Connect with us
[bsa_pro_ad_space id=12]

espionage

Ex-NYPD Cop Jailed in Beijing’s Transnational Repatriation Plot, Canada Remains Soft Target

Published

12 minute read

Sam Cooper's avatar Sam Cooper

A former NYPD sergeant was sentenced to 18 months in prison this week for his role in a shadowy Chinese government operation that sought to coerce a political exile in New Jersey to return to the mainland. The conviction of Michael McMahon marks the first successful prosecution of a current or former American law enforcement officer accused of profiting from Beijing’s covert repatriation campaign, known as Operation Fox Hunt—a global manhunt that has ensnared operatives from Vancouver and Toronto to Los Angeles.

McMahon, 57, was convicted alongside two Chinese-American co-conspirators, Zhu Yong and Congying Zheng, who were previously sentenced to 24 and 16 months in prison, respectively. The trio was found guilty of interstate stalking and acting as unregistered agents of the People’s Republic of China, after a federal jury heard how they aided Beijing’s secret police—using Chinese businessmen and hired thugs based in the Tri-State area and California—to track and psychologically terrorize their target: a former Wuhan official named Xu Jin.

While McMahon’s sentencing concludes one legal chapter, The Bureau’s investigation into court records and national security sources reveals a far broader and ongoing web of espionage, coercion, and transnational repression—directed by senior Chinese Communist Party officials and bolstered by diaspora operatives and criminal proxies across North America.

McMahon and his family have fiercely denied his culpability as a tool of China’s secret police, insisting he was an unwitting pawn in a clandestine war that U.S. authorities failed to warn domestic citizens—including former law enforcement officers—about.

In private messages to The Bureau, following months of in-depth reporting into sealed court documents, McMahon’s wife, Martha Byrne, emphasized their belief that he had done nothing wrong.

“My husband, Michael McMahon, committed no crime,” she wrote. “There’s plenty of media to expose this grave injustice on my family.” She added a stark warning directed at law enforcement and intelligence communities: “It’s extremely important you use your platform to warn private investigators and local law enforcement of these patterns. Our government did nothing to warn us, and they knew my husband was being used. They knew since as early as 2015/16 these Chinese actors were using PIs. They put our family in danger and in turn the security of the entire country.”

But the sentencing judge in Brooklyn emphasized McMahon’s witting participation—and the fact that he profited from the scheme.

The case centered on Xu Jin, a former municipal official from Wuhan who fled China with his wife in 2010, seeking refuge in the United States. By 2015, his face appeared on a China Daily “most wanted” list—alongside dozens of Canada-based targets—part of Beijing’s sweeping Fox Hunt campaign to repatriate ex-officials accused of corruption, dissidents, and political rivals of President Xi Jinping. While Chinese authorities accused Xu of accepting bribes, he maintained he was not a criminal but a political target caught in a purge masked as anti-graft enforcement.

By 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security escalated its efforts, dispatching emissaries, threatening Xu’s relatives in China, and launching a North American rendition operation. That’s when Zhu Yong, a 66-year-old Chinese national living in New York, hired McMahon—then working as a private investigator—to locate Xu.

Tapping law enforcement databases and traditional surveillance tactics, McMahon began tracking Xu and his family. The key break came in April 2017, when Xu’s elderly father—who had recently suffered a brain hemorrhage—was flown to the U.S. by the PRC, accompanied by a government doctor. His role: deliver a threatening message in person to his son. If Xu refused to return to China, his family would suffer the consequences.

These same tactics have been deployed in Canada, according to a January 2022 “Special Report” by the Privy Council Office on Chinese Fox Hunt operations, obtained by The Bureau.

McMahon surveilled the father’s arrival at a New Jersey home, then followed him to Xu Jin’s residence. Within days, the Chinese team had the address they needed.

Soon after, Congying Zheng and another associate showed up at Xu’s front door. They pounded on it, peered through the windows, and left a note that read: “If you are willing to go back to the mainland and spend 10 years in prison, your wife and children will be all right. That’s the end of this matter!”

By that point, McMahon’s role had deepened. Text messages recovered by federal investigators confirmed that he understood the objective of the operation. In one exchange with another investigator he had contracted, McMahon acknowledged that the goal was to repatriate the target to China “so they could prosecute him.”

After providing the address of Xu Jin, McMahon told his surveillance partner that he was “waiting for a call” to determine next steps. The partner replied, “Yeah. From NJ State Police about an abduction,” to which McMahon responded: “Lol.”

He later suggested further intimidation tactics to a Chinese co-conspirator, advising: “Park outside his home and let him know we are there.” According to prosecutors, McMahon also conducted background research on the victim’s daughter, including details about her university residence and academic major.

In total, McMahon was paid over $19,000 for his role in the PRC-directed operation. To obscure the origin of the funds, he deposited the payments into his son’s bank account—an arrangement prosecutors noted he had never used with any other client.

Court filings in the case traced troubling connections northward—to Canada—where suspects linked to Fujian-based organized crime networks, long known to Canadian police and senior elected officials, have been under investigation since at least 2022. Yet despite mounting intelligence, no charges have been laid.

The same Interpol “red notice” that named Xu also listed Chinese nationals living in Canada. According to Canadian law enforcement sources who spoke to The Bureau, multiple individuals now targeted by Fox Hunt reside in Vancouver and Toronto—cities with large mainland Chinese communities and a documented history of interference concerns.

“In Canada, we just knock on doors and talk to people,” one RCMP officer told The Bureau. “In the U.S., they go in and make arrests.” The officer pointed to a critical gap in Canadian law: the absence of a foreign agent registry—one of the FBI’s key legal tools in dismantling Fox Hunt cells on U.S. soil.

Beyond McMahon and Zhu Yong, the FBI investigation revealed a sprawling web of operatives functioning as “cutouts”—deniable intermediaries who provide a buffer between Chinese intelligence and the dirty work of coercion.

Even as the New Jersey operation began to falter—after Xu’s ailing father reportedly resisted efforts to pressure his son and Chinese operatives grew wary of U.S. law enforcement closing in—officials in Beijing leveraged McMahon’s surveillance to identify a new target: Xu’s daughter, a university student in Northern California. A second Fox Hunt pressure campaign was soon launched.

In California, the Ministry of Public Security dispatched Rong Jing—a PRC national and permanent U.S. resident—who had operated with apparent impunity across the U.S. as a bounty hunter for Beijing’s global rendition program.

This time, Rong sought to hire a new American private investigator.

On May 22, 2017, Rong met with the PI at a restaurant in Los Angeles. He didn’t know the man was an undercover FBI informant—and agreed to let their four-hour conversation be recorded.

When Rong proposed video surveillance on Xu’s daughter, the informant began to ask probing questions. Rong opened up—not only about the mission, but about the entire Fox Hunt apparatus behind it.

Asked how payment would be arranged, Rong said it would depend on what the PRC decided to do once the daughter was located. “Say, if the next step somebody asks me to catch [Xu’s] daughter,” he speculated. “When we get there, they wouldn’t feel comfortable to arrest her… So we need to be there on their behalf.”

According to Rong, successful Fox Hunt collaborators could submit for reward money—paid out inside China and split with U.S.-based operatives. The funds, he said, were controlled by Party officials, with the Communist Party overseeing all payments.

Rong contrasted his own freelance status with another class of agents—PRC “lobbyists” sent abroad as salaried civil servants. These operatives, he said, traveled under false names and work visas, sometimes posing as academics or trade representatives. Their job was to persuade overseas Chinese to return “voluntarily.”

“These lobbyists explain the advantages of returning to the PRC,” Rong said, euphemistically.

And then he pointed north.

Rong told the informant he had personally met one such PRC lobbyist in Canada. Though he did not name the individual, he described the tactic: use false identities, operate under official cover, and insulate the PRC government from any legal risk.

As the conversation turned back to Xu’s daughter, the informant asked the most pressing question: would she be safe?

“If there was an accident,” Rong replied, “in truth, you could claim that you were just investigating her.”

The Bureau is a reader-supported publication.

To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Invite your friends and earn rewards

If you enjoy The Bureau, share it with your friends and earn rewards when they subscribe.

Invite Friends

Todayville is a digital media and technology company. We profile unique stories and events in our community. Register and promote your community event for free.

Follow Author

Artificial Intelligence

UK Police Pilot AI System to Track “Suspicious” Driver Journeys

Published on

logo

By

AI-driven surveillance is shifting from spotting suspects to mapping ordinary life, turning everyday travel into a stream of behavioral data

Police forces across Britain are experimenting with artificial intelligence that can automatically monitor and categorize drivers’ movements using the country’s extensive number plate recognition network.
Internal records obtained by Liberty Investigates and The Telegraph reveal that three of England and Wales’s nine regional organized crime units are piloting a Faculty AI-built program designed to learn from vehicle movement data and detect journeys that algorithms label “suspicious.”
For years, the automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) system has logged more than 100 million vehicle sightings each day, mostly for confirming whether a specific registration has appeared in a certain area.
The new initiative changes that logic entirely. Instead of checking isolated plates, it teaches software to trace entire routes, looking for patterns of behavior that resemble the travel of criminal networks known for “county lines” drug trafficking.
The project, called Operation Ignition, represents a change in scale and ambition.
Unlike traditional alerts that depend on officers manually flagging “vehicles of interest,” the machine learning model learns from past data to generate its own list of potential targets.
Official papers admit that the process could involve “millions of [vehicle registrations],” and that the information gathered may guide future decisions about the ethical and operational use of such technologies.
What began as a Home Office-funded trial in the North West covering Merseyside, Greater Manchester, Cheshire, Cumbria, Lancashire, and North Wales has now expanded into three regional crime units.
Authorities describe this as a technical experiment, but documents point to long-term plans for nationwide adoption.
Civil liberty groups warn that these kinds of systems rarely stay limited to their original purpose.
Jake Hurfurt of Big Brother Watch said: “The UK’s ANPR network is already one of the biggest surveillance networks on the planet, tracking millions of innocent people’s journeys every single day. Using AI to analyse the millions of number plates it picks up will only make the surveillance dragnet even more intrusive. Monitoring and analysing this many journeys will impact everybody’s privacy and has the potential to allow police to analyse how we all move around the country at the click of a button.”
He added that while tackling organized drug routes is a legitimate goal, “there is a real danger of mission creep – ANPR was introduced as a counter-terror measure, now it is used to enforce driving rules. The question is not whether should police try and stop gangs, but how could this next-generation use of number plate scans be used down the line?”
The find and profile app was built by Faculty AI, a British technology firm with deep ties to government projects.
The company, which worked with Dominic Cummings during the Vote Leave campaign, has since developed data analysis tools for the NHS and Ministry of Defence.
Faculty recently drew attention after it was contracted to create software that scans social media for “concerning” posts, later used to monitor online debate about asylum housing.
Faculty declined to comment on its part in the ANPR initiative.
Chief constable Chris Todd, chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s data and analytics board, described the system as “a small-scale, exploratory, operational proof of concept looking at the potential use of machine learning in conjunction with ANPR data.”
He said the pilot used “a very small subset of ANPR data” and insisted that “data protection and security measures are in place, and an ethics panel has been established to oversee the work.”
William Webster, the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, said the Home Office was consulting on new legal rules for digital and biometric policing tools, including ANPR.
“Oversight is a key part of this framework,” he said, adding that trials of this kind should take place within “a ‘safe space’” that ensures “transparency and accountability at the outset.”
A Home Office spokesperson said the app was “designed to support investigations into serious and organised crime” and was “currently being tested on a small scale” using “a small subset of data collected by the national ANPR network.”
From a privacy standpoint, the concern is not just the collection of travel data but what can be inferred from it.
By linking millions of journeys into behavioral models, the system could eventually form a live map of how people move across the country.
Once this analytical capacity becomes part of routine policing, the distinction between tracking suspects and tracking citizens may blur entirely.
Continue Reading

espionage

Carney Floor Crossing Raises Counterintelligence Questions aimed at China, Former Senior Mountie Argues

Published on

Michael Ma has recently attended events with Chinese consulate officials, leaders of a group called CTCCO, and the Toronto “Hongmen,” where diaspora community leaders and Chinese diplomats advocated Beijing’s push to subordinate Taiwan. These same entities have also appeared alongside Canadian politicians at a “Nanjing” memorial in Toronto.

By Garry Clement

Michael Ma’s meeting with consulate-linked officials proves no wrongdoing—but, Garry Clement writes, the timing and optics highlight vulnerabilities Canada still refuses to treat as a security issue.

I spent years in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police learning a simple rule. You assess risk based on capability, intent, and opportunity — not on hope or assumptions. When those three factors align, ignoring them is negligence.

That framework applies directly to Canada’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China — and to recent political events that deserve far more scrutiny than they have received.

Michael Ma’s crossover to the Liberal Party may be completely legitimate, although numerous observers have noted oddities in the timing, messaging, and execution surrounding Ma’s move, which brings Mark Carney within one seat of majority rule.

There is no evidence of wrongdoing.

But from a law enforcement and national security perspective, that is beside the point. Counterintelligence is not about proving guilt after the fact; it is about identifying vulnerabilities before damage is done — and about recognizing when a situation creates avoidable exposure in a known threat environment.

A constellation of ties and public appearances — reported by The Bureau and the National Post — has fueled questions about Ma’s China-facing judgment and vetting. Those reports describe his engagement with a Chinese-Canadian Conservative network that intervened in party leadership politics by urging Erin O’Toole to resign for his “anti-China” stance after 2021 and later calling for Pierre Poilievre’s ouster — while advancing Beijing-aligned framing on key Canada–China disputes.

The National Post has also reported that critics point to Ma’s pro-Beijing community endorsement during his campaign, and his appearance at a Toronto dinner for the Chinese Freemasons — where consular officials used the forum to promote Beijing’s “reunification” agenda for Taiwan. Ma reportedly offered greetings and praised the organization, but did not indicate support for annexation.

Open-source records also show that the same Toronto Chinese Freemasons and leaders Ma has met from a group called CTCCO sponsored and supported Ontario’s “Nanjing Massacre Commemorative Day” initiative (Bill 79) — a campaign celebrated in Chinese state and Party-aligned media, alongside public praise from PRC consular officials in Canada.

China Daily reported in 2018 that the Nanjing memorial was jointly sponsored by CTCCO and the Chinese Freemasons of Canada (Toronto), supported by more than $180,000 in community donations.

Photos show that PRC consular officials and Toronto politicians appeared at related Nanjing memorial ceremonies, including Zhao Wei, the alleged undercover Chinese intelligence agent later expelled from Canada after The Globe and Mail exposed Zhao’s alleged targeting of Conservative MP Michael Chong and his family in Hong Kong.

The fact that Michael Ma recently met with some of the controversial pro-Beijing community figures and organizations described above — including leaders from the Hongmen ecosystem and the CTCCO — does not prove any nefarious intent in either his Conservative candidacy or his decision to cross the floor to Mark Carney.

But it does demonstrate something Ottawa keeps avoiding: the PRC’s influence work is often conducted in plain sight, through community-facing institutions, elite access, and “normal” relationship networks — the very channels that create leverage, deniability, and political pressure over time.

Canada’s intelligence community has been clear.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has repeatedly identified the People’s Republic of China as the most active and persistent foreign interference threat facing Canada. These warnings are not abstract. They are rooted in investigations, human intelligence, and allied reporting shared across the Five Eyes intelligence alliance.

At the center of Beijing’s approach is the United Front Work Department — a Chinese Communist Party entity tasked with influencing foreign political systems, cultivating elites, and shaping narratives abroad. In policing terms, it functions as an influence and access network: operating legally where possible, covertly where necessary, and always in service of the Party’s strategic objectives.

What differentiates the People’s Republic of China from most foreign actors is legal compulsion.

Under China’s National Intelligence Law, Chinese citizens and organizations can be compelled to support state intelligence work and to keep that cooperation secret. In practical terms, that creates an inherent vulnerability for democratic societies: coercive leverage — applied through family, travel, business interests, community pressure, and fear.

This does not mean Chinese-Canadians are suspect.

Quite the opposite — many are targets of intimidation themselves. But it does mean the Chinese Communist Party has a mechanism to exert pressure in ways democratic states do not. Ignoring that fact is not tolerance; it is a failure to understand the threat environment.

In the RCMP, we were trained to recognize that foreign interference rarely announces itself. It operates through relationships, access, favors, timing, and silence. It does not require ideological agreement — only opportunity and leverage.

That is why transparency matters. When political figures engage with representatives of an authoritarian state known for interference operations, the burden is not on the public to “prove” concern is justified. The burden is on officials to explain why there is none — and to demonstrate that basic safeguards are in place.

Canada’s allies have already internalized this reality. Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom have all publicly acknowledged and legislated against People’s Republic of China political interference. Their assessments mirror ours. Their conclusions are the same.

In the United States, the Linda Sun case — covered by The Bureau — illustrates, in the U.S. government’s telling, how United Front–style influence can be both deniable and effective: built through diaspora-facing proxies, insider access, and relationship networks that rarely look like classic espionage until the damage is done.

And this is not a niche concern.

Think tanks in both the United States and Canada — as well as allied research communities in the United Kingdom and Europe — have documented the scale and persistence of these political-influence ecosystems. Nicholas Eftimiades, an associate professor at Penn State and a former senior National Security Agency analyst, has estimated multiple hundreds of such entities are active in the United States. How many operate in Canada is the question Ottawa still refuses to treat with urgency — and, if an upcoming U.S. report is any indication, the answer may be staggering.

Canada’s hesitation to address United Front networks is not due to lack of information. It is due to lack of resolve.

From a law enforcement perspective, this is troubling. You do not wait for a successful compromise before tightening security. You act when the indicators are present — especially when your own intelligence agencies are sounding the alarm.

National security is not ideological. It is practical.

The Bureau is a reader-supported publication.

To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Continue Reading

Trending

X