CCSA leader Joe Li, bottom right, attends an event in Toronto with former Conservative senator Victor Oh, top right, CTCCO leader Wei Chengyi, back center, former Don Valley North Liberal MP Geng Tan, top left, and former Markham-area MP and Trudeau cabinet minister John McCallum, between Tan and Wei.

Sam Cooper

Call for Poilievre to step down follows pattern of strategic diaspora messaging amid national security scrutiny over foreign interference networks

A controversial diaspora pressure group with ties to Chinese consular circles in Toronto is demanding that Pierre Poilievre step down, following an election marked by Beijing’s attacks on Conservative candidates, and renewing the same type of challenge it posed to former leader Erin O’Toole, which first drew national security attention after the 2021 federal contest.

On May 12, the Chinese Canadian Conservative Association (CCCA), led by York Region councillor Joe Li, publicly called for Pierre Poilievre to step down following the Conservative Party’s defeat in the recent federal election. At a small press event in Markham, the group denounced Poilievre’s plan to run in an anticipated Calgary by-election—after his surprising loss of his longtime Ottawa riding—as undemocratic and fiscally wasteful. Li’s comments echoed a similar event in 2021, when he called for Erin O’Toole’s resignation after another disappointing election result.

Both campaigns unfolded amid persistent evidence of foreign interference, including disinformation and alleged intimidation operations targeting Chinese Canadian voters and Conservative candidates.

Founded in 1983 to encourage civic engagement among Chinese Canadians, the CCCA has no formal ties to the federal Conservative Party. But its political messaging—delivered through Chinese-language media and tightly networked community forums—has intersected with meetings involving Chinese officials and Toronto community leaders under national security scrutiny.

Li has often appeared alongside former Liberal MP Paul Chiang, whose election efforts were supported by the CCCA.

Li and the group’s latest demand for Poilievre’s resignation came just days after the election, with Li telling Chinese-language media that Poilievre had failed. “Don’t waste money on a by-election,” a translated report from the CCCA event says. “Respect democracy and step down, Pierre Poilievre.”

The post-election comments from the CCCA echo earlier criticism directed at O’Toole, who, like Poilievre, was portrayed in Chinese-language media as unfriendly to China—and by extension, to the Chinese Canadian community.

The CCCA’s call also drew attention for its timing, coming as Conservatives prepared for a by-election in the reliably Conservative riding of Battle River–Crowfoot. The group’s message that Poilievre’s gambit is wasteful and undemocratic demonstrates a sophistication, because these arguments are also circulating in mainstream punditry, where Poilievre is now facing internal leadership questions following his failure to defeat the widely unpopular Liberal government. Prime Minister Mark Carney, who replaced Justin Trudeau, was notably boosted by Chinese disinformation portraying him as Canada’s best hope to resist Donald Trump’s global tariff regime—a narrative that clearly aligned with Beijing’s geopolitical interests.

Li and the CCCA, while consistently supportive of Paul Chiang, also played a visible role in discrediting Conservative candidate Joseph Tay.

Li unsuccessfully sought the Conservative nomination this year in Markham–Unionville—positioning himself against Tay.

Tay, a prominent Hong Kong activist, ultimately ran as the Conservative candidate in Don Valley North. Paul Chiang—a former York Region police officer—reportedly said during the campaign that Tay “could be handed over to the Chinese consulate,” a remark interpreted by Tay and international human rights groups as threatening. The Bureau previously confirmed that the RCMP advised Tay to suspend in-person campaigning due to credible safety concerns. Tay ultimately lost the race by about 5,000 votes.

Li’s takedown of Poilievre marks a reversal from 2023, when Poilievre reportedly reached out to Li’s group and other pro-Beijing community leaders—apparently in an effort to soften the party’s perceived stance toward China and distance himself from Erin O’Toole, his predecessor. According to the National Post, one of the organizers and the man who introduced Poilievre was Joe Li, “the regional councillor who harshly criticized the tough China policies proposed in the Conservatives’ 2021 election platform, suggesting Canada should not publicly confront Beijing on human rights.”

Quoting former CSIS China Desk officer Michel Juneau-Katsuya—who has direct experience investigating Toronto consular networks that overlap with the CCCA—the Post wrote: “You know what that means?” asked Juneau-Katsuya. “It means the Chinese have successfully scared and bullied the Conservatives.”

If this network is now targeting Poilievre on behalf of external forces—and if that effort represents a continuation of interference seen during the election campaign—there has yet to be any public confirmation.

Earlier, the SITE Task Force tracked coordinated disinformation targeting Tay, including narratives suggesting Canada would become a “refuge for fugitives” if he were elected. Paul Chiang echoed those remarks. In a statement to The Bureau yesterday, CSIS confirmed that Tay’s family members were detained in Hong Kong after the election—an act Canadian authorities assessed as transnational political pressure.

At a CCCA press conference earlier this year, which appeared closely tied to the Chiang–Tay controversy, the group accused both major parties of bypassing diaspora input and “directly appointing candidates without consulting community groups or even party members.”

Public records and Chinese-language media show CCCA members have attended events with officials from the People’s Republic of China and leaders of the Confederation of Toronto Chinese Canadian Organizations (CTCCO). One of CTCCO’s honorary chairs, businessman Wei Chengyi, along with other group leaders, has been under RCMP investigation for alleged involvement in China’s overseas “police station” operations. Wei Chengyi and CTCCO have, through statements in Chinese media, denied any involvement in Chinese interference in Canada. More recently, according to a report from The Globe and Mail citing FINTRAC disclosures, TD Bank reportedly closed CTCCO’s accounts, citing concerns over money laundering and foreign interference.

Former CSIS officer Michel Juneau-Katsuya has identified Wei and CTCCO as key players in pro-Beijing propaganda efforts in Canada, including support for Confucius Institutes in Ontario schools. These institutes were designated by the U.S. State Department as arms of the Chinese state.

Conservative leader Erin O’Toole revealed in 2023 he had been briefed by CSIS on PRC attempts to attack his leadership through operations funded by the United Front Work Department. According to O’Toole, his party witnessed what appeared to be active efforts to suppress the Conservative vote in Chinese communities. The tactics included disinformation on WeChat, whisper campaigns portraying Conservative MPs as anti-China, and potential intimidation of Conservative incumbent Bob Saroya in the Markham area, according to senior party sources.

By 2025, these tactics had apparently evolved from online influence to publicly confirmed transnational coercion—reaching into diaspora communities and Canadian elections through threats, arrests, and reputational attacks, as seen in the case of Joseph Tay.

Ottawa has “raised its strong concerns directly with both Chinese and Hong Kong authorities” and is monitoring the circumstances surrounding the detention of family members of former Conservative election candidate Joe Tay in Hong Kong, CSIS confirmed to The Bureau.

“They are tracking the situation closely, and are in contact with Mr. Tay,” a spokesperson for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) said.

Global Affairs Canada stated it “deplores the decision by Hong Kong authorities to punish people for actions that amount to nothing more than freedom of expression.”

Sam Cooper

Central to this strategy is fentanyl—a substance whose reach now extends far beyond Canadian borders.

Fentanyl overdoses. Dirty money flooding real estate. Election interference. Foreign-backed antisemitism igniting across Canadian campuses. These are not isolated crises, warns Calvin Chrustie, a veteran RCMP national security and transnational crime investigator. They are interlinked weapons in an accelerating campaign of hybrid warfare targeting Canada—one that is hollowing out state institutions, fracturing social cohesion, and damaging our alliances. In the view of Chrustie, like other North American experts recently interviewed by The Bureau, adversarial regimes are exploiting Canada’s systemic vulnerabilities to destabilize the country from within, with consequences extending into the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Taiwan, Japan, and beyond.

In a sweeping interview with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Chrustie laid out a sobering account of how foreign states—chiefly China and Iran—are combining their intelligence capabilities with organized crime networks and proxies such as Mexican cartels to exploit Canadian systems. The Bureau has analyzed Chrustie’s comments and connected them to broader findings in its investigations into transnational crime and state-sponsored influence operations.

At the heart of Chrustie’s warning is a shift in how adversaries like China and Iran operate. No longer relying solely on spies or cyberattacks, they are weaponizing organized crime—leveraging fentanyl trafficking, corruption, and influence operations to destabilize democracies.

“Hybrid warfare is the blending of military and non-military means to weaken or destabilize a target,” Chrustie explained. “For hostile states, transnational crime is a tool—just like cyberattacks or disinformation. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea—the CRINKs—use TOC to raise money, create chaos, and undermine our institutions. TOC is no longer just criminal—it’s geopolitical.”

Fentanyl, in this context, is not only a public health catastrophe but a deliberate weapon.

This erosion now extends beyond physical harms into the social and political realm. Chrustie pointed to radical protest movements and the rise in antisemitic incidents on Canadian campuses as evidence of convergence between TOC and foreign influence operations.

“These aren’t disconnected trends,” he said. “The same threat actors behind fentanyl and money laundering are often involved in radicalization efforts. Iranian networks, for example, have long been tied to money laundering and extremist financing. And those networks are not operating in isolation. They’re aligned with China and the Mexican cartels.”

Chrustie argued that radical activism and identity-based polarization are being amplified not just by ideology, but by illicit foreign-backed financing and digital manipulation. “We’re talking about convergence,” he said. “These networks exploit every vulnerability—from public health to political discourse. Failing to connect the dots between TOC, extremism, and foreign interference means we’re always reacting too late.”

Central to this strategy is fentanyl—a substance whose reach now extends far beyond Canadian borders. “There’s no denying the scale of fentanyl production in Canada. It far outpaces our internal consumption,” he said. “We know Canadian labs are supplying Australia in large quantities. And we don’t know how much is crossing into the U.S.—because we’re not meaningfully tracking it. That lack of visibility alone is a serious national security concern.”

Seizures at the border are not the solution, Chrustie argued, because they’re not the full picture. “The U.S. has robust systems for this. Canada doesn’t,” he said. “So pointing to low seizures as proof of safety is misleading—it really just tells us what we’re not seeing.”

And what we’re not seeing, he says, includes deeply compromised infrastructure. “They exploit Canada’s weaknesses, especially in places like Vancouver, where strategic assets such as ports, shipping companies and supply chain infrastructure are key hybrid warfare targets,” he said. “The intent is to target North America through Vancouver-based assets, because it’s a lower-risk operating environment.”

The financial flows enabling this system are equally opaque—and equally dangerous. Chrustie cited the HSBC cartel laundering scandal, which led to a $1.9 billion U.S. settlement, as a historic warning that was never heeded. “The same cartel networks that emerged through the HSBC probe are engaged in Canada today,” he said.

“At one point, more encrypted communication companies linked to TOC and terrorist financers were based in Vancouver than anywhere else in the world,” he added. “These platforms were used globally—by cartels, arms traffickers, terrorists, state proxies. That tells you all you need to know about how Canada is perceived by adversaries.”

So why is Canada such a prime target? Chrustie identifies four layers of failure: strategy, structure, systems, and culture.

“We lack a cohesive, public national security strategy,” he said. “Unlike the United States or Australia, Canada doesn’t clearly define TOC as a strategic national threat. We don’t have a single, unified doctrine coordinating our federal agencies—police, intelligence, border services, foreign affairs. And TOC thrives in those gaps.”

“Our institutions are siloed,” he continued. “Policing is on the front line, but CSIS, CBSA, military and CSE aren’t always integrated. Right now, the RCMP is expected to shoulder most of the burden. But that’s unsustainable. We need an all-agency model.”

Canada’s legal and regulatory systems are another weak point. “Our legal system is designed for a domestic, rule-of-law environment. It’s ill-suited to confront global adversaries who don’t play by those rules,” Chrustie said. “Disclosure rules from Stinchcombe, Charter constraints, and evidentiary burdens mean that complex prosecutions often fall apart or never proceed.”

Finally, Chrustie warned that Canadian political culture is its most underappreciated vulnerability. “Canadians are culturally indifferent to national security,” he said. “We’ve taken a maternalistic approach—shielding the public from harsh realities, hoping to avoid panic or xenophobia. But that silence has allowed foreign actors to operate here with little resistance.”

“The historical paternalist approach of governments and bureaucrats—‘we won’t discuss these issues in public, we are the experts’—that thinking is outdated,” he said. “China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are the biggest fans of that mindset.”

Asked what a real solution looks like, Chrustie offered a sweeping and urgent framework: a national strategy naming hostile states and TOC as geopolitical threats; centralized agency coordination; intelligence-led disruption operations with allies abroad; and legal reforms enabling proactive countermeasures.

“We either need carve-outs with enhanced powers for TOC-related and foreign threat investigations—or we rely more on foreign-facing disruption efforts and accept that prosecutions are secondary,” he said.

He also emphasized grassroots engagement. “The solutions are in the communities, not in the siloed offices of governments,” Chrustie said. “We need to engage business leaders, civic organizations, educators, and diaspora communities. We need to build national resilience—not just enforce laws after the damage is done.”

His closing warning was as stark as his opening diagnosis.

“Canada is a saturated and vulnerable target,” he said. “And until we stop treating this as a criminal justice problem and start treating it as an integrated national security emergency, we will continue to lose ground.”

“There is no room for spectators.”