espionage
After Suspected Tajik Terrorist Arrests,Little-Known Biden Border Entry Program Demands Hard Focus
From Todd Bensman as published June 20, 2024 in The Daily Wire
The ‘CBP One’ phone app entry scheme has brought in 888 other Tajiks, plus thousands more, from nations of terrorism concern
A multi-state FBI counterterrorism wiretap sting has rolled up eight Tajikistani nationals in three cities who had entered over the U.S. Southwest Border and were plotting some sort of bombing.
On its own, what little is known about this terrible new consequence of President Joe Biden’s ongoing historic mass migration border crisis – a coordinated, large-cell infiltration attack on the homeland – ranked as startling enough to draw congressional demands for much more basic information than the administration will currently release.
“Unfortunately, the unacceptable security failures that have allowed individuals with terrorist ties to enter the United States through the Southwest Border have become an alarming pattern under the administration,” states a recent U.S. House Homeland Security Committee letter demanding the Biden administration disclose how it failed here.
Not yet demanded, however, is attention to a recent revelation about the Tajik Eight case that should propel what is happening at the border to an even higher and broader level of national security concern. NBC News has reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), of all agencies, actually vetted and pre-approved the entry of at least one of the busted Tajikistanis on the administration’s “CBP One” phone app — a humanitarian parole scheme.
The CBP One phone app-based entry program has allowed more than 500,000 foreign nationals from 100 different countries who intended to illegally cross the border to instead schedule a DHS-approved “legal” escort through eight U.S.-Mexico land ports, according to information exclusively obtained and reported by the Center for Immigration Studies through Freedom of Information Act litigation over the past year.
The Biden administration began piloting the program in May 2021 but dramatically expanded it in January 2023, it said, as a means to clear politically damaging illegal entry border congestion.
Almost all 500,000, we are assured, were supposedly well vetted for security, then granted quick release into the United States, sight unseen, on two-year, renewable permits that also come with work authorization eligibility.
But the NBC revelation that one or more of the arrested Tajiks used the CBP One land ports entry scheme warrants new scrutiny about that land port pipeline into the country. It poses a unique national security risk, quite separate from traditional illegal border crossings, especially the vetting that is supposedly done byDHS before passage is granted.
In this case, the vetting obviously didn’t work.. But for how many others did the vetting system not work? The odds do not look promising.
It turns out that DHS personnel have approved not one or two problematic Tajiks of malintent for passage, but hundreds from that Muslim-majority country of U.S. terrorism concern over the past couple of years – and literally thousands from some two dozen other nations of terrorism concern, according to an analysis of the center’s FOIA lawsuit data on this program.
From its May 2021 inception through at least December 2023, DHS approved 888 Tajiks for land port passage and release into the country on the two-year humanitarian parole releases, no doubt many more during the first half of 2024.
And they are the least of a rich diversity of foreign nationals from two dozen nations of terrorism concern that the administration has wittingly allowed through the pipeline.
Thousands More Approved For Entry
The historical context as a homeland security matter for these entries is important to know. To reduce the risk of terrorist border infiltration a few years after 9/11, the U.S. homeland security enterprise began tagging those arriving from some 35-40 nations where Islamic terrorist groups operate as “special interest aliens,” or SIAs, which flagged them for detention and additional security vetting. The Biden administration now uses the term “special interest migrants” internally.
SIAs are not regarded as terrorists but, because they arrive from nations where avowed anti-U.S. terrorist groups are prevalent, homeland security protocols dating back to a 2004 CBP Memorandum required extra security procedures for those coming from the designated list of countries. Tajikistan has been on that list from the beginning.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. November 1, 2004.
In addition to the 888 Tajiks allowed in through the CBP One app program, DHS has authorized thousands more from 24 special interest countries to enter, including from Afghanistan (653), and smatterings from Iran (27), Lebanon (10), Syria (7), Iraq (4), Egypt (6), and Jordan (5). But the largest numbers of SIAs let in are coming from other Muslim-majority former Soviet republics in Central Asia neighboring Tajikistan, such as Kyrgyzstan (4,224 through December), Uzbekistan (2,071), and Kazakhstan (585).
The terrorism section of the CIA’s “World Factbook” notes that U.S.-designated foreign terrorist groups have long operated in the dangerous neighborhood that all three of the most numerous of the SIAs hail from: the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan is in the same tough neighborhood.
Among the groups operating in those three countries are the Islamic Jihad Union, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K). But there are many other extremist groups operating in the region too, such as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan and various ISIS-affiliated groups the government has suppressed, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 Country Report on Terrorism for Tajikistan, and who might want to flee to the United States.
The same report notes that terrorist group members move throughout the mostly unguarded borders of these countries, with Tajikistan asserting that “thousands of militants” come and go from neighboring Afghanistan.
As one indication of public sentiment toward Islamic extremist ideology in the Kyrgyz Republic, an estimated 850 of its citizens reportedly joined ISIS between 2013 and 2015, and regional scholars insist the real number is higher, according to George Washington University’s Program on Extremism.
Uzbekistan also has figured prominently in global counterterrorism efforts, in part because the internationally designated terrorist organization known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has had regional and global reach and regularly conducts attacks. Extremists from Uzbekistan have been implicated in U.S. attacks and plots too. Hundreds of Uzbeks also fought for ISIS and many have returned.
At issue with the entry of one or more of the Tajik Eight, along with the thousands of other government-authorized entries of SIAs, is whether the Biden administration’s DHS is conducting effective enhanced security screening.
Failing Security Screening
DHS Secretary Alejandra Mayorkas has repeatedly assured the American public that security vetting for this program is its highlight.
DHS policy documents say all approved CBP One applicants pass “rigorous biometric and biographic national security and public safety screening and vetting.”
CBP agents and U.S. processors, however, mainly run this information through criminal and domestic national security databases looking for matches to U.S. criminal records, warrants, and terrorism watch lists, those who do this work say. A DHS source with direct knowledge of government vetting processes for the CBP One land port parole program, who was not authorized to speak or be identified, told me last fall that all of the SIAs going through the CBP One appointment and parole at the land ports are run through more databases than non-SIA applicants — these ones containing classified intelligence information — as a means to detect terrorism problems.
But this vetting process is deeply flawed, experts say, because of a presumption that only fractional few real terrorists ever make intelligence databases. Database checks can’t detect information that is not in them.
“The only thing we can query is information that we have,” former FBI Director James Comey once said of vetting foreign national refugees. “So, if we have no information on someone, they’ve never crossed our radar screen, they’ve never been a ripple in the pond, there will be no record of them there and so it will be challenging.”
Neither can U.S. intelligence agencies very well check for derogatory information with governments that are diplomatically hostile to the United States and would never cooperate, such as Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan.
Pertinent Questions
“That’s a really hard target to analyze, and to just shoot from the hip and let them in is absolute insanity in my book,” said James G. Conway, a retired FBI counterterrorism agent who after 9/11 worked in Mexico trying to detect terrorists within the SIA flows. “How would you knowingly and wittingly bring people from terrorist countries into the United States with that level of vetting? Some of these terrorism countries don’t even have an electric grid let alone a computer system, and you can’t scrub them on databases that don’t exist. The whole thing is insane to me.
“What’s the motivation? I mean, why would they do that?” Conway added, referencing the Biden administration’s approval of SIAs for the CBP One entry program.
That’s a pertinent question that lawmakers, media pundits, and reporters might start asking before there’s blood in American streets.
Censorship Industrial Complex
How the UK and Canada Are Leading the West’s Descent into Digital Authoritarianism
“Big Brother is watching you.” These chilling words from George Orwell’s dystopian masterpiece, 1984, no longer read as fiction but are becoming a bleak reality in the UK and Canada—where digital dystopian measures are unravelling the fabric of freedom in two of the West’s oldest democracies.
Under the guise of safety and innovation, the UK and Canada are deploying invasive tools that undermine privacy, stifle free expression, and foster a culture of self-censorship. Both nations are exporting their digital control frameworks through the Five Eyes alliance, a covert intelligence-sharing network uniting the UK, Canada, US, Australia, and New Zealand, established during the Cold War. Simultaneously, their alignment with the United Nations’ Agenda 2030, particularly Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.9—which mandates universal legal identity by 2030—supports a global policy for digital IDs, such as the UK’s proposed Brit Card and Canada’s Digital Identity Program, which funnel personal data into centralized systems under the pretext of “efficiency and inclusion.” By championing expansive digital regulations, such as the UK’s Online Safety Act and Canada’s pending Bill C-8, which prioritize state-defined “safety” over individual liberties, both nations are not just embracing digital authoritarianism—they’re accelerating the West’s descent into it.
The UK’s digital dragnet
The United Kingdom has long positioned itself as a global leader in surveillance. The British spy agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), runs the formerly-secret mass surveillance programme, code-named Tempora, operational since 2011, which intercepts and stores vast amounts of global internet and phone traffic by tapping into transatlantic fibre-optic cables. Knowledge of its existence only came about in 2013, thanks to the bombshell documents leaked by the former National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence contractor and whistleblower, Edward Snowden. “It’s not just a US problem. The UK has a huge dog in this fight,” Snowden told the Guardian in a June 2013 report. “They [GCHQ] are worse than the US.”
Following that, is the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016, also dubbed the “Snooper’s Charter,” which mandates that internet service providers store users’ browsing histories, emails, texts, and phone calls for up to a year. Government agencies, including police and intelligence services (like MI5, MI6, and GCHQ) can access this data without a warrant in many cases, enabling bulk collection of communications metadata. This has been criticized for enabling mass surveillance on a scale that invades everyday privacy.
Recent expansions under the Online Safety Act (OSA) further empower authorities to demand backdoors in encrypted apps like WhatsApp, potentially scanning private messages for vaguely defined “harmful” content—a move critics like Big Brother Watch, a privacy advocacy group, decry as a gateway to mass surveillance. The OSA, which received Royal Assent on October 26, 2023, represents a sprawling piece of legislation by the UK government to regulate online content and “protect” users, particularly children, from “illegal and harmful material.” Implemented in phases by Ofcom, the UK’s communications watchdog, it imposes duties on a vast array of internet services, including social media, search engines, messaging apps, gaming platforms, and sites with user-generated content forcing compliance through risk assessments and hefty fines. By July 2025, the OSA was considered “fully in force” for most major provisions. This sweeping regime, aligned with global surveillance trends via Agenda 2030’s push for digital control, threatens to entrench a state-sanctioned digital dragnet, prioritizing “safety” over fundamental freedoms.
Elon Musk’s platform X has warned that the act risks “seriously infringing” on free speech, with the threat of fines up to £18 million or 10% of global annual turnover for non-compliance, encouraging platforms to censor legitimate content to avoid punishment. Musk took to X to express his personal view on the act’s true purpose: “suppression of the people.”
In late September, Imgur (an image-hosting platform popular for memes and shared media) made the decision to block UK users rather than comply with the OSA’s stringent regulations. This underscores the chilling effect such laws can have on digital freedom.
The act’s stated purpose is to make the UK “the safest place in the world to be online.” However, critics argue it’s a brazen power grab by the UK government to increase censorship and surveillance, all the while masquerading as a noble crusade to “protect” users.
Another pivotal development is the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 (DUAA), which received Royal Assent in June. This wide-ranging legislation streamlines data protection rules to boost economic growth and public services but at the cost of privacy safeguards. It allows broader data sharing among government agencies and private entities, including for AI-driven analytics. For instance, it enables “smart data schemes” where personal information from banking, energy, and telecom sectors can be accessed more easily, seemingly for consumer benefits like personalized services—but raising fears of unchecked profiling.
Cybersecurity enhancements further expand the UK’s pervasive surveillance measures. The forthcoming Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, announced in the July 2024 King’s Speech and slated for introduction by year’s end, expands the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations to critical infrastructure, mandating real-time threat reporting and government access to systems. This builds on existing tools like facial recognition technology, deployed extensively in public spaces. In 2025, trials in cities like London have integrated AI cameras that scan crowds in real-time, linking to national databases for instant identification—evoking a biometric police state.
Source: BBC News
The New York Times reported: “British authorities have also recently expanded oversight of online speech, tried weakening encryption and experimented with artificial intelligence to review asylum claims. The actions, which have accelerated under Prime Minister Keir Starmer with the goal of addressing societal problems, add up to one of the most sweeping embraces of digital surveillance and internet regulation by a Western democracy.”
Compounding this, UK police arrest over 30 people a day for “offensive” tweets and online messages, per The Times, often under vague laws, fuelling justifiable fears of Orwell’s thought police.
Yet, of all the UK’s digital dystopian measures, none has ignited greater fury than Prime Minister Starmer’s mandatory “Brit Card” digital ID—a smartphone-based system effectively turning every citizen into a tracked entity.
First announced on September 4, as a tool to “tackle illegal immigration and strengthen border security,” but rapidly the Brit Card’s scope ballooned through function-creep to envelop everyday essentials like welfare, banking and public access. These IDs, stored on smartphones containing sensitive data like photos, names, dates of birth, nationalities, and residency status, are sold “as the front door to all kinds of everyday tasks,” a vision championed by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change— and echoed by Work and Pensions Secretary Liz Kendall MP in her October 13 parliamentary speech.
Source: TheBritishIntel
This digital shackles system has sparked fierce resistance across the UK. A scathing letter, led by independent MP Rupert Lowe and endorsed by nearly 40 MPs from diverse parties, denounces the government’s proposed mandatory “Brit Card” digital ID as “dangerous, intrusive, and profoundly un-British.” Conservative MP David Davis issued a stark warning, declaring that such systems “are profoundly dangerous to the privacy and fundamental freedoms of the British people.” On X, Davis amplified his critique, citing a £14m fine imposed on Capita after hackers breached pension savers’ personal data, writing: “This is another perfect example of why the government’s digital ID cards are a terrible idea.” By early October, a petition opposing the proposal had garnered over 2.8 million signatures, reflecting widespread public outcry. The government, however, dismissed these objections, stating, “We will introduce a digital ID within this Parliament to address illegal migration, streamline access to government services, and improve efficiency. We will consult on details soon.”
Canada’s surveillance surge
Across the Atlantic, Canada’s surveillance surge under Prime Minister Mark Carney—former Bank of England head and World Economic Forum board member—mirrors the UK’s dystopian trajectory. Carney, with his globalist agenda, has overseen a slew of bills that prioritize “security” over sovereignty. Take Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Customs Act, introduced June 17, 2025, which enables warrantless data access at borders and sharing with U.S. authorities via CLOUD Act (Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act) pacts—essentially handing Canadian citizens’ digital lives to foreign powers. Despite public backlash prompting proposed amendments in October, its core—enhanced monitoring of transactions and exports—remains ripe for abuse.
Complementing this, Bill C-8, first introduced June 18, 2025, amends the Telecommunications Act to impose cybersecurity mandates on critical sectors like telecoms and finance. It empowers the government to issue secret orders compelling companies to install backdoors or weaken encryption, potentially compromising user security. These orders can mandate the cutoff of internet and telephone services to specified individuals without the need for a warrant or judicial oversight, under the vague premise of securing the system against “any threat.”
Opposition to this bill has been fierce. In a parliamentary speech Canada’s Conservative MP Matt Strauss, decried the bill’s sections 15.1 and 15.2 as granting “unprecedented, incredible power” to the government. He warned of a future where individuals could be digitally exiled—cut off from email, banking, and work—without explanation or recourse, likening it to a “digital gulag.”
Source: Video shared by Andrew Bridgen
The Canadian Constitution Foundation (CCF) and privacy advocates have echoed these concerns, arguing that the bill’s ambiguous language and lack of due process violate fundamental Charter rights, including freedom of expression, liberty, and protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
Bill C-8 complements the Online Harms Act (Bill C-63), first introduced in February 2024, which demanded platforms purge content like child exploitation and hate speech within 24 hours, risking censorship with vague “harmful” definitions. Inspired by the UK’s OSA and EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA), C-63 collapsed amid fierce backlash for its potential to enable censorship, infringe on free speech, and lack of due process. The CCF and Pierre Poilievre, calling it “woke authoritarianism,” led a 2024 petition with 100,000 signatures. It died during Parliament’s January 2025 prorogation after Justin Trudeau’s resignation.
These bills build on an alarming precedent: during the COVID era, Canada’s Public Health Agency admitted to tracking 33 million devices during lockdown—nearly the entire population—under the pretext of public health, a blatant violation exposed only through persistent scrutiny. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), empowered by the longstanding Bill C-59, continues bulk metadata collection, often without adequate oversight. These measures are not isolated; they stem from a deeper rot, where pandemic-era controls have been normalized into everyday policy.
Canada’s Digital Identity Program, touted as a “convenient” tool for seamless access to government services, emulates the UK’s Brit Card and aligns with UN Agenda 2030’s SDG 16.9. It remains in active development and piloting phases, with full national rollout projected for 2027–2028.
“The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” Orwell’s 1984 warns we must urgently resist this descent into digital authoritarianism—through petitions, protests, and demands for transparency—before a Western Great Firewall is erected, replicating China’s stranglehold that polices every keystroke and thought.
If you find value in the work I do, please consider a paid subscription or make a one-off donation.
Britain’s most consequential espionage scandal in a generation has narrowed on Keir Starmer’s inner cabinet after The Sunday Times revealed that alleged Chinese agent Christopher Berry was intercepted at Heathrow Airport with a “suitcase full of cash” — and that senior officials, including National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell and Cabinet Secretary Christopher Wormald, held a closed-door meeting, allegedly discussing that advancing the case would harm relations with Beijing, weeks before prosecutors abandoned the insider-threat file.
The revelations, combined with an explosive Opposition letter from Kemi Badenoch and a rare diplomatic intervention from Washington, have plunged Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s government into the most serious national-security controversy of its tenure — one now shaking both Westminster and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Not since the Kim Philby affair and the exposure of the Cambridge Spy Ring has a British government been so roiled by allegations of insider compromise and appeasement toward a hostile foreign state.
As The Sunday Times reported, Christopher Berry — a 33-year-old academic from Oxfordshire — was stopped under the Terrorism and Border Security Act after a February 2023 flight from China. Police seized £4,000 in cash, believed to have been supplied by his Chinese handler, codenamed “Alex,” linked to the Ministry of State Security.
A witness statement tabled in Parliament last week indicated that Berry funnelled real-time political intelligence through his MSS handler to one of Beijing’s senior leaders, all collected from a former Chinese teaching colleague — a Parliamentary researcher with deep access to senior Conservative MPs. Beijing reportedly viewed those MPs as a strategic threat, fearing that if they rose to higher office they would adopt a far stricter stance toward China’s geopolitical ambitions.
Though Berry was not detained at the time, the incident became central to the espionage case later dropped by the Crown Prosecution Service when the Starmer government declined to certify that China posed an “ongoing threat to national security” — a legal requirement under the Official Secrets Act.
The Sunday Times also revealed that Deputy National Security Adviser Matthew Collins, the government’s sole witness, privately acknowledged that the decision not to describe China as an “ongoing threat” was “political.” The paper further disclosed that Jonathan Powell — a former banking executive who rose to become Starmer’s National Security Adviser — chaired a meeting on September 1 attended by Cabinet Secretary Christopher Wormald and MI5 Director-General Sir Ken McCallum, in which “the general theme of discussion was how the UK’s relationship with China was going to be damaged by this case.”
If accurate, that account directly contradicts Starmer’s assurance to Parliament that “no minister or special adviser was involved.” The implication — that Britain’s most senior national-security officials were weighing diplomatic consequences while an active espionage prosecution was still underway — has intensified accusations that the case was derailed by political interference rather than evidentiary weakness.
Within hours of the Sunday Times story, Opposition Leader Kemi Badenoch posted a letter to X accusing Keir Starmer of misleading Parliament and concealing ministerial involvement in the case’s collapse.
Framing the letter, Badenoch sought to explain the rapidly evolving affair to a wider audience. “I don’t blame you if you’ve struggled to follow the China spying case engulfing Parliament. Even MPs are finding it hard to keep up with a story that seems to change by the hour,” she wrote. “I suspect many fair-minded people have assumed this story can’t contain much. It seems too implausible for the government to have deliberately let off people who were accused of spying on MPs. But the story is truly astonishing. The layers of it have unravelled over the past few weeks like something from a spy novel.”
In the letter itself, Badenoch demands full disclosure of all correspondence, meetings, and witness-statement revisions involving Jonathan Powell, the Attorney General, or the Cabinet Office. She references the Sunday Times account directly, noting that “Powell left attendees with the understanding that Deputy National Security Adviser Collins’s witness statement would operate within the language of the report,” implying foreknowledge and coordination between Downing Street and prosecutors. She further alleges that Starmer’s ministers “softened” later witness statements to downplay Chinese espionage, replacing hard intelligence assessments with diplomatic phrasing designed to reassure Beijing. Her conclusion is cutting: “You have shown Britain is weak in the face of espionage, and have emboldened our enemies to believe they can spy on us with impunity.”
As reported previously by The Bureau, the controversy has now drawn international concern. The Chair of the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, John Moolenaar, has issued an extraordinary public rebuke on the court matter — a move almost without precedent between close allies. In a two-page letter dated October 16, 2025, addressed to James Roscoe, chargé d’affaires at the British Embassy in Washington, Moolenaar warned that Britain’s decision to abandon the prosecution risked setting “a dangerous precedent that foreign adversaries can target democratically elected legislators with impunity.” He wrote that the decision “deeply troubles” U.S. lawmakers and “undermines Five Eyes security coordination,” given the substantial amount of evidence against Berry and Christopher Cash, who were accused of funnelling parliamentary intelligence to the Chinese Communist Party.
“I hope the UK government will not allow this case to falter,” Moolenaar said, “and will instead take the steps necessary to ensure that both justice and due process are served.”
The letter, co-signed by senior members of the Committee and publicly released by Congress, marks an exceptional public intervention in a live national-security case involving a Five Eyes partner. Moolenaar added that the decision to drop the prosecution — despite evidence confirming a direct intelligence channel from Westminster to Beijing — “paints a concerning picture,” noting the resumption of high-level UK–China trade talks, negotiations over China’s proposed “super embassy” in London, and London’s ongoing review of its diplomatic posture toward Beijing. “Allowing this PRC aggression to go unchecked,” he warned, “would only incentivize the CCP to further interfere in Western democracies.”
As The Bureau previously detailed, Matthew Collins’s witness statement traced an intelligence pipeline connecting Westminster directly to Beijing’s leadership. Berry, via his handler “Alex,” transmitted reports obtained from Christopher Cash, a parliamentary aide with access to Conservative MPs critical of Beijing. Collins confirmed that some of the same intelligence later appeared in the possession of a senior CCP Politburo Standing Committee member — reportedly Cai Qi, one of Xi Jinping’s closest allies. Collins also documented Beijing’s targeted inquiries into the 2022 Conservative leadership race, focusing on Tom Tugendhat and Neil O’Brien, both members of the China Research Group (CRG) and long-standing critics of the CCP.
Taken together, the Heathrow cash seizure, the Powell-chaired meeting, the Badenoch letter, and the U.S. congressional intervention point to a modern Cold War crisis — a confrontation that has now moved beyond Westminster to test the cohesion of the Western alliance itself.
The Bureau is a reader-supported publication.
To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Bank of Canada governor warns citizens to anticipate lower standard of living
The era of Climate Change Alarmism is over
B.C. government laid groundwork for turning private property into Aboriginal land
From Underdog to Top Broodmare
-
Agriculture18 hours agoDanish Cows Collapsing Under Mandatory Methane-Reducing Additive
-
Bruce Dowbiggin2 days agoA Story So Good Not Even The Elbows Up Crew Could Ruin It
-
Alberta2 days agoCanada’s heavy oil finds new fans as global demand rises
-
Daily Caller1 day agoTrump Reportedly Planning Ground Troops, Drone Strikes On Cartels In Mexico
-
Health2 days agoRFK Jr’s argument for studying efficacy of various vaccines
-
Addictions2 days agoThe War on Commonsense Nicotine Regulation
-
Business1 day agoTrump’s Tariffs Have Not Caused Economy To Collapse
-
Business2 days agoCarney government should retire misleading ‘G7’ talking point on economic growth