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Economy

Former socialist economist explains why central planning never works

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16 minute read

From the Fraser Institute

By Matthew D. Mitchell

Central planning from the inside—an interview with a Soviet-era economist

In our descriptions of socialism in Poland and Estonia, we often quoted firsthand accounts of Poles and Estonians who lived through the period. These were workers, consumers, victims of oppression and resistance fighters. One voice that we didn’t capture was that of the planner—the government official charged with making the economy work, despite socialism’s enormous handicaps.

To better understand that perspective, I recently interviewed Gia Jandieri, an economist who worked for the State Supply Committee in Georgia from 1984 to 1989.

In 1989 Gia cofounded the very first non-governmental organization in Soviet Georgia (the Association of Young Economists) to push for market economic education. And in 2001 he established a think-tank, the New Economic School, to promote economic freedom. The New Economic School has been a full member of the Economic Freedom Network since 2004.

Here’s our discussion (lightly edited for readability):

Matthew Mitchell (MM):

How did you become an economist and a Soviet planner?

Gia Jandieri (GM):

It was accidental. In 1984 my mother worked at the Gossnab (the State Supply Committee for the Central Planning Authority) and she offered to introduce me to her boss. At that time I was only 23 years old and had graduated from the Georgian Polytechnical Institute. My knowledge of economics was mostly from life and family experience (my parents worked at a metallurgical plant).

But as a student in 1979 I had had what I thought were a few strange discussions with a teacher of political economy. Like most teachers, he was no true believer in socialism (it was hard for anyone to believe at that time). But he was required to teach the propaganda. What surprised me was that he was willing to publicly agree with me about my suspicions that the system was failing and might even collapse. This was rare, and he was taking a risk. But it also inspired me. It is also important to note that he wanted to hide his hesitation about Marxism and the Soviet system and he also wanted me to stop my questions, and/or stop attending his lectures (which was of course not allowed). I recall he told me: “either I report you or someone reports both of us for having prohibited discussions.”

When I finished my university study of engineering, I was already sure I wanted to be an economist. So, when the opportunity arose in 1984 to work at the State Supply Committee, I seized it.

MM:

Tell us a little bit about the job of a planner. What were your responsibilities? And how did you go about doing them?

GJ:

Our department inside of Gossnab was responsible for monitoring the execution of agreements for production of goods and government orders. My task was to verify that the plans had been executed correctly, to find failures and problems, and to report to the higher authorities.

This included reading lots of reports and visiting the factories and their warehouses for auditing.

The Soviet economy had been in a troublesome condition since the 1970s. We (at the Gossnab) had plenty of information about failures, but it wasn’t useful. We knew that the quality of produced goods was very low, that any household good that was of usable quality was in deficit, and that the shortages encouraged people to buy on the black market through bribes.

In reality, a bribe was a substitute for a market-determined price; people were interested in paying more than the official price for the goods they valued, and the bribe was a way for them to indicate that they valued it more than others.

The process of planning was long. The government had to study demand, find resources and production capacities, create long-run production and supply plans, compare these to political priorities, and get approval for general plans at the Communist Party meetings. Then the general plans needed to be converted to practical production and supply plans, with figures about resources, finances, material and labour, particular producers, particular suppliers, transportation capacities, etc. After this, we began the process of connecting factories and suppliers to one another, organizing transportation, arranging warehousing, and lining up retail shops.

The final stage of the planning process was to send the participating parties their own particular plans and supply contracts. These were obligatory government orders. Those who refused to follow them or failed to fulfill them properly were punished. The production factories had no right or resources to produce any other goods or services than those described in the supply contracts and production plans they received from the authorities. Funny enough, though, government officials could demand that they produce more goods than what was indicated in the plans.

MM:

What made your job difficult? Let’s assume that a socialist planner is 100 per cent committed to the cause; all he or she wants to do is serve the state and the people. What makes it difficult to do that?

GJ:

There were several difficulties. We had to find appropriate consumer data and compare it to the data of suppliers (of production goods mostly). I was working with several (5-15) factories per year. I needed to have current and immediate information, but the state companies were always trying to hide or falsify their reports. In some cases, waste and theft could be so significant that production had to be halted.

The planners invested vast sums of money and time in data collection and each had special units of data processing.

This was a technical exercise and had nothing to do with efficiency or usefulness. The collected data was outdated by the time it was printed. The planning, approval, and execution processes could take many years to complete, and by the time plans were ready, demand had usually changed, creating deficits of what was demanded and surpluses of what was not demanded. The planners, no matter how dedicated or intelligent they might be, simply couldn’t meet the demands of the customers.

Central planning was not an easy exercise. The central planners needed to understand what was needed—both production supplies and consumer goods. But, of course, we had no way of knowing what people truly wanted because there was no market. Consumers weren’t free to choose from different suppliers and new suppliers weren’t free to enter the market to offer new or slightly different goods.

One of the more helpful ways to find out what people wanted was to look at what consumers in the West wanted since they actually had economic freedom and their demands were quickly satisfied. The government also did a lot of industrial spying to steal Western production ways and technologies.

MM:

Were most of the planners you encountered 100 per cent committed to the cause? Were they incentivized to serve the cause?

GJ:

Some of the staffers were dedicated to their work. Others were mostly thinking about how they could obtain bribes from the production factories as a reward for closing their eyes to mismanagement and failure. The planners were also involved in more significant corruption to allow the production factories to have extra materials and financial resources so they could produce for the black market or so they could simply steal.

Then the revenue from these bribes would be divided among all personnel from different agencies (like the Price Committee, Auditing (“Public Control”), and several other agencies charged with inspections). So, in fact, the system generated corruption as a substitute for official incentives. If anything was still operating, this was mostly due to these corrupt incentives and not in spite of them.

The planning system was quite complex and involved many governmental offices though the main decisions were made by the Communist Party. Planning authorities would report to the Party leadership what they thought would be possible to produce and Party leaders would inevitably demand higher quantities.

Gosplan was bureaucratic to its core, both in principle and character. Nobody was allowed to innovate other than planned/artificial innovation. Everyone had to work only by decrees and orders coming from the political leadership. The political orders and bribes were the only engines that were moving anything. Market incentives didn’t exist. Bonuses (premia) were awarded according to bureaucratic rules, and, paradoxically, these destroyed the motivation of the genuinely hard workers.

MM:

Moving beyond economics a bit, how did the socialist system affect other aspects of life? Culture, families, relationships, civil institutions?

GJ:

One of the examples is Western pop-music. Soviet propaganda tried to hide Western culture. Music schools mostly taught Russian classical music and some folk music of various Soviet ethnic nationalities, but it was mostly Russian.

Jazz and hard rock were not prohibited but very much limited. That of course encouraged smuggling and illegal dissemination, as in every sector. Soviet music factories were buying some rights to the music (for instance the Beatles, Louis Armstrong and Ella Fitzgerald). But these recordings were only available in limited quantities and were of bad quality in order to limit their influence.

Small illegal outfits would make unofficial and illegal copies of any popular western music (not classical).

Cultural institutions like theatre or cinema were harshly censored and mostly served the propaganda machine. The people involved in these sectors did what all producers of goods did. They needed to lobby their benefactors in the bureaucracy, bribing and currying favour with them in different ways. It was said that only one out of four films produced would be shown in the cinemas. The other three films were only produced so studios could steal the resources and obtain higher reimbursements.

Before Soviet rule, Georgia was a property rights and ethics-based society. We have ancient proverbs that testify to this. The Soviets killed the ethical leaders, the property-owning elite, and confiscated their property. The stolen property was supposed to be held in common. In fact, the bureaucracy took it.

State ownership of property opened the way to waste and theft of construction and production materials, office inventory, fertilizer, harvested agricultural products, etc.

In Georgia, one bright spot was underground education. Georgians succeeded in growing a network of informal tutors who effectively operated despite very harsh efforts by the authorities to quash them. These skillful teachers prepared the young people for university exams. This was so widespread that some successful young people (including my wife and friends, for instance) started offering private (completely illegal) teaching services when they were university students.

MM:

To this day, socialism remains alluring to many in the West, especially young people. What do you have to say to the 46 per cent of Canadians aged 18-34 who support socialism?

GJ:

Very simply, it is a mistake to think socialism fails because of the wrong managers. This mistake allows people to think that it’ll work the next time it is tried, if we just have better people. In fact the opposite is true—socialism invites the wrong managers. It doesn’t reward a great manager who tries to improve the system but a person who can adapt to and accept the corruption, waste and theft. Socialism also encourages corruption. When more resources are in the control of politicians and the bureaucracy, there is more favouritism, privilege, and discrimination. Jobs and business opportunities are based on privilege rather than market competition. This means naïve people will always be cheated by brazen liars and manipulators.

Poor people are told that the state is under their control but in fact the bureaucracy and political hierarchy control everything.

In socialism, nature and natural resources are abused and wasted. The Tragedy of the Commons runs rampant without private property, voluntary cooperation, and ethics. The government tries to manage everything centrally and totally fails because it lacks dynamic information, competitive discipline, and proper incentives.

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Bjorn Lomborg

How Canada Can Respond to Climate Change Smartly

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From the Fraser Institute

By Bjørn Lomborg

At a time when public finances are strained, and Canada and the world are facing many problems and threats, we need to consider policy choices carefully. On climate, we should spend smartly to solve it effectively, making sure there is enough money left over for all the other challenges.

A sensible response to climate change starts with telling it as it is. We are bombarded with doom-mongering that is too often just plain wrong. Climate change is a problem but it’s not the end of the world.

Yet the overheated rhetoric has convinced governments to spend taxpayer funds heavily on subsidizing current, inefficient solutions. In 2024, the world spent a record-setting CAD$3 trillion on the green energy transition. Taxpayers are directly and indirectly subsidizing millions of wind turbines and solar panels that do little for climate change but line the coffers of green energy companies.

We need to do better and invest more in the only realistic solution to climate change: low-carbon energy research and development. Studies indicate that every dollar invested in green R&D can prevent $11 in long-term climate damages, making it the most effective long-term global climate policy.

Throughout history, humanity has tackled major challenges not by imposing restrictions but by innovating and developing transformative technologies. We didn’t address 1950s air pollution in Los Angeles by banning cars but by creating the catalytic converter. We didn’t combat hunger by urging people to eat less, but through the 1960s Green Revolution that innovated high-yielding varieties to grow much more food.

In 1980, after the oil price shocks, the rich world spent more than 8 cents of every $100 of GDP on green R&D to find energy alternatives. As fossil fuels became cheap again, investment dropped. When climate concern grew, we forgot innovation and instead the focus shifted to subsidizing existing, ineffective solar and wind.

In 2015, governments promised to double green R&D spending by 2020, but did no such thing. By 2023, the rich world still wasn’t back to spending even 4 cents out of every $100 of GDP.

Globally, the rich world spends just CAD$35 billion on green R&D — one-hundredth of overall “green” spending. We should increase this four-fold to about $140 billion a year. Canada’s share would be less than $5 billion a year, less than a tenth of its 2024 CAD$50 billion energy transition spending.

This would allow us to accelerate green innovation and bring forward the day green becomes cheaper than fossil fuels. Breakthroughs are needed in many areas. Take nuclear power. Right now, it is way too expensive, largely because extensive regulations force the production of every new power plant into what essentially becomes a unique, eye-wateringly expensive, extravagant artwork.

The next generation of nuclear power would work on small, modular reactors that get type approval in the production stage and then get produced by the thousand at low cost. The merits of this approach are obvious: we don’t have a bureaucracy that, at a huge cost, certifies every consumer’s cellphone when it is bought. We don’t see every airport making ridiculously burdensome requirements for every newly built airplane. Instead, they both get type-approved and then mass-produced.

We should support the innovation of so-called fourth-generation nuclear power, because if Canadian innovation can make nuclear energy cheaper than fossil fuels, everyone in the world will be able to make the switch—not just rich, well-meaning Canadians, but China, India, and countries across Africa.

Of course, we don’t know if fourth-generation nuclear will work out. That is the nature of innovation. But with smarter spending on R&D, we can afford to focus on many potential technologies. We should consider investing in innovation to grow hydrogen production along with water purification, next-generation battery technology, growing algae on the ocean surface producing CO₂-free oil (a proposal from the decoder of the human genome, Craig Venter), CO₂ extraction, fusion, second-generation biofuels, and thousands of other potential areas.

We must stop believing that spending ever-more money subsidizing still-inefficient technology is going to be a major part of the climate solution. Telling voters across the world for many decades to be poorer, colder, less comfortable, with less meat, fewer cars and no plane travel will never work, and will certainly not be copied by China, India and Africa. What will work is innovating a future where green is cheaper.

Innovation needs to be the cornerstone of our climate policy. Secondly, we need to invest in adaptation. Adaptive infrastructure like green areas and water features help cool cities during heatwaves. Farmers already adapt their practices to suit changing climates. As temperatures rise, farmers plant earlier, with better-adapted varieties or change what they grow, allowing the world to be ever-better fed.

Adaptation has often been overlooked in climate change policy, or derided as a distraction from reducing emissions. The truth is it’s a crucial part of avoiding large parts of the climate problem.

Along with innovation and adaptation, the third climate policy is to drive human development. Lifting communities out of poverty and making them flourish is not just good in and of itself — it is also a defense against rising temperatures. Eliminating poverty reduces vulnerability to climate events like heat waves or hurricanes. Prosperous societies afford more healthcare, social protection, and investment in climate adaptation. Wealthy countries spend more on environmental preservation, reducing deforestation, and promoting conservation efforts.

Focusing funds on these three policy areas will mean Canada can help spark the breakthroughs that are needed to lower energy costs while reducing emissions and making future generations around the world more resilient to climate and all the other big challenges. The path to solving climate change lies in innovation, adaptation, and building prosperous economies.

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Business

Net Zero by 2050: There is no realistic path to affordable and reliable electricity

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  By Dave Morton of the Canadian Energy Reliability Council.

Maintaining energy diversity is crucial to a truly sustainable future

Canada is on an ambitious path to “decarbonize” its economy by 2050 to deliver on its political commitment to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Although policy varies across provinces and federally, a default policy of electrification has emerged, and the electricity industry, which in Canada is largely owned by our provincial governments, appears to be on board.

In a November 2023 submission to the federal government, Electricity Canada, an association of major electric generators and suppliers in Canada, stated: “Every credible path to Net Zero by 2050 relies on electrification of other sectors.” In a single generation, then, will clean electricity become the dominant source of energy in Canada? If so, this puts all our energy eggs in one basket. Lost in the debate seem to be considerations of energy diversity and its role in energy system reliability.

What does an electrification strategy mean for Canada? Currently, for every 100 units of energy we consume in Canada, over 40 come to us as liquid fuels like gasoline and diesel, almost 40 as gaseous fuels like natural gas and propane, and a little less than 20 in the form of electrons produced by those fuels as well as by water, uranium, wind, solar and biomass. In British Columbia, for example, the gas system delivered approximately double the energy of the electricity system.

How much electricity will we need? According to a recent Fraser Institute report, a decarbonized electricity grid by 2050 requires a doubling of electricity. This means adding the equivalent of 134 new large hydro projects like BC’s Site C, 18 nuclear facilities like Ontario’s Bruce Power Plant, or installing almost 75,000 large wind turbines on over one million hectares of land, an area nearly 14.5 times the size of the municipality of Calgary.

Is it feasible to achieve a fully decarbonized electricity grid in the next 25 years that will supply much of our energy requirements? There is a real risk of skilled labour and supply chain shortages that may be impossible to overcome, especially as many other countries are also racing towards net-zero by 2050. Even now, shortages of transformers and copper wire are impacting capital projects. The Fraser Institute report looks at the construction challenges and concludes that doing so “is likely impossible within the 2050 timeframe”.

How we get there matters a lot to our energy reliability along the way. As we put more eggs in the basket, our reliability risk increases. Pursuing electrification while not continuing to invest in our existing fossil fuel-based infrastructure risks leaving our homes and industries short of basic energy needs if we miss our electrification targets.

The IEA 2023 Roadmap to Net Zero estimates that technologies not yet available on the market will be needed to deliver 35 percent of emissions reductions needed for net zero in 2050.  It comes then as no surprise that many of the technologies needed to grow a green electric grid are not fully mature. While wind and solar, increasingly the new generation source of choice in many jurisdictions, serve as a relatively inexpensive source of electricity and play a key role in meeting expanded demand for electricity, they introduce significant challenges to grid stability and reliability that remain largely unresolved. As most people know, they only produce electricity when the wind blows and the sun shines, thereby requiring a firm back-up source of electricity generation.

Given the unpopularity of fossil fuel generation, the difficulty of building hydro and the reluctance to adopt nuclear in much of Canada, there is little in the way of firm electricity available to provide that backup. Large “utility scale” batteries may help mitigate intermittent electricity production in the short term, but these facilities too are immature. Furthermore, wind, solar and batteries, because of the way they connect to the grid don’t contribute to grid reliability in the same way the previous generation of electric generation does.

Other zero-emitting electricity generation technologies are in various stages of development – for example, Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage (CCUS) fitted to GHG emitting generation facilities can allow gas or even coal to generate firm electricity and along with Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) can provide a firm and flexible source of electricity.

What if everything can’t be electrified? In June 2024, a report commissioned by the federal government concluded that the share of overall energy supplied by electricity will need to roughly triple by 2050, increasing from the current 17 percent to between 40 and 70 percent. In this analysis, then, even a tripling of existing electricity generation, will at best only meet 70 percent of our energy needs by 2050.

Therefore, to ensure the continued supply of reliable energy, non-electrification pathways to net zero are also required. CCUS and SMR technologies currently being developed for producing electricity could potentially be used to provide thermal energy for industrial processes and even building heat; biofuels to replace gasoline, diesel and natural gas; and hydrogen to augment natural gas, along with GHG offsets and various emission trading schemes are similarly

While many of these technologies can and currently do contribute to GHG emission reductions, uncertainties remain relating to their scalability, cost and public acceptance. These uncertainties in all sectors of our energy system leaves us with the question: Is there any credible pathway to reliable net-zero energy by 2050?

Electricity Canada states: “Ensuring reliability, affordability, and sustainability is a balancing act … the energy transition is in large part policy-driven; thus, current policy preferences are uniquely impactful on the way utilities can manage the energy trilemma. The energy trilemma is often referred to colloquially as a three-legged stool, with GHG reductions only one of those legs. But the other two, reliability and affordability, are key to the success of the transition.

Policymakers should urgently consider whether any pathway exists to deliver reliable net-zero energy by 2050. If not, letting the pace of the transition be dictated by only one of those legs guarantees, at best, a wobbly stool. Matching the pace of GHG reductions with achievable measures to maintain energy diversity and reliability at prices that are affordable will be critical to setting us on a truly sustainable pathway to net zero, even if it isn’t achieved by 2050.

Dave Morton, former Chair and CEO of the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC), is with the Canadian Energy Reliability Council. 

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