Business
Canadians largely ignore them and their funding bleeds their competition dry: How the CBC Spends its Public Funding

If we want to intelligently assess the value CBC delivers to Canadians in exchange for their tax-funded investment, we’ll need to understand two things:
- How CBC spends the money we give them
- What impact their product has on Canadians
The answer to question #2 depends on which Canadians we’re discussing. Your average young family from suburban Toronto is probably only vaguely aware there is a CBC. But Canadian broadcasters? They know all about the corporation, but just wish it would lift its crushing hobnailed boots from their faces.
Stick around and I’ll explain.
For the purposes of this discussion I’m not interested in the possibility that there’s been reckless or negligent corruption or waste, so I won’t address the recent controversy over paying out millions of dollars in executive benefits. Instead, I want to know how the CBC is designed to operate. This will allow us to judge the corporation on its own terms.
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CBC’s Financial Structure
We’ll begin with the basics. According to the CBC’s 2023-24 projections in their most recent corporate plan strategy, the company will receive $1.17 billion from Parliament; $292 million from advertising; and $209 million from subscriber fees, financing, and other income. Company filings note that revenue from both advertising and legacy subscription pools are dropping. Advertising is trending downwards because of ongoing changes in industry ad models, and the decline in subscriptions can be blamed on competition from “cord-cutting” internet services. The Financing and other income category includes revenue from rent and lease-generating use of CBC’s many real estate assets.
The projected combined television, radio, and digital services spending is $1.68 billion. For important context, 2022-23 data from the 2022-2023 annual report break that down to $996 million for English services, and $816 million for French services. 2022-23 also saw $60 million in costs for transmission, distribution, and collection. Corporate management and finance costs came to around $33 million. Overall, the company reported a net loss of $125 million in 2022-23.
The corporation estimates that their English-language digital platforms attract 17.4 million unique visitors each month and that the average visitor engages with content for 28 minutes a month. In terms of market relevance, those are pretty good numbers. But, among Canadian internet users, cbc.ca still ranked only 43rd for total web destinations (which include sites like google.com and amazon.ca). French-language Radio-Canada’s numbers were 5.2 million unique visitors who each hung around for 50 minutes a month.
Monthly engagement with digital English-language news and regional services was 20 minutes. Although we’re given no visitor numbers, the report does admit that “interest in news was lower than expected.”
CBC content production
All that’s not very helpful for understanding what’s actually going on inside CBC. We need to get a feel for how the corporation divides its spending between programming categories and what’s driving the revenue.
The CRTC provides annual financial filings for all Canadian broadcasters, including the CBC. I could describe what’s happening by throwing columns and rows of dollar figures at you. In fact, should you be so disposed, you can view the spreadsheet here. But it turns out that my colorful graph will do a much better job:
As you can see for yourself, CBC spends a large chunk of its money producing news for all three video platforms (CBC and Radio-Canada conventional TV and the cable/VOD platforms they refer to as “discretionary TV”). The two conventional networks also invest significant funds in drama and comedy production.
The chart doesn’t cover CBC radio, so I’ll fill you in. English-language production costs $143 million (roughly the equivalent of the costs of English TV drama/comedy) while the bill for French-language radio production came in at $94 million (more or less equal to discretionary TV news production).
CBC Content Consumption
Who’s watching? The CBC itself reported that viewers of CBC English television represented only 5.1 percent of the total Canadian audience, and only 2.0 percent tuned in to CBC news. By “total Canadian audience”, I mean all Canadians viewing all available TV programming at a given time. So when the CBC tells us that their News Network got a 2.0 percent “share”, they don’t mean that they attracted 2.0 percent of all Canadians. Rather, they got 2.0 percent of whoever happened to be watching any TV network – which could easily come to just a half of one percent of all Canadians. After all, how many people still watch TV?
According to CRTC data, between the 2014–15 and 2022–23 seasons, English language CBC TV weekly viewing hours dropped from 35 million to 16 million. That total would amount to less than six minutes a day per anglophone Canadian. Specifically, news viewing fell by 52 percent, sports by 66 percent, and drama and comedy by 51 percent.
CBC Radio One and CBC Music only managed to attract 14.3 percent of the Canadian market. What does that actually mean? I’ve seen estimates suggesting that between 15 and 25 percent of all Canadians listen to radio during the popular daily commute slots. So at its peak, CBC radio’s share of that audience is possibly no higher than 3.5 percent of all Canadians.
A recent survey found that only 41 percent of Canadians agreed the CBC “is important and should continue doing what it’s doing.” The remaining 59 percent were split between thinking the CBC requires “a lot of changes” and was “no longer useful.” Those numbers remained largely consistent across all age groups.
It seems that while some Canadian’s might support the CBC in principle, for the most part, they’re not actually consuming a lot of content.
CBC Revenue sources
CBC’s primary income is from government funding through parliamentary allocations. Here’s what those look like:
Advertising (or, “time sales” as they refer to it) is another major revenue source. That channel brought in more than $200 million in 2023:
But here’s the thing: the broadcast industry in Canada is currently engaged in a bitter struggle for existence. Every single dollar from that shrinking pool of advertising revenue is desperately needed. And most broadcasters are – perhaps misguidedly – fighting for more government funding. So why should the CBC, with its billion dollar subsidies, be allowed to also compete for limited ad revenue?
Or, to put it differently, what vital and unique services does the CBC provide that might justify their special treatment?
It’s possible that CBC does target rural and underserved audiences missed by the commercial networks. But those are clearly not what’s consuming the vast majority of the corporation’s budget. Perhaps people are watching CBC’s “big tent” drama and comedy productions, but are those measurably better or more important than what’s coming from the private sector? And we’ve already seen how, for all intents and purposes, no one’s watching their TV news or listening to their radio broadcasts.
Perhaps there’s an argument to be made for maintaining or even increasing funding for CBC. But I haven’t yet seen anyone convincingly articulate it.
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Business
Losses Could Reach Nearly One Billion: When Genius Failed…..Again

Illustration by Daniel Medina
By Eric Salzman
The smartest guys in the room fall for the same scam twice in less than 5 years
THE SCHEME: Fraud and Money Laundering
THE COMPANY: Stenn Technologies
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THE NEWS: For the second time in five years, a scam involving sexing up a boring, centuries old financing business blew up in the faces of some of the world’s largest banks
You know the old saying. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice…
In December, “fintech” supply chain financier Stenn Technologies and its subsidiaries Stenn Assets UK Ltd and Stenn International Ltd, collapsed, spanking investors and lenders such as Citigroup, Nexis, BNP Paribas, HSBC and private equity firm Centerbridge. Just a month prior to the blow-up, Stenn was viewed as a fintech unicorn with a robust $1 billion book of business, poised for strong growth.
As we’ve seen time and again, a unicorn can quickly die when a company’s business model screams fraud to anyone bothering to look.
Stenn Technologies claimed to use artificial intelligence and state of the art technology to analyze credit and money laundering risk in order to turn a low margin, supply chain financing business into an awesome, high return, low risk securitized product.
Here’s a quick explanation of supply chain financing:
1. A company delivers its product to a buyer and the buyer promises to pay in a few months’ time, creating an accounts receivable.
2. The company that has the accounts receivable sends it to the supply chain financier (Greensill Capital or Stenn Technologies).
3. The supply chain financier pays the company cash for the receivable minus a discount which is another business practice called factoring.
4. The buyer pays the financier the full amount of the receivable on the due date.
Supply chain financing is nothing new. It was probably around when Marco Polo set out for the Orient.
If it sounds boring, that’s because it is, or at least is supposed to be. Lex Greensill’s Greensill Capital changed that a decade ago.
Through fancy structuring, as well as four private jets, Greensill created a byzantine circular loop where money flowed around the world, much of it to Greensill favorites like steel maker Sanjeev Gupta and then back again. The operation was continuously funded by either GAM, Credit Suisse, SoftBank as well as Greensill’s own German bank, Greensill Bank AG. After a while, as more money poured into Greensill from eager investors, the company began to essentially just lend money out, mostly to Gupta while calling the transactions “future receivables.”
Greensill Capital collapsed under the weight of fraud in 2021, costing its big investors mentioned above billions. Matt reported on the story here in 2021.
Greensill’s receivable notes (the fancy structuring) were insured by a number of insurers, the biggest being Japanese insurer Tokio Marine. The insurance made investors comfortable because, if Tokio Marine insured it, the notes have to be money good, right?
Wrong.
At one point, Tokio had nearly $8 billion of exposure to Greensill deals. How insurers got comfortable with insuring receivables to a blizzard of shell companies that all seemed to point back to Gupta and Lex’s pockets is anyone’s guess, but when Tokio finally did a good look under the hood, they cried insurance fraud and Greensill came crashing down. Credit Suisse investors alone lost $10 billion.
At this point, we need to hear from Lt. Commander Montgomery Scott, better known as Scotty.
So now, we’re at the shame on you portion of the story.
Astoundingly, Stenn Technologies was able to pull off a similar scam just a couple of years later, posing as a fintech company, supposedly using the latest in technology to do global supply chain financing faster and better than everyone else in the business.
The victims are new, but given the high publicity of Greensill’s failure, you’d figure they would catch on.
According to Bloomberg News, “Stenn’s main backers were Citigroup Inc., BNP Paribas SA, Natixis and HSBC Holdings Plc while Barclays Plc, M&G Plc and Goldman Sachs Group also backed the transaction.”
Private equity firm Centerbridge invested $50 million in capital and valued the company at $900 million in 2022.
In 2022, TechCrunch described the secret sauce that Stenn was supposedly using to bring a 13th century business into the modern age.
Stenn — which applies big data analytics, taking a few datapoints about a business (the main two being what money it has coming in and going out based on invoices) and matching them up against an algorithm that takes some 1,000 other factors into account to determine its eligibility for a loan of up to $10 million; and on the other side taps a network of institutions and other big lenders to provide the capital for that financing.
Perhaps this multi-factor algorithm was super cool when they showed it to investors and lending partners. The only problem was Stenn, in the words of a business crime attorney who spoke to Bloomberg, “has all the hallmarks of both fraud and money laundering.”
Greensill might have been a bit hard to figure out with large, respected insurance companies insuring their notes.
But anyone who took the time to investigate Stenn Technologies by simply looking at the data they pumped out to investors weekly would have seen the scheme for what it was.
While it appears the previously mentioned institutional investors didn’t bother to investigate, Bloomberg did and the results were darkly hilarious.
Some of Stenn’s biggest suppliers were tiny companies in Thailand and Hong Kong with little in common yet corporate filings for all of them list the same Russian name as a backer. One in Singapore was accused by the U.S. of enabling payments to Russian naval intelligence and sanctioned in August. Tracing a group owned by another Russian investor that was supposedly shipping millions of dollars of goods to corporations in Switzerland and Canada led to a derelict Prague building with boarded-up windows.
Bloomberg contacted the largest 50 firms that were supposedly the buyers for what Stenn’s suppliers produced, and the bulk had no idea who Stenn Technologies or these suppliers were! A spokesman for Edion Corp., one of the biggest electronics retailers in Japan, told Bloomberg, “we have absolutely no knowledge of this matter. We really have no idea what it’s about.”
Essentially, the data produced by Stenn highlighted thousands of bogus transactions on a weekly basis to investors, lying about who was paying and who was receiving billions of dollars of funds. According to Bloomberg, investors received these details with the name of the suppliers and buyers included. Therefore, at any time, investors could have done a sanity check on these obscure suppliers to see who they were, or in this case, weren’t.
HSBC finally caught up to what Stenn was doing. Again from the Bloomberg report:
HSBC triggered Stenn’s downfall when it lodged an application to the UK courts, alleging that its officials had uncovered ‘deeply troubling issues on a large scale.’ The
invoices at the heart of the deal weren’t ‘genuine debts’ and payments to suppliers weren’t coming from ‘blue-chip companies’ but from bogus firms with similar names, according to the complaint filed by the London-based bank.
Investors are facing a potential loss of $200 million, although it could be a lot more as $978 million in invoiced-financed notes are outstanding, Bloomberg reports.
There is a bright side to Stenn’s collapse though. A senior trade finance official told The Sunday Times:
“The saving grace here is at least it’s smaller than Greensill.”
Well played.
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Banks
TD Bank Account Closures Expose Chinese Hybrid Warfare Threat

From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
Scott McGregor warns that Chinese hybrid warfare is no longer hypothetical—it’s unfolding in Canada now. TD Bank’s closure of CCP-linked accounts highlights the rising infiltration of financial interests. From cyberattacks to guanxi-driven influence, Canada’s institutions face a systemic threat. As banks sound the alarm, Ottawa dithers. McGregor calls for urgent, whole-of-society action before foreign interference further erodes our sovereignty.
Chinese hybrid warfare isn’t coming. It’s here. And Canada’s response has been dangerously complacent
The recent revelation by The Globe and Mail that TD Bank has closed accounts linked to pro-China groups—including those associated with former Liberal MP Han Dong—should not be dismissed as routine risk management. Rather, it is a visible sign of a much deeper and more insidious campaign: a hybrid war being waged by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) across Canada’s political, economic and digital spheres.
TD Bank’s move—reportedly driven by “reputational risk” and concerns over foreign interference—marks a rare, public signal from the private sector. Politically exposed persons (PEPs), a term used in banking and intelligence circles to denote individuals vulnerable to corruption or manipulation, were reportedly among those flagged. When a leading Canadian bank takes action while the government remains hesitant, it suggests the threat is no longer theoretical. It is here.
Hybrid warfare refers to the use of non-military tools—such as cyberattacks, financial manipulation, political influence and disinformation—to erode a nation’s sovereignty and resilience from within. In The Mosaic Effect: How the Chinese Communist Party Started a Hybrid War in America’s Backyard, co-authored with Ina Mitchell, we detailed how the CCP has developed a complex and opaque architecture of influence within Canadian institutions. What we’re seeing now is the slow unravelling of that system, one bank record at a time.
Financial manipulation is a key component of this strategy. CCP-linked actors often use opaque payment systems—such as WeChat Pay, UnionPay or cryptocurrency—to move money outside traditional compliance structures. These platforms facilitate the unchecked flow of funds into Canadian sectors like real estate, academia and infrastructure, many of which are tied to national security and economic competitiveness.
Layered into this is China’s corporate-social credit system. While framed as a financial scoring tool, it also functions as a mechanism of political control, compelling Chinese firms and individuals—even abroad—to align with party objectives. In this context, there is no such thing as a genuinely independent Chinese company.
Complementing these structural tools is guanxi—a Chinese system of interpersonal networks and mutual obligations. Though rooted in trust, guanxi can be repurposed to quietly influence decision-makers, bypass oversight and secure insider deals. In the wrong hands, it becomes an informal channel of foreign control.
Meanwhile, Canada continues to face escalating cyberattacks linked to the Chinese state. These operations have targeted government agencies and private firms, stealing sensitive data, compromising infrastructure and undermining public confidence. These are not isolated intrusions—they are part of a broader effort to weaken Canada’s digital, economic and democratic institutions.
The TD Bank decision should be seen as a bellwether. Financial institutions are increasingly on the front lines of this undeclared conflict. Their actions raise an urgent question: if private-sector actors recognize the risk, why hasn’t the federal government acted more decisively?
The issue of Chinese interference has made headlines in recent years, from allegations of election meddling to intimidation of diaspora communities. TD’s decision adds a new financial layer to this growing concern.
Canada cannot afford to respond with fragmented, reactive policies. What’s needed is a whole-of-society response: new legislation to address foreign interference, strengthened compliance frameworks in finance and technology, and a clear-eyed recognition that hybrid warfare is already being waged on Canadian soil.
The CCP’s strategy is long-term, multidimensional and calculated. It blends political leverage, economic subversion, transnational organized crime and cyber operations. Canada must respond with equal sophistication, coordination and resolve.
The mosaic of influence isn’t forming. It’s already here. Recognizing the full picture is no longer optional. Canadians must demand transparency, accountability and action before more of our institutions fall under foreign control.
Scott McGregor is a defence and intelligence veteran, co-author of The Mosaic Effect: How the Chinese Communist Party Started a Hybrid War in America’s Backyard, and the managing partner of Close Hold Intelligence Consulting Ltd. He is a senior security adviser to the Council on Countering Hybrid Warfare and a former intelligence adviser to the RCMP and the B.C. Attorney General. He writes for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.
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