Crime
What did Canada Ever Do to Draw Trump Tariff on Immigration, You Ask? Plenty
By Todd Bensman as published by The Daily Wire
Much US national security and public safety damage from: an historic Canadian legal immigrant importation program and making Mexican travel visa-free.
President-elect Donald Trump bloodied Mexico and Canada with diplomatic buckshot this week by writing that, on his first day in office, he’ll levy devastating 25-percent trade tariffs on those two U.S. neighbors if they fail to crack down on illegal immigration and drug trafficking.
Much public puzzlement has filled international media coverage over why Trump would single out Canada for punishment equal to that of the far guiltier Mexico.
“To compare us to Mexico is the most insulting thing I’ve ever heard from our friends and closest allies, the United States of America,” Ontario Premier Doug Ford said. “I found his comments unfair. I found them insulting. It’s like a family member stabbing you right in the heart.”
“We shouldn’t confuse the Mexican border with the Canadian border,” Canadian Industry Minister Francois-Philippe Champagne said.
But this narrative seems intended to deflect public acknowledgement of what the liberal progressive government of Justin Trudeau did do to draw Trump’s tariff ire. In terms of immigration policy, the Canadian offenses are indeed much different from Mexico’s opened super-highway mass migration wave-throughs during the Biden-Harris years. But what Canada has done, arguably, damaged U.S. national security and public safety interests in harmful ways that media outlets on both sides rarely report.
Canada’s massive legal immigration program as a U.S. national security threat

Much of the damage arises from an historic Canadian legal immigrant importation program of unprecedented scope. Since the program’s 2021 implementation, the Great White North has imported some 1.5 million foreign national workers (400,000+ per year for the nation of 38 million) from dozens of developing nations and hundreds of thousands more foreign students in just 2023 – the third record-breaking year of those.
Why are those programs a U.S. problem? Because a spiking number of foreign nationals are apparently abusing the Canadian programs as a Lilly pad from which to illegally enter the United States between northern border land ports of entry, among them proven threats to U.S. national security and public safety.
Why this traffic leaking into the United States is a problem – even though the total numbers illegally entering from Canada are small relative to those crossing from Mexico – arises from the fact that many hail from Muslim-majority nations and have, Canadian media reports, fueled a spate of terrorism and anti-Semitic attacks throughout Canada. As well, far too many of the Mexicans Canada has allowed in turned out to be cartel drug traffickers and killers.
Those kinds of criminals are crossing the U.S. northern border in increasing numbers due to Canadian policies that Canada could address if it wanted to.
Consider that U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions in the brush between U.S.-Canada land ports of entry jumped from 2,238 in FY2022 to 23,721 in FY2024, neatly coinciding with Trudeau’s mass legal immigration programs.
Among those crossing in illegally from Canada, for instance, were 15,827 Indian nationals in FY 2023 and 2024, 8,367 Mexicans, and 3,833 from unspecified countries listed only as “Other” on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s public statistics website.
A border-crossing terror plot foiled
Concern on both sides of the U.S.-Canada line has simmered for some years as Canadians saw the newcomers carry out terror plots, actual attacks, and probably some of the record-breaking nearly 6,000 antisemitic incidents Canada logged since the Israel-Hamas war broke out.
What’s been happening in Canada was obvious to many.
“Canada has become a hotbed of radicalization, fanaticism, and jihadism,” wrote Casey Babb, Senior Fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Newsweek shortly after the arrest. “As un-Canadian as it sounds, Canada has a terrorism crisis on its hands and that should worry the United States for a whole host of reasons.”
Concern would reach an apogee in October 2024, when a joint U.S.-Canadian counterterrorism operation thwarted a plot by a Pakistani student on a Canadian visa to illegally cross the northern border to conduct an October 2024 massacre of Jews in New York.
Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, a 20-year-old Pakistani citizen legally issued a Canadian student visa in June 2023, now stands accused in U.S. federal court of plotting an illegal-smuggler-assisted northern border crossing to carry out a mass shooting of Jews in New York City to celebrate with blood the October 7 anniversary of the Hamas massacre in Israel. Khan hoped it would go down in history as “the largest U.S. attack since 9/11”.
“We are going to nyc (sic) to slaughter them” with AR-style rifles and hunting knives “so we can slit their throats,” Khan told an undercover FBI agent he believed to be a co-conspirator, according to an agent complaint. “Even if we don’t attack an event we could rack up easily a lot of Jews.”
His was among the record-breaking 400,000 foreign student visas Canada issued in 2023.
That alarming new terrorism prosecution in New York State should have been enough to renew Trump’s interest in turning diplomatic pressure onto Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau’s mass legal immigration policies and border security on its side.
But terrorists cannot be the only concern.
Mexican cartel killers and traffickers in Canada crossing too
The incoming Trump administration 2.0 will need to force resolution of another issue of U.S. public safety concern dating to an especially damaging 2016 Trudeau move that went unaddressed until only recently. Trudeau rescinded 2009 visa requirements on Mexican citizens and against the advice of his own government that Mexican criminals would abuse the policy to fly in at will and bedevil Canadian cities and northern American ones too.
That’s just what was happening again by early 2017. A sustained surge was underway of Mexican nationals who, unable to easily cross the southern border under Trump 1.0, were flying over the United States into Canada. They would claim Canadian asylum, then cross southward over the less tended northern U.S. border.
Among them were the predictable – and predicted – Mexican cartel operatives.
Leaked Canada Border Services Agency intelligence reports said Mexican “drug smugglers, human smugglers, recruiters, money launders and foot soldiers” were turning up in greater numbers than ever before. The cartels went to work building human smuggling networks to move other Mexicans south over the American border, just as they did all along the southern border.
In July 2017, Global News quoted published the intelligence reports saying the ultra-violent Sinaloa cartel had turned up in Canada to “facilitate travel to Canada by Mexicans with criminal records.” Others identified included La Familia Michoacana, Jalisco New Generation, and Los Zetas.
For instance, whereas the reports said 37 Mexicans linked to organized criminal groups had entered between 2012 and 2015, 65 involved in “serious crimes” were identified midway through just 2017, compared to 28 in 2015. By May 2019, at least 400 Mexican criminals connected to drug trafficking, including sicario hitmen, were plying their trades in Canada, at least half of them in Quebec, according to a May 24, 2019, report in the Toronto Sun and other Canadian media outlets.
All had entered through the Trudeau visa loophole for Mexicans.
By the end of 2019, Canada saw a 1,400 percent spike in the number of bogus Mexican refugee claims, the vast majority naturally rejected, and of associated detentions.
Canada finally about to face the music
Only in February 2024 did the Americans pressure the Canadians finally begin to roll back some – but not all — of its visa-free Mexicans policy, because the influx had clogged Canada’s asylum system with too many bogus claims and also sent too many Mexicans illegally over the U.S. border, which presented a politically terrible look as the 2024 presidential election campaign got underway. Now, only Mexicans who already hold a US visa or old Canadian one can travel visa-free, while most other Mexicans with neither will have to apply for a Canadian one.
But the damage that must be managed today is by now well baked into the cake.
From January to mid-October 2022, for instance, 7,698 Mexican asylum seekers took direct flights from Mexico City to Montreal, according to a November 2022 Canadian Press story. The paper quoted officials at nonprofit refugee assistance groups attesting that most fly to Canada because they found out Trudeau’s visa-free policy also got them government financial assistance while awaiting their mostly denied asylum applications.
In their October 2021 book, The Wolfpack: The Millennial Mobsters Who Brought Chaos and the Cartels to the Canadian Underworld, journalists Peter Edwards and Luis Najera established that the Sinaloa Cartel now has a foothold across eastern Canada, with “solid control of cocaine shipments in and out of Canada.” The Arellano Felix group has its foothold in Vancouver and in the state of Alberta.
The Zetas are in Canada “involved with temporary migrant workers”.
Asked in 2023 if Canada’s importance to Mexican organized crime had increased “in recent years,” co-author Luis Najera answered: “I would say it has increased since criminal cells moved up north to settle and expand operations here. It is also strategic to have groups operating north of the U.S. border, close to key places such as Chicago and New York, and without the scrutiny of the DEA and rival groups.”
Canada is not Mexico but its policies pose consequences for the United States. Any normal U.S. administration would put Canada on the hook for adjusting its policies and more robustly guarding its supposedly treasured neighboring ally, the United States, from harm. If punishing trade tariffs finally focus Canada’s attention on those policy-driven harms, let them last until Canada fixes what it recklessly broke.
Crime
U.S. seizes Cuba-bound ship with illicit Iranian oil history
President Trump revealed Wednesday afternoon that U.S. authorities intercepted a Cuba-bound oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast, a dramatic move aimed at tightening the squeeze on illicit oil networks operating throughout the region. Speaking to reporters at the White House, Trump described the vessel as “a very large tanker — the largest one ever seized in action,” hinting that more developments are coming. He declined to get into specifics, saying only that the operation happened “for a very good reason.” When asked about the tanker’s crude, Trump didn’t overcomplicate it. “Well, we keep it, I guess,” he said.
According to a U.S. official familiar with the operation, the seizure was executed by the Coast Guard with support from the U.S. Navy after a federal judge green-lit the warrant roughly two weeks ago. Another official told the New York Times the ship — identified as the Skipper — had been sailing under a falsified flag and has a documented history of trafficking illicit Iranian oil. The vessel, although carrying Venezuelan crude at the time, was seized because of those Iranian smuggling ties, not because of any direct connection to Nicolás Maduro’s regime.
Today, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security Investigations, and the United States Coast Guard, with support from the Department of War, executed a seizure warrant for a crude oil tanker used to transport sanctioned oil from Venezuela and Iran. For multiple… pic.twitter.com/dNr0oAGl5x
— Attorney General Pamela Bondi (@AGPamBondi) December 10, 2025
Vanguard, a UK-based maritime risk firm, confirmed Wednesday that the Skipper fits the profile of a tanker previously sanctioned by the United States for operating under the alias Adisa while moving banned Iranian oil. A source speaking to Politico said the ship was on its way to Cuba, where state-run Cubametales intended to flip the cargo to Asian brokers — an increasingly common workaround as U.S. sanctions isolate both Havana and Caracas from traditional buyers. With most Venezuelan product now flowing to China under the sanctions regime, oil traders began recalibrating almost immediately after the news broke. Prices ticked upward modestly as markets waited to learn whether any Venezuelan crude was on board and how much would be effectively taken off the table.
Maduro, for his part, avoided directly mentioning the seizure during a speech later Wednesday, instead railing against the United States and claiming Venezuela’s military stands ready “to break the teeth of the North American empire, if necessary.” His bluster did little to obscure the reality: the Trump administration just disrupted yet another shadowy oil operation linking Caracas, Havana, and Tehran — and sent a clear signal that these networks will be confronted, tanker by tanker.
Crime
Inside the Fortified Sinaloa-Linked Compound Canada Still Can’t Seize After 12 Years of Legal War
Exclusive analysis shows how a fortified Surrey mansion tied in court filings to the Sinaloa Cartel’s leader has become the core of a stalled civil forfeiture fight, exposing Canada’s weak laws.
A British Columbia government lawsuit seeks to merge almost a decade of litigation into a single, high-stakes test of whether the province can finally seize a fortified mansion near the U.S. border that was first swept up in a 2014 fentanyl investigation, raided in 2016, and is now at the center of a new synthetic-opioid case alleging its occupants contracted with the leader of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel to flood narcotics into Canada.
In a notice of application filed in November 2025, the Director of Civil Forfeiture argues that all of the files revolve around one owner — James Sydney Sclater — and his flagship property on 77th Avenue, a multi-million-dollar house about twenty minutes’ drive from the Peace Arch crossing.
The property became newly notorious this spring when the latest effort to seize it pulled back the curtain on a 2024 RCMP raid. Officers say they entered a mansion ringed by compound fencing, steel gates and razor wire, wired with Chinese-made Hikvision surveillance cameras and hardened doors.
Inside, they reported finding hidden compartments in bedrooms and a basement bathroom packed with counterfeit pills and kilograms of raw synthetic opioids — including fentanyl — while assault-style rifles with screw-on suppressors, thousands of bullets and other firearms and body armour were stored in ways that suggested the residents were prepared for urban warfare. Investigators later alleged the targets had “connections to virtually every criminal gang in British Columbia.”
They also seized travel documents, including Mexican visas, before tracing the operation to alleged negotiations with Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García, the reputed head of the Sinaloa Cartel, which Ottawa has now listed as a terrorist entity.
But for Canadian anti-mafia units, the address tracks the history of fentanyl’s deadly sweep across British Columbia, among the hardest-hit opioid death zones in North America. Their interest in the Surrey mansion stretches back to the first wave of lethal fentanyl trafficking that surged from Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside to Victoria and Vancouver Island around 2013 — making this single property a through-line in the North American opioid crisis, one that now runs through senior offices in Washington, Mexico City, Beijing and Ottawa.
Behind the hundreds of pages of civil filings reviewed by The Bureau lies a failure of governance as urgent as the unchecked advance of Latin cartels into Canadian cities — and as lethal as the synthetic opioids tied to the Surrey home.
British Columbia has been chasing the same house, and the same alleged transnational traffickers, through raids, affidavits and Charter of Rights battles since before fentanyl became a household word — and still has not managed to take the keys away.
The case documents explicitly point to a criminal-defence-friendly Supreme Court of Canada ruling — Stinchcombe, notoriously cited by police leaders — and to its role in undermining numerous major prosecutions involving networks tied to alleged narcoterror suspect Ryan Wedding and modern Canadian fentanyl-lab operators. One of those networks is the Wolfpack, a hybrid of Mexican cartels, Middle Eastern threat networks and biker gangs said to be supplied by Chinese Communist Party–linked criminal organizations and other Latin American cartel interests.
For the Director, the newest chapter begins in earnest with an RCMP raid on September 23, 2024. By then, investigators say, the Surrey mansion was no longer a domestic drug base, but the Canadian end of a supply line reaching into Sinaloa itself. Notably, 38 days later, on October 31, the RCMP announced a separate raid on what U.S. sources describe as the largest fentanyl lab ever discovered in the world, in rugged Falkland, B.C., roughly halfway between Vancouver and Calgary.
“The combined fentanyl and precursors seized at this facility could have amounted to over 95,500,000 potentially lethal doses of fentanyl, which have been prevented from entering our communities, or exported abroad,” the Mounties said.
But Sinaloa does not appear out of nowhere in the Surrey compound. The older case that the Director now wants consolidated onto the same track reaches back to a different phase of the crisis — and sketches an earlier incarnation of the Surrey house as a node in a Lower Mainland fentanyl network.
According to a 2019 notice of civil claim filed in the Victoria registry, the RCMP’s Project E-Probang began in November 2014, targeting a chemical narcotics distribution network that operated across the Lower Mainland and Vancouver Island. At the centre of that probe, police say, was Nicholas Lucier and his associates. The Director alleges that Sclater supplied Lucier’s network with controlled substances, while his father-in-law Gary Van Buuren lived with him at the 77th Avenue property and “assisted him in trafficking of controlled substances.”
The narrative that follows reads like a blueprint for mid-2010s fentanyl tradecraft. In October 2016, Lucier associate Yevgeniy Nagornyy-Kryvonos allegedly drove to the Surrey mansion to receive fentanyl from Sclater. Two days later, Nagornyy-Kryvonos met Daemon Gariepy; Gariepy was arrested shortly after that meeting, with one kilogram of fentanyl in his possession. On November 6, 2016, Sclater and Van Buuren visited the Surrey home of another associate, Azam Abdul. Van Buuren was picked up soon afterwards, allegedly carrying a kilogram of methamphetamine, a kilogram of fentanyl and two cellphones.
That same day, RCMP officers moved in on 16767 77th Avenue with a warrant. Inside, according to the pleadings, they found the kind of infrastructure that exists to supply major drug lines: long guns and improvised weapons scattered through the house, from conventional shotguns and rifles to a deactivated grenade, brass knuckles and a small armoury of knives, batons and throwing stars. There was a money counter parked near vacuum-sealing equipment; shelves of drug-packaging and currency-bundling materials; a body armour vest; and a banknote stash of roughly $20,000 in twenties, bundled with elastic bands and tucked into vacuum-sealed bags.
Fentanyl-containing pills and scoresheets documenting transactions sat alongside a multi-monitor surveillance system and a wiretap-detection kit. In a separate corner, tax records in Sclater’s name showed his declared income stepping down from more than $77,000 in 2010 to just over $11,000 by 2014 — data points that undermined his ability to carry mortgages on two Surrey properties.
The days that followed widened the picture.
A search at Abdul’s residence turned up scales, fentanyl and the tools of drug production and processing. Raids at Lucier’s home and two rentals he allegedly used produced what the Director describes as a haul worth a serious cartel’s attention: weapons and ammunition, more than $2-million in cash, and “thousands of grams” of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, a heroin-fentanyl mixture, fentanyl “oxy” tablets and MDMA, along with the scoresheets and processing gear that underpin a wholesale operation.
On Vancouver Island, an arrest search of Lucier allegedly produced tens of thousands of dollars in cash and multiple phones.
Lucier had been on Canadian police radar since at least the mid-2000s, and his story intertwines with the murder of B.C. cocaine broker Tom Gisby in Mexico — a killing that, according to a Canadian police source interviewed by The Bureau, formed part of a bloody consolidation of Mexican cartel power over Vancouver’s drug markets.
Lucier’s notoriety stretches back to October 2009, when Victoria police announced what they described as the city’s largest-ever cocaine bust. After a three-month undercover probe triggered by a shooting near Beacon Hill Park, nearly 100 officers carried out pre-dawn raids on five locations around the capital region, seizing roughly 22.5 kilograms of cocaine, four high-powered handguns, two vehicles and about $420,000 in cash. Lucier, then 41 and already on parole from a 2007 trafficking sentence involving multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine and heroin, was the lone suspect to slip away; a Canada-wide warrant was issued for his arrest.
In 2012, police in Mexico’s Nayarit state announced they had arrested Lucier in the Pacific resort city of Nuevo Vallarta on the outstanding Canadian warrant — the same town where Gisby, a longtime player in British Columbia’s cocaine trade, had been shot dead days earlier while ordering coffee at a Starbucks. Mexican authorities said Lucier had been living under an assumed name and socializing with other Canadian expatriates in the Puerto Vallarta area, including people who knew Gisby, although his arrest was not believed to be directly tied to the murder.
For investigators, the episode underscored how Canadian traffickers were deeply embedded in Mexican resort corridors from Mazatlán to Cancún that doubled as hubs for cartel-linked players from the north. In the years that followed, it would be former Canadian snowboarder Ryan Wedding — tightly associated with the Wolfpack networks tied to Western Canada’s fentanyl superlabs — who, according to U.S. government sources, rose above other Canadian narcos in those resort towns to become perhaps the single conduit for Latin American–supplied narcotics imported into Canada for both domestic consumption and onward transshipment.
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No Charges on Fentanyl Network
E-Probang era investigations underpin the 2019 civil claim that seeks forfeiture of both the 77th Avenue mansion and a second property at 15797 92nd Avenue. The Director’s position is that the homes were purchased and maintained with money that cannot be reconciled with Sclater’s reported earnings and should be treated as the proceeds of crime.
According to an amended notice of civil claim filed in May 2025, Sclater shared the 77th Avenue house with Hector Armando Chavez-Anchondo and John Brian Whalen, while Whalen’s father, John Edwin Whalen, and Brittany Anne Horvey are drawn into the case through their alleged roles in what the Director calls a drug trafficking organization, or DTO. The court filings describe not a loose circle of dealers, but a structured group that trafficked ketamine, methamphetamine, counterfeit Xanax, oxycodone, MDMA and fentanyl, and that “since June 2021 at the latest” had been working to import bulk cocaine from Mexico.
As the Director tells it, those efforts led straight to Sinaloa itself. The Surrey group is alleged to have agreed to purchase cocaine from senior cartel suppliers — operating at such scale, sophistication and power within Canada that they ultimately negotiated directly with alleged cartel boss Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García.
When U.S. authorities arrested El Mayo on July 25, 2024, the Surrey operation is said to have lurched sideways, searching for “other parties” to keep the cocaine pipeline alive. In early September, Sclater, Chavez-Anchondo and Whalen Jr. allegedly pooled money to secure a shipment, then drove out to a rendezvous where they expected to collect their imported cocaine. According to the filings, their transport contact never materialized, and they returned to Surrey empty-handed.
Eleven days later, the RCMP arrived with a search warrant. Inside the mansion, officers reported walking into what looked more like a mid-level cartel outpost than a suburban home: firearms racked and stashed in multiple rooms, including assault-style rifles with screw-on suppressors and piles of ammunition, suggesting residents lived with the expectation of raids or perhaps clashes with some of the six other Mexican cartel networks aside from Sinaloa that have been identified in Canada by federal police.
Hidden compartments had been carved into bedrooms and a basement bathroom, where police say they found kilogram-scale quantities of ketamine and methamphetamine, counterfeit alprazolam tablets pressed to resemble Xanax, hundreds of oxycodone pills, a smaller but potent stash of fentanyl, and bundles of Canadian cash tucked away in a manner seasoned investigators instantly recognized — elastic-bound bricks, some vacuum-sealed, packed tightly enough to hint at far more money moving through the house than Sclater’s tax returns would ever show.
Downstairs, a kitchen freezer allegedly doubled as a storage vault for nearly a kilogram of MDMA; elsewhere, RCMP catalogued an Azure pleasure boat, a stable of trucks and custom motorcycles, gold jewellery and two Hikvision digital-video recorders that formed the core of a security system surveying the compound. The Director’s case is that neither Sclater nor his co-defendants had legitimate income capable of supporting that lifestyle, and that the house was both the proceeds and instrument of unlawful activity.
The timing was not incidental. Ottawa formally listed the Sinaloa Cartel as a terrorist entity on February 20, 2025, as one of seven Latin American criminal organizations added to Canada’s Criminal Code list in response to the fentanyl crisis and mounting U.S. pressure.
The Director’s pleadings lean into that backdrop, explicitly calling Sinaloa a terrorist entity and portraying 16767 77th Avenue as part of the infrastructure of a cartel now placed at the centre of a transnational security crisis.
While the alleged facts of police raids against the Surrey mansion seem to move steadily, the apparent lack of criminal charges against any of the targets — let alone a racketeering-style case against the network itself, which is effectively impossible to mount in Canada, where there is no U.S.-style RICO statute — reveals a litigation record that can fairly be described as broken and ineffectual, except from the perspective of criminal-defence lawyers and their clients.
The Director’s Victoria-based action was filed on May 22, 2019.
Sclater responded months later, disputing the forfeiture. In December 2019, the province produced its list of documents. Sclater replied in January 2020 with a list that named no documents at all. Over the next two years, Crown counsel sent a steady stream of letters — in March 2020, August 2021, and repeatedly between October 2021 and March 2022 — demanding a proper list and the financial and property records that would show how Sclater funded his holdings.
In a 2022 application, the Director’s frustration spilled onto the record. The submission notes that under the Civil Forfeiture Act, the core question is whether the Surrey properties are proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity — and that without basic financial disclosure, there is no way to test Sclater’s claim that they were acquired lawfully. The Director points out that documents showing income sources, mortgage servicing, and the acquisition and storage of weapons “are critical to a determination of the action on its merits,” and accuses Sclater of refusing or neglecting, for almost three years, to meet even the baseline disclosure duties imposed by the civil-procedure rules.
To head off what it casts as an attempt to turn the case into a criminal-style disclosure standoff, the Director leans on British Columbia v. PacNet Services Ltd., where the court rejected defence arguments that tried to graft the Supreme Court’s Stinchcombe-era criminal disclosure standards onto civil forfeiture proceedings. R. v. Stinchcombe — the 1991 Supreme Court of Canada decision that imposed a broad duty on the Crown to disclose all potentially relevant information so an accused can make full answer and defence under section 7 of the Charter — is firmly rooted in criminal procedure. Echoing that line of authority, the Director argues that there is “no justification” for Sclater to shelter behind Stinchcombe to avoid producing his own financial and property records, and tells the court it is “time to move [the case] forward,” with full document production or a lawful explanation for the default.
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Constitutional Test
The newer Sinaloa-linked file adds another layer of complexity. Four of the five named defendants — Chavez-Anchondo, the two Whalens and Horvey — have not filed responses. In a separate notice of application, the Director now asks the court to treat the core allegations against them as admitted by default: that they were members of a drug trafficking organization; that they used or threatened violence; that they trafficked a catalogue of synthetic drugs and opioids; that they negotiated with Sinaloa; and that the weapons, cash and assets found in the 2024 raid are instruments and proceeds of crime.
For his part, Sclater is trying to turn the Surrey files into a constitutional test case. In his latest defence, he claims a lawful ownership interest in the 77th Avenue property, certain vehicles, cash, jewellery and electronic devices, and denies every allegation that he joined a criminal organization, conspired to import cocaine from Mexico, or negotiated with El Mayo. He acknowledges having a criminal record but disputes the particulars, and insists he had sufficient legitimate income to fund his properties and toys.
More ambitiously, he argues that the Civil Forfeiture Act itself is unconstitutional. By using allegations that he failed to declare taxable income as part of the proceeds-of-crime theory, he says, the province is encroaching on the federal government’s exclusive power over taxation under the Constitution Act, 1867. Assessing taxes owed, he points out, is the business of the Minister of National Revenue and the Tax Court of Canada. Civil forfeiture, in his view, cannot be used as a kind of shadow tax audit. He also asserts that the case “has arisen solely” from breaches of his Charter rights by RCMP officers and other state actors, arguing that the Director — “also an agent of the state” — is improperly relying on those breaches in seeking forfeiture.
It is, in effect, a bid to turn a forfeiture trial about a Surrey mansion into a referendum on how far provincial authorities can go in dismantling alleged drug networks without turning civil litigation into a criminal prosecution by another name.
All of this is unfolding against a national and continental backdrop that makes the Surrey house look less like an isolated problem than a symbol of a wider national failure.
Under National Fentanyl Sprint 2.0, Canadian police and partner agencies seized 386 kilograms of fentanyl and analogues between May 20 and October 31, 2025, with Ontario and British Columbia accounting for more than 90 per cent of that total. British Columbia reported 88 kilograms of seized fentanyl during the sprint. Yet those numbers miss some of the most alarming data points. Just days before the sprint window opened, Canada Border Services Agency officers at the Tsawwassen container facility in Delta intercepted more than 4,300 litres of chemicals from China, including 500 litres of propionyl chloride — a direct fentanyl precursor — and other substances capable of feeding clandestine labs in the Canadian wilderness for years. That shipment was destined for Calgary, and conservative estimates suggest it could have yielded enough fentanyl for billions of potentially lethal doses.
The Carney government continues to insist that Canada is primarily an end market, not a major exporter, and CBSA officials emphasize that only “small, personal doses” of finished fentanyl are being found heading south.
Seen from that angle, the fight over one Surrey mansion and the man who owns it becomes more than a story of Mexican cartels embedding in British Columbia’s wealthy suburbs.
It is a test of whether Canada’s patchwork of civil forfeiture laws, criminal prosecutions and Charter-driven disclosure rules can keep pace with transnational networks that blend Chinese chemical suppliers, Mexican cartels and domestic labs into a single system. For now, many Canadian police experts acknowledge in private — and some senior leaders flag in cautious public statements — that this test is being failed, and failed egregiously.
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