Connect with us
[bsa_pro_ad_space id=12]

Business

Understanding the Nature of Canada’s Fiscal and Economic Challenges

Published

10 minute read

From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss and Jason Clemens

” between 2016 and 2019 (pre-COVID), growth in per-person GDP (inflation-adjusted) was an anemic 0.9 percent. According to one study, among the last five pre-recession periods in Canadian history, the Trudeau period (again, 2016 to 2019) recorded the weakest economic growth “

The Trudeau government was first elected in 2015 based in part on a new approach to government policy, which promised greater prosperity for Canadians based on short-term deficit spending (totaling $25.1 billion over three years), lower taxes for most Canadians (except higher-income earners), and a more active approach to economic development (LPC, 2015). This new policy direction stood in stark contrast to the consensus of the previous 20 years (Clemens and Palacios, 2017). The result has been a marked deterioration in the country’s finances, economic stagnation, and a collapse in business investment. If Canada is to restore its fiscal and economic health, Ottawa must enact fundamental policy reform.

Government spending, taxes, and debt

The Trudeau government has markedly increased spending to finance both new programs and increases in existing programs. Federal spending (excluding interest costs) increased from $256.3 billion in 2014-15 (the year before the Trudeau government took office) to $448.2 billion in 2022-23 (an increase of 74.9 percent) (Canada, 2023a) and a projected $453.0 billion in 2023-24 (Canada, 2023b). Not surprisingly, COVID-related spending contributed to increases in 2019-20 to 2021-22. But in 2022-23 and thereafter, there is no COVID-related spending.

The federal government has used tax increases and large increases in borrowing to finance these spending increases. In 2016, the federal government increased the top personal income tax rate imposed on entrepreneurs, professionals , and business owners from 29 percent to 33 percent. Consequently, the combined top personal income tax rate (federal and provincial) now exceeds 50 percent in eight provinces (with the remaining provinces only slightly below 50 percent) and in 2022 Canada had the 5th highest tax rate out of 38 OECD countries. This represents a serious competitive challenge for Canada’s ability to attract and retain entrepreneurs, investors, skilled professionals, and businesses.

And while the Trudeau government reduced the middle personal income tax rate, it also eliminated several tax credits. The combination of the two policy changes means that 86 percent of middle-income families now pay higher personal income taxes (Palacios et al., 2022). If the analysis also includes increases to the Canada Pension Plan contribution rate, almost all Canadians now pay higher taxes.

The Trudeau government also borrowed to finance its new spending. Figure 1 contrasts the originally
planned deficits with the actual deficits incurred by the Trudeau government (excluding COVID-related
spending) from 2016-17 to 2022-23. The actual borrowing exceeds the originally planned borrowing
every year (except 2021-22), often by significant margins, due to the government’s inability to control
spending growth.

The string of deficits means federal debt (measured as gross debt) has ballooned to $1.9 trillion
(2022-23) and is projected to reach $2.4 trillion by 2027/28, fueling a dramatic growth in interest costs,
which have grown by 53.2 percent (inflation-adjusted) between 2014/15 and 2023/24 and will reach
a projected $46.5 billion in 2023/24. Interest costs now consume substantial revenue that is then unavailable for government services or tax reduction.

Simply put, Trudeau government policy changes have produced large increases in government spending, taxes, and borrowing. Unfortunately, these policy changes have not resulted in a more robust and vibrant economy.

Weak economic growth and collapsing business investment

The broadest measure of living standards is GDP per person, which calculates the total value of all goods and services produced in the economy in a given year (adjusted by the population). As illustrated in Figure 2, between 2016 and 2019 (pre-COVID), growth in per-person GDP (inflation-adjusted) was an anemic 0.9 percent. According to one study, among the last five pre-recession periods in Canadian history, the Trudeau period (again, 2016 to 2019) recorded the weakest economic growth (Clemens, Palacios, and Veldhuis, 2021). Another study found that Canada’s per-person GDP growth from 2013 to 2022 was the weakest on record since the 1930s (Cross, 2023). And per-person GDP in 2022 (inflation-adjusted) had still not recovered from the pandemic losses and was basically stagnant at 2018 levels (see figure 2).

Prospects for the future, given current policies, are not encouraging. The OECD projects that Canada will record the lowest rate of per-person GDP growth among 32 advanced economies from 2020 to 2030 and from 2030 to 2060(OECD, 2021).Countries such as Estonia, South Korea, and New Zealand are expected to vault past Canada and achieve higher living standards by 2060.

According to a recent analysis, Canada’s economic growth crisis is due in part to the decline in business investment, which is critical to increasing living standards because it equips workers with tools and technologies to produce more higher-quality goods and services. This, in turn, fuels innovation and improved productivity (Cross, 2023). There are obvious explanations for the decline in business investment including regulatory barriers, particularly related to the energy and mining sectors (Globerman and Emes, 2021), and government deficits, which imply tax increases in the future, dampening investment today. Business investment (inflation-adjusted), excluding residential construction, has declined by 1.8 percent annually since 2014.

According to a 2023 study (Hill and Emes, 2023), between 2014 and 2021, business investment per worker (inflation-adjusted, excluding residential construction) decreased by $3,676 (to $14,687) compared to growth of $3,418 (to $26,751) in the United States. Put differently, in 2014, Canadian
businesses invested 79 cents per worker for every dollar invested in the United States. By 2021, that level of investment had declined to just 55 cents per worker.

Moreover, the amount of investment in Canada by foreigners has decreased while the amount of investment by Canadians outside of the country has increased. In 2008, the two levels were roughly comparable—$65.7 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada vs. $84.6 billion in investment by Canadians outside of the country. However, a sizeable change began in 2015; by 2022, the amount of FDI ($64.6 billion) was significantly smaller than the amount of investment by Canadians outside the country ($102.3 billion).

Finally, while Canada’s labour market has consistently demonstrated its strength and resilience, the labour market numbers hide some concerning trends. For example, between February 2020 (when the pandemic began) and June 2023, private-sector job creation (net) was fairly weak at 3.3 percent compared to 11.8 percent job growth in the government sector (Eisen, Ryan and Palacios, 2023). In other words, the recovery and growth in the private sector following the pandemic has not been as strong as expected.

Conclusion: The Path Forward

There is reason for optimism, however, since many of Canada’s challenges are of the federal government’s own making. The Chrétien Liberals in the 1990s faced many of the same challenges that we do today (Veldhuis, Clemens, and Palacios, 2011). By shifting the focus to more prudent government spending, balanced budgets, debt reduction, and competitive tax rates, the Chrétien Liberals—followed in large measure by the Harper Tories—paved the way for two decades of prosperity when Canada outperformed other OECD countries on economic growth, job-creation, and business investment.

To help foster greater prosperity for Canadians today, the federal government can learn from the Chrétien Liberals, and the Harper Tories. The rest of this series identifies policy options that can increase living standards for Canadians by repairing federal finances, improving tax competitiveness, and lowering economic barriers. These reforms could help build a more prosperous country through the creation of good jobs which would lead to rising incomes for Canadians.

 

Todayville is a digital media and technology company. We profile unique stories and events in our community. Register and promote your community event for free.

Follow Author

Business

Canadians largely ignore them and their funding bleeds their competition dry: How the CBC Spends its Public Funding

Published on

 

If we want to intelligently assess the value CBC delivers to Canadians in exchange for their tax-funded investment, we’ll need to understand two things:

  1. How CBC spends the money we give them
  2. What impact their product has on Canadians

The answer to question #2 depends on which Canadians we’re discussing. Your average young family from suburban Toronto is probably only vaguely aware there is a CBC. But Canadian broadcasters? They know all about the corporation, but just wish it would lift its crushing hobnailed boots from their faces.

Stick around and I’ll explain.

For the purposes of this discussion I’m not interested in the possibility that there’s been reckless or negligent corruption or waste, so I won’t address the recent controversy over paying out millions of dollars in executive benefits. Instead, I want to know how the CBC is designed to operate. This will allow us to judge the corporation on its own terms.

The Audit is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

CBC’s Financial Structure

We’ll begin with the basics. According to the CBC’s 2023-24 projections in their most recent corporate plan strategy, the company will receive $1.17 billion from Parliament; $292 million from advertising; and $209 million from subscriber fees, financing, and other income. Company filings note that revenue from both advertising and legacy subscription pools are dropping. Advertising is trending downwards because of ongoing changes in industry ad models, and the decline in subscriptions can be blamed on competition from “cord-cutting” internet services. The Financing and other income category includes revenue from rent and lease-generating use of CBC’s many real estate assets.

The projected combined television, radio, and digital services spending is $1.68 billion. For important context, 2022-23 data from the 2022-2023 annual report break that down to $996 million for English services, and $816 million for French services. 2022-23 also saw $60 million in costs for transmission, distribution, and collection. Corporate management and finance costs came to around $33 million. Overall, the company reported a net loss of $125 million in 2022-23.

The corporation estimates that their English-language digital platforms attract 17.4 million unique visitors each month and that the average visitor engages with content for 28 minutes a month. In terms of market relevance, those are pretty good numbers. But, among Canadian internet users, cbc.ca still ranked only 43rd for total web destinations (which include sites like google.com and amazon.ca). French-language Radio-Canada’s numbers were 5.2 million unique visitors who each hung around for 50 minutes a month.

Monthly engagement with digital English-language news and regional services was 20 minutes. Although we’re given no visitor numbers, the report does admit that “interest in news was lower than expected.”

CBC content production

All that’s not very helpful for understanding what’s actually going on inside CBC. We need to get a feel for how the corporation divides its spending between programming categories and what’s driving the revenue.

The CRTC provides annual financial filings for all Canadian broadcasters, including the CBC. I could describe what’s happening by throwing columns and rows of dollar figures at you. In fact, should you be so disposed, you can view the spreadsheet here. But it turns out that my colorful graph will do a much better job:

As you can see for yourself, CBC spends a large chunk of its money producing news for all three video platforms (CBC and Radio-Canada conventional TV and the cable/VOD platforms they refer to as “discretionary TV”). The two conventional networks also invest significant funds in drama and comedy production.

The chart doesn’t cover CBC radio, so I’ll fill you in. English-language production costs $143 million (roughly the equivalent of the costs of English TV drama/comedy) while the bill for French-language radio production came in at $94 million (more or less equal to discretionary TV news production).

CBC Content Consumption

Who’s watching? The CBC itself reported that viewers of CBC English television represented only 5.1 percent of the total Canadian audience, and only 2.0 percent tuned in to CBC news. By “total Canadian audience”, I mean all Canadians viewing all available TV programming at a given time. So when the CBC tells us that their News Network got a 2.0 percent “share”, they don’t mean that they attracted 2.0 percent of all Canadians. Rather, they got 2.0 percent of whoever happened to be watching any TV network – which could easily come to just a half of one percent of all Canadians. After all, how many people still watch TV?

According to CRTC data, between the 2014–15 and 2022–23 seasons, English language CBC TV weekly viewing hours dropped from 35 million to 16 million. That total would amount to less than six minutes a day per anglophone Canadian. Specifically, news viewing fell by 52 percent, sports by 66 percent, and drama and comedy by 51 percent.

CBC Radio One and CBC Music only managed to attract 14.3 percent of the Canadian market. What does that actually mean? I’ve seen estimates suggesting that between 15 and 25 percent of all Canadians listen to radio during the popular daily commute slots. So at its peak, CBC radio’s share of that audience is possibly no higher than 3.5 percent of all Canadians.

recent survey found that only 41 percent of Canadians agreed the CBC “is important and should continue doing what it’s doing.” The remaining 59 percent were split between thinking the CBC requires “a lot of changes” and was “no longer useful.” Those numbers remained largely consistent across all age groups.

It seems that while some Canadian’s might support the CBC in principle, for the most part, they’re not actually consuming a lot of content.

CBC Revenue sources

CBC’s primary income is from government funding through parliamentary allocations. Here’s what those look like:

Advertising (or, “time sales” as they refer to it) is another major revenue source. That channel brought in more than $200 million in 2023:

But here’s the thing: the broadcast industry in Canada is currently engaged in a bitter struggle for existence. Every single dollar from that shrinking pool of advertising revenue is desperately needed. And most broadcasters are – perhaps misguidedly – fighting for more government funding. So why should the CBC, with its billion dollar subsidies, be allowed to also compete for limited ad revenue?

Or, to put it differently, what vital and unique services does the CBC provide that might justify their special treatment?

It’s possible that CBC does target rural and underserved audiences missed by the commercial networks. But those are clearly not what’s consuming the vast majority of the corporation’s budget. Perhaps people are watching CBC’s “big tent” drama and comedy productions, but are those measurably better or more important than what’s coming from the private sector? And we’ve already seen how, for all intents and purposes, no one’s watching their TV news or listening to their radio broadcasts.

Perhaps there’s an argument to be made for maintaining or even increasing funding for CBC. But I haven’t yet seen anyone convincingly articulate it.

Share

Subscribe to The Audit.

Continue Reading

Business

What Inter-Provincial Migration Trends Can Tell Us About Good Governance

Published on

 

It turns out we move a great deal less than our American neighbors

Government policies have consequences. Among them is the possibility that they might so annoy the locals that people actually get up and head for the exit. Given how parting can be such sweet sorrow (and how it’s a pain to lose out on all that revenue from provincial income, property, and sales tax), legislatures generally prefer to keep their citizens on this side of the door.

Nevertheless, migration happens. And when enough people do it at the same time, they sometimes leave economic and social clues behind waiting to be discovered. This graph represents net migrations since 1971 into and out of the four largest provinces:

The Audit is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

It may just be possible to make out some broad patterns here. Quebec has never had a net inbound migration year (although there’s been plenty of immigration to Quebec from outside of Canada). But nothing matches the mass exodus of anglophones due to concerns over language and separation in the 1970s.

Curiously it seems that Alberta and British Columbia received far more migrants than Ontario around that time – although the actual numbers tell us that they were more likely to have come from Saskatchewan and Ontario than Quebec. By contrast, most disillusioned Quebecers found their way to Ontario. Besides the 70s, Alberta also enjoyed inbound spikes in the mid-90s, mid-00s, and early 10s. And it looks like they’re in the middle of another boom cycle as we speak.

The real value of all this data however, is in using it to test causation hypotheses. In other words, can statistical analysis tell us what it was that caused the migrations? And are some or all of those causes the result of government policy choices? Here are some possibilities we’ll explore:

  • Household income trends
  • Government debt
  • Crime rates
  • Healthcare costs
  • Housing costs

Right off the top I’ll come clean with you: there’ll be no smoking gun here. I could find no single historical measure that came close to explaining migration patterns. However I was able to confidently discard some theories. That’s a win I guess. And other numbers did hint to intriguing possibilities.

Inter-provincial variations in household income, crime rates (specifically murder rates), healthcare costs (including prescriptions, eye care, and dental care), and even housing affordability had no measurable impact on migration. This was true for both correlation coefficients and lag analysis (where we looked at migration changes in the years following an economic event).

Rising unemployment had, at best, a minimal impact on outbound migration. And even then, it was only noticeable for Alberta and Prince Edward Island.

Of all the metrics I explored, the only one that might have had a serious influence in migration was provincial government budget deficits.

Folks from Alberta, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland all responded to growing government debt by clearing out. Now, I doubt this was their way to telling the government what they really thought about bad fiscal management. Rather, people probably decided to move to greener pastures in response to the ripple-effect consequences of deficits, like higher taxes, reduced social services, and deteriorating infrastructure.


I suspect that part of the reason I wasn’t able to find any strong connections between those metrics and migration patterns is because there really isn’t all that much migration going on in the first place.

Take Ontario’s record net population loss of 31,018 residents back in 2021. That may sound like a lot of people, but it’s actually just a hair over two-tenths of one percent of the total Ontario population. And even Quebec’s epic 1979 loss of 46,429 people was still nowhere near one percent. It was 0.7117456, to be precise. Those aren’t significant numbers.

When so few people choose to move, it’s probably because there’s nothing on the macro level going on that’s pushing them. Those who do go, probably do it primarily for personal reasons that just won’t show up in population-scale data.

There’s also the very real possibility that Canadians are smart enough to realize that things probably won’t be any better over there than they already are right here. Fewer than two-thirds of one percent of Ontarians left for other provinces in 2023, while only around one-third of a percent gave up on Quebec.

By contrast, annual state-to-state migration figures in the U.S. typically range between 1 percent to 5 percent of each state’s population. In 2022, that added up to 8.2 million people, according to the Census Bureau.

Subscribe to The Audit. For the full experience, upgrade your subscription.

In the market for bespoke data analysis?

Custom Reports by The Audit

Continue Reading

Trending

X