pipeline capacity. The perennial bugbear of Western Canadian oil producers, pipeline capacity is, quite unusually, sufficient thanks to last summer’s start-up of the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (TMX). TMX is the largest single addition to Western Canadian egress capacity in more than a decade and, since TMX entered service last summer, the transportation-related differential has remained low and stable, eliminating the largest and most common drag on Canadian crude pricing.
Without TMX, the Western Canadian oil industry would be suffering an all too familiar and increasingly acute egress crisis. Acute egress shortages would have dwarfed the threat of US tariffs and pushing differentials, in stark contrast to today, far wider – the spectre of provincial production curtailment would not have been out of the question. And it is also important to note that this pipeline sufficiency is inherently temporary. Current pipeline sufficiency will likely only last another year or two at most and then Western Canadian egress will require additional expansions to avoid the resurrecting of egress-scarcity-driven differential blowouts.
Heavy is the crude that wears the crown
The second reason that Canadian oil prices are remarkably strong now is the unusually strong global market for heavy crude. Heavy crude grades (e.g., Iraqi Basra Heavy and Mexican Maya), medium crude grades (e.g., Dubai and Mars), and high sulphur fuel oil (used in global shipping) have all seen their value rise relative to Brent and WTI benchmarks, which both reflect lighter, sweet grades of crude.
For WCS, the differential has narrowed from more than $10/bbl at the end of 2023 to around $2.8/bbl under WTI. The bolstered value of heavy crudes relative to lighter grades is being driven by a host of factors including ongoing OPEC+ production cuts (much of which came in the form of heavier crude grades), strong shipping activity, and tighter sanctions against traditional suppliers of heavy shipping fuel like Russia and more recently Venezuela.
What tariff threat?
Finally, the most acute and volatile reason that Canadian oil prices are remarkably strong at the moment is the near elimination of US tariff-related discounting. The US imports more than half of its total foreign oil purchases from Canada and Canadian crude has long enjoyed tariff-free access to the US market. Tariff-related pricing pressure began in earnest in late-2024 as Canadian crude markets tried to build in an ever-evolving handicapping of that tariff risk following Trump’s initial tariff threats. Tariff-related discounting grew stronger from mid-January through February with the excess geographic WCS differential rising to nearly $5/bbl (see chart above and read “Canadian Crude Drops Tariff Discount” for more on the logic of this measure).
After a months-long rollercoaster of “will he/won’t he” uncertainty around the imposition of US tariffs on Canadian crude imports, USMCA-compliant exemptions and broader US official chatter regarding potential outright Canadian crude exemptions have allowed markets to reduce the (roughly) implied probability to effectively zero. This factor alone narrowed the headline WCS differential in Hardisty, Aberta, by $3–$4/bbl over the past month.
Conclusion
Canadian oil prices are so strong today because just about everything that can be going right is going right. WCS differentials are benefitting from a perfect storm of (i) unusually sufficient pipeline capacity, (ii) exceptionally strong global heavy crude markets, and (iii) a near elimination of US tariff-related discounting. Together, these factors are lifting the relative value of Canadian crude oil exports, and this is a boon for Canadian oil industry profits, provincial royalty income, income tax receipts, and employment in the sector.
Looking ahead, WCS differentials may narrow by another dollar or two as this beneficial momentum persists. However, the balance of risk is now tilted towards a reversal (i.e., widening) of differentials over the coming year as OPEC+ begins to ease production cuts and Western Canadian production continues to grow without the hope of any new near-term pipeline additions. While Canadian crude markets are as optimistic as they’ve been in months regarding US tariffs, the industry is still far from safe – given the volatility of policy coming out of the White House, there is still a chance that this near-erasure of tariff risk from Canadian crude pricing may have come too far, too fast.
If and as tariff concerns fall away, egress sufficiency (i.e., pipeline capacity) will resume its place as king of the differential determinants. At the current rates of Western Canadian production growth, Canada is set to again overrun egress capacity – after the relief provided by the start-up of TMX – over the next year or two at most. While Canada may have dodged a near-term bullet to crude exports destined for the US, this situation serves to only emphasize the continued challenges associated with current pipeline infrastructure. It would be prudent for Canadian politicians to begin shifting their current concerns towards the structural, and entirely predictable, threat of renewed egress insufficiently coming down the pipe.
About the author
Rory Johnston is a leading voice on oil market analysis, advising institutional investors, global policy makers, and corporate decision makers. His views are regularly quoted in major international media. Prior to founding Commodity Context, Johnston led commodity economics research at Scotiabank where he set the bank’s energy and metals price forecasts, advised the bank’s executives and clients, and sat on the bank’s senior credit committee for commodity-exposed sectors.
Alberta
Alberta Premier Danielle Smith Discusses Moving Energy Forward at the Global Energy Show in Calgary
From Energy Now
At the energy conference in Calgary, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith pressed the case for building infrastructure to move provincial products to international markets, via a transportation and energy corridor to British Columbia.
“The anchor tenant for this corridor must be a 42-inch pipeline, moving one million incremental barrels of oil to those global markets. And we can’t stop there,” she told the audience.
The premier reiterated her support for new pipelines north to Grays Bay in Nunavut, east to Churchill, Man., and potentially a new version of Energy East.
The discussion comes as Prime Minister Mark Carney and his government are assembling a list of major projects of national interest to fast-track for approval.
Carney has also pledged to establish a major project review office that would issue decisions within two years, instead of five.
Alberta
Punishing Alberta Oil Production: The Divisive Effect of Policies For Carney’s “Decarbonized Oil”
From Energy Now
By Ron Wallace
The federal government has doubled down on its commitment to “responsibly produced oil and gas”. These terms are apparently carefully crafted to maintain federal policies for Net Zero. These policies include a Canadian emissions cap, tanker bans and a clean electricity mandate.
Following meetings in Saskatoon in early June between Prime Minister Mark Carney and Canadian provincial and territorial leaders, the federal government expressed renewed interest in the completion of new oil pipelines to reduce reliance on oil exports to the USA while providing better access to foreign markets. However Carney, while suggesting that there is “real potential” for such projects nonetheless qualified that support as being limited to projects that would “decarbonize” Canadian oil, apparently those that would employ carbon capture technologies. While the meeting did not result in a final list of potential projects, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith said that this approach would constitute a “grand bargain” whereby new pipelines to increase oil exports could help fund decarbonization efforts. But is that true and what are the implications for the Albertan and Canadian economies?
The federal government has doubled down on its commitment to “responsibly produced oil and gas”. These terms are apparently carefully crafted to maintain federal policies for Net Zero. These policies include a Canadian emissions cap, tanker bans and a clean electricity mandate. Many would consider that Canadians, especially Albertans, should be wary of these largely undefined announcements in which Ottawa proposes solely to determine projects that are “in the national interest.”
The federal government has tabled legislation designed to address these challenges with Bill C-5: An Act to enact the Free Trade and Labour Mobility Act and the Building Canada Act (the One Canadian Economy Act). Rather than replacing controversial, and challenged, legislation like the Impact Assessment Act, the Carney government proposes to add more legislation designed to accelerate and streamline regulatory approvals for energy and infrastructure projects. However, only those projects that Ottawa designates as being in the national interest would be approved. While clearer, shorter regulatory timelines and the restoration of the Major Projects Office are also proposed, Bill C-5 is to be superimposed over a crippling regulatory base.
It remains to be seen if this attempt will restore a much-diminished Canadian Can-Do spirit for economic development by encouraging much-needed, indeed essential interprovincial teamwork across shared jurisdictions. While the Act’s proposed single approval process could provide for expedited review timelines, a complex web of regulatory processes will remain in place requiring much enhanced interagency and interprovincial coordination. Given Canada’s much-diminished record for regulatory and policy clarity will this legislation be enough to persuade the corporate and international capital community to consider Canada as a prime investment destination?
As with all complex matters the devil always lurks in the details. Notably, these federal initiatives arrive at a time when the Carney government is facing ever-more pressing geopolitical, energy security and economic concerns. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development predicts that Canada’s economy will grow by a dismal one per cent in 2025 and 1.1 per cent in 2026 – this at a time when the global economy is predicted to grow by 2.9 per cent.
It should come as no surprise that Carney’s recent musing about the “real potential” for decarbonized oil pipelines have sparked debate. The undefined term “decarbonized”, is clearly aimed directly at western Canadian oil production as part of Ottawa’s broader strategy to achieve national emissions commitments using costly carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects whose economic viability at scale has been questioned. What might this mean for western Canadian oil producers?
The Alberta Oil sands presently account for about 58% of Canada’s total oil output. Data from December 2023 show Alberta producing a record 4.53 million barrels per day (MMb/d) as major oil export pipelines including Trans Mountain, Keystone and the Enbridge Mainline operate at high levels of capacity. Meanwhile, in 2023 eastern Canada imported on average about 490,000 barrels of crude oil per day (bpd) at a cost estimated at CAD $19.5 billion. These seaborne shipments to major refineries (like New Brunswick’s Irving Refinery in Saint John) rely on imported oil by tanker with crude oil deliveries to New Brunswick averaging around 263,000 barrels per day. In 2023 the estimated total cost to Canada for imported crude oil was $19.5 billion with oil imports arriving from the United States (72.4%), Nigeria (12.9%), and Saudi Arabia (10.7%). Since 1988, marine terminals along the St. Lawrence have seen imports of foreign oil valued at more than $228 billion while the Irving Oil refinery imported $136 billion from 1988 to 2020.
What are the policy and cost implication of Carney’s call for the “decarbonization” of western Canadian produced, oil? It implies that western Canadian “decarbonized” oil would have to be produced and transported to competitive world markets under a material regulatory and financial burden. Meanwhile, eastern Canadian refiners would be allowed to import oil from the USA and offshore jurisdictions free from any comparable regulatory burdens. This policy would penalize, and makes less competitive, Canadian producers while rewarding offshore sources. A federal regulatory requirement to decarbonize western Canadian crude oil production without imposing similar restrictions on imported oil would render the One Canadian Economy Act moot and create two market realities in Canada – one that favours imports and that discourages, or at very least threatens the competitiveness of, Canadian oil export production.
Ron Wallace is a former Member of the National Energy Board.
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