From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro

Some analysts compare Canada’s fiscal health with other countries in the Group of Seven (G7) to downplay concerns with how Canadian governments run their finances. And while it’s true that Canada’s finances aren’t as bad some other countries, the data show Canada’s finances are deteriorating fastest in the G7, and if we’re not careful we may lose any advantage we currently have.

The G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) represents seven of the world’s most advanced economies and some of Canada’s closest peer countries. As such, many commentators, organizations and governments use Canada’s standing within the group as a barometer of our fiscal health. Indeed, based on his oft-repeated goal to “build the strongest economy in the G7,” Prime Minister Carney himself clearly sees the G7 as a good comparator group for Canada.

Two key indicators of a country’s finances are government spending and debt, both of which are often measured as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) to allow for comparability across jurisdictions with various sized economies. Government spending as a share of GDP is a measure of the overall size of government in a country, while government debt-to-GDP is a measure of a country’s debt burden. Both the size of government in Canada and the country’s overall debt burden have grown over the last decade.

This is a problem because, in recent years, government spending and debt in Canada have reached or exceeded thresholds beyond which any additional spending or debt will most likely harm economic growth and living standards. Indeed, research suggests that when government spending exceeds 32 per cent of GDP, government begins to take over functions and resources better left to the private sector, and economic growth slows. However, the issues of high spending and debt are often downplayed by comparisons showing that Canada’s finances aren’t as bad as other peer countries—namely the rest of the G7.

It’s true that Canada ranks fairly well among the G7 when comparing the aforementioned measures of fiscal health. Based on the latest data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a new study shows that Canada’s general government (federal, provincial and local) total spending as a share of GDP was 44.7 per cent in 2024, while Canada’s general government gross debt was 110.8 per cent of GDP. Compared to the G7, Canada’s size of government ranked 4th highest while our overall debt burden ranked 5th highest.

But while Canada’s size of government and overall debt burden rank middle-of-the-pack among G7 countries, that same study reveals that Canada is not in the clear. Consider the following charts.

The first chart shows the overall change in general government total spending as a share of GDP in G7 countries from 2014 to 2024. Canada observed the largest increase in the size of government of any G7 country, as total spending compared to GDP increased 6.34 percentage points over the decade. This increase was nearly three times larger than the increase in the U.S., and both France and Italy were actually reduced their size of government during this time.

The second chart shows the overall change in general government gross debt as a share of GDP over the same decade, and again Canada experienced the largest increase of any G7 country at 25.23 percentage points. That’s considerably higher than the next closest increases in France (16.97 percentage points), the U.S. (16.36 percentage points) and the U.K. (14.13 percentage points).

Simply put, the study shows that Canada’s finances have deteriorated faster than any country in the G7 over the last decade. And if we expand this comparison to a larger group of 40 advanced economies worldwide, the results are very similar—Canada experienced the 2nd highest increase in its size of government and 3rd highest increase in its overall debt burden, from 2014 to 2024. Some analysts downplay mismanagement of government finances in Canada by pointing to other countries that have worse finances. However, if Canada continues as it has for the last decade, we’ll be joining those other countries before too long.

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute

Grady Munro

Policy Analyst, Fraser Institute

From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Ian Madsen

From telecom ownership limits to convoluted regulations, these hidden obstacles drive up prices, choke innovation, and shield domestic industries from global competition. Canada ranks among the worst offenders. If Ottawa is serious about free trade, it’s time to tackle the red tape, not just the tariffs.

Governments claim to support free trade, but use hidden rules to shut out foreign competition

Tariffs levied by governments on imports are a well-known impediment to trade. They raise costs for consumers and businesses alike. But tariffs are no longer the main obstacle to the elusive goal of “free and fair trade.” A more significant—and often overlooked—threat comes from non-tariff barriers: the behind-the-scenes rules, subsidies and restrictions that quietly block competition from foreign exporters.

These barriers can take many forms, including import licences, quotas, discriminatory regulations and state subsidies. The result is often higher prices, limited product choices and reduced innovation, since foreign competitors are effectively shut out of the market before they can enter.

This hidden protectionism harms both consumers and Canadian firms that rely on imported goods or global supply chains.

To understand the global scope of these barriers, a recent analysis by the Tholos Foundation sheds light on their prevalence and impact. Its 2023 Non-Tariff Barriers Index Report examined the policies, laws and trade practices of 88 countries, representing 96 per cent of the world’s population and GDP.

The results are surprising: the United States, with some of the lowest official tariffs, ranked 65th on non-tariff barriers. Canada, by contrast, ranked fourth.

These barriers are often formalized and tracked under the term “non-tariff measures” by international organizations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Trade Organization.

UNCTAD notes that while some serve legitimate non-trade objectives like public health or environmental protection, they still raise trade costs through procedural hurdles that can disproportionately affect small exporters or developing nations.

Other barriers include embargoes, import deposits, subsidies to favoured companies, state procurement preferences, technical standards designed to exclude foreign goods, restrictions on foreign investment, discriminatory taxes and forced technology transfers.

Many of these are detailed in a study by the Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.

Sanctions and politically motivated trade restrictions also fall under this umbrella, complicating efforts to build reliable global trade networks.

Among the most opaque forms of trade distortion is currency manipulation. Countries like Japan have historically used ultra-low interest rates to stimulate growth, which also weakens their currencies.

Others may unintentionally devalue their currency through excessive, debt-financed spending. Regardless of motive, the effect is often the same: foreign goods become more expensive, and domestic exports become artificially competitive.

Canada is no stranger to non-tariff barriers. Labelling laws, technical standards and foreign ownership restrictions, particularly in telecommunications and digital media, are clear examples. Longstanding rules prevent foreign companies from owning Canadian telecom providers, limiting competition in an industry where Canadians already pay among the highest cellphone bills in the world. Similar restrictions on investment in broadcasting and interactive digital media also curtail innovation and investment.

Other nations use these barriers just as liberally. The U.S. has expanded its use of the “national security” exemption to justify restrictions in nearly any industry it sees as threatened. The European Union employs a wide range of non-tariff measures that affect sectors from agriculture to digital services. So while China is frequently criticized for abusing trade rules, it is far from the only offender.

If governments are serious about pursuing freer, fairer global trade, they must confront these less visible but more potent barriers. Tariffs may be declining, but protectionism is alive and well, just hidden behind layers of red tape.

For Canada to remain competitive and protect consumers, we must look beyond tariffs and scrutinize the subtler ways the federal government is restricting trade.

Ian Madsen is a senior policy analyst at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.