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It’s Time for Canadians to Challenge the American Domination of the LNG Space

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From EnergyNow.Ca

By Susan McArthur

Canada is now among the top 10 countries with natural gas reserves. It’s time to take advantage of that

Canadians are starting to understand the Americans ate our breakfast, lunch and dinner when it comes to selling liquefied natural gas (LNG) on the global market while simultaneously undermining our national security.

They are finally waking up to the importance of the urgent request by oil and gas CEOs to all federal party leaders calling for the removal of legislation and regulation impeding and capping the development of our resources.

The LNG story in the United States is one of unprecedented growth, according to a recent Atlantic Council report by Daniel Yergin and Madeline Jowdy. Ten years ago, the U.S. did not export a single tonne of LNG. Today, U.S. exports account for 25 per cent of the global market and have contributed US$400 billion to its gross domestic product (GDP) over the past decade.

The U.S. is now the world’s largest LNG supplier, edging out Qatar and Australia, and according to Yergin and Jowdy, its export market is on track to contribute US$1.3 trillion to U.S. GDP by 2040 and create an average of 500,000 jobs annually.

Last week, Alberta announced a sixfold increase in its proven natural gas reserves to 130 trillion cubic feet (tcf). The new figures push Canada into the top 10 countries with natural gas reserves.

Unfortunately, notwithstanding this vast resource, Canada didn’t even make it to the LNG party and the Americans have been laughing all the way to the bank at Canada’s expense. Our decade-long anti-pipeline and natural resource agenda has cost us dearly and Donald Trump’s trade tariffs are a stake to the heart.

As the world grapples with global warming, natural gas is the perfect transition fuel. It generates half the CO2 emissions of coal, provides needed grid backup for intermittent renewable wind and solar power, and it is relatively easy to commission.

Canada has extensive natural gas reserves, but these reserves are less valuable if we can’t get them to offshore markets where countries will pay a premium for energy generation. Canadian gas is abundant, but, given our smaller market, typically trades at a discount to U.S. gas and a massive discount to European and Asian markets.

The capital-intensive nature of LNG facilities requires long-term supply contracts. Generally, 20-year supply contracts with creditworthy counterparties are required to secure the financing required to build gas infrastructure and liquefaction plants.

For example, as part of a larger strategic deal, Houston-based LNG company NextDecade Corp. signed a 20-year offtake agreement to supply 5.4 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) to French multinational TotalEnergies SE.

As the market grows and matures, the spot market is gaining share, but term contracts continue to represent most of the market. This is a problem for Canada as it tries to break into the market, as much of current and future demand is already committed.

More than half the current LNG market demand, or 225 mtpa, is under contract until 2040, according to Shell PLC’s LNG outlook report for 2024. A further 100 mtpa is contracted to 2045. Shell recently revised its LNG market growth forecast upward to 700 mtpa by 2040 and it estimates the LNG supply currently in operation or under construction already accounts for about 525 mtpa, or almost 75 per cent of the estimated market in 2040.

Even if Canada secured 100 per cent of the available market share (impossible), this represents a fraction of the 130 trillion cubic feet of reserves in Alberta and an infinitesimal amount of Canada’s natural gas reserve.

If Canada wants to sell its LNG to the global market, it needs to be at the starting line now. Canada has seven LNG export projects in various stages of development. They are all in British Columbia. The capacity of these export plants is 50 mtpa and the capital cost is estimated to be $110 billion.

After significant delays and cost overruns, our first export facility, LNG Canada’s 14 mtpa Phase 1 in Kitimat, is set to ship its first cargo to Asia later this year. Phase 2, representing a further 14 mtpa, is still awaiting a final investment decision. The Cedar LNG, Ksi Lisims LNG and Woodfibre LNG projects are licensed, at various stages of development and represent a further 17 mtpa.

Canada’s LNG exports today are a drop in the bucket compared to both our potential and the 88 mtpa exported by the U.S. in 2024. We have one project completed and, if history repeats itself and Canada doesn’t get its act together, the runway for the remaining licensed projects will be long, painful and costly.

Financing large capital projects requires predictability with respect to timing and cost. This is also a problem for Canada. As the oil and gas CEOs have pointed out, LNG market players have lost trust in Canada as an investible jurisdiction for these projects.

In the face of Trump’s trade war, Canadians have become pipeline evangelists. Wishful thinking and political talking points won’t be enough if we repeat our decade of own goals on this file. We have literally left billions on the table.

Governments should fast-track all licensed projects, limit special interest distractions and provide the required muscle and financial support to get these projects up and running as soon as possible.

From Churchill, Man., to Quebec to the Maritimes to British Columbia, we should be making plans for LNG terminals and the required pipeline infrastructure to get this valuable and clean resource to market. And Canadians should pray we haven’t totally missed the market.

Susan McArthur is a former venture capital investor, investment banker and current corporate director. She has previously served on a chemical logistics and oil service board.

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UNDRIP now guides all B.C. laws. BC Courts set off an avalanche of investment risk

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From Resource Works

Gitxaala has changed all the ground rules in British Columbia reshaping the risks around mills, mines and the North Coast transmission push.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Gitxaala v. British Columbia (Chief Gold Commissioner) is poised to reshape how the province approves and defends major resource projects, from mills and mines to new transmission lines.

In a split ruling on 5 December, the court held that British Columbia’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act makes consistency with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples a question courts can answer. The majority went further, saying UNDRIP now operates as a general interpretive aid across provincial law and declaring the Mineral Tenure Act’s automatic online staking regime inconsistent with article 32(2).

University of Saskatchewan law professor Dwight Newman, who has closely followed the case, says the majority has stretched what legislators thought they were doing when they passed the statute. He argues that section 2 of British Columbia’s UNDRIP law, drafted as a purpose clause, has been turned from guidance for reading that Act into a tool for reading all provincial laws, shifting decisions that were meant for cabinet and the legislature toward the courts.

The decision lands in a province already coping with legal volatility on land rights. In August, the Cowichan Tribes title ruling raised questions about the security of fee simple ownership in parts of Richmond, with critics warning that what used to be “indefeasible” private title may now be subject to senior Aboriginal claims. Newman has called the resulting mix of political pressure, investor hesitation and homeowner anxiety a “bubbling crisis” that governments have been slow to confront.

Gitxaala’s implications reach well beyond mining. Forestry communities are absorbing another wave of closures, including the looming shutdown of West Fraser’s 100 Mile House mill amid tight fibre and softwood duties. Industry leaders have urged Ottawa to treat lumber with the same urgency as steel and energy, warning that high duties are squeezing companies and towns, while new Forests Minister Ravi Parmar promises to restore prosperity in mill communities and honour British Columbia’s commitments on UNDRIP and biodiversity, as environmental groups press the government over pellet exports and protection of old growth.

At the same time, Premier David Eby is staking his “Look West” agenda on unlocking about two hundred billion dollars in new investment by 2035, including a shift of trade toward Asia. A centrepiece is the North Coast Transmission Line, a grid expansion from Prince George to Bob Quinn Lake that the government wants to fast track to power new mines, ports, liquefied natural gas facilities and data centres. Even as Eby dismisses a proposed Alberta to tidewater oil pipeline advanced under a new Alberta memorandum as a distraction, Gitxaala means major energy corridors will also be judged against UNDRIP in court.

Supporters of the ruling say that clarity is overdue. Indigenous nations and human rights advocates who backed the appeal have long argued that governments sold UNDRIP legislation as more than symbolism, and that giving it judicial teeth will front load consultation, encourage genuine consent based agreements and reduce the risk of late stage legal battles that can derail projects after years of planning.

Critics are more cautious. They worry that open ended declarations about inconsistency with UNDRIP will invite strategic litigation, create uncertainty around existing approvals and tempt courts into policy making by another name, potentially prompting legislatures to revisit UNDRIP statutes altogether. For now, the judgment leaves British Columbia with fewer excuses: the province has built its growth plans around big, nation building projects and reconciliation framed as partnership with Indigenous nations, and Gitxaala confirms that those partnerships now have a hard legal edge that will shape the next decade of policy and investment.

Resource Works News

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Too nice to fight, Canada’s vulnerability in the age of authoritarian coercion

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Macdonald-Laurier Institute

By Stephen Nagy for Inside Policy

Beijing understands what many Canadians still resist: that our greatest national virtues, including our desire to be an “honest broker” on the world stage, have become our most exploitable weaknesses.

On December 1, 2018, RCMP officers arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou at Vancouver International Airport. As Canadians know well, within days, China seized two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, on fabricated espionage charges. For 1,019 days, they endured arbitrary detention while Canada faced an impossible choice of abandoning the rule-of-law or watching its citizens suffer in Chinese prisons.

This was hostage diplomacy. But more insidiously, it was also the opening move in a broader campaign against Canada, guided by the ancient Chinese proverb “借刀杀人” (Jiè dāo shā rén), or “Kill with a borrowed knife.” Beijing’s strategy, like the proverb, exploits others to do its bidding while remaining at arm’s length. In this case, it seeks to exploit Canadian vulnerabilities such as our resource-dependent economy, our multicultural identity, our loosely governed Arctic territories, and our naïve belief that we can balance relationships with all major powers – even when those powers are in direct conflict with one another.

With its “borrowed knife” campaign, Beijing understands what many Canadians still resist: that our greatest national virtues, including our desire to be an “honest broker” on the world stage, have become our most exploitable weaknesses.

The Weaponization of Canadian Niceness

Canadian foreign policy rests on the Pearsonian tradition. It is the belief that our lack of imperial history and (now irrelevant) middle-power status uniquely positions us as neutral mediators. We pride ourselves on sending peacekeepers, not warfighters. We build bridges through dialogue and compromise.

Beijing exploited this subjective, imagined identity. When Canada arrested Meng pursuant to our extradition treaty with the United States, Chinese state media framed it as Canada “choosing sides” and betraying its honest broker role. This narrative trapped Canadian political culture. Our mythology says we transcend conflicts through enlightened multilateralism. But the modern world increasingly demands choosing sides.

When former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and former Ambassador John McCallum advocated releasing Meng to free the “Two Michaels,” they weren’t acting as Chinese agents. They were expressing a genuinely Canadian impulse that conflict resolves through compromise. Yet this “Canadian solution” was precisely what Beijing sought, abandoning legal principles under pressure.

China’s economic coercion has followed a similar logic. When Beijing blocked Canadian canola, pork, and beef exports – targeting worth $2.7 billion worth of Prairie agricultural products – the timing was transparently political. However, China maintained the fiction of “quality concerns,” making it extremely difficult for Canada to challenge the restrictions via the World Trade Organization. At the same time, Prairie farmers pressured Ottawa to accommodate Beijing.

The borrowed knife was Canadian democratic debate itself, turned against Canadian interests. Beijing didn’t need to directly change policy, it mobilized Canadian farmers, business lobbies, and opposition politicians to do it instead.

The Arctic: Where Mythology Meets Reality

No dimension better illustrates China’s strategy than the Arctic. Canada claims sovereignty over vast northern territories while fielding six icebreakers to Russia’s forty. We conduct summer sovereignty operations that leave territories ungoverned for nine months annually. Chinese state-owned enterprises invest in Arctic mining, Chinese research vessels map Canadian waters, and Beijing now calls itself a “near-Arctic state,” a term appearing nowhere in international law.

This campaign weaponizes the gap between Canadian mythology and capacity. When China proposes infrastructure investment, our reflex is “economic opportunity.” When Chinese researchers request Arctic access, our instinct is accommodation because we’re co-operative multilateralists. Each accommodation establishes precedent, each precedent normalizes Chinese presence, and each normalized presence constrains future Canadian options.

Climate change accelerates these dynamics. As ice melts, the Northwest Passage becomes navigable. Canada insists these are internal waters. China maintains they’re international straits allowing passage. The scenario exposes Canada’s dilemma perfectly. Does Ottawa escalate against our second-largest trading partner over waters we cannot patrol, or accept Chinese transits as fait accompli? Either choice represents failure.

The Diaspora Dilemma

Canada’s multiculturalism represents perhaps our deepest national pride. The Chinese Communist Party has systematically weaponized this openness through United Front Work Department operations, an ostensibly independent community organization that provides genuine services while advancing Beijing’s agenda including: monitoring dissidents, mobilizing Chinese-Canadians for CCP-approved candidates, organizing counter-protests against Tibetan and Uyghur activists, and creating environments where criticism of Beijing risks community ostracism and threats to relatives in China.

The establishment of illegal Chinese police stations in Toronto and Vancouver represents this operation’s logical endpoint. These “overseas service centres” conducted intimidation operations, pressured targets to return to China, and maintained surveillance on diaspora communities.

Canada’s response illuminates our vulnerability. When investigations exposed how Chinese organized crime groups, operating with apparent CCP protection, laundered billions through Vancouver real estate while financing fentanyl trafficking, initial reactions accused investigators of anti-Chinese bias. When CSIS warned that MPs might be compromised, debate focused on whether the warning represented racial profiling rather than whether compromise occurred.

Beijing engineered this trap brilliantly. Legitimate criticism of CCP operations becomes conflated with anti-Chinese racism. Our commitment to multiculturalism gets inverted into paralysis when a foreign government exploits ethnic networks for political warfare. The borrowed knife is Canadian anti-racism, wielded against Canadian sovereignty and this leaves nearly two million Chinese-Canadians under a cloud of suspicion while actual operations continue with limited interference.

What Resistance Requires

Resisting comprehensive pressure demands abandoning comfortable myths and making hard choices.

First, recognize that 21st-century middle-power independence is increasingly fictional. The global order is re-polarizing. Canada cannot maintain equidistant relationships with Washington and Beijing during strategic competition. We can trade with China, but not pretend shared rhetoric outweighs fundamental disagreements about sovereignty and human rights. The Pearsonian honest-broker role is obsolete when major powers want you to choose sides.

Second, invest in sovereignty capacity, not just claims. Sovereignty is exercised or forfeited. This requires sustained investment in military forces, intelligence services, law enforcement, and Arctic infrastructure. It means higher defence spending, more robust counterintelligence, and stricter foreign investment screening, traditionally un-Canadian approaches, which is precisely why we need them.

Third, build coalitions with countries facing similar pressures. Australia, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, and others have faced comparable campaigns. When China simultaneously blocks Canadian canola, Australian wine, and Lithuanian dairy, that’s not separate trade disputes but a pattern requiring coordinated democratic response. The borrowed knife only works when we’re isolated.

Fourth, Ottawa must do much more to protect diaspora communities while confronting foreign operations. Effective policy must shut down United Front operations and illegal police stations while ensuring actions don’t stigmatize communities. Success requires clear communication that we’re targeting a foreign government’s operations, not an ethnic community.

Finally, we must accept the necessity of selective economic diversification. Critical infrastructure, sensitive technologies, and strategic resources cannot be integrated with an authoritarian state weaponizing interdependence. This means higher costs and reduced export opportunities – but maximum efficiency sometimes conflicts with strategic resilience. Canada can achieve this objective with a synergistic relationship with the US and other allies and partners that understand the tangential link between economic security and national security.

Conclusion

Canada’s myths, that we transcend conflicts, that multiculturalism creates only strength, that resource wealth brings pure prosperity and positivity, coupled with our deep vein of light-but-arrogant anti-Americanism, have become exploitable weaknesses. Beijing systematically tested each myth and used the gap between self-conception and reality as leverage.

The borrowed knife strategy works because we keep handing over the knife. Our openness becomes the vector for interference. Our trade dependence becomes the lever for coercion. Our niceness prevents us from recognizing we’re under attack.

Resistance doesn’t require abandoning Canadian values. It requires understanding that defending them demands costs we’ve historically refused to pay. The Chinese “Middle Kingdom” that tells the world it has had 5,000 years of peaceful history has entered a world that doesn’t reward peaceability, it exploits it. The question is whether we’ll recognize the borrowed knife for what it is and put it down before we bleed out from self-inflicted wounds.


Stephen R. Nagy is a professor of politics and international studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo and a senior fellow and China Project lead at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI). The title for his forthcoming monograph is “Japan as a Middle Power State: Navigating Ideological and Systemic Divides.”

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